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Abstract
The subject of this study is the influence of favourable exogenous shocks on the 
structure of prices and output composition in small open economies. The study is 
based, theoretically, on the Dutch Disease theory; and, empirically, on research 
conducted on Jordan.
Under general equilibrium conditions, a boom in a traded sector is likely to 
produce a contraction of output and employment in non-booming traded sectors - 
de-industrialisation. This is the essence of the Dutch disease theory, its conclusions 
valid only within its particular set of assumptions about factor-market underpinnings 
of the model, including macro-equilibrium and full employment, fixed national 
stock of labour and capital, and perfect capital markets; and unchanging technical 
conditions of production. Furthermore, changes in the structure of demand that 
underlie the process of industrialisation are ignored, as the model assumes growth, 
other than that generated by the windfall gain, away.
The present study contests this analytical approach, and offers an alternative 
that considers initial conditions of disequilibrium and conducts dynamic analysis to 
show the effects of demand expansion, with its disproportionately large stimulus to 
manufacturing, on these conditions. Demand-led output growth combined with 
supply-side changes induced by booming conditions leads to rapid productivity 
growth in manufacturing, by both increasing production efficiency and inducing 
technological advance. The outcome of these inter-linked supply-demand changes is 
an acceleration of industrialisation. The study thus presents an antithesis to the 
Dutch disease hypothesis.
After an overview of the Dutch disease theory, the study discusses the 
necessary modifications when certain characteristics of industrialising economies 
are taken into consideration. The focus of the analysis is the Dutch disease theory's 
assumptions, its level of abstraction, and the static nature of its analysis. Various 
countries1 experience of booms are presented to show that the outcome of sectoral 
shifts is crucially dependent on the pre-boom economic conditions; and thus to 
show also that boom experiences of industrial and industrialising economies differ 
considerably.
The discussion of Jordan starts by outlining that country's historical 
experience of sectoral shifts. The counterfactual to the Dutch disease is established 
with the aid of trend analysis, and it is shown that at the end of the boom, the share
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in aggregate output of agriculture was smaller, and that of manufacturing larger, 
than 'expected' from historical trends. Dutch disease analysis is used to show that 
resource mobility and the spending effect have induced currency appreciation, as 
would have been predicted by the theory. Contrary to the theory's predictions, 
however, the examination of the commodity trade balance reveals significant 
growth in agricultural and manufacturing exports during the boom. The study then 
examines the reasons behind the discrepancy between the theory and this empirical 
observation.
The performance of agriculture and manufacturing are examined separately. 
In both sectors booming conditions brought about rapid technological advance 
which expanded profits in these sectors. In addition, the disproportionately large 
demand for manufactured goods, both for consumption and investment, led to a 
rapid expansion of this sector's share in aggregate output; which was compensated 
for by a decline in that of agriculture. Seen in this light, the decline in the share of 
agriculture was a manifestation of successful industrialisation, rather than the Dutch 
disease effect.
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CHAPTER I  
Introduction
16
The subject of this study is the influence of favourable exogenous shocks 
(henceforth booms) on the structure of prices and output composition in small open 
industrialising economies. The theoretical starting point of this study is the Dutch 
Disease theory as developed by Corden and Neary (1982), and Corden (1983; 
1984); research on Jordan constitutes its empirical basis. The study thus extends the 
empirical literature on booming sector economics.
The Dutch disease theory is built on a general equilibrium model. As such, 
it exploits the dual relationship between factor endowment and mobility and 
commodity output, on the one hand, and commodity prices and factor prices, on the 
other. The focus of the theory is a boom's effect on profitability and the size of the 
manufacturing sector. Specifically, the theory predicts a pull of resources from non­
booming sectors, both traded and non-traded, to the booming sector where factor 
productivity has risen - the resource movement - and a further pull of resources 
from the traded sector into the non-traded sector, where output prices have risen - 
the spending effect. Combined, these two processes produce de-industrialisation.
This type of analysis was prompted by the experience of Holland with the 
Schlochteren natural gas discoveries in the sixties, which allegedly led to a 
contraction of manufacturing output and employment. Wider application of the 
theory ensued from the oil-price rises in the seventies which constituted a 
favourable exogenous shock to a large number of economies, both already 
industrial and newly industrialising. Whilst this application conveys an acceptance 
of the theoretical construct of the Dutch disease, empirically the theory showed 
weak explanatory power of most of these experiences. Yet this finding has not 
prompted serious criticism of the Dutch disease theory; nor, as a consequence, have 
alternative approaches been developed for the analysis of booms.
The foregoing makes clear the raison d'etre of the present study; it 
establishes the analytical aspects necessary for the study of booming industrialising 
economies, either by elaborating the Dutch disease theory itself, or by conducting a 
different type of analysis altogether. Empirically, the study documents an era of 
rapid sectoral shifts in the economic history of Jordan. It should be noted that this 
study is positive, not normative. It provides some of the positive analysis required 
for the full normative analysis of policies used by industrialising economies 
benefiting from favourable exogenous shocks.
Critique of the Dutch disease theory has generally centred around two 
issues, both of which are driven by normative concerns. First, the short-to-medium 
term, one-period nature of its analysis does not accommodate important
17
intertemporal issues of adjustment. In most economies that benefit from favourable 
exogenous shocks, the cost of adjustment to non-booming conditions has proven to 
be quite high. This is especially true if the boom is transient, and the economy 
adjusts fully to the boom, as recommended by Dutch disease theorists. Second, the 
Dutch disease theory models private agents' behaviour only, while a significant 
proportion of the boom windfall revenue accrues to the public sector. This 
constitutes a serious oversight given that government action can influence resource 
allocation both directly, through investment and spending behaviour, and indirectly, 
through fiscal and monetary policies. In the context specifically of developing 
economies, the theory has also been critiqued for its full employment assumption, 
whereas most developing economies are likely to have an excess supply of labour in 
the pre-boom period, which can neutralise the resource movement effect on de­
industrialisation.
In addition to lending support to this critique with empirical analysis, the 
present study extends the Dutch disease critique into two main analytical areas: 
dynamic analysis, and the effect of changes in the structure of demand on sectoral 
output. The static nature of Dutch disease analysis does not take into consideration 
the effect of productivity growth on resource allocation and, consequently, on the 
structure of production. Bearing in mind that productivity differentials between 
sectors are the main cause, on the supply side, of sectoral shifts over time, to ignore 
productivity growth is a serious omission from the Dutch disease model. Similarly 
on the demand side, changes in the demand vector, which might be induced by the 
booming conditions, would directly change the structure of production. Demand 
patterns can change in three ways during a boom (bear in mind here that the 
discussion concerns industrialising economies). First, and perhaps most important, 
the share of manufactured goods in total expenditure tends to grow, as per capita 
income rises, at the expense of that of agricultural commodities. Second, 
expenditure on investment goods rises as economic activity increases, which 
benefits the manufacturing sector. Third, demand for the country's exports may 
change if the boom is regional, as was the case for many Middle East economies.
It should be noted that the demand aspect of the critique becomes important 
only when dynamic aspects of growth and structural change are taken into 
consideration. Otherwise, such changes would produce the same results as the 
Dutch disease model since the only important variable in such a case would be the 
new structure of prices. Any change in demand for tradeables can be met through 
imports, whose prices are lower under booming conditions than otherwise.
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The elaboration of these points of critique in the body of the thesis 
establishes an alternative analytical approach to the Dutch disease theory. The new 
approach has four main strands. First, it challenges the Dutch disease theory's 
assumptions about factor-market underpinnings of the model - macro-equilibrium 
with full employment and perfect factor markets, and fixed national stock of labour 
and capital; and about the immutability of technical conditions of production. 
Second, it uses the two main analytical tools of the Dutch disease model, namely 
the spending effect and the resource movement, to examine the boom effect on 
altering relative prices. Third, taking into consideration the new structure of prices 
and of demand, productivity analysis is conducted to show the effect of booming 
conditions on changing the technical conditions of production. And fourth, it 
analyses profitability in tradeables.
There are eight chapters. After this introduction, chapter two establishes the 
analytical framework for the rest of the study. Starting from the conclusions of the 
Dutch disease theory, the chapter discusses the modifications needed when certain 
characteristics of industrialising economies are taken into considerations. The focus 
of the analysis is the assumptions of the model, its level of abstraction and the static 
nature of its analysis. The dynamics of productivity change constitute a pervasive 
element that in some ways links these three aspects of the critique.
Historical and contemporary experiences of booms are presented in chapter 
three. Two types of booms are considered: those arising from a new discovery of a 
natural resource, and those from a favourable change in the resource price. In the 
former case the resource movement dominates, and in the latter the spending effect 
does. A distinction is made between permanent and transitory booms on the 
grounds that they require different levels of adjustment. The chapter brings out the 
main difference between industrial and industrialising economies, with regard to the 
boom's effect on the structure of production. Emphasis is placed on how economic 
conditions preceding a boom may differ, including the level of per capita income 
and the degree of industrialisation; the economy's position on the business cycle; 
and the existence of constraints in capital markets. The problem of the 
counterfactual is also discussed: since all economies go through sectoral shifts 
continuously, attributing change in sectoral shares to the Dutch disease effect is not 
justifiable unless the counterfactual has been established. A similar problem arises 
with macro-economic policies: where the policy counterfactual is not established, 
the debate on the Dutch disease effect remains inconclusive.
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Chapter four starts the discussion of the Jordanian economy by outlining its 
growth and structural change over 1921-1992. The analysis is done within a time­
frame composed of three distinct periods, determined mainly by exogenous shocks. 
An effort is made to incorporate demand-side factors in the analysis of sectoral 
shifts in order to redress the balance of the Dutch disease supply-side analysis. 
Factor input and output growth are compared to test whether or not productivity 
change has contributed to the growth of the Jordanian economy. Particular 
emphasis is placed on labour, which constitutes the mobile resource in the Dutch 
disease model for Jordan. The role of the government in influencing sectoral shifts 
in favour of productive sectors is brought to the fore. Factors underlying the 
atypical structure of production in Jordan, with a disproportionately large share of 
service sectors, are studied. Finally, the Dutch disease counterfactual is established 
with the aid of trend analysis.
Because Jordan does not produce the natural resource - oil - that was 
responsible for its booming conditions in the seventies, a case needs to be made for 
the use of Dutch disease theory at all in an analysis of Jordan's economic history. 
This is done in chapter five in two steps. First, it is shown that the sudden inflow of 
Arab aid and workers' remittances in the wake of the 1970s oil booms constituted a 
favourable exogenous shock. Second, I demonstrate that through the spending effect 
and resource mobility the effects of foreign exchange inflows were fully transmitted 
to the economy; and that change in the structure of prices was as would have been 
predicted by the Dutch disease model. Comparisons with other industrialising 
countries, themselves oil producers already discussed in the Dutch disease 
literature, are made to strengthen further the case for the appropriateness of the 
model in Jordan's case. The commodity trade balance is examined next to show 
whether or not in the process of adjustment to the boom a deterioration in this 
balance occurred.
Chapters six and seven examine the respective performance of agriculture 
and manufacturing during the boom. The sequence of analysis followed in both 
chapters is as follows. The sectors' growth and contribution to output and 
employment over time are examined to show whether or not performance during 
the boom was different from what would have been predicted on the basis of 
historically observed patterns. Trends in output, import substitution and export 
growth are established to show the effect of changes in domestic demand and trade 
on the structure of production. Factor input (land, capital and labour for 
agriculture, and capital and labour for manufacturing) and output growth are
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compared to see whether productivity growth has been significant in changing the 
sectors' growth and contribution to aggregate output. The effect of changes in 
output prices, factor cost and productivity on profitability are analysed in two ways: 
indirectly, by constructing profitability indexes and examining their trends over 
time; and directly, by examining actual profitability accounts from financial 
records, where available. The analysis is done at the enterprise level in agriculture 
(fruit, vegetables, wheat, etc.) and at both two-digit manufacturing industries and 
firm-level in manufacturing. In constructing profitability indexes a new 
methodology is presented which improves on traditional Dutch disease measures in 
two ways, firstly by considering the structure of production cost in each industry 
(factor prices are weighted by the factor's share in total production cost); and 
secondly by accounting for the effect of productivity growth on changing unit costs. 
The latter aspect gives these profitability indexes a dynamic quality.
Although the main outline for the analysis of agriculture and manufacturing 
is similar, the analytical treatment of each sector differs considerably, and follows 
mainly from the technology of production in each sector. For example, whilst the 
main source of technological change in manufacturing is equipment and machinery, 
the same is not true in agriculture where agrochemicals can be more instrumental 
than tractors in inducing technological advance. Also, where land is a major factor 
input in agricultural production, the same is not true for manufacturing. The 
complementarity between investment in equipment - irrigation - and in new material 
inputs does not have exact parallels in manufacturing. Nor does the effect of 
irrigation on expanding the land frontier - by allowing double cropping - which 
increases total factor input. On the other hand, the presence of dynamic economies 
of scale in manufacturing, and their apparent absence in agriculture, considerably 
changes the effect of factor input on output growth between the two sectors.
Finally, it is important to note the complications arising from the 
differential effects of a rise in per capita income on the demand for agricultural and 
manufacturing commodities. As the rise in per capita income induced by the boom 
reduces the share in total expenditure of agricultural commodities and increases that 
of manufacturing, it is expected that resources will be drawn from agriculture to 
manufacturing. It follows that the interpretation of a change in each sector's share 
in total output and employment is different. In manufacturing, a decline is attributed 
to the Dutch disease effect and a rise to successful industrialisation. In agriculture, a 
decline could be the result either of the Dutch disease effect or of successful
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industrialisation. It follows that the interpretation of agriculture's performance 
during the boom remains problematical.
22
CHAPTER II
Favourable Exogenous Shocks in Small Open Economies 
A Theoretical Framework
23
Introduction
This chapter outlines the Dutch disease theory and presents my critique of it. 
Together, these form the analytical framework of this study. My critique 
constitutes the main burden of this thesis, in which lies its originality, and thus the 
contribution of my work to an understanding of favourable exogenous shocks in 
industrialising economies.
The theoretical literature on booming sectors is quite extensive, and since the 
aim of this study is to redress the balance on the empirical side, only those aspects 
of the theory that are highly relevant to applied studies are presented here. 
Reference to more elaborate theoretical work will be made when appropriate.
The Dutch disease theory is a comparative statics model that assesses the 
general equilibrium effect of a favourable exogenous shock (henceforth boom) in a 
small open economy. More specifically, the theory examines how the boom alters 
the structure of prices and output composition; and, more specifically still, how 
and why profits in manufacturing diminish in such circumstances. The theory 
relates, on the one hand, factor mobility and sectoral output with, on the other, 
factor and output prices; and predicts that, given a fixed national stock of capital 
and labour, a boom will create a pull on the mobile resource used in other sectors 
and thus crowds out their output. This is called the resource movement effect. In 
addition, when income gained from the boom is spent on non-traded goods, output 
prices and, accordingly, profitability rises in that sector, relative to the traded 
goods sector. More resources are drawn from the traded sector, further crowding 
out its output. This is known as the spending effect. Combined, these two effects 
lead to a contraction of employment and output in the traded sector, known in the 
Dutch disease literature as de-industrialisation.
This type of analysis gives valuable insights to the mechanisms through 
which the boom effects are transmitted to the rest of the economy. However, the 
theory does not accurately predict the outcome of sectoral composition in booming 
industrialising economies. There are numerous reasons for this shortcoming, 
which can be related to three analytical aspects: the model’s assumptions; its level 
of abstraction; and the static nature of its analysis.
First, the theory assumes competitive product and factor markets and full 
employment, whereas a pre-boom industrialising economy may be quantity 
constrained in world and domestic capital markets. Low per capita income, 
combined with the unavailability of capital, increases the likelihood of slack labour 
markets. In this case, the resource movement, and maybe even the spending effect,
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need not take place. The theory also assumes technology to be given and 
unchanging, whereas greater capital availability under the boom, combined with a 
real appreciation, making capital and other imported inputs relatively cheap, can 
change the technology of production quite significantly in favour of pro­
industrialisation.
Second, in the model there are only optimising rational agents and no 
governments. Governments, however, generally loom large in these economies 
and by exercising their control over a significant share of the market are able to 
influence its behaviour markedly. Government's role becomes even more 
significant under booming conditions if it captures a large share of the windfall.
Third, the static nature of the model does not accommodate productivity 
growth and productivity differentials between sectors. These underly sectoral shifts 
over time in any economy, and become increasingly important in a booming 
economy when per capita income rises rapidly. This is especially true if the 
economy starts from low per capita income, excess capacity and backward 
technology. These three aspects will be discussed in more detail in the last section 
of this chapter.
The plan of this chapter is as follows. Section one is an empirical and 
theoretical background to the Dutch disease theory. Section two presents the core 
model of the Dutch disease, as developed by Corden and Neary (1982) and Corden 
(1983; 1984). Section three presents extensions to the core model, as developed by 
Corden (1984). Section four is the critique.
II. 1 An Empirical and Theoretical Background to the Dutch Disease Theory
The Dutch disease theory falls within a wider realm of literature on booming 
sectors, which itself draws on other trends in literature, namely: international trade 
theories; open economy macro-economics; and resource depletion. The focus of 
booming sector literature is the general equilibrium effects of a change in the price 
or availability of exportable natural resources. Specifically, discussion centres on 
how a favourable exogenous shock in one export sector changes intersectoral 
resource allocation in the economy, via relative price alterations; and what policy 
implications of such changes might be.
The empirical circumstances that prompted this type of literature go as far 
back as the 16^ century, when the sudden inflow of American precious metal into 
Spain left Spanish industries in disarray (Forsyth and Nicholas, 1983). Similar
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circumstances occurred in Australia, when the 19^ century gold discoveries led to 
a loss of competitiveness in Australia's more traditional agricultural exports and 
eventually to their decline (Cairnes, 1859). Two other mineral resource booms 
took place in Australia in this century; a major one in 1968-74 and a minor one in 
1978-82. Australia's latter experience with booms prompted an interesting 
theoretical debate between Gregory (1976) and Snape (1977). This debate formed 
the cornerstone of the Dutch disease model, itself developed a few years later by 
Corden and Neary (1982) and Corden (1983; 1984) to analyse Holland's 
experience with North Sea gas discoveries in the 1960s. It is within this latter 
framework that more recent literature has addressed and analysed the effects on a 
wide range of developed1 and developing2 countries of booms associated with a 
number of commodities - including the seventies oil boom (these are reviewed in 
detail in Chapter III). Some of the theoretical points raised in this literature are 
consolidated in Corden's paper (1984) on booming sector and Dutch disease 
economics, in which his original core model is extended by varying the core 
model's restrictive assumptions.
Thus, the evolution of the Dutch disease model seems to have been triggered 
by Gregory's theoretical work on Australia, which was developed further by 
Snape. Gregory addressed the question of how discovery of an exportable resource 
would impact on agricultural exports and manufacturing import substitutes, via the 
balance of payment effect. For his analysis, Gregory developed a partial 
equilibrium model (reproduced in Figure II. 1) that describes supply and demand in 
the traded sector market. He assumed constant international terms of trade, and 
that import-competing goods are perfect substitutes for imports. The vertical axis 
shows relative price between traded and non-traded goods, and the horizontal axis 
the quantity of traded goods. The curves X q and M q indicate the supply of exports
10n Britain: Forsyth and Kay (1980, 1981); Corden (1981); Flemming (1982); Bank of England 
(1982); Eastwood and Venables (1982); and Neary and van Wijnbergen (1984). On Holland: Corden 
(1983, 1984); Corden and Neary (1982); Ellman (1981); Fajnzylber (1981); Kremeres, (1986); and 
Rowthorn and Wells (1987, Appendix 13: 374-81). On Norway: Bjerkholt, et. al. (1981). On 
comparisons between Britain and Australia: Forsyth (1986). The British experience has also been 
discussed extensively under the de-industrialization literature. For more, see Blackaby (1979), Barker 
and Brailovsky (1981), and Rowthorn and Wells (1987).
2On Nigeria: Collier (1983) and Pinto (1987). On Indonesia: Corden and Warr (1981) and Struthers 
(1990). On Iran: Katouzian (1978); Karshenas (1990); and Majd (1991). On comparisons between 
Indonesia, Mexico and Nigeria: Scherr (1989); on comparisons between Nigeria and Iran: Jazayeri 
(1988); and on comparisons between a number of oil-exporting capital-importing countries: Gelb 
(1986; 1988).
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and the demand for imports, respectively, at various price ratios prior to the 
mineral discovery.
F igu re  II .1
Boom  E ffect on E xp orts , Im p orts , an d  R e la tive  Prices
P t /P n
Qo
With mineral discoveries, the export curve shifts to the right to X j,  leading to a 
lower equilibrium traded/non-traded price ratio, P /  domestic inflation or 
exchange rate revaluation could change the price ratio in the required manner. This 
price reduction has the effect of: increasing the quantity supplied of non-tradeables; 
reducing the quantity supplied of traditional exports from Q q to Qj ; and increasing 
the quantity demanded of imports from Q q to <22. Hence, with mineral discoveries 
both import-competing industries and pre-existing exporting industries will be 
reduced in size: "the adjustment made depends on the extent of the mineral 
discoveries; the price elasticity of supply of mineral exports; and the price 
elasticity of imports and traditional exports" (Gregory, 1976: 76).
Snape (1977) noted the problems inherent in the application of Gregory's 
partial equilibrium analysis to questions of a general equilibrium nature.3 
Specifically, import and export curves are not shifted in Gregory's model as 
aggregate income and, hence, total demand changes. Also, the impact of mineral
3For partial equilibrium analysis of traded and non-traded goods markets - which assumes general 
equilibrium conditions - see Corden (1981) section V.
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development on the costs of import-competing and pre-existing export industries is 
not considered. Consequently, Snape developed a simple general equilibrium 
model which enabled him to consider these effects (Snape's model is the prototype 
of Corden and Neary's (1982) model, its detailed exposition is therefore deferred 
to the following section). Snape confirmed Gregory's general conclusions that: (i) 
the price of non-tradeables increases, relative to tradeables, and (ii) non-mineral 
tradeable production contracts; but in contrast to Gregory he showed that (iii) 
production of non-tradeables either increases or decreases (Snape, 1977: 155). 
These points, which will become clearer in the following section, remain the most 
important conclusions of the Dutch disease model, to which we now turn.
n.2 The General Equilibrium Effects of The Boom: The Dutch Disease Model
As already mentioned, the Dutch disease theory explores the short-to-medium term 
structural effects of a windfall gain from an exportable natural resource, be it 
through a new discovery or a price increase.4 More specifically, the question 
addressed in the model concerns the effect of the boom on the functional 
distribution of income, and on the size and profitability of the manufacturing 
sector.
The framework of the model is one of a small open economy that produces 
three goods. Two are traded internationally at exogenously determined world 
prices. These are the natural resource or booming sector (denoted B) and the 
lagging sector (denoted T) (henceforth, I shall use lagging sector and traded sector 
interchangeably, bearing in mind that B is also tradeable). The third is a non-traded 
good whose price is determined domestically (denoted N). All prices move flexibly 
to clear markets; and so do real wages,5 thus ensuring full employment at all times.
The non-oil traded good output is taken as the numeraire, so that factor 
prices are measured in terms of T, although real wage are measured in terms of 
both traded and non-traded goods. To highlight the structural aspects of the boom,
The analysis is equally applicable to technological progress in one industry that leads to a 
replacement of older industries, as happened in Japan, Switzerland, and Ireland (see Corden, 1983; 
Corden and Neary, 1982). However, for technological progress to be equal in effect to the natural 
resource boom, it has to be neutral, i.e . elasticity of substitution between labour and capital in the 
booming sector must remain the same after the boom as before it.
sIn Corden (1981) nominal wages are sticky downward and macro-equilibrium is brought about 
through Keynesian style demand management.
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monetary considerations are ignored and the model focuses on the boom's 
implications for real, rather than nominal, variables.6
Other assumptions of the model include constant terms of trade and perfect 
substitution between imports and importables, so that, with given tariffs, export 
subsidies, etc., relative prices of traded goods (exports, exportables consumed 
domestically, imports, and import substitutes) do not change.7 However, the price 
of non-traded goods relative to that of traded goods can change, and an increase in 
this relative price corresponds to real appreciation. National output and 
expenditure are equal so that trade is always balanced overall. There are no 
distortions in factor and commodity markets; and all commodities, including the 
natural resource, are used for final consumption only.
The core model of the Dutch disease follows Jones (1971) and Snape (1977) 
by assuming that each of the three sectors employs a single specific factor (raw 
material, capital, skilled labour, etc.), as well as a factor that is perfectly mobile 
between sectors. The mobile factor is referred to here as labour, the mobility of 
which tends to equalise wage in all sectors. Finally, the total amount of capital 
stock and labour endowment in the economy is fixed, that is, labour and capital are 
internationally immobile.
These are the core model assumptions, variations on which can lead to 
different, and sometimes counter-intuitive, results. Of these varied assumptions, 
relevant to LDCs' experience are to allow both capital and labour to be mobile 
between the lagging and the non-traded sectors; or, indeed, within the lagging 
sector itself. A third variation that is particularly relevant to Jordan is the 
international mobility of labour. These cases are considered in section II.3.
The central feature of the Dutch disease model is the two, analytically 
different, mechanisms through which changes in the economy induced by the 
boom work themselves out. These are the resource movement and the spending
6For a discussion of the monetary effects of the boom see Buiter and Purvis (1983); Neary and van 
Wijnbergen (1984); and Corden (1981) sections I-IV.
7The small country assumption may not hold if the country is able to increase its export prices or 
lower its import prices, after currency appreciation. This may have taken place in the UK (see Forsyth, 
1986). Terms of trade may also change if the boom brings about a change in trade policies towards 
more liberalisation as foreign exchange availability increases. For a model that allows such changes see 
Bevan, Collier and Gunning (1990) on Kenya and Tanzania. Corden (1981) discusses a case where, 
once appreciation has taken place, reduction in non-oil exports improves terms of trade.
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effect. These two mechanisms and the final adjustment in the economy are 
discussed in the next sections.
H.2.1 The Resource Movement
A boom in B entails an increase of the marginal product of factors employed in 
that sector, which increases its demand for these factors. Consequently, B  draws 
the intersectorally mobile resource out of both T and N, thus crowding out their 
output. This is called direct de-industrialisation (for reasons to be discussed later). 
Figure II.2 depicts the effect of this resource movement by measuring the output of 
both T and B on the vertical axis, and of N  on the horizontal axis.
The  R es ou rc e  M o v e m e n t
Before the boom, production was at point a on the initial production frontier RS, as 
determined by the relative price line P0P0 and the highest attainable collective 
indifference curve IQ (this is only valid in the absence of product and factor market 
distortions). The boom shifts the production possibilities curve outward to RS' in 
an asymmetrical manner, reflecting changes in factor proportions as factor 
productivities change in B.
The analysis can now be conducted in two stages: first the real exchange rate 
is held constant, and then it is allowed to vary to restore equilibrium in the market 
for N. At constant PN/PT production moves to point b on RS', which lies to the left
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of point a : less N  is now produced.8 Consumption, on the other hand, and in the 
absence of any spending effect, lies vertically above point a , at d .9 Hence, the 
resource movement has created excess demand for N, thus bidding Pn up to 
restore equilibrium in the N  market,10 while PT is fixed by the small country 
assumption: there is real appreciation. Wage in terms of N  drops, and suppliers are 
encouraged to produce more in this sector, thus drawing on the mobile resource 
from T and causing further de-industrialisation. Final production thus moves to the 
right of point b, say to point c, but will not reach point d. In other words, the fall 
in N  production cannot be completely reversed - for the reasons stated above, 
namely the decline in the opportunity cost of producing B (Cordon and Neary, 
1982).
If B  behaves like an enclave, that is, production of B goods is not a function 
of inputs of factors other than B  itself, the resource movement does not take place 
and direct de-industrialisation is avoided.
II.2.2 The Spending Effect
This effect is the result of spending the additional income generated in B. To 
abstract from the resource movement, we assume B  to be an enclave. In this case 
the boom works as a transfer from abroad that shifts the production possibilities 
curve vertically upward to R 'S ' as shown in Figure H.3; the marginal cost of 
producing tradeables at any given point of N  remains unchanged after the boom. 
With the exchange rate initially fixed, production shifts to b, which now lies 
directly above a . Production of both T and N  has not changed, but total domestic 
availability of output has expanded by B  - the magnitude of the windfall.
This occurs because at any given level of N  production the marginal opportunity cost of producing 
B has decreased after the boom, and at point d, directly above the old production point a, there are still 
profits to be gained from producing more B.
''Since the "spending effect" is abstracted from momentarily, the income elasticity of demand for N  
goods is zero; the income consumption line is a vertical line passing through point a.
10If market rigidities are introduced in the system, excess demand for N  goods may be exacerbated 
by supply lags in that sector leading to further real appreciation. There may also be lagged supply in T, 
but not as prolonged (see Struthers, 1990: 324). Such market imperfections are abstracted from in the 
model, as stated in the assumptions.
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F i g u r e  II .3
X T T h e  S p e n d i n g  E f f e c t
S
S
Xo R
Equilibrium in this model is determined solely in terms of the market clearing 
conditions for the non-traded goods, as shown in equation (1).
Xn  (q) =  Cm  (q,y) (1)
where XN is total production of N  goods; CN is total demand for N  goods; q is 
prices of N  relative to T  - the inverse of the real exchange rate; y  is income in 
terms of T, and is determined exogenously - by the full employment assumption.
As the windfall revenue is spent, there will be a rise in demand for N  and 7, 
both of which are assumed to be normal goods. Since production, and therefore 
income, are now determined at b , desired consumption must lie along the price 
line tangential to b. Furthermore, since relative prices are unchanged, consumption 
must take place at point e, where the price line intersects the income-consumption 
line extending from the origin and passing through a . The resulting excess demand 
for N  drives up their price relative to 7  until a new equilibrium is reached at point 
c. In equation (1) q rises and there is real appreciation.11 The characteristics of this 
new equilibrium, as regards the production structure, are: an increase in the output
nReal appreciation can occur even if increased spending is spread evenly between T and N, because 
P^is determined by world markets while increases to clear home markets. However, if the income 
elasticity of demand for N  is greater than that for T, which is normally the case, the spending effect 
will be magnified, and real appreciation will be higher than would otherwise be the case.
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of the non-traded good and, therefore, of welfare as compared to point b; and a 
decline in that of the traded good (Neary and Van Wijnbergen, 1986: 16-17).
If we relax the assumption of non-shiftable resources, i.e. labour becomes 
intersectorally mobile again, the spending effect has yet another outcome. Labour 
moves out of T  into N, because of real appreciation, and wage in terms of N  drops 
accordingly. Under these circumstances, equation (1) has to be modified since 
equilibrium in the domestic market now depends on wage as well as income and 
relative prices, as reflected in equation (2):
XN (q/w) =  CN (q,y) (2)
where w is wage in terms of T. This is an equation with two endogenous variables, 
q and w. To solve it we can use equation (3), which describes equilibrium in the 
labour market:
L =  Ln (q/w) +  Lt  (w)  + Lb (w,b) (3)
where L is the total supply of labour, which is exogenously determined; Li is the 
labour demand in sector i; b is the additional demand for labour from the boom 
effect.
Equations (2) and (3) can be plotted in a (q, w) space as two loci, the first, 
N, representing equation (2), and the second, L, representing equation (3) as 
shown in Figure II.4. From the two equations, one can see that an increase in w 
depresses demand for labour in all sectors - equation (3); and reduces the supply of 
N  goods - equation (2). An increase in q is required to restore equilibrium. The 
two loci must, therefore, be upward sloping. Moreover, the increase in q must be 
more than proportional in the N  locus, since a proportional increase leads to an 
unchanged supply of, but a decreased demand for, N  goods, leading to excess 
supply. Thus the slope of the N  loci is > 1. The equilibrium in the labour market, 
however, requires a slope that is < 1 since less than a proportional increase in q is 
required to re-equilibrate the labour market when there is an increase in w. A  
proportional increase in both leaves LN unaltered, while depressing both L T and LB, 
and thus leading to unemployment (ibid: 17-18).
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Figure II .4
Resource Movement  and Spending Effect of a Boom
The spending effect and the resource movement can also be traced in Figure II.4. 
The spending effect has relocated the pre-boom equilibrium point from a to d, at 
higher wage and prices. The resource movement further relocates equilibrium 
from d to /, thus reinforcing the spending effect in terms of higher q and w. Both 
effects, therefore, unambiguously lead to real appreciation. This was shown in 
Figures II.2 and II.3 where the new point of production c in both figures had a 
steeper slope of relative prices than the original point of production a .
As regards the combined effect of the resource movement and the spending 
effect on employment and output in N, the result is rather ambiguous. Whilst the 
resource movement diminishes production and employment in N, the spending 
effect has the reverse effect. The final outcome depends on which effect 
dominates. This can be deduced from Figure II.5, which plots the supply and 
demand curves for N  as a function of PN. The 0 and 1 indicate conditions in pre- 
and post- boom, respectively, The new equilibrium point d might lie either to the 
left or right of a y the point of original equilibrium.
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Figure II .5 
Supply And Demand for Nontradeables
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The dominance of either the spending effect or the resource movement in turn 
depends on a number of factors:
- Factor mobility: if B  employs factors specific to it, the resource movement 
effect diminishes, and output and employment in N  tend to rise, via the spending 
effect. Also, the more mobile the shiftable resource between T  and N, the more 
expansion in N  and contraction in T will take place.
- The income elasticity of demand for N; the higher this elasticity the more 
pronounced the spending effect will be.
- The magnitude of change in the ratio q/w in equation (2); the greater q/w 
is, the less resources move out of N  into B , and the more resources move out of T 
into N .u'13
12A high rate of change in q/w  means, tautologically, a higher rate of change of q than of w; that is, 
the drop in wage in terms of N  goods is more pronounced than would otherwise be the case 
(remembering that q is PN/PT, and that w is wage in terms of T, so q/w  is the inverse of wage in terms 
of AT). It follows that the resource movement out of N  into B is lower, and out of T into N  is higher, 
than would otherwise be the case.
13Changes in q and w  in turn depend on: the magnitude of the boom; factor intensities in terms of 
value shares; factor distribution among sectors; elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in 
all sectors; income elasticity of demand; and price elasticity of supply of services (see mathematical 
appendix in Corden and Neary (1982).
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The combined effect of the resource movement and the spending effect on 
the output of T, and in contrast to that of N , is unambiguous. Both mechanisms 
draw resources out of T, the output of T  thus unequivocally falls.14 This is called 
de-industrialisation. The Dutch disease literature distinguishes between two types 
of de-industrialisation, direct and indirect. Direct de-industrialisation is caused by 
the movement of resources out of T into B  without involving the market for N. 
Indirect de-industrialisation is caused by real appreciation of the exchange rate, 
which itself is caused by the combined effect of resource movement and the 
spending effect.
U.2.3 Factor Income Distribution
11.2.3.1 The Impact of the Boom on Real Wage
To see how the boom affects labour welfare we resort to the following equation:
w = Pi . MPPil (4)
where w is still nominal wage; P[ is price in sector i; and MPPil is marginal 
physical product of labour in sector i .
In the traded sector T, both the resource movement and the spending effect 
lead to a fall in PT relative to PNt and to a consequent move of labour out of T into 
B and N. MPPjl rises as less labour is employed per unit of capital. The increase 
in nominal wage must exceed the fall in PT for MPPjl to rise at all, i.e. w > P T, 
where a circumflex indicates the rate of change (Jazayeri, 1988: 11-12).
In the non-traded sector N, the same happens under the resource movement: 
as labour moves into B  output of N  declines, and wage rises in terms of PN. Since, 
as we saw above, wage has also risen in terms PTi real wage rises, at least until we 
introduce the spending effect. The spending effect has an adverse effect on the real 
wage in the N  sector since w/PN would actually drop as the output, and hence the 
prices, of N  rise. When both effects are considered, the impact of the boom on the 
real wage is uncertain. A fall in the real wage is more likely the stronger the 
spending effect is relative to the resource movement effect - i.e. the less mobile 
labour is; and the greater the share of services in wage-earners' consumption 
(Corden and Neary, 1982: 831).
14However, to the extent that T and N  are substitutable, real appreciation makes T goods relatively 
cheaper than N} and the substitution effect shifts demand from N  to T, thus reducing contraction in T.
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11.2.3.2 The Impact of the Boom on the Specific Factor
Return to the specific factor in each sector can be thought of as a measure of 
profitability in that sector. Factor immobility negatively impacts on its return when 
prices in the sector in which it is employed fall. Thus, in T, both the spending 
effect and the resource movement lower PT relative to pN. Real return to the 
specific factor in T  is thus lowered. This can be seen by rewriting equation (4) as 
follows:
nk = Pi . MPPik (5)
where r[k is return to capital in sector i; Pi is prices in sector i; and MPPik is 
marginal physical product of capital in sector i.
A fall in PT, with labour mobile and capital immobile, means there is more 
capital per unit labour. Marginal physical product of capital in T  diminishes, i.e. 
MPPLk falls. Return to capital r inevitably falls, and by a greater amount than the 
drop in PT, i.e. pT ) rr k . The same happens under the resource movement: as 
labour moves out of N  into B , MPP^Jc falls and so does r^k, with r y k )p N . On 
the other hand, the spending effect has a positive effect on return to the specific 
factor in N, as more labour is absorbed in this sector when its prices go up, and 
thus MPP^k goes up. The final result of these two opposing effects on profitability 
in N  is again ambiguous, as was the effect on employment and output, the results 
depending on the dominance of either effect. The reverse is true for T, where 
profitability unambiguously falls. In the booming sector B , profitability must rise 
because of the resource movement effect, but it must fall because of the spending 
effect.
The order of changes in all these variables can now be summed up as:
h,k )PN)PT) f r k
That is, return to the fixed factor in the traded sector suffers both in terms of 
Pat and P T, while that in the non-traded sector gains most. This also means that any 
change in PN has a disproportionately large effect on increasing return to capital in 
7V(Jazayeri, 1988: 12).
So far we have investigated absolute changes in profitability. However, in 
the medium-to-long run, resource allocation depends on relative profitability; in 
which case factor intensities in terms of value shares become important. Consider 
a relatively capital-intensive T  compared to N. The resource movement raises real 
wage and reduces return to capital in both sectors. However, return to capital in T
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would fall by less than it would in N, since the value share of capital is larger in 
the former than the latter. Profitability in T  would thus rise relative to N. If we 
now allow capital mobility between T  and N, it is easy to see that it would move 
out of the latter and into the former: de-industrialisation would thus be averted 
(capital mobility will be further explored in section II.3.2). The spending effect, on 
the other hand, is not influenced by factor intensities. Output of T would still be 
squeezed by the spending effect and its profitability decline in both absolute and 
relative terms. Whether de-industrialisation takes place or not in the medium-to- 
long run depends on which effect dominates.
II.3 Extensions to The Model
The extended model relaxes some of the restrictive assumptions of the core model, 
by way of investigating different economic conditions and thus expanding the 
applicability of the model. Only those extensions that are relevant to the Jordanian 
experience are investigated below; the full range of extensions can be found in 
Corden and Neary (1982) and Corden (1984).
II.3.1 International Labour Mobility (Immigration)
Immigration takes place if the national stock of labour is allowed to vary, and if
❖
true real wage W  (real wage defined in terms of a consumption basket of T and 
N) rises.15 Immigration continues until W  is restored to its pre-boom level. At that 
point, we want to investigate whether or not immigration can avert de­
industrialisation, or even achieve pro-industrialisation. Since what is important for 
the restoration of T  is W, the answer depends on what happens to W when W* is 
restored to its pre-boom level; if it had risen T would have fallen, and vice-versa.16
Ignoring the spending effect for the moment, immigration replaces the 
labour that had left N  for the booming sector B, and thus restores its supply curve
15As mentioned in section II.2 .3 .1 , W*may rise or fall because of the boom. We know that both the 
spending effect and the resource movement raise W  - wage in terms of T . Bearing in mind that N  falls 
because of the resource movement and rises because of the spending effect, the resource movement 
must raise W  while the spending effect may either raise or lower it.
16What happens to W  is not clear because immigration on its own increases both supply of, and 
demand for, N  .
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&in Figure II.5 to its original position - assuming W  is fully restored.17 That is, 
product and factor prices are restored, and de-industrialisation is averted.
Once the spending effect is introduced, to which we must now add the 
spending of migrant labour, the picture changes. The demand curve for N  moves 
to the right beyond D jDj , say to At the new equilibrium point c both
output and prices of N  are higher than the pre-boom, pre-immigration conditions 
(point a). Real wage in terms of N  must fall, since output of N  has risen, and so 
wage in terms of T  must rise (i.e., condition (ii) in the previous footnote is 
satisfied). Consequently, output of T  must fall, and some de-industrialisation must 
take place.
Another variation on the core model is the mobility of more than one factor 
across and within sectors. In such cases, factor intensities become important, and 
the economy resembles a Hecksher-Ohlin model. Two cases are investigated 
below: in the first, capital moves between T and N  and, in the second, capital 
moves within the lagging sector T. In both cases labour is still mobile between and 
within all sectors, as assumed in the core model.
II.3.2 Two Factors Intersectorally Mobile
If the analysis is concerned with the medium-to-long run, it is more reasonable to 
allow capital full mobility between T and N. The two sectors behave like a 
Heckscher-Ohlin economy facing a variable supply of labour (labour available to 
the two sectors is equal to total labour supply less labour employed in the booming 
sector). Output and employment in the T and N  sectors after the boom depend 
entirely on the sectors' relative factor intensities. To consider the resource 
movement first, the boom moves labour out of the two sectors into B, making the 
resource structure facing these two sectors more capital-intensive. The Rybczynski 
(1955: 339) theorem states that under such conditions and at constant prices,
Sf!
The restoration of W  requires the fulfilment of one of the following conditions:
P N =  W = 0 ;  N  = 0 (i)
P N > W > 0; N  > 0 (ii)
P N < W < 0; N <  0 (iii)
where a circumflex denotes the rate of change from the pre-boom to the post-boom, post-immigration
conditions. The new point of equilibrium in Figure II.5 must be at a: before reaching point a, P ^  > 0
but TV < 0, while beyond point a the reverse is true, so conditions (ii) and (iii) above are not fulfilled. 
At point a , however, condition (i) is fulfilled and it is, therefore, the only point at which W is fully 
restored (Corden, 1984: 366).
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output of the relatively labour-intensive sector, be it T or N, contracts, while that 
of the relatively capital-intensive sector expands. Thus, if N  is the relatively 
labour-intensive sector, which is normally the case, in Figure II.5 the supply curve 
moves from SqSq to SjS1} equilibrium moves from point a to point b, less N  goods 
are now produced. This is as in the core model. However, output of T  in the 
present case expands, i.e. pro-industrialisation takes place as a result of the 
resource movement alone - in Dutch disease literature this is called the paradox 
model. This result will be opposed by the spending effect, because of real 
appreciation and the movement of both capital and labour out of T  into N. 
Nevertheless, the expansion of T  remains a possibility.
A yet more paradoxical outcome obtains if N  is relatively more capital- 
intensive than T. As labour moves into B, there is less of it available for N  and T, 
so output of A  expands while that of T contracts. De-industrialisation is still taking 
place. However, since N  is capital-intensive, a rise in wage leads to a decline in 
PN, and the real exchange rate falls (the Stolper-Samuelson condition). There is 
real depreciation. The spending effect, on the other hand, raises output and prices 
of N  and squeezes T, irrespective of factor intensities in the two sectors (Corden 
and Neary, 1982: 833-4; Corden, 1984: 363).
II.3.3 Decomposition of the Lagging Sector
If the lagging sector T  is decomposed into sub-sectors or industries; if each 
industry employs capital and labour in different proportions; and if the two factors 
are mobile between its sub-sectors, then the sector as a whole behaves like a mini 
Heckscher-Ohlin economy. The same forces as above will be operative here, albeit 
at an intra-sector rather than inter-sector level. The boom brings about the usual 
movement of labour out of T as a whole; however, within the sector there will be a 
rearrangement of factors. With the stock of capital for the sector as a whole fixed 
(an assumption of the core model) and its labour reduced, it follows that the 
labour-intensive sub-sectors contract, while the capital-intensive sub-sectors 
expand, as for the Rybczynski theorem (1955: 339).
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II.4 Critique of The Dutch Disease Theory
The critique given here of the Dutch disease model is of an empirical rather than 
an abstract nature, the place for which would be the more theoretical literature 
(see, for example, Weeks 1989). The critique has been motivated by the Dutch 
disease model's weak explanatory power of the empirical observations concerning 
a number of recent booms, especially that of Jordan (to be discussed in later 
chapters). The discussion here will be very general but will become more detailed 
in subsequent chapters as it considers the model's applicability to a number of 
countries (chapter III), and then to specific sectors: agriculture (chapter VI) and 
manufacturing (chapter VII) in Jordan.
The critique is made in three main respects: the model's assumptions; its 
level of abstraction; and the static nature of its analysis. As will be shown, 
productivity growth is a pervasive element that in some ways links these three 
aspects and, as such, its absence from the model is considered, from my 
perspective, to be the main shortcoming of the Dutch disease theory.
The first point concerns modelling in general and relates to the ceteris 
paribus assumption. All other things may change, and simultaneously, rendering 
the model far removed from reality. In our context, sectoral changes that all 
countries go through, for reasons extraneous to the model, make it difficult to 
ascertain the existence and magnitude of the Dutch disease effect. It follows from 
above that establishing the counterfactual to the Dutch disease is a necessary 
condition for the correct testing of its hypothesis.
Because the model does not show the 'extent' of change in sectoral 
contributions, its advantage over Gregory's (1976) partial equilibrium analysis is 
somewhat undermined. It is important to distinguish in this regard between the two 
types of booms considered here, i.e., between booms caused by a new discovery 
and those caused by a favourable price change. The most salient difference 
between the two is resource transfer, which would take place in the first type of 
booms but not necessarily in the second. Where some degree of resource transfer 
is involved, the Dutch disease general equilibrium model does not add much to 
partial equilibrium analysis, except to show the effect of changes in income and 
cost on the 'potential' demand for, and supply of, traded and non-traded goods. 
However, what the general equilibrium model sets out to do is to explain sectoral 
shifts, and this it does only partially by showing that the traded goods sector 
declines, which Gregory's model has shown already. The resource movement, on 
the other hand, obscures the effect on output and employment in the non-traded
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goods sector. This is not a statement on the general equilibrium nature of the 
model as such - the advantage of general, as opposed to partial, equilibrium 
models is well taken. Rather, it is to show that in particular cases where there is 
resource transfer, no advantage is gained by moving from partial to general 
equilibrium analysis.18
More important is the Dutch disease model's set of assumptions, especially 
those relating to factor markets. The model is built on macro-equilibrium with no 
unemployment before, during or after the boom (see section II.2).19 This 
immediately precludes a large number of booming economies from its application. 
If the boom takes place in a low per capita income economy, or, if per capita 
income is high, the economy is on the downswing of its business cycle, then the 
boom starts when a certain fraction of resources is idle. Inevitably, demand 
expansion induced by the boom leads to an expansion of the traded sector, both in 
absolute and relative terms. This is because under conditions of repressed demand 
it is usually the traded sector, especially manufacturing industries, that suffer most 
in terms of depressed share in aggregate output. Services, on the other hand, 
would have a larger than usual proportion in aggregate output during a recession 
(see Rowthorn and Wells, 1987: 24-25).20 Conversely, as demand rises and 
unemployment is reduced, incremental demand has a disproportionately larger 
impact on manufactures, especially consumer durables, than on agriculture or 
services. Moreover, with a faster rate of growth, the share of investment in GDP
lsIn fact, when only the spending effect is operative, Corden (1981) employs partial equilibrium 
analysis for the traded and non-traded markets, with general equilibrium assumed in the background.
19A  post-boom unemployment case is discussed by Corden (1984) and Neary and Wijnbergen (1986) 
- using disequilibrium analysis - where unemployment is caused by downward rigidity of wages. In 
this case, labour is specific to the traded, T, and nontraded, N, sectors. In T, where the resource 
movement and the spending effect reduce returns to the specific factor in that sector, rigid wages can 
only lead to increasing unemployment. If, furthermore, workers in T seek real wage increases to 
maintain their wage relative to those of workers specific to B, where market forces will have raised real 
wage, unemployment in T intensifies. The reverse takes place in N, via the spending effect, which 
increases and, therefore, return to the specific factor.
20Once resources are fully utilised, the path of industrialisation would differ in industrial from 
industrialising economies. In 'mature' industrial economies a further increase in per capita income 
increases the share of services, and contracts that of manufacturing, in aggregate output. This is due 
both to the Dutch disease effect and to the same factors that cause de-industrialization in these 
economies, namely higher productivity growth in manufacturing compared with that in services (see 
Rowthorn and Wells, 1987, chapter one). In industrialising economies, a further increase in per capita 
income leads to a continuation of industrialisation, provided the Dutch disease effect is overcome. I 
will show later that industrialising economies are more likely than not to continue industrialisation 
under booming conditions, for reasons other than resource utilization.
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is greater, and this too implies a relative increase in the demand for manufactures 
(ibid: 242-3).
The existence of excess supply of labour at the start of the boom means that 
the resource movement need not take place: the booming sector, B, can draw on 
the pool of surplus labour, rather than on labour employed in N  and T. The 
spending effect itself may be neutralised: N  can expand without an increase in Pn 
since the absorption of excess capacity means that output can expand without 
increasing costs. In equation (4) above, the marginal physical product of labour in 
N  (MPPfll) is rising, if wage rises in line with productivity but not more, PN need 
not rise at all. Similarly, in the lagging sector T the marginal physical product of 
capital MPPjk rises because production is taking place at higher productivity 
levels. In equation (5) the return to the specific factor r-jk does not decline even 
though PTis fixed. Therefore, resources do not move out of T to N. Both direct 
and indirect de-industrialisation are thus averted.
A further point relates to the assumption of perfect capital markets. A pre­
boom developing economy is likely to be quantity-constrained in world capital 
markets, or indeed in its own market if saving is not forthcoming and there is 
credit rationing. The boom relieves these constraints by increasing the country's 
creditworthiness and by making capital more abundant domestically. In this case, 
capital, combined with the hitherto surplus labour, can be used to accelerate 
industrialisation.
There is another aspect to relieving the foreign exchange gap, if we relax the 
assumption of fixed technical coefficients of production. The relative abundance of 
foreign exchange is consistent with both increasing production efficiency, as 
improved imported inputs are now available, and with technological advance, 
embodied in imported machinery and material. Both these aspects, in turn, are 
consistent with rapid productivity growth which would increase returns to specific 
factors employed in tradeables.
We turn now to the model's level of abstraction. As in all neo-classical 
models, in the Dutch disease model there is no government, only agents that 
optimise rationally in a competitive environment.21 Yet in most cases of resource 
booms a significant proportion of resource rents are returned to the government 
through taxation. From a neo-classical point of view, availability of this rent
21See Corden (1981) for a discussion of fiscal policy’s effect on functional income distribution and 
resource allocation.
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lowers the shadow price of public revenue, which in turn increases the optimal 
proportion of publicly provided commodities in national income (Please's Law: see 
Neary and Wijnbergen, 1986: 328). In principle, even if governments supplanted 
markets, this should not affect the conclusions of the theory, provided that 
governments’ actions mirror the market's mechanisms. In reality, governments do 
not behave in this way, both because it is impossible for them to do so, and 
because they have a political agenda to pursue. Once removed from the market 
image, government action can affect the model's outcome in unpredictable ways. It 
may emphasise sectoral changes, or it may counter them. The important thing to 
note is that without the inclusion of government in the model - as in two agents 
models - the outcome of the boom cannot be determined.
Government action that directly relates to the Dutch disease hypothesis 
includes spending and investment behaviour (the spending effect), and trade 
policies (which may impinge on tradeability). A related set of actions is 
macroeconomic policies that are either induced by, or coincide with, the boom. 
These policies would either exaggerate the Dutch disease effect (e.g. monetary 
contraction leading to currency appreciation), or counterbalance them (e.g. a 
devaluation leading to currency depreciation). Ideally, the effect of such policies 
would be modelled separately to test the Dutch disease hypothesis correctly. That 
is, a counterfactual to the effect of macroeconomic policies on output and 
employment should be established before the Dutch disease effect is assessed (it 
will be shown in the following chapter that empirically this is quite difficult).
The static nature of the model22 is perhaps its most limiting aspect, since the 
dynamics of productivity growth and productivity differentials between sectors are 
the supply-side factors that determine growth and sectoral shifts over time.23 Under 
booming conditions the factors underlying productivity growth themselves undergo 
significant change, as I have already noted. To recapitulate, in industrialising 
economies booming conditions can induce rapid productivity growth for three 
main reasons. First, the boom relieves economic constraints such as the foreign 
exchange and saving gaps by making capital more abundant. Production can now
22Some Dutch disease literature discusses dynamic aspects such as intertemporal adjustment to the 
boom, or the 'leaming-by-doing1 effect in manufacturing (see for example Neary and Wijnbergen, 
1986: 23-28). According to this source, learning by doing in manufacturing justifies subsidies to the 
sector during the boom.
“On the demand side, the factors that determine growth and sectoral shares are the rise in per capita 
income and the differential income elasticities of demand for sectoral output. These issues are discussed 
further in the following chapter.
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take place with better quality investment and production inputs. The same result 
obtains because relative price movement makes imported capital and material 
cheaper relative to pre-boom conditions. Second, these conditions are consistent 
with technological advance, which is more likely to take place with new 
investment than otherwise. Third, the existence of idle capacity in the pre-boom 
period, which is rapidly absorbed as the boom expands demand, means that 
production can rise without additional inputs, i.e. output per unit input rises. More 
generally, the rapid expansion of demand generates rapid productivity growth 
through dynamic economies of scale (Verdoorn's law) that arise from leaming-by- 
doing, embodied technology, new entrepreneurs, etc.. These changes are likely to 
promote industrialisation because of the higher-than-average productivity level and 
growth rates in manufacturing.
Finally, it is important to note that if the boom takes place in the initial 
stages of industrialisation, the boom's effect on changing the structure of demand, 
as per capita income rises, is an important factor in inducing further supply-side 
changes. I am specifically referring to the higher income elasticity of demand for 
manufactures than for agriculture (Engel law). Thus, as income rises, the share of 
expenditure on agricultural products declines, and that on manufactures rises. The 
effect of demand expansion on the above mentioned supply changes is magnified in 
manufacturing and diminished in agriculture, whose output and employment are 
expected to decline in relative terms as per capita income rises. It is inaccurate, 
therefore, to consider agriculture and manufacturing in one category of analysis 
under booming conditions in these economies. Whilst the two sectors are 
influenced in the same way by relative price changes, they are influenced in 
opposite ways by the income and demand effects. Corden's (1984: 362-3) assertion 
that the theory can be applied equally to agriculture and manufacturing is correct 
only within the Dutch disease formulation, where there is neither growth nor 
change in productivity over time. Once the model's assumptions are relaxed and/or 
dynamic analysis is adopted, the two sectors behave in vitally different ways; a 
subject that the next chapter discusses in more detail.
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CHAPTER III
Literature Review: The Experience Of Industrial And Industrialising
Economies With Booms
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Introduction
This chapter reviews the literature on a number of countries' experiences of 
favourable exogenous shocks (henceforth booms). The survey is by no means 
exhaustive, but serves its two-fold purpose, namely, firstly, to enhance our 
understanding of these experiences by examining them together and thus permitting 
comparisons to be made; and, secondly, to advance the critique of the Dutch 
disease theory began in chapter II.
The literature is reviewed within the framework presented in the previous 
chapter, including the Dutch disease argument and my own critique of it. To 
recapitulate the Dutch disease argument: the boom brings about real appreciation 
via two, analytically different, mechanisms: the spending effect and the resource 
movement. The most likely outcome of changes induced by these mechanisms is a 
squeeze on profits in the traded sector and a contraction of its output and 
employment. This outcome, however, is not inevitable. If tradeables are relatively 
more capital-intensive than non-tradeables, profits will be less squeezed in the 
former than in the latter. In the medium-to-long run when capital becomes mobile, 
it will move out of non-tradeables into tradeables leading to the latter's expansion. 
Against this outcome works the spending effect which increases the prices, and 
consequently profits, of non-tradeables. Whether or not de-industrialisation takes 
place, therefore, depends on which effect dominates.
I have noted the main shortcomings of this type of analysis, some aspects of 
which can be accommodated within the Dutch disease framework. For instance, 
government action which impinges on resource allocation and profitability can be 
endogenised. Or, the counterfactual to the Dutch disease model can be established, 
to determine whether or not the boom has resulted in a decline of output and 
employment in tradeables. The latter would be necessary since in both 
industrialising and industrial economies this sector's share in aggregate output is 
changing over time.
There are, on the other hand, three other analytical considerations, crucial to 
an understanding of booming sector economics, that cannot as easily be 
accommodated within the framework of the Dutch disease model. These are, 
firstly, dynamic aspects of productivity change and technological advance; 
secondly, the view of booms as originating in positions of dis-equilibrium, with 
unemployment and capital market constraints; and thirdly, the effects of demand 
growth and of changes in the structure of demand on these initial conditions, 
mainly through productivity growth.
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The foregoing sets out the framework within which countries' experiences 
with booms are examined here. The question underlying the analysis is, to what 
degree do industrial and industrialising economies' experiences with booms reflect 
the relevance of the Dutch disease model? A related question is whether the 
sectoral outcome can be expected to differ in industrialised from industrialising 
economies. It will be shown that the answers to these questions depend crucially on 
the economic conditions at the start of the boom; and, in that respect, experiences 
of developed and developing economies differ considerably. It will also be shown 
that despite the extensive literature critical of applications of the Dutch disease 
model to developing countries, many of the critiques do not adequately confront 
the analytical framework inherent in the model. The Jordanian experience, the 
subject of this study, is strongly suggestive of the need for dynamic rather than 
static analysis of sectoral shifts; which, if Jordan is at all representative of 
industrialising economies, is likely to have important implications for the 
interpretation of booms in other industrialising economies.
Section one discusses historical experiences of booms, which are presented 
chronologically until the 1970s, when the two oil shocks took place. In section two 
a cross-section of industrial countries' experiences are compared, followed by a 
similar analysis for a group of industrialising economies in section three. Section 
four synthesises.
HI. 1 Historical Experiences With Booms
The decline of Spanish industry in the 16*h and 17^ centuries in the wake of 
American discoveries of treasure is one of the earliest examples of a boom to have 
been referred to in the literature. Two approaches to the description and analysis of 
this phenomenon are identifiable: a monetary approach by the American economic 
historian Earl Hamilton dating from 1928, and a neo-classical approach by Forsyth 
and Nicholas (1983). According to the former, imports of gold and silver from 
America into Spain were regarded as amounting to an expansion of the money 
supply, while actual production of goods and services was constant or only 
growing slowly. The familiar situation of "too much money chasing too few 
goods" was observed. The consequent price rise reduced Spanish manufactures' 
competitiveness and by the mid 17^ century very little remained of the traditional 
industries. The implicit assumption in this analysis is that had the government 
sterilised the impact on the domestic economy of monetary inflows, inflation would 
have been avoided as would the decline in manufacturing.
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Forsyth and Nicholas' approach is closer to the general equilibrium analysis 
of Corden and Neary (1982). In their view, the Spanish transformed the windfall 
gain into consumable goods through both trade and the increased production of 
non-traded goods, so diverting resources from manufactures. Changes were 
affected through the price mechanism, whereby the price of non-traded goods rose 
relative to traded goods to facilitate the How of trade (the exchange rate was fixed), 
and factor prices in the non-traded sector rose relative to the traded sector to 
stimulate factor flows. There was also a change in factor rewards, whereby those 
factors used relatively intensively in the traded sector experienced a decline in their 
rewards, while other factors experienced a rise.
It was mainly government spending that influenced structural changes in the 
economy, since about 26% of American treasure accrued to the Crown, thus 
raising the share of this source in total revenue from 11% in 1554 to 20% in 1590, 
and redistributing income towards the state. The government had a high propensity 
to spend on wars, public works, civil service, and extravagant buildings. Similarly, 
private treasure was used to consume more goods and services either directly (e.g. 
on ornamentation) or through the purchase of return cargoes to the Americas. 
There was a consequent pull of labour into services out of manufacturing, whose 
decline was manifested by a balance of payments deficit and an eventual desertion 
of the urban centres that had historically been home to textiles, glass, sugar, leather 
and copper industries. When the treasure flow was exhausted, manufacturing 
industries failed to revive. Forsyth and Nicholas attribute this to the loss of 
technical edge and human skills; to the deterioration of the capital stock; and to the 
fact that any sustained industrial revival would have required substantial capital 
stock.
In the foregoing example, the boom was like manna from heaven in that it did 
not entail any transfer of resources to the booming sector. Adjustment to the boom 
was confined to services and manufacturing, without involving the booming sector, 
and was brought about via the spending effect. On the other hand, in Spanish 
America itself, where the discoveries were made, resource transfer to the gold 
fields was quite significant. As recorded by Caimes (1859), the discoveries helped 
populate this area at a pace so fast as to result, paradoxically, in agriculture 
flourishing in areas otherwise considered undesirable. This is a significant 
theoretical point, as it highlights one of the difficulties of applying the Dutch 
disease model to developing countries. Had agriculture been well-established in 
Spanish America, this expansion in cultivation would probably not have taken
place. But as America was at that time largely unsettled (i.e., it was at an initial 
stage of development), these discoveries of precious metal can be viewed as 
facilitating agricultural expansion and thus bringing a hitherto idle resource - land - 
into productive use, perhaps not only because of labour immigration but also 
because of the availability of capital.
On the other hand, travellers' accounts note that in the settled areas where 
land was already being cultivated, some agricultural areas were neglected as a 
result of the boom. Institutional factors were given a role in bringing about this 
outcome, where laws prevented the creation of a class of small proprietors. 
However, Cairnes refutes this suggestion on the basis that a great portion of land 
sold was not brought under cultivation. Instead, the new discoveries were a 
premium against agriculture and industry, as high wages prevented these traded 
sectors from being able to compete internationally.
The Australian experience with gold discoveries in the 19*h century, as 
recorded by Cairnes (ibid), brings up the interesting question of whether 
immigration can avert de-industrialisation or even lead to over-shooting, i.e. bring 
about pro-industrialisation. The discoveries brought about two changes; namely, 
firstly, labour immigration, and secondly an immediate disorganisation of industry, 
as Australia tried to capture her new comparative advantage by turning capital and 
labour to the production of gold, away from dairy farming. Cairnes records that a 
two-to-four fold increase in prices of pastoral products was needed if farmers were 
to recoup their increased labour cost. The wool industry was thus placed in serious 
jeopardy and was only saved by the increase in demand for meat brought about by 
immigration. The price of meat rose four-fold, which covered the increase in 
outlay on sheep farming, and worked as an inducement to continue supplying sheep 
and, therefore, wool.
This example highlights the effect of immigration on both the supply of, and 
demand for, non-traded goods. It has been shown in section II.3.1 that immigration 
should neutralise the resource movement, but not the spending effect, in which we 
must include the spending of migrant workers. Theoretically, de-industrialisation 
can be avoided if immigration is sufficient to restore wages in terms of tradeables 
to their pre-boom level. This does not seem to have been the case in Australia, 
since Cairnes records a significant rise of wages in terms of traded goods thus 
indicating that both the resource movement and the spending effects were 
operative, the latter augmented by the spending of migrant workers. However, as 
migrant workers' spending on meat - a non-traded good at that time - also meant
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the continued production of wool, de-industrialisation seems to have been 
attenuated, quite fortuitously, by immigration, but was not averted, nor indeed was 
it reversed.
III.2 Experiences of Industrial Economies With Booms
Australia's rich endowment of gold, silver, lead, copper and coal has permitted 
two further mineral resource booms this century. A major one in 1968-74 (off­
shore oil, iron ore and bauxite alumina), and a minor one in 1978-82 (coal and 
uranium). According to Forsyth (1986: 268), the second boom in Australia might 
be better regarded as stemming from expectations of increased mineral production 
that failed in the event to materialise; yet there was real appreciation, especially 
through a rapid rise in wages and investment in the sector. As mentioned in chapter 
II, Australia’s more recent experience with booms prompted an interesting 
theoretical debate between Gregory (1976) and Snape (1977) that culminated in the 
formulation of the Dutch Disease model by Corden and Neary (1982) and Corden 
(1983; 1984).
The booms in Australia increased the share of minerals in GDP from 2% to 
only 4%. Nevertheless, this small percentage entailed long term adjustment 
problems since, because of the nature of the boom, revenues were sustainable over 
a long period of time. Relative price movement was as to be excepted, i.e. there 
was real appreciation through higher inflation rates in Australia than her trading 
partners, as the exchange rate was fixed. Appreciation was more marked during 
the second, compared with the first, boom, apparently due to rapid wage rises 
because of optimistic expectations regarding the size of the boom. From 1982 there 
was a depreciation consistent with the view that earlier price forecasts had been 
optimistic (Forsyth, 1986: 256 & 264-5).
Since most of Australia's minerals were exported (apart from oil, which went 
into import substitution), the boom changed her trading position. As mining 
exports grew in the two decades after the first discoveries, wool exports declined 
contemporaneously. The decline might have been more than warranted by the 
boom conditions, since the government granted a 25% across the board reduction 
in tariffs (Gregory, 1976; Forsyth, 1986: 264).
Like the 19^ century gold boom, the main aspect of this boom was the 
substantial resource movement, manifested mainly in immigration, and also in the 
pull to mining and away from other sectors of labour and the capital needed for
51
investment. Theoretically then, the outcome for the non-booming traded sector is 
unambiguous with regard to its output and employment: both decline. On the other 
hand, the outcome for the non-traded sector is ambiguous, as shown by Snape 
(1977) and Corden (1984) (see section II.2.2). This sector may contract or expand, 
depending on the magnitude of change in relative prices and on the movement of 
labour, including immigration (see section II.3.1). The outcome in non-traded 
goods was also ambiguous empirically. Forsyth (1986: 264) speculates that the 
non-traded sector was left unaffected, while structural changes took place between 
booming and non-booming traded sectors.
We now turn to the experiences of North Sea oil and gas which, generally 
speaking, exemplify the enclave type of booms, where little or no resource transfer 
is involved, while resource rents are very large. The spending effect, especially 
that of the government, thus dominates, leading to an expansion of output and 
employment in the non-traded sector. Such experiences demonstrate the difficulty 
of establishing the Dutch disease effect without establishing the counterfactual, 
because the boom started at a time when these economies were experiencing de­
industrialization. It is perhaps worth digressing here to explain the difference 
between Dutch disease effect and longer term de-industrialization.
De-industrialisation in mature industrial economies is caused, on the demand 
side, by the greater-than-unity income elasticity of demand for services; and, on 
the supply side, by the higher rates of growth in labour productivity in 
manufacturing compared with services (see Inman, 1985: 2-5; 17-19). As per 
capita income rises, demand for services rises at higher rates than that of aggregate 
demand. Furthermore, with productivity in services lagging behind that of 
manufacturing, labour will be drawn from the latter into the former, and not from 
agriculture, whose small share in aggregate output cannot be reduced any further 
(see Rowthom and Wells, 1987: 14-15). The two effects combined lead to an 
increase in the share of labour in services and to its decline in manufacturing. This 
is the true definition of de-industrialisation. In addition, prices in services will rise 
and in manufacturing fall because of the productivity differential between the two 
sectors, thus increasing the former’s, and reducing the latter's, share in aggregate 
output (ibid).
The Dutch disease effect, on the other hand, is caused by relative price 
movement induced by the boom, which makes tradeables less profitable to produce 
that non-tradeables. This movement in prices in turn is caused, in North Sea oil 
cases, by spending of the additional income gained from the boom on both
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tradeables and non-tradeables, and by the rise in non-tradeables' prices relative to 
those of tradeables - whose prices are determined by world markets - to eliminate 
excess demand in domestic markets. It should be clear now how the same 
phenomenon - de-industrialisation - may have two entirely different causes; and 
why it is crucially important to establish the counterfactual before testing the Dutch 
disease. However, the line of demarcation between the two effects is more 
apparent than real, since the sudden rise in income from the boom can be expected 
to strengthen the tendencies underlying de-industrialisation. Theoretically, the 
Dutch disease theory avoids these complexities by, first, ignoring the effect of 
growth on general equilibrium and, second, ignoring productivity growth 
altogether. Empirical analysis is thus left with no theoretical grounds on which to 
base an accurate assessment of the boom effect on sectoral output.
I shall start the discussion of North Sea oil experiences with the country that 
inspired the Dutch disease theory's name, Holland. The Dutch experience shows 
how governments can largely replace market forces and still effect the same 
structural changes predicted by the model, and perhaps even aggravate them. By 
contrast, the controversy over the effect of government policy on output and 
employment in manufacturing in England left the model more or less open - 
indeterminate. In both cases, we are reminded that care should be exercised in 
attributing government behaviour to the accrual of large rents, rather than, more 
correctly, to other factors that pre-date the boom and that may be social and 
political in nature, rather than economic.
In Holland the government sector looms large and became even more 
significant with the discovery of cheap energy (first made in the late 1950s). About 
80% of gas rents accrued to the government, making up 14% of its total income in 
1981. Public expenditure grew more rapidly than growth in revenue, especially 
transfer payments. The share of central and local governments and social security 
expenditures rose from 34% of national income in 1964 to 50% in 1979 (while gas 
accounted for 5.5% of national income in 1981) (Ellmen, 1981: 153-4). Note that 
while government's share in total expenditure rose during the boom, it had already 
reached an exceptionally high level (by West European standards) prior to the 
boom.
Another prominent feature of the Dutch boom was the rapid increase in 
wages. Wage indexation, that includes indirect taxes and household energy 
consumption, had started in the 1960's. Wage bargaining was centralised and based 
on an aggregate measure of labour productivity, including the gas sector, where
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labour inputs were minimal and production very high. This brought pressure to 
bear on product wages in all except the most productive sectors. Inevitably, the rise 
in wages exceeded that of labour productivity, as evidenced from the increase of 
wage share in value added. In addition, employers' contributions to social security 
increased, leading to a general increase in labour costs (Kremeres, 1986: 112-3).1 It 
is precisely the increase in labour costs that constituted the Dutch disease according 
to Corden (1983: 441), where wages in Holland were much higher than those in its 
most important trading partner, Germany (30% of Holland's exports go to 
Germany). The wage differential between the two countries, which exceeded 
nominal appreciation, put pressure on production costs and squeezed profits in 
export and import-substituting industries in Holland. Consequently, rapid structural 
changes were observed in the economy, one aspect of which was de­
industrialization (Ellman, 1981: 157-9). It was especially the labour-intensive, 
internationally competitive manufactures that experienced low profits or losses - for 
example, ship building, vehicles, mechanical engineering, and metal 
manufacturing. The textiles, clothing, and shoe industries virtually disappeared in 
the seventies, as they could no longer compete with South Korean and Taiwanese 
prices. Thus the capital-intensive, labour-extensive sectors (energy) replaced the 
labour-intensive sectors (clothing, etc.). The service sector, meanwhile, continued 
to grow but was not able to absorb all the labour that industry shed. 
Unemployment, which had not existed prior to the boom, stood at 6% in the early 
eighties (ibid).
Despite this neat presentation of Holland as a case for the Dutch disease, the 
Dutch experience is far from being ideal. The boom was super-imposed on long- 
drawn structural changes in the Dutch economy. De-industrialization did not start 
with the energy boom, but much earlier in the mid-sixties, as evidenced by a 
decline in the share of manufacturing, a balance of payments deficit, and the 
rapidly increasing share of services. These trends in the Netherlands have been 
observed in other advanced economies. So have other symptoms: increasing 
participation of the public sector in GDP; internationalisation of leading industrial 
enterprises; modification of sectoral structures within manufacturing industry; a 
decrease in the rhythm of growth of industrial productivity in the mid-1960s; and
^Ellman (1981: 156-7) argues that labour costs in Holland were the highest in the world, and were 
substantially higher that those in the US (total labour cost per hour was DM 21.18 in Holland, and DM 
16.95 in the US in 1981). This does not mean that labourers benefited more, as wages in Holland were 
lower than those in the US. (average hourly wage was DM 12.01 in Holland, and DM 12.24 in the US in 
1981). Rather, it was the beneficiaries of the social security system who gained.
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the fall of the profit rate since the end of the 1960's. All these factors appeared 
before gas exports became relevant to the Dutch economy (Fajnzylber, 1981: 167- 
9), an observation which should remind us of the need to distinguish between the 
temporary effects of the boom - the Dutch disease effect - and the more profound 
de-industrialization problem in Europe.
It is generally accepted that Holland is the example to be avoided, and 
Norway the one to be followed, in managing energy rents (Kaldor, 1981: 6; see 
also chapters 3, 7 & 11 in Barker and Brailovsky, 1981). Norway's oil reserves, 
which became substantial in the late 1970s, are larger than Holland's relative to the 
economy (one-third of exports, and an equal output share in GDP as manufactures) 
and are expected to last well into the next century. Thus, long-term adjustment 
issues are involved. In the mid-seventies, there were expectations of high levels of 
revenue. Anti-recessionary measures were adopted, and domestic demand and 
employment were kept high. Foreign borrowing was increased rapidly, and 
financial incentives in various forms were given to some of the struggling 
industries when traditional exports stagnated. In 1978 there were fears that 
industry's competitiveness might decline because of the uncertainty of future oil 
prices, and accordingly the then policy of demand expansion was reversed: 
domestic demand was reined in and a comprehensive prices and incomes freeze 
was instituted (Bjerkholt et. al. , 1981: 172).
From a purely neo-classical point of view, this non-adjustment stance entails 
resource waste, especially since Norway's energy resources are sustainable over 
long periods of time. However, the Norwegian example is celebrated because it 
shows how, at an efficiency cost, the transitional cost of adjustment to post-boom 
conditions is reduced.
The British case is far more complicated, and brings out the need for 
macroeconomic, rather than structural, analysis, as the boom came at a time of 
poor economic performance. The British experience also shows the need for 
further disaggregation of the non-booming traded sector, as the oversimplified 
presentation of the economy in two sectors, trade and non-traded, hides much of 
what happened during the boom (Forsyth, 1986: 266-7). In addition, as in all 
industrial economies the counterfactual problem is considerable not only in terms 
of sectoral shifts, but also in terms of government policies.
Forsyth and Kay (1980) stirred controversy in the way they analysed the 
economic implications of the North Sea oil revenues. Basing their analysis on a 
neo-classical model, they showed that if domestic resource use is to rise in line
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with notional income, a balance on external trade must be maintained. This implies 
that a move from deficit to surplus on the primary account must be reflected in a 
move from surplus to deficit in other accounts, which consists largely of 
manufactures. Moreover, since manufactures make up a much larger fraction of 
the tradeable sector than of the economy as a whole, the 'crowding out' effect of 
the boom will be disproportionately concentrated on manufacturing. In other 
words, there is no mechanism for deriving benefit from North Sea oil which does 
not sooner or later require structural changes that then reduce the production of 
manufactures. The benefit to the UK citizens - a rise in their real income - comes 
indirectly through changes in the terms of trade: "the value of British output
measured in terms of its purchasing power for the goods Britain wants to buy" 
rises. Such a rise in income allows a further rise in total domestic resource 
utilisation. As regards the use of the additional income, investment is desirable, 
and the most ideal type of investment is one that uses tradeables to produce non- 
tradeables, imported machinery for use in services, for example. Investment in 
manufacturing, or indeed any type of protection to manufacturing such as import 
controls or restraints on the upward movement of the exchange rate, is 
counterproductive. Structural unemployment is likely to increase if reductions in 
wages in manufacturing are resisted.
The controversy stemmed mainly from the implication of a reduced role for 
manufacturing in the future development of the UK. Criticisms did not, however, 
challenge the logic of the argument in any fundamental way (Forsyth and Kay, 
1980; 1981). Because Forsyth and Kay's exposition, a hypothetical case based on 
comparative statics analysis, was basically microeconomic, while the UK's 
contemporary problems were of a macroeconomic nature, the article did not 
answer many normative questions,2 such as what fiscal, monetary, and wage 
policies the government should follow. Since a large portion of the rent accrued to
2The debate over North Sea oil's macro-economic effects in the UK. remains inconclusive for the 
simple reason that there is no agreement as to how oil discoveries influenced government policies, 
which can be traced back to disagreement about the policy counterfactual. Some economists claim that 
North Sea oil allowed the government to pursue a more expansionary policy than would otherwise have 
been possible, with the result that total employment is greater than it would have been in the absence of 
oil. Others argue the reverse. Wells and Rowthorn (1987) view lies in the middle, as they contend that 
North Sea oil had no significant medium-term effect on employment, because government action was 
such that it neutralised such effects. However, there has been changes in structural patterns of 
employment in accordance with sectoral shifts induced by the boom. Estimates of employment lost in 
manufacturing range between 380,000 to 600,000, which was offset by an equal gain in non­
manufacturing employment.
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the government, the failure to address government spending (and other government 
policies) rendered the analysis unduly partial.
The complexity of the British case stems from the presence of other real 
changes taking place during the boom, the effects of which cannot be distinguished 
from the boom effect. These effects were not large enough to be unambiguously 
evident in the data (Forsyth, 1986: 262). Their existence, however, is evidenced 
from a larger decline in manufacturing than warranted by the increase in oil and 
gas production. Manufacturing fell from 30% of GDP in 1974 to 23% in the early 
eighties,3 while oil and gas production rose by only 5% in the same period (Barker, 
1981). The theoretical ambiguity, regarding how large any particular change from 
the boom should be, casts a shadow on the matter, especially since expectations of 
the changes would themselves have had real effects. For example, expectations of 
large oil production after the mid-seventies in the UK., just as in Norway, led to 
currency appreciation even before actual production had taken place, and when the 
balance of payments was still in deficit (Forsyth and Kay, 1980). In contrast, 
modest expectations of the importance of North Sea oil over 1974-76 explain the 
low exchange rate in that period, which led to a revival of industrial production 
until 1979 (Forsyth, 1986: 268).
The British experience brings out other important points missed in the Dutch 
disease model because of its level of aggregation and its assumptions of perfect 
market and of small country. Within manufacturing, performances differed 
significantly. Whilst some manufacturing industries expanded (chemicals, electrical 
and industrial engineering, and food), some declined at faster than the average rate 
for the sector as a whole (man-made fibres, clothing, and textiles) (Forsyth, 1986: 
Table 8.15: 267).
According to Forsyth (ibid: 268) some markets may have had a lagged 
response to the boom which manifested itself in the overshooting of the exchange 
rate. The rapid appreciation of the pound and its subsequent rapid decline revealed 
that some overshooting did take place. This is a plausible explanation of the larger 
than merited de-industrialization.
Forsyth (ibid: 267) also mentions the possibility that the small country 
assumption was not justified for all manufacturing industries. As the currency 
appreciated, some industries might have been able to secure higher than market
Primary production increased in this period, but this was a special case because of the effect of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (Forsyth 1986: 263).
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prices for exports, and lower than world prices for imports. In such a case 
appreciation would have been exacerbated, and adjustment would have been forced 
on a smaller number of industries.
HI.3 Experiences of Industrialising Economies With Booms: New Evidence
Developing countries' experiences of booms raise a number of important 
theoretical issues, some of which have already being discussed in connection with 
industrial countries. It is, first of all, clear that government action plays a crucial 
role in determining the impact effect of the boom on resource allocation. Secondly, 
they reveal the importance of fine-tuning the traded and non-traded dichotomy on 
the basis of careful examination of trade policies and institutional aspects that 
impinge on tradeability - e.g. low capacity, or high cost, of transportation. And 
thirdly, they demonstrate the importance of establishing the counterfactual. The 
latter point merits further consideration since in the case of industrialising 
economies the direction of sectoral shifts is different, and the boom effect on these 
shifts may also be expected to be different.
Industrialisation in developing economies is caused mainly by the differential 
income elasticity of demand for manufacturing and agriculture (greater-than-unity 
in the former and less-than-unity in the latter), a statistical regularity known as 
Engel's law. There are also supply-side factors underlying industrialisation, the 
most important of which is the above average rate of growth in labour productivity 
in manufacturing. As per capita income rises, the stimulus given to, and the supply 
response of, manufacturing output is disproportionately larger than that for 
agriculture, whose output declines and is compensated for by a rise in the share of 
manufacturing.
Thus, the industrialisation process which continues during the boom works in 
the opposite direction to the Dutch disease effect. This is contrary to the experience 
of industrial countries where the two processes work in the same direction. 
However, the difficulty of distinguishing between the two effects is no less in the 
case of industrialising, than it is for industrial, economies, unless the 
industrialisation effect overcomes the Dutch disease effect, which we will see 
shortly is the case for most industrialising economies despite claims in the literature 
to the contrary.
There are other ways in which the experience of industrialising economies 
differ markedly from those of industrial ones. These are connected with the initial
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conditions on which the boom is superimposed, and include low level of per capita 
income, small markets, excess supply of labour, and constrained borrowing ability. 
The boom changes these conditions, either directly through making capital more 
available and through inducing a rapid expansion of demand that absorbs excess 
capacity, or indirectly through relative price changes, which makes imported inputs 
relatively cheaper. The likely outcome of these changes is an acceleration of 
industrialisation, or reversed Dutch disease.
Although a large number of developing countries experienced booms in the 
seventies, including Arab Gulf countries, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Indonesia, Iran, 
Algeria, Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Mexico, Cameroon and 
Gabon, only a few of them are discussed thoroughly in the literature. And those 
are the ones considered in what follows.
Nigeria attracted a lot of attention because of its poor performance during and 
after the boom. As a percentage of GDP, oil production in Nigeria increased from 
8% in 1970 to 22% in 1983, and its share in total exports rose from 57% to 96%. 
None the less, over the same period only in three years did Nigeria have a current 
account surplus (Pinto, Table 1, 1987). With 80% of the population living in rural 
areas, agriculture's performance seems more relevant than manufacturing for 
Dutch disease analysis.
Nigeria started the boom with an already over-valued currency, but with an 
inflation rate ranging between 20-35% p.a. during the boom, the Nira suffered 
from extreme over-valuation (Scherr, 1989). Between 1981 and 1973 the real 
effective exchange rate appreciated by 110%, and by a further 13% in 1984 
(Struthers, 1990). The increased opportunities for employment and self- 
employment in services and distributive branches in urban areas created a pull on 
labour from agriculture, bidding up rural wages three-fold during the period 1970- 
82 (Scherr, 1989). Consequently, CPI-deflated food prices rose by 46% over 1968- 
77 (Struthers, 1990). The result was that food production, which constitutes 90% 
of total agricultural production, increased at a modest rate of 2.7% during the two 
booms, which is less than population growth; while the formerly dynamic 
agricultural export sector declined at an average annual rate of 30% p.a.: cocoa 
production declined by 43% p.a., rubber by 29% p.a., and cotton by 65% p.a.. 
Groundnut exports declined to meet domestic demand. Only the protected palm 
kernel and palm oil sectors rose, by 23% and 30% respectively. Over the same 
period the share of agriculture in national output declined by 55% (from 49% to 
22%), and its share of total employment declined by 21% (from 75% to 59%)
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(Scherr, 1989). Although the decline in agriculture in Nigeria had commenced 
prior to the boom, there are reasons to believe that during the boom the decline 
intensified. During 1976-77 alone it fell by 22.7%.
Gelb (1986: 338) has argued that, if agriculture is broken down into food 
agriculture and export agriculture, then it can be said that the former was non- 
traded as it was shielded from international markets by inadequate port facilities. If 
so, then the Nigerian case comes closer to the theoretical model of the Dutch 
disease. However, this oversimplifies the Nigerian case. The decline in export 
agriculture in Nigeria was the result not only of resource transfers out of 
agriculture, and of increased spending on services, but also of numerous other 
factors. During the boom Nigeria was embracing a strategy of import substitution, 
and thus imposed taxes on exports and barriers on imports. The adverse terms of 
trade for agriculture benefited food producers for the domestic market, and hurt 
exporters. Government investment policies were biased against rural development 
(Struthers, 1990). Throughout most of the decade, government spending on 
agriculture and rural development amounted to only 3-5% of its total expenditure, 
rising to 9-10% in 1980-82. The largest proportion of government expenditure 
during the boom went to transport, primary education, a major steel complex, 
construction and auto assembly (Pinto, 1987). Construction of a new federal capital 
was also planned (Gelb, 1986). Furthermore, investment in agriculture was 
dominated by large-scale capital-intensive projects, including mechanised state-run 
food farms. Scherr (1989) contends that most of these projects were inefficiently 
managed and drew resources away from small-holders. Only 17% of federal 
agricultural expenditures went to small farm activities.
Trade, pricing and marketing policies were erratic and seem to have further 
confused farmers who were already overwhelmed by wild fluctuations in prices 
(Pinto, 1987; Scherr, 1989). For example, between 1978 and 1982, import duties 
on maize, rice, wheat and sorghum were raised to between 50-100%. But trade 
was already controlled through quantitative restrictions via import licensing. Export 
taxes were maintained until 1976, but were replaced with subsidies in 1982. 
Support prices were granted for many major crops, and although in some cases 
they were twice as high as international prices, they did not compensate for the 
indirect tax of currency over-valuation, except in the case of palm kernel and palm 
oil (Scherr, 1989). Also, more generally, agricultural tariff rates were lower than 
those for manufacturing.
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Manufacturing output in Nigeria, contrary to that of agriculture, grew at 
13.4% p.a. over 1970-82. This is partly explained by tariff protection, but also by 
availability of imported inputs, cheapened by high currency overvaluation. New 
capital-intensive industries were created during the boom such as iron, steel, and 
petroleum refining. After 1982, however, output of manufacturing declined sharply 
as imported raw and intermediate materials were no longer available (Struthers, 
1990). Thus the entire growth of manufacturing in Nigeria hinged on relaxing the 
foreign exchange constraint and on relative price movement.
Whilst the effect of adverse relative prices on the trade position of agriculture 
in Nigeria is easy to interpret, the same is not true of the output of its traded 
sectors. Disregarding, for the moment, the confusing signals government action 
sent to agriculture, the latter's performance was not as suiprising as the above 
suggests it ought to be, given what happened in manufacturing. Manufacturing's 
remarkable 13.4% p.a. growth compared with non-oil GDP growth at 5.3% p.a. 
over 1972-81 (Gelb, 1986, table 2.11: 79) by necessity meant a large increase of 
manufacturing's share in aggregate output; compensated by a decline in that of 
agriculture. Seen in this light, a 2.3% p.a. growth in food agriculture, which 
makes up 90% of the agricultural sector, seems quite reasonable. The crucial point 
is that Nigeria's experience during the oil boom is better interpreted as an 
acceleration of industrialisation, which is to have been expected given the rapid rise 
in per capita income and agriculture's initial 49% share of gross output. Thus, 
paradoxically, agriculture's poor performance during the boom is in part the 
reverse of the Dutch disease and not entirely a manifestation of it.
Indonesia's experience is diagonally opposed to Nigeria's in that government 
action reversed the boom's effect on agriculture, rather than add to it, as we found 
in the case of both Nigeria and Holland. The share of oil in Indonesia's national 
income is as important as that of Nigeria's (rising from 5% in 1970 to 25% in 
1980), and the urban/rural ratio is identical (20:80 in 1980). The share of oil in 
total exports, however, features less prominently in Indonesia than it does in 
Nigeria (40% in 1970 and 66% in 1982) (Pinto, 1987, Table 1). The boom 
revenues were completely monetised, as a consequence of which there was 
currency appreciation, which led the government to devalue twice, in 1978 and in 
1983 (Warr, 1986: 298-301).
Despite appreciation, agricultural production in Indonesia grew by 3.8% p.a. 
over 1970-82, and rice production increased by two-thirds over the same period, 
approaching self-sufficiency (reached in 1984). Maize production increased by
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50%, and cassava by 25%. Among major food crops, only sweet potato production 
declined, although there was substantial substitution of rice for other foods. The 
period 1977-82 brought about an agricultural export boom due to favourable world 
prices. Over the seventies, rubber production increased by a fifth, palm oil exports 
tripled, crop exports rose by nearly half, and coffee exports were up over 40% 
(Scherr, 1989).
Indonesia's performance seems to be explained, partly, by the fortuitous 
coincidence of the green revolution, foreign exchange availability from the oil 
shock which enabled the purchase of fertilisers necessary for the new rice varieties, 
and the effective establishment of rural institutions just before the start of the boom 
(Gelb, 1986: 337-8); and, partly, by government action which was committed to 
the development of the rice sector. Its efforts included extending subsidies for the 
purchase of fertilisers to promote "green revolution" technologies, technical 
extension programs, small-scale infrastructure improvements and smallholder 
irrigation rehabilitation in Java (Scherr, 1989). More generally, government 
spending priorities favoured rural areas heavily. The proportion of government 
spending on agriculture rose from 16% prior to the boom to 22% in 1979-80 
(compared with 5% in Nigeria). In addition, price and trade policies were used to 
stabilise agriculture. Prices generally followed international markets, but a 
guaranteed floor price was maintained. The costs of world price uncertainty were 
borne by the government, although there were not large net public subsidies. 
Imports were targeted to cover only domestic production shortfall. Many 
traditional export taxes were abolished or lowered in 1976 and 1978 (ibid). Thus 
the story of agriculture in Indonesia is closer to the question of resource rents and 
technological change, as Gelb has argued (1986: 337), than it is to the Dutch 
disease. Manufacturing performed much better than agriculture in Indonesia during 
the boom, supported mainly by an effective rate of protection as high as 66%, 
compared with -11% for agriculture (Scherr, 1989).
Despite the celebrated performance of agriculture in Indonesia its share in 
aggregate output declined at faster rates during the boom than would have been 
expected had past trends continued (Warr, 1986: 307).4 Thus, even in Indonesia the 
boom period seems to have been one of rapid industrialisation, since growth in
4 According to Warr (ibid), "the same decline that took a decade in Indonesia (from 44% to 31% of GDP 
from 1971 to 1981), took 25 years in Japan
62
manufacturing's share in aggregate output was also higher than past trends.5 
According to Gelb (1988, Table 6-3: 88) the average annual change in 
manufacturing's share over 1972-81 in Indonesia was 0.77%, while the 'norm' 
change - as calculated on the basis of Chenery-Syrquin methodology - in this share 
should have been only 0.34%. Conversely, agriculture's share declined at 1.5% 
p.a. instead of the 1.31% p.a. predicted by the norm. For Nigeria these 
differentials are even more striking: manufacturing increased its share at 0.48 % 
p.a. against an expected 'norm' of only 0.11% p.a.; and agriculture declined at 
1.9% p.a. against an expected norm of 0.67% p.a. (similar results obtained for 
Algeria and Ecuador).
Despite a recognition by many Dutch disease economists, including Gelb, that 
a rise in manufacturing's share is 'normally' accompanied by a decline in that of 
agriculture, the accelerating decline in agriculture's share is still perceived as a 
symptom of the Dutch disease only, rather than merely a concomitant of 
accelerating industrialisation. The confusion in the literature seems to have been 
spurred by Corden's (1984) assertion that the Dutch disease theory applies equally 
to agriculture and manufacturing, since both produce tradeables; "the term 'de- 
industrialisation' can thus be misleading .... and should be regarded as no more 
than a shorthand" (262-3). This, of course, is only valid within the assumptions of 
Corden's static model, with no growth and structural change over time, apart from 
those induced by the change in relative prices, and no productivity change. The 
same is not true in real economies where these changes do take place over time; 
and they do so more strongly during the boom than otherwise, because of the rapid 
rise in income. Thus, while it is expected that the two sectors would behave 
similarly in response to changes in the structure of prices, their behaviour should 
be expected to differ in responding to the income-demand effect (because of 
differential income elasticities of demand, which would instigate different supply 
responses; and because of differential productivity growth in the two sectors, as I 
have already mentioned).
Iran's experience lies somewhere between the two extremes of Nigeria and 
Indonesia (only performance during the first oil-boom will be considered since the 
second oil boom coincides with political upheaval in Iran). Above all, it reveals the
Nevertheless, Warr (ibid) argues that compared with South-East Asian neighbours, Indonesia's 
expansion of manufacturing contribution was not particularly 'dramatic', and that perhaps the boom did 
have the effect of holding back rapid growth in manufacturing that would otherwise have occurred. 
Needless to say this comparison is quite arbitrary, since there is no presumption that these economies 
should behave in the same manner.
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importance of incorporating micro-analysis, a study of socio-economic institutions, 
and an awareness of government policy reaction (especially since oil revenues 
accrued in their entirety to the government).
Iran was highly dependent on oil prior to the first boom, but this dependence 
increased with the oil price revolution. The ratio of oil to total exports rose from 
75% prior to the boom to 84% during it. Oil revenues were used for both 
consumption (government consumption increased by 12,2% p.a., and private 
consumption by 10% p.a., both in real terms) and investment (GFCF increased by 
10% p.a.). However, the share of consumption was larger than that of investment, 
and was equally divided between military spending and subsidies. Investment was 
skewed towards construction and services. Investment in agriculture stood at 3% of 
GDP during the boom; if credit to agriculture is included, the figure rises to 5% of 
GDP (Majd, 1991).
The share of agriculture in non-oil GDP during the boom declined from its 
pre-boom levels by about 6.4% between 1973/4-78/9 (Jazayeri, 1988, Table 2.6: 
54). This performance however is open to conflicting interpretations. On the one 
hand, Gelb (1988: 88) estimates that agriculture's share in total output over the 
period 1972-81 declined by 0.42% p.a. more that it should, had the norm been 
followed. On the other hand, Majd (1991) contends that agriculture performed 
rather well during this period, since its value added rose at 2.5% p.a. - the problem 
of the counterfactual revisited.
The most interesting feature of agriculture's performance in Iran is that in 
many agricultural enterprises small farmers performed better than large 
commercial farmers. This indicates the importance of micro-analysis in 
understanding the mechanisms by which a boom's effects are transmitted to 
agriculture, a type of analysis that seems to have been pioneered by Scherr (1989), 
who tried to explain the strong performance of Tabascan peasant farmers of 
Mexico, in contrast to large land-holders and commercial farmers. Similarly, Majd 
(1991) has found that while the output of large sugar-beet producers fell 
substantially in Iran, there was a strong increase in the output of peasant and 
medium farmers. What brought this about in Iran were the phenomena of family 
labour and dual employment, with rural labour engaged simultaneously in 
agriculture and rug making or construction.6 Thus, despite high transportation costs
6Around one-quarter to one-third of all farmers owned and operated a carpet workshop on their 
premises. Amongst small farmers the percentage is 40% (Majd, 1991).
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and wage growth twice as fast as increases in sugar prices, total production costs 
rose more slowly on small farms than on large farms. Consequently, the break­
even yield per hectare for small farms was below that for large commercial farms, 
and much lower than for mechanised farms (14 tons for small farmers, 27 tons for 
large farmers, and 38 for mechanised farmers).7
The picture in manufacturing is less equivocal than that of agriculture. 
According to Jazayeri (1988), the general performance is in line with the Dutch 
disease model. Prices of manufactures lagged behind all other prices in the 
economy, especially those of construction, while labour costs increased by 13% 
p.a. in real terms. Having been the fastest growing sector in the economy in the 
decade preceding the oil boom (12.3% p.a. in real terms), manufacturing lost this 
position to services (growing at only 5.9% p.a. over 1973/4-78/9, compared with 
non-oil GDP growth of 9.8% p.a. over the same period). Thus Iran seems to have 
been de-industrialising during the boom, since the share of manufacturing in total 
output declined by about 6.7% over the first oil shock period; and as such is the 
only industrialising economy reviewed that seems to have behaved as predicted by 
the Dutch disease model.
Within manufacturing, performances varied amongst industries, as in 
agriculture. Jazayeri argues that growth took place in industries that had low value 
added and high percentages of imported inputs. For example, whilst the labour- 
intensive textile industry faced serious competition from cheap imports from 
Taiwan and Korea, and production started declining from 1976 onwards, the 
relatively capital-intensive footwear production was able to resist such a squeeze. 
Similarly, in transport equipment and metal products, both of which have a high 
import content as well as being capital-intensive, output grew rapidly. Other 
industries that did well, such as non-metal mining products (mainly bricks), were 
non-traded in nature. Thus even at the micro-level, Jazayeri is able to explain the 
performance of traded goods production while staying strictly within Dutch disease 
analysis, by using the factor intensity argument and the de-composition of the 
traded sector (see section II.3.3).
7Scherr (1989) argues other factors that change the supply response of small farmers, such as high 
short-term labour mobility; the ability to exploit family labour by accepting lower returns than the going 
market rates; the immobility of small farmers' capital; the exclusion of land value from their cost of 
production; operating at a lower fixed cost; and having a flexible production schedule due to smaller 
scale (Majd, 1991).
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Gelb (1986: 54-93) examines how closely the experiences of seven booming 
industrialising economies fit the Dutch disease model. These countries are: 
Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, Algeria, Iran, Indonesia, Nigeria and Ecuador. 
There were deviations from the model both in terms of sectoral shifts and exchange 
rate movements; the correlation between these two variables was not always very 
good. The study strongly suggests government action to be the single most 
important determinant of performance during and after the boom.
The estimated average size of the windfall in these seven economies was 
about one-quarter of non-oil GDP; about four-fifths of this windfall accrued to 
producer governments, whose reaction therefore primarily determined the ultimate 
effects of the price increase. All the countries studied showed a striking alacrity to 
use about half the windfall to finance domestic capital formation. This share was 
reduced by greater consumption in the late 1970s, while the fraction invested 
abroad remained stable at a quarter.
Government action varied considerably from country to country. At one 
extreme, central government and public enterprises accounted for 90% of domestic 
investment. At the other, the role of the Ecuadorian public sector has been quite 
limited. Nevertheless, all these oil exporters saw an unprecedented growth in the 
size of the public sector after 1973 and, in most, the public sector participated 
directly in industrial production. Investment was intended to increase growth and 
attenuate currency appreciation and, therefore, sectoral shifts of the non-oil output. 
This, however, depends on the efficacy and distribution of capital formation, and 
the factor intensity of various sectors. Generally speaking, in the countries 
investigated by Gelb, the impact of investment on growth has been disappointing. 
Most infrastructure investments were subject to long gestation lags. The oil price 
shock itself rendered some of the initial capital stock obsolete. Much public 
investment was in large-scale, complex projects, which were prone to substantial 
cost overruns and disappointing operating performance. Once oil revenues had 
fallen, governments faced serious problems in attempting to curb the momentum of 
public investment, some of which implied large future recurrent obligations and 
growing subsidies.
On average, the non-oil economies in these countries were 4.1% smaller 
during 1979-81 than they would have been had they maintained their 1967-72 
growth trajectories. Average non-oil growth after 1972 was only 0.9% more rapid 
than that of oil-importing developing countries. Moreover, most of this growth was 
demand-led rather than supply-generated, in the sense that non-oil growth
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responded to increased absorption after 1974 but was lowered after 1978, despite 
the expectation that large investments undertaken in the period 1975-1978 would 
begin to contribute to output (ibid).
Finally we turn to Jordan, whose experience brings to light an analytical 
aspect of booms neglected in all the literature reviewed above, namely dynamic 
analysis. Furthermore, empirical findings on Jordan lend support to Karshenas' 
(1990) argument that boom conditions are conducive to rapid technological 
advance. Jordan's experience also shows that investment in non-traded sectors - 
e.g. transport, telecommunications, etc. - can be complementary to that in the 
traded sector and, therefore, increases returns to factors employed in the 
production of tradeables.
The boom in Jordan was caused by a sudden and large inflow of foreign aid 
and workers' remittances, coinciding with the two oil shocks (see chapter V). The 
ratio of grants and remittances to GDP peaked in 1979 at 73% (42% grants, 31% 
remittances); and to exports averaged 317% during 1974-1981. Thus the potential 
impact of the boom on the economy was larger than that in any of the countries 
reviewed thus far.
During the boom investment in traded sectors - agriculture and manufacturing 
- were considerable. In mining and manufacturing, investment was 25.9% of total 
investment, of which the government contributed 33%. Investment in agriculture 
and irrigation stood at 10.2% of total investment, with the government share as 
high as 60% (World Bank, 1980: 5; 1983a: 21). In addition, a significant 
proportion of the remaining government investment went into infrastructure, such 
as the Port of Aqaba and major feeder roads. This type of investment directly 
enhanced production and distribution efficiency in the two traded sectors, as it 
increased the handling capacity of exporters and imports of raw and intermediate 
inputs.
Jordan's general performance during the booms was quite remarkable, with 
GDP growing at 12.7% p.a. in real terms in the period 1974-81. Growth in 
agriculture was the slowest at 5.7% p.a., but agricultural production rose 
uninterruptedly, despite a 78% decline in agricultural employment. Mining and 
manufacturing were two of the fastest growing sectors, at 19.5% and 18.6% p.a. 
in real terms, respectively. Export growth was even more impressive. Over 1975- 
82, agricultural exports grew by 50% in real terms and 100% in nominal terms; 
and exports of manufactures grew at 36% p.a. in real terms.
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My findings on the performance of agriculture show that public and private 
investment in the sector brought about significant technological advance. Public 
investment in primary irrigation schemes, which started in the sixties but continued 
well into the eighties, induced private investment in on-farm irrigation, improved 
agricultural inputs (fertilisers, improved seeds, pesticides, and herbicides) and 
modern production techniques (hot-house farming). These technology-embodying 
investments changed technical conditions of production, which was now taking 
place at much higher levels of productivity and, therefore, profitability.
In manufacturing, excess capacity prior to the boom was of the order of 50%. 
The rapid expansion of demand induced by the boom allowed industries to expand 
very rapidly without increasing their production costs, by utilising more of the 
existing capacity. Econometric investigation has shown that productivity growth 
was highly dependent on output expansion, that is, dynamic economies of scale - 
Verdoorn's law - was in operation. The Dutch disease model was thus found to be 
unsatisfactory for the study of manufacturing in Jordan mainly because it employs 
comparative static analysis, whereas in industrialising booming economies dynamic 
models seem to be more appropriate.
III.4 Synthesis
The most remarkable feature of experiences with booms is the influence on the 
final sectoral outcome of the initial conditions on which the boom is super­
imposed. These conditions can be grouped in three classes: the level of per capita 
income and the degree of industrialisation; the economic constraints; and the phase 
of the business cycle at which the economy is operating.
Broadly speaking, economies can be divided into two groups on the basis of 
the extent of industrialisation obtaining at the start of the boom; those whose share 
of manufacturing in aggregate output was on an upward trend - industrialising 
economies - and those whose share was on a downward trend - mature industrial 
economies. The forces that underlie industrialisation or de-industrialization, as the 
case may be, are related to the level of per capita income; differential income 
elasticities of demand for sectoral output; and differential productivity growth 
between sectors, a subject that has already been discussed in sections III.2 and
III.3. These forces do not stop operating during the boom; on the contrary, they do 
so more powerfully since the boom translates to a demand shock, if the windfall is 
partially or wholly monetised. However, since these forces work in the same 
direction as the Dutch disease effect in industrial economies, and in an opposing
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direction in industrialising economies, we would expect them to augment the Dutch 
disease in the former and to counter them in the latter.
The second initial condition that influences the sectoral outcome is the 
presence of economic constraints, such as a balance of payments deficit, or being 
quantity-constrained in capital markets. These constraints may hold back 
industrialisation so their removal can only accelerate it. Furthermore, availability 
of capital and imported inputs is consistent with both technological advance and 
rapid productivity growth, both of which feed into further industrialisation.
Sectoral shifts are also strongly influenced by the economy's position on the 
business cycle at the start of the boom. As noted in chapter II, the Dutch disease 
model assumes the economy to be in macro-equilibrium with no unemployment at 
any time. If, on the other hand, prior to the boom there exists idle capacity in the 
economy, be it industrial or industrialising, the boom is likely to induce 
industrialisation. This is because under conditions of repressed demand the share of 
services is disproportionately larger, and of manufacturing disproportionately 
smaller, than under conditions of equilibrium (see section II.4 in previous chapter).
On the question of employment, experiences of industrial and industrialising 
economies differ considerably. In industrial economies, it is likely that they start 
the boom with fully employed resources, but that the boom creates unemployment 
because of wage increases and downward rigidities in wages, and because of the 
replacement of labour-intensive sectors (manufacturing) with labour-extensive 
sectors (energy). In this case, a more useful model would be one in which the full 
employment assumption is dropped, and employment is made dependent on, 
among other things, oil revenues, government spending, and the wage rate (see 
Seers, 1962).
Developing economies are likely to start the boom from unemployment 
because of the economic constraints referred to above. This unemployment will be 
reduced or eliminated by the boom as the foreign exchange and savings gaps are 
relieved. The reversal of the boom would reverse this outcome leading again to 
excess supply of labour. In this case a more useful model is likely to be one in 
which the full employment assumption hinges on the removal of economic 
constraints such as the two-gap model (see Salizu, 1990, for an application of this 
model to Nigeria during the oil boom). It is important to note that as far as 
employment is concerned, the outcomes for industrial and industrialising 
economies will differ because industrialising economies’ idle capacity starting point 
will ensure that productivity gains associated with the boom will be highly
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significant, leading to an expansion of manufacturing (where productivity growth 
can reasonably be expected to be fastest).
If we synthesise all these factors; namely, firstly, growth in per capita income 
and its effect on changing demand structure; secondly, the existence or not of 
economic constraints; and thirdly the state of the economy in regard to its position 
on the business cycle, we come up with two plausible scenarios. One is 
representative of the majority of industrialising economies' experiences, and the 
other of the majority of industrial economies' experiences. The two scenarios 
follow.
In a pre-boom industrialising economy, per capita income is low; demand is 
constrained by a balance of payments deficit and lack of investible funds; and there 
is, therefore, an excess supply of labour. If, in addition, the economy is very small 
there may be idle physical capacity because of the efficient size of plant constraint. 
Furthermore, much production technology will not be state of the art because of 
the foreign exchange constraint, and because investment in human resources is also 
constrained by the generally low level of economic activity. As per capita income 
rises in the course of development, the relative importance of food expenditure 
undergoes continuous decline and that of manufacturing a continuous rise. 
However, the above mentioned economic constraints will hold back 
industrialisation. The boom changes these conditions all at once. Per capita income 
rises rapidly inducing a rapid expansion of demand. Foreign exchange becomes 
relatively abundant and imported inputs are purchased more cheaply, than before 
the boom. Industrialisation can proceed at a quick pace, since as idle capacity is 
reduced, output expands while unit costs fall; that is, productivity is advancing. 
There may also be rapid technological change induced by imported capital and 
material.
The effect of relative price changes on output - the Dutch disease effect - 
would counterbalance these forces, but is unlikely to reverse them. The 
experiences of Jordan, Indonesia and even Nigeria (where currency appreciation 
was the strongest, yet its industrialisation was accelerated during the boom period) 
all fit this scenario.
In a developed economy, per capita income is high and demand is buoyant 
enough to absorb any excess capacity in the economy. Technology is state of the 
art, and production takes place at the frontier. The economy experiences de­
industrialization, because productivity growth in services lags behind that of 
manufacturing. The rise in per capita income induced by the boom can only
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accelerate these patterns. In addition, the Dutch disease effect also reduces the 
share of manufacturing in aggregate output, via the change in the structure of 
prices. Continued de-industrialisation is the most plausible outcome. This scenario 
is consistent with the experiences of all industrial booming economies reviewed, 
namely Holland, Australia, the UK, and Norway.
Our conclusion is that the question asked by the Dutch disease theory should 
be modified from: Does the boom reduce the share of manufacturing output and 
employment? to: What is the extent to which the boom accelerates the decline in 
the shares of manufacturing output8 and employment in industrial countries; and 
accelerates the rise in these shares in developing countries?9
In the next chapter I will begin the discussion on the Jordanian experience 
with booms. I will first examine historical trends in sectoral shifts and, having 
established them, I will geometrically construct the counterfactual to the Dutch 
disease.
T o recapitulate, the share of manufacturing output in national income declines in industrial 
countries because of a shift in demand in favour of services as income rises; and because productivity 
growth is faster in manufacturing than in sendees, so that as output grows differential productivity 
between the two sectors leads to a decline in manufacturing prices, relative to those of services, and 
deflects employment away from the dynamic sector - manufacturing - to the less dynamic sector - 
services.
sIn developing economies, as incomes rise there will be a noticeable shift in demand away from 
agriculture towards manufacturing, in terms of value shares in total income spent. Starting from a 
relatively large share of agricultural output in national income, the rise in per capita income is 
concomitant with a decline in the share of agriculture and a rise in that of manufacturing. This is true in 
both nominal and real terms, although as productivity in manufacturing exceeds that in other sectors, 
sectoral shifts will be much larger when expressed in real, rather than in nominal, terms.
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CHAPTER IV
Economic Growth And Structural Change In Jordan: 1952-1992
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Introduction
This chapter discusses trends in economic growth and sectoral changes in the 
Jordanian economy from its inception to date. Such an analysis is made 
necessary by two considerations.
First, as a developing economy Jordan was going through a process of 
industrialisation when the boom took place - sectoral contributions to growth 
were changing over time, with manufacturing share expanding and agricultural 
share declining. Under these circumstances, experiencing the Dutch disease (a 
squeeze on the tradeable sector) may merely mean that the manufacturing sector 
grew more slowly, and the agricultural sector declined more quickly, than would 
otherwise have been the case. Therefore, establishing the counterfactual to the 
Dutch disease is a first necessary step in assessing whether or not Jordan 
experienced a squeeze on the tradeable sector. This is done by first establishing 
the historical trends of growth and sectoral change, and then projecting these 
trends onto the boom period.
Second, the Dutch disease theory stresses the effect of relative price 
changes on altering supply conditions, which then determine the pattern of 
sectoral shifts. Demand conditions, beyond those required to equilibrate markets, 
are implicitly assumed to be stable, and thus have no significant effect on the 
observed shifts among products. For an economy with a high per capita income, 
most of the change in demand patterns has taken place in the past. In these 
economies, demand conditions are expected to be stable under booming 
conditions, and the change in production would be determined largely by supply 
factors. The same is not true for developing economies. Starting from a low per 
capita income, a sudden increase in available resources would have significant 
effects on demand patterns. A host of literature has addressed exactly this 
question:1 how does the change in per capita income influence the observed final 
demand vector, via the change in demand patterns and the ensuing interaction 
between demand and supply factors. Thus a full understanding of the causes of
^For example Chenery (1960); Chenery, Shishido, and Wautanabe (1962); Kim (1977); and Pack 
(1971).
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sectoral shifts necessitates the reconciliation of these two types of literature: the 
Dutch disease and the structural models,2 which is the intent in this chapter.
Although structural models have traditionally explained changes in 
demand largely in terms of consumption elasticities (Engel law) and changes in 
technology, it will be shown here that government policy, especially its 
investment behaviour, has had a significant effect on influencing patterns of 
growth and sectoral change.
IV. 1 Background3
No economic study of Jordan could be regarded complete without a 
consideration of exogenous shocks.1 These shocks were mostly political 
(directly, the 1948 and 1967 wars with Israel, and the 1970 civil unrest; and, 
indirectly, the 1979 Iran/Iraq war and the 1990 Gulf war). But economic shocks 
also played a role (the two oil price shocks in the seventies, which themselves 
may have been politically induced). Both these sets of shocks are linked to 
Jordan's geopolitical position vis-d-vis Israel, on the one hand, and the rest of the 
Arab countries, on the other. The most salient effect of the shocks on the country 
has been to alter the size and condition of factor and commodity markets. Also 
important has been the impact on the construction sector, as with each new influx 
of refugees a construction boom has been spurred. The recurrent nature of 
external shocks helped to perpetuate two more features of the Jordanian 
economy.
First, foreign aid has always been forthcoming (from the UK. and the US. 
prior to the oil boom, and from Arab oil-exporting countries after the boom). 
Together with the rapidly growing population, high per capita foreign aid has 
meant that Jordan has lacked neither labour nor capital for development. Second, 
and intimately linked with the first factor, a large public administration has been 
created mainly to serve as a means of distributing foreign aid to the economy,
2This is not to say that structuralist models such as Chenery's, to which the paragraph above refers, 
ignore supply conditions. Rather, it is not where the stress lies.
3For an elaborate political economy background to Jordan see Sayigh (1978: 187-228), and Mazur 
(1979: 1-15).
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but also to provide social services (health, education, etc.) to the rapidly growing 
population, not least because of refugee influxes. In addition, political insecurity 
entailed the maintenance of a large army which further expanded the public 
administration.
The economic history of Jordan is best studied in three distinct periods:
1. 1921-1950, from Jordan's inception until its annexation of the 'West Bank'. 
This period encompasses the loss of the greater part of Palestine in 1948, 
with which Jordan had maintained, up to that point, close economic ties.
2. 1950-1967, when the Jordanian economy and the 'West Bank' behaved as 
one unit. Within this period two sub-periods can be discerned:
1) 1950-1955. a period of adjustment to the severing of links with 
the Palestinian economy; the annexation of the 'West Bank'; and 
the influx of refugees into Jordan.
2) 1955-1967. a period of steadier growth than previously 
achieved. Rapid rates of expansion were experienced in all sectors 
of the economy.
3. 1967-present, when the Jordanian economy no longer includes the 'West 
Bank'. This period may be divided into three sub-periods:
1) 1967-1972. a period of dislocation and adjustment to the war of 
1967 and the loss of the 'West Bank'; the influx of refugees into 
Jordan; and the civil war of 1970/71.
2) 1973-1982. a period of great prosperity, with indirect windfall 
gains from the two oil booms.
3) 1983-present, up until 1992 the period was one of economic 
slowdown, culminating in a debt-induced economic crisis in 1988. 
The economic slowdown deepened further with the Gulf war in 
1990/91, and major disruptions in the economy took place as a 
result of the influx of refugees into Jordan. From 1992 to-date, a
rapid expansion in all economic activities is taking place. The main
impetus seems to have come from increased human and capital 
resources, provided by the Palestinian "returnees" from Kuwait.
In what follows, a highly stylised analysis of economic growth and structural
changes in the Jordanian economy is given, within the time frame set above
(Tables IV. 1-1 & IV. 1-2). It must be stressed that the following analysis is
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Table IV.1-1
Sectoral Shares in Aggregate Output, 1951-1992 
(% at constant 1975 prices)__________________
GDP A griculture
M ining &
Q uarry ing  M anufacturing
Electricity 
& W ater Construction
T ransport & 
C om m unication
T rade & 
Business
G overnm ent
Services
O ther
Services
1954 100.0 32.4 2.2 4.6 0.3 1.1 8.7 27.8 16.5 6.4
1961 100.0 23.7 2.5 6.7 0.5 2.6 11.2 30.2 15.6 7.1
1966 100.0 18.0 3.7 9.7 0.8 6.6 9.4 29.9 14.7 7.3
1972 100.0 13.9 5.5 9.7 0.9 4.2 9.0 28.9 24.0 3.9
1978 100.0 7.6 8.9 12.9 0.8 7.8 11.0 31.6 16.4 3.0
1982 100.0 7.0 6.8 15.2 1.6 9.8 10.6 29.1 17.5 2.4
1988 100.0 8.3 10.9 9.3 2.3 5.6 15.4 31.6 17.9 3.8
1992 100.0 9.3 5.8 11.7 2.5 3.9 15.3 28.2 24.1 3.7
Source: Calculated from Appendix AIV.l.
Table IV.1-2
Compounded Growth Rates of the Jordanian Economy by Sector, 1952-1992
(at constant 1975 prices)
GDP A griculture
M ining &
Q uarry ing  M anufacturing
Electricity 
& W ater Construction
T ransport & 
Com m unication
Trade & 
Business
Governm ent
Services
Other
Services
1955-1960 10.01 5.04 7.41 9.38 16.44 19.89 12.02 12.98 10.15 12.76
1961-1966 8.16 6.32 19.16 17.85 19.01 22.01 2.63 7.19 6.20 7.69
1967-1972 4.06 -0.28 9.60 2.18 13.39 -5.86 7.58 4.20 6.46 12.51
1973-1982 11.89 4.39 19.18 16.66 17.16 18.22 13.61 13.06 6.32 2.46
1983-1988 3.01 11.99 17.67 -4.00 17.36 -10.96 6.82 1.67 3.21 2.93
1989-1992 7.95 -1.94 -18.64 6.99 6.60 7.86 6.12 13.74 22.88 5.31
Source: Ibid.
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mainly descriptive, with relatively little explanation of the underlying 
determinants of the observed changes. It is designed to illuminate the overall 
intersectoral background necessary for the intensive analysis of individual sectors 
in subsequent chapters (VI & VII).
1921-1950: At the inception of the modern Jordanian State in 1921, industrial 
output contributed an insignificant part of aggregate economic activity. The 
development of the materials-producing sector were constrained by limited raw 
materials, shortages of skilled labour, capital scarcity, and the high cost of 
infrastructure facilities. The few existing industries consisted largely of small- 
scale processing of agricultural products, especially flour milling. Most 
industries relied on work done at home or in small workshops, and even these 
activities were relatively rare. The economy thus thrived on basic farming. The 
country's close ties with Palestine stimulated its agricultural production,4 and 
enhanced its employment opportunities, as some Transjordanians found seasonal 
employment in Palestine, especially on public construction projects.
Since both the physical and social infrastructure were lacking in this 
period, the service sector was far less developed than now. However, due to 
political instability,5 there was disproportionately generous spending on the 
military, financed from abroad (Dar Al-Handasah, 1982g: 13-14; Mazur, 1979: 
7-8 & 10; El-Akel, 1985: 18). No national accounts are available for this period, 
and estimates of growth cannot, therefore, be made.
1950-1967: The World Bank mission (IBRD, 1956: 10) that visited Jordan in 
1955 estimated GDP growth in current prices to be 10% p.a. for the period 
1952-54 (inflation was not expected to have exceeded 2% p.a.). This rate of 
growth is quite remarkable, given the problems Jordan faced with labour 
absorption, after the influx of 350,000 Palestinians into the country (which then 
included the 'West Bank'). According to Sayigh (1978: 191), about one third of
4Jordau seems to have run a surplus ou its balance of trade with Palestiue, consisting mostly of 
agricultural products (Mazur, 1979: 7).
instability in this period was caused mainly by the constant Bedouin raids on settled areas. Later in 
the period, tensions came mainly from Arab-Israeli politics, with its consequent internal tensions in 
Jordan - between Jordanians and Palestinians (ibid: 8).
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the total labour force was unemployed in the early fifties, and there was in 
addition a high level of disguised unemployment.6
To a large extent, problems of excess capacity were overcome in the 
following period (1955-60) by a construction boom spurred by the arrival of the 
Palestinian refugees. From that point, a construction-led expansion, following a 
large influx of population, seems to have become something of a trend in Jordan. 
Behind this phenomenon lie the relatively strong backward linkages construction 
has to many other manufacturing and service sectors. Construction booms, 
therefore, are usually concomitant with rapid expansion in many labour intensive 
manufacturing industries (wood, paints, metals, cement, etc.). Over the 1955-60 
period, construction grew at 19.9% p.a., and was the leading sector as far as 
growth is concerned. Manufacturing grew at 9.4% p.a., with the impetus coming 
mainly from private sector ventures into cement, petroleum refining, cigarettes, 
vegetable oil and other small-scale industries (Five Year Plan 1976-80: 6). The 
state's economic activities were concentrated on the provision and development 
of infrastructure: road construction, building facilities at the Port of Aqaba,7 and 
expanding facilities for basic services like education, health, etc. (ibid: 5), which 
explains the rapid growth in electricity, transport and communication and 
services. Agriculture's growth was slowest at 5% p.a. (Table IV. 1-2)
Thus, whilst the direct annexation of the 'West Bank' did not change the 
structure of the Jordanian economy (as both Transjordan and the 'West Bank' 
were predominantly agricultural),8 the addition to the quantity and quality of
6In addition to the 350,000 refugees of the occupied part of Palestine, for whom there were no 
immediate jobs in Jordan, a good proportion of the 'West Bank' residents - at least 120,000 - lost their 
livelihood which was some way or another linked to the occupied part of Palestine (ibid: 9).
7After the occupation of most of Palestine, Jordan was forced to reorient its trade routes and 
communication lines, which used to move westward to the ports of Palestine, to north-south directions 
(ibid: 10).
8The proportion of commercial as opposed to subsistence farming was greater in the 'West Bank' than 
in Jordan. Also, the 'West Bank' was initially better equipped with manufacturing industry and trading 
establishments in general than Jordan. Yet, "the two economies were rather more complementary with 
that part of Palestine which was lost to Israel, than with each other" (ibid: 9. See also Sayigh, 1978: 
187).
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Jordan's labour resource,9 as well as to its capital stock,10 led to rapid sectoral 
shifts. Over 1954-61 the share of agriculture in aggregate output declined from 
32.4% to 23.7%; that of industry (mining, manufacturing and construction) rose 
from 7.9% to 11.8%; and of services from 59.4% to 60.1% (Table V I.1-1).
These sectoral shifts are in keeping with the 'universal' trends of 
development, reflecting a GDP elasticity of less than one for agriculture, and 
more than one for industry (all expressed in per capita terms). This in turn 
reflects a change in demand patterns as income per capita rises (Engel law). Yet 
the share of manufacturing at this stage of Jordan's development was relatively 
small (6.7%). Mazur explains this apparent 'disequilibrium' in terms, firstly, of 
the political instability of the period, which must have discouraged investment in 
this sector; and, secondly, the inadequacy of the transport system in the 
aftermath of the severing of transport links with Palestine. "In trying to address 
the latter issue, the government tied up human and capital resources which could 
have been used in industrial promotion" (Mazur, 1979: 75-76 & 79).
This imbalance was somewhat redressed in the subsequent period 1961- 
1966, which was one of relative political stability. The emphasis of the 
government shifted from developing an infrastructure base towards a more 
comprehensive development approach, with emphasis on the expansion of the 
productive capacity of the economy. This took the form of completion of on­
going projects, such as the East Ghor Main Canal (EGMC) which is of 
monumental importance to agriculture in Jordan, and the expansion of phosphate 
production and the exploitation for export purposes of other mineral resources, 
which was helped by the substantial expansion of infrastructure that had been 
provided in the previous period (Five Year Plan 1976-80: 9). The private sector 
continued its activity in developing industry, helped in this not only by the 
encouragement and sometimes active participation of the government, but also
9With the annexation, "Jordan added significantly to its educated merchant, civil service, and
professional groups  these provided a fairly high level of sophisticated leadership in government and
private economic activity" (Mazur, 1979: 11. See also Sayigh, 1978: 187 & 190; and IBRD, 1956: 41).
10Sayigh (1978: 187) estimates that Palestinians brought with them 20 million Palestinian pounds 
(P£). The P£ was legal teuder in Transjordan and was equal to one pound sterling. He contends that this 
amount was probably larger than the total money supply in Jordan at that time.
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by the then political security (Ibid: 7). Consequently, the value added in mining 
and manufacturing increased at 17,8% p.a., which is more than double the rate 
at which aggregate output grew (8.2% p.a.), and was one of the fastest growing 
sectors in this period (Table IV. 1-2). The sector's contribution to overall growth 
(the ratio of increase in its value added to increase in aggregate value added) was 
thus very significant at 19%, and its share in the total value added at the end of 
the period rose to 9.7%. In the meantime, the share of agriculture declined to 
18%; of construction increased substantially to 6.6%; and of private and public 
services increased slightly to 61.3%.
1967-1972: To a large extent, the growth momentum gathered in the 1961-66 
period was lost with the eruption of the 1967 war and the consequent loss of the 
'West Bank'.11 The economic loss to Jordan was estimated by Anani (1987: 127) 
at 40% of farming income; 80% of tourism income; and 20% of industrial 
income. Furthermore, an inflow of 300,000 people from the 'Occupied 
Territories' (the 'West Bank' and Gaza) into Jordan increased the latter's 
population by about a quarter in one year (Mazur, 1979: 81). Inevitably, the 
economy suffered from a sharp recession in activity immediately following the 
war, and the most severely affected were the commodity producing sectors.
Arab aid to Jordan became very significant in this period,12 which 
resuscitated the economy, and by 1969 industry had largely recovered from the 
post-war slump. Unemployment was also reduced by absorption in the 
construction sector since, once again, a new housing boom was spurred by the 
influx of refugees. This period of recovery was short-lived as the internal 
political conflict of 1970/71 disrupted all economic activities again and produced 
a severe, but temporary, setback in the economy. In addition to the physical 
losses, industrial and agricultural activities were discontinued for about two 
months. Some sectors, such as manufacturing and agriculture, began to recover
^Immediately following the occupation of the 'West Bank', Israel imposed steep tariffs on 'West 
Bank' imports from Jordan, while completely abolishing barriers to trade in manufactures between her 
and the ’West Bank’. Thus Jordan lost all of the 'West Bank' as a commodity and factors market - 
notwithstanding the 300,000 refugees who fled the West Bank to the East Bank - (Mazur, 1979: 213).
12JD 40 million per year from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya were pledged in the Khartoum Arab 
summit of September 1967. In addition a one-off JD 14 million was given as a relief fund.
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in 1971, while other sectors, particularly construction, had a lagged recovery 
which only really began in 1972. By 1972, however, all sectors were expanding, 
and the government resumed its development efforts (Central Bank of Jordan, 
1967 to 1973, Annual Report).
As is to be expected, the share of the productive sectors (agriculture, 
mining and manufacturing) declined, while that of services increased over this 
period. In 1972 the real value added for many manufacturing industries was 
lower than its level at 1966.13 This is reflected in an all time low contribution 
made by the commodity producing sector to the economy, which dropped from 
31.4% in 1966 to 29.1% in 1972. Another feature of this period, from the 
beginning of 1972, was double digit inflation as measured by the Amman 
consumer price index, with the most rapid rise occurring in the food sector. By 
comparison, throughout the 1950s and 1960s the rate of inflation had remained 
relatively low at about 2% (Central Bank of Jordan, 1989, Yearly Statistical 
Series 1964-88, Table 49).
1973-1982: The oil boom in the Gulf states began to spill over into Jordan, via 
Arab aid and workers remittances. By 1974/75 booming conditions were well 
established in the Jordanian economy, with unemployment virtually non-existent. 
Of equal importance to foreign exchange flows was the increase in demand for 
Jordanian exports originating from neighbouring oil producing countries, which 
significantly expanded Jordan's commodity markets and allowed its 
manufacturing to benefit from economies of scale. The period was thus one of 
rapid industrialisation. While aggregate output grew at 11.9% p. a., 
manufacturing growth was 16.7% p.a., which increased its share by more than 
5% over one decade. Construction's growth was even more outstanding (18.2% 
p.a.) followed by electricity and water (17.2% p.a.). Taking all industrial sectors 
together, industrialisation reached its zenith at the end of this period, when the 
share of industry as a whole (mining, manufacturing, and construction) reached 
31.8%. On the other hand, agriculture's relatively slow growth at 4.4% p.a., 
indicated the sector's continuing long term decline.
13The decline was particularly noted in products that depended on the local market (cement, petroleum 
refining, liquid batteries and tanning), while those that could be marketed abroad suffered less (e.g., 
phosphate, tobacco) (Central Bank of Jordan, 1967, Annual Report).
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The hallmark of this period is high inflation, experienced especially from 
1973-79, which encompasses the two oil price hikes. The most rapid inflation 
rates were observed in non-traded sectors such as construction and services, 
while tradeable sectors had their prices moderated by the rapid increase in 
imports.
1983-1988: The economic slowdown in the Gulf14 that started in 1981/82 had 
been fully transmitted to Jordan by 1983, via declining foreign aid receipts, 
reduced remittances, and shrinking markets for Jordanian commodities. The 
boom was now reversing itself. The sectors that showed least resilience to 
changing economic conditions were construction followed by manufacturing, 
both of which experienced a rapid decline in the immediate post-boom period; 
while agriculture, quite surprisingly, experienced rapid rates of growth, and 
managed to increase its share in output quite significantly. Unemployment, 
especially amongst the professional groups and highly skilled labour, became 
visible as the Gulf economies no longer absorbed their labour. All these 
deteriorating economic conditions were reflected in the all time low GDP growth 
(3% p.a.).
The mid-eighties were a period characterised by economic 
mismanagement in Jordan. The slowdown of the economy and the decline in 
external aid notwithstanding, Jordan increased its non-concessionary borrowing 
quite rapidly. In 1988 Jordan faced a serious debt problem when its debt 
servicing fell due, and its total debt stock reached $7,418 billion with a ratio to 
GNP of 119%.15 Foreign reserves, on the other hand, had been drawn upon 
heavily in the preceding years, precisely because Arab aid had diminished. 
Almost inevitably, in late October 1988 Jordan adopted the IMF/World Bank 
Structural Adjustment Programme, the main features of which were 
contractionary fiscal policies and a major currency devaluation (by 50%); which 
led to high rates of inflation, unemployment, and civil unrest.
14Brought about mainly by the decline in oil prices, together with the protracted Iran-Iraq war. With 
Arab Gulf states financially supporting Iraq, the war placed severe constraints on their resources.
15Other relevant ratios are: total debt service to export earnings, 29.8%; and external debt stock to 
export earnings, 194.9% (World Debt Tables, 1990-91).
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1989-date: The programme was interrupted in 1990/91 by the Gulf war. Jordan 
was a major casualty in the conflict, as it became home to a massive number of 
refugees from Kuwait; although, at the same time, because of its neutral stance 
vis-a-vis Iraq, Jordan was penalised by both Arab and foreign states, who 
curtailed grant aid. Constraints were also put on the marketing of Jordanian 
commodities in the Gulf, and on employment opportunities for Jordanian labour 
in these markets, which reduced remittances significantly. Reverse migration, 
admittedly on a small scale, also began. Serious macroeconomic imbalances 
occurred, not least because of the government budget and balance of payments 
deficits. Nevertheless, in 1992 the gross domestic product increased by 10% in 
real terms, reflecting the economy's built-in resilience to exogenous shocks. It is 
still a matter of conjecture what were the sources of this growth, but it is 
plausible to think that 'returnees' from Kuwait had funds to invest not only in 
construction, but also in industrial production, which witnessed the fastest 
sectoral growth in that year.
IV.2 Factor Inputs, Output Growth, and Productivity
Table IV.2-1 recapitulates aggregate growth rates over selected periods (all data 
is in 1975 prices). The periods with the highest growth rates are notably 1960- 
66, representing an era of political stability; and 1973-82, the boom period. Post 
boom growth was much slower than that following the 1967 war, reflecting poor 
adjustment to the reversal of boom conditions.
For the economy as a whole, the rapid growth of the boom period 1973- 
82 was almost entirely due to the rapid growth in factor inputs, while technical 
change seems to have been insignificant in this period. In the following two 
sections, factor inputs will be examined in greater detail, as they underpin the 
assumptions on which the Dutch disease model is built. The analysis will 
proceed from the year 1968, since this is the first year for which data do not 
include the 'West Bank'.
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Table IV.2-1
Compounded Growth Rates of Real GDP, 1954-92
1 9 5 4 -1 9 6 0 1 0 .0 1
1 9 6 0 -1 9 6 6 8 .1 6
1 9 6 7 -1 9 7 2 4 .0 6
1 9 7 3 -1 9 8 2 1 1 .8 9
1 9 8 3 -1 9 8 8 3 .0 1
1 9 8 9 -1 9 9 2 7 .9 5
Source: Central Bank o f Jordan, (1989), Yearly Statistical Series 
1964-88 ; & Monthly Bulletin, various issues.
Notes: For details o f estimation see Appendix A IV .l.
IV.2.1 Labour
IV.2.1.1 Characteristics of the Labour Market
The main characteristics of the Jordanian labour market are: 1) high population 
growth rate, 2) high level of enrolment in educational institutions, and 3) low 
female participation rate.
The two comprehensive population censuses that took place in 1961 and 
1979 indicate that the average annual population growth rate in the inter-census 
period was 4.8% p.a.. This rapid increase is attributed both to a high natural 
growth rate (3.8% p.a.), and to the influx of refugees in 1967, which added over 
one percentage point to the growth rate observed previously. From 1968 to 1990 
population growth resumed its natural rate, but the influx from Kuwait in 1990 
pushed the growth rate to 5.3% in 1991. These high growth rates resulted in 
50% of the population in Jordan being below the working age of 15 years.
School and college enrolment has increased dramatically since the mid­
seventies, not least because of work opportunities in the Gulf. In 1982, 40% of 
the total population and 56% of the 15-24 year-old group were enrolled in 
educational institutions. Primary school enrolment continues to grow at the same 
pace as population: 4% annually. At middle and secondary school the rates are 
higher, at 7% and 9%, respectively; and at post secondary levels, the rate of 
growth is even higher: in 1979/80 enrolment increased by 36%. This extended 
the time lag for joining the labour force, and raised the educational profile of the 
labour market entrants. It also meant that the Jordanian population is amongst the 
best educated in the Arab world with a literacy level of 65.4% in 1979 and 81%
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in 1991, which was a major determinant in the numbers that migrated to the Gulf 
during the boom. An ECWA (the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Western Asia) comparison of nine Arab countries in the late seventies showed 
Jordan to have the highest literacy rate, while other countries had significantly 
lower figures (Yemen Arab Republic 14%, Saudi Arabia - a major importer of 
Jordanian labour - 32%, and Iraq 40%).
Female participation in the labour force amounted to 7.7% in 1979, 9.7% 
in 1983, and 10.6% in 1987. This rate is low by world standards, as well as 
when compared with other Arab countries who were at a similar stage of social 
and economic development in the late eighties, such as Syria (13.9%), Iraq 
(19.1%), and Tunisia (23.6%). It is generally believed, however, that female 
participation in agriculture is much higher than the national average, where 
women are mainly active as family workers. The majority of working women in 
Jordan are young, aged between 20 and 24, unmarried, and well qualified (in the 
early nineties, 59% of male employees had not attained more than a secondary 
qualification, while the figure for females was only 25%.)
A high population growth rate, combined with high school enrolment, and 
modest female participation resulted in a low activity rate, or, conversely, a high 
dependency level. It was mentioned earlier that 50% of the Jordanian population 
is below 15 years old, thus making half the population economically inactive. 
Amongst those aged above 15 years, the activity rate for the age group 15-19 
does not exceed 30%, resulting from the relatively high levels of attendance at 
educational establishments. Together with a female participation rate of less than 
11%, these factors put the overall activity rate16in Jordan on average at 20%, and 
the dependency ratio in the order of 1:5, one of the highest in the world. 
Comparisons made by ILO and ECWA in 1975 showed that among all Arab 
countries, only Saudi Arabia had a lower activity rate than Jordan (El-Akel, 
1985: 60; World Bank, 1989, Annex E: 79-82; World Bank 1986b: 3; Takriti 
and Quwar, 1992: 77; Economic and Social Plan, 1993-1997: 25 & 52; Dar Al- 
Handasah, 1982i: 8-32).
16Tke proportion of the population who are either working or seeking employment.
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In addition to these basic characteristics, new characteristics emerged 
during the boom period. These were high volatility; rapid turnover; and visible 
segmentation. Volatility resulted mainly from Jordan's policy of open borders, 
which led to large-scale labour movement in both directions. Out-migration to 
the Gulf accelerated dramatically after the first oil boom in 1973, and by 1980 
had reached 43% of the total Jordanian labour force. In-migration rose from a 
negligible percentage of the labour force in 1975, to 10% in 1979, and 32% in 
1984 (the subject is discussed in more detail in the next chapter). Regional 
conflicts have also contributed to the volatility of the labour market via 
population influxes into Jordan.17
The massive labour migration to the Gulf, consequent upon the oil boom, 
had by 1975 created serious labour shortages in the Jordanian economy, which 
led to rapid labour turnover (e.g., 107% p.a. in the hotel industry). Employees 
were constantly changing jobs either within Jordan or to travel abroad. "These 
high levels of turnover were an appropriate way of responding to the economic 
conditions of the time, and served to minimise the deleterious impact of labour 
emigration, by internal promotion and replacement of departed workers" (World 
Bank, 1989, Annex E: 82). Since 1983 labour turnover has plummeted as the 
labour market has begun to show some slack, especially for Jordanian workers. 
The Civil Service Commission rate of turnover fell from 4% in 1981 to 2% in 
1986 (ibid).
Segmentation of the labour market in Jordan is a more recent 
phenomenon, which started with the influx of foreign labour, and became 
pronounced with the economic slowdown and the ensuing increase in 
unemployment. An important aspect of labour market segmentation is the 
existence of unemployment among Jordanians alongside the employment of non­
national migrant workers. Other important aspects are differential remuneration, 
conditions of employment, occupations and skill levels applying to the two 
groups of workers. And finally, as a consequence of migration, there has been a
17"The Iran-Iraq war disrupted economic life for the estimated two million erstwhile Egyptian farmers 
in Iraq, and brought a stream of migration into Jordan culminating in 1982 with 130,000 net Egyptian 
arrivals in Jordan" (World Bank, 1989, Annex E: 88). More recently, the Gulf war in 1990 brought an 
influx of approximately 400,000 Palestinian "returnees" from Kuwait into Jordan ( Economic and Social 
Plan, 1993-97: 9).
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growth in importance of rentier income, especially from land speculation, which 
diminished competition between non-nationals and nationals for available jobs 
(ibid). Some of these aspects will be discussed in more detail in the following 
chapter (section IV.3).
IV.2.1.2 The Labour Supply18
For the period preceding 1968 there are only guesstimates regarding growth in 
employment in Jordan. The World Bank mission visiting Jordan in 1955 
estimated the total population at 1,475,000, of whom 370,000 were economically 
active. Unemployment was put at 16.5%. In addition, the mission estimated 
there were 10.8% only partially employed (IBRD, 1956: 10 & 441-44). The 
1961 census reported an unemployment rate of 7%. Although both figures may 
have large error margins, the trend of declining unemployment is plausible, 
given that GDP growth for the period 1954-60 was rapid at about 8.7% p.a.. If 
we accept these figures, then employment as calculated by Mazur (1979: 30 & 
35) would have grown at 5% p.a., led by a labour-intensive construction sector. 
The period 1961-66 witnessed a slower rate of labour absorption of 4% p.a., 
which was still high enough to reduce unemployment further to 4-5% in 1966 
(ibid: 31). With the influx of refugees in 1967, both the growth of the population 
and unemployment rose. Unemployment was estimated in the late 1960s and on 
the eve of the first oil boom to range between 10-14%.
Table IV.2.1.2-1 depicts labour supply and unemployment during the 
boom and after. Both the oil boom in the Gulf and the oil-induced domestic 
boom moved the Jordanian economy into tight labour market conditions, with
18The main source of information on Jordanian employment is the Department of Statistics. 
According to this source, the labour force is defined as all those aged 15 years or more, who are 
economically active. Economic activity excludes students, home owners, the disabled, and pensioners 
who are not seeking employment. Employment is defined as the performance of some work for wage or 
salary, in cash or in kind, or own account work for profit or family gain, in cash or in kind. 
Unemployment refers to all those economically active, who are seeking employment; have worked 
before; but are not currently employed (Department of Statistics, Employment Survey 1982/83 and 
1992; Royal Scientific Society, 1989: 8).
87
Table IV.2.1.2-1
Population, Labour Supply, and Unemployment in Jordan, 1968*1987
1968 2973 1976 1981 1987
Annual Percent Growth 
1968- 1973- 1976- 1982- 
1972 1975 1981 1987
Population (000) 1409 1675 1889 2307 2897 3.5 4.1 4.1 3.9
Labour supply (000) 279.4 332.8 367.2 435.4 555.7 3.6 3.3 3.5 4.1
Actually employed 251.7 296 361.3 418,4 509.3 3.3 6.9 3.0 3.3
Participation rate 1 /  (%) 19.8 19.9 19.4 18.9 19.2 0.0 -0.7 -0.6 0.3
Unemployment (%) 9.9 11.1 1.6 3.9 8.3 2.2 -47.4 19.4 13.5
Source: C alculated  from  Royal Scientific Society (1989), T h e  D ata Base for the  Jo rdan ian  Labour M arke t1, vol. HI. 
1 /  L abour su p p ly  over total population .
Table IV.2.1.2-2
A n n u al Percent G row th P ercen tage Share (%) Total N u m b er  in  '000s
1968-
1973
1973-
1975
1975- : 
1979
1979-
1983
1983-
1987 1968 1973 1979 1987 1968 1973 1979 1987
Agriculture -2.4 0.4 -2.6 -7.7 3.5 22.3 16.8 11.5 7A 56.2 49.8 45.1 37.7
Mining & Manufacturing 2.6 5.5 2.4 7.3 4.7 9.7 9.3 8.6 10.5 24.3 27.6 33.7 53.5
Electricity & Water 5.2 8.0 3.4 14.3 20.0 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.7 1.4 1.8 2.4 8.5
Construction 3.8 12.1 8.8 0.9 0.3 9.5 9.7 13.0 10.5 23.9 28.8 50.8 53.4
Trade 5.0 7.9 4.7 3.3 2.2 8.9 9.7 10.2 9.8 22.4 28.6 40 49.7
Communication & Transport 9.5 5.3 2.4 8.2 5.3 5.8 7.8 7.2 9.2 14.6 23 28 47.1
Finance & Insurance Services 5.3 9.2 5.4 11.6 7.2 1.7 1.9 2.1 3.4 4.4 5.7 8.4 17.2
Social & Administrative Services 4.6 8.3 4.5 4.1 3.1 41.5 44.2 46.7 47.6 104.4 130.7 182.7 242.2
Total 3.3 3.7 3.3 3.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 251.6 296.0 391.1 509.3
Total non-Agricultural 4.7 8.1 4.7 4.5 3.4
Source: Ibid.
88
unemployment falling as low as 1.6% in 1976. The rapid labour immigration of 
the late seventies relieved these tight conditions, raising unemployment to 3.9% 
in 1981. 1982 marks the beginning of Jordan's economic slowdown, which 
continued until 1991. Unemployment increased to 8% in 1986, and 18% in 
1991, but decreased to 14% in 1992 (Lanzendorfer, 1985: 38; Aretsvic, 1976: 
24; Royal Scientific Society, 1989: 41; World Bank, 1989: Table 5: 90; and 
Central Bank of Jordan, 1992, Annual Report).
Table IV.2.1.2-2 shows the size, growth, and sectoral distribution of 
employment in Jordan over the period 1968-1987. Employment increased at an 
annual rate of 6.9% p.a. during 1973-1975; compared with about 3.5% p.a. 
during all other periods. The rapid increase in employment in the early years of 
the boom, in addition to labour migration, were responsible for reducing 
unemployment from 14% in 1972 to 1.6% in 1976. During the boom sub­
period 1973-79, construction was the lead sector in employment growth in 
terms of its overall impact, i.e. its share in overall employment as well as its 
growth rate. This is in large part attributable to the boom in housing as well as 
the Five Year National Plan's ambitious infrastructure development 
programme. Despite the rapid growth in employment in industry (including 
water and electricity), it still accounted for less than 10% of total employment 
by 1979. In contrast, over 45% of the employed labour force was absorbed by 
public administration and defence, in the same year. This reflects the 
disproportionately large share of services in total production in Jordan, which is 
discussed in section (IV.3) below. Employment in agriculture declined in the 
late seventies, as domestic and external demand for Jordanian labour increased 
rapidly and resulted in higher wages in non-agricultural sectors.
The years 1979-83 witnessed a change in the structure of employment 
growth. Characteristic of this sub-period was the high rate of employment in 
mining and manufacturing, particularly in labour-intensive industries such as 
clothing, food products, and wood and furniture. A number of large projects, 
like fertilisers, oil refinery and potash, also created considerable employment as 
they came on stream. The sub-period also reflected the turnaround in domestic 
and regional economic activity as the boom years of 1979-81 turned into a 
recession in 1982. This is evidenced by the near stagnation of employment in 
construction following a period of very rapid growth. On the other hand, the 
ambitious expansion of public capital expenditures resulted in continued rapid
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increases in government employment, which raised its share by 1% between 
1979 and 1987.
IV.2.2 Investment
IV.2.2.1 Investment Financing
The financial sector in Jordan consists of the following four main types of 
institution: i) commercial banks, ii) specialised credit institutions, iii) financial 
companies (merchant banks), and iv) non-bank financial institutions (the post 
office savings fund, the pension fund, and the social security corporation). The 
first three types of institutions are involved in loan financing, whereas the latter 
are involved mainly in providing equity shares. In addition, there are several 
insurance companies, money changers, and leasing companies that constitute 
potential participants in the financing of economic activities through equity 
shares. A small but quite active stock exchange has also existed in Jordan since 
197819 (World Bank, 1988: 35).
Of these institutions, commercial banks are the largest source of loan 
finance in Jordan. The role of commercial banks was enhanced significantly with 
the advent of remittances. As Table IV.2.2.1-1 shows, the value of commercial 
banks' assets, deposits, and credit rose at least sixteen-fold over the boom decade 
1972-82. Credit rose from JD 50.5 million in 1972 to JD 887.2 in 1982, and 
further to JD 2,218.3 million in 1992. The high inflation rate in the seventies 
reduced the real significance of all money values, as the JD was worth only 333 
fils by 1982, compared with 1972 (1 JD =  1,000 ills). The second part of Table
IV.2.2.1-1 shows the growth in commercial banking after deflation by the 
general cost-of-living index (adjusted to make 1972=100). The deflated figures 
give increases for the ten year boom period of about 550% for the three variables 
considered, namely assets, deposits, and credit.
19For a detailed description of financial arrangements and institutions in Jordan see Dar Al-Handasah, 
1982f.
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Table IV.2.2.1-1
Growth of Commercial Banking, end of year data (000 JD)
Ratios
1972 1982 1992 1978/1972 1992/1982
Total Assets 95.5 1,553.5 6,615.7 16.3 4.3
Total Deposits 72.9 1,169.5 4,749.1 16.0 4.1
Total Credit 50.5 887.2 2,218.3 17.8 2.5
o/w Industrial 4.4 98.5 269.3 22.4 2.7
Growth at 1972 Prices
Ratios
1972 1982 1992 1972/1982 1992/1982
Total Assets 95.5 521.3 1,127.0 5.5 2.2
Total Deposits 72.9 392.4 809.0 5.4 2.1
Total Credit 50.5 297.7 378.2 5.6 1.3
Source: Central Bank o f Jordan, 1989, Yearly statistical Series 1964-89; and Monthly Statistical Bulletin, various 
issues.
The fastest rate of increase of commercial credit during the boom period was in 
agriculture, whose share in total credit increased from 1.3% in 1972 to 2.8% in 
1982. Credit to industry grew almost as quickly, its share of total credit 
increasing from 8.7% to 12.1% over the same years. For much of the boom 
period, growth in credit for industry (mining and manufacturing) exceeded 
growth in activity in that sector (as measured by the growth in total value added). 
This may be due to the Central Bank of Jordan's (CBJ henceforth) authoritative 
encouragement of commercial banks to increase their loan allocations to 
"productive" activities, such as agriculture and industry, and away from 
commercial activities. In 1973 banks were "asked" to switch lending from 
commercial sectors to productive sectors and National Plan projects. Later in the 
same year banks were "instructed" to differentiate interest charges to favour 
development projects over non-essential imports (Dar Al-Handasah, 1982f: 50). 
In late 1974, CBJ imposed a ceiling on the expansion of commercial bank 
lending, with exemptions for agriculture, industry and public projects (Mazur, 
1979: 233). The CBJ's attempts to redistribute credit in favour of productive 
sectors and away from all other sectors through monetary policies is thus 
apparent.
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The CBJ took other measures to increase credit availability to the 
industrial sector. These measures included rediscounting syndicated loans at low 
interest rates; statutory purchase of equity by banks; and limits on funds that 
could be held abroad (World Bank, 1989: 35).
IV.2.2.2 The Accumulation Process
Throughout the seventies and until 1981, interest rates were fixed by law which 
stipulated that commercial banks could charge 9% (plus a 2% fee) on investment 
loans, while interest on savings accounts was 6.5%. The Industrial Development 
Bank (a Specialised Credit Institution) charged 8-9% for lending to "developed 
areas", and 7% to "underdeveloped areas" and "export-oriented" projects. These 
rates persisted throughout the seventies against inflation rates averaging 10.5%, 
and sometimes reaching as high as 14%. Hence the real rate of return on savings 
was negative throughout the period, and the cost of borrowing was negative in 
most years, as indicated in Table IV.2.2.2-1 below.
Table IV.2.2.2-1
The Cost of Capital in Jordan, 1970-1992 (%)
Nominal Lending Rate Inflation 
Rate (average)
Average Real Lending 
Rate
1970-1982 9.00 10.50 (1.50)
1983-1986 8.00-8.75 2.30 6.00
1986-1987 7.25-8.00 0.20 7.50
1988 9.00 6.60 2.40
1989 10.00 25.80 (15.80)
1990-date 10.00-14.00 6.00 6.00
Source: Central Bank o f Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, various issues
From 1981, the Central Bank of Jordan was given the power to adjust interest 
rates, and from the second quarter of 1983 the lending rate on loans by 
commercial banks was slightly lowered to 8-8.75% (plus a 1.7% fee), and 
further to 7.25-8% in 1986. Inflation having dropped to 2.3% p.a. in 1983-86 
and further to 0.2% p.a. in 1986-87, positive real interest rates arose. Lending
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rates increased to 9% in late 1988, and further to 10% in 1989. Since then they 
have been floating, and have ranged between 10-14% over 1990-92.
With abundant foreign exchange, and negative real interest on investment 
loans, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) increased significantly during the 
two oil booms, as compared with other periods (Table IV.2.2.2-2). The 1973-82 
average is higher than the average for non-oil producing countries (24.1%), as 
well as that of oil-producing countries (26.2%), for the same period. The 
subsequent period average, although much lower, was still higher than both 
groups (data comparisons from IMF, IFS, 1990). The reason behind the higher 
than usual GFCF ratio is Jordan's large receipts of foreign aid, unrequited 
transfers, and remittances, which, in relation to GDP, are themselves high (see 
following chapter).
Table IV.2.2.2-2
Ratio of Gross Fixed Capital Formation to GDP: 1952-90 (period average)
1952-62 1963-66 1973-75 1976-82 1983-90
14.7 17.2 31,2 42.7 20.3
Source: For 1952-1966 Bdour (1990): 73. For 1973-92 Central Bank o f Jordan (1989),
Yearly statistical Series 1964-89\ Monthly Statistical Bulletin, various issues.
As far as the Dutch disease model is concerned, it is the distribution of 
investment that is of relevance rather than the absolute level. During a boom, 
relative profitability in the economy should favour non-traded sectors and work 
against traded sectors, which in the Jordanian model consist of agriculture and 
manufacturing. The differential distribution of pre- and post-boom investment 
should thus be a good indicator of the effect of relative price movements on 
profitability, and will be examined thoroughly in what follows.
The distribution of investment cannot be discussed in isolation from 
development planning in Jordan or from government intentions vis-a-vis the 
structure of the economy. Government actions, for example its own investment 
pattern, can significantly influence the pattern of demand growth in the 
economy. Also, and given the normal interplay between demand and supply
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factors, supply responses can be expected to change, thus seriously influencing 
the observed patterns of sectoral shift.
Starting in 1973, the government of Jordan adopted serious development 
planning when it launched the 1973-75 national plan.20 In this period, there was 
heavy concentration of planned government investment, as well as that of the 
private sector, in the non-commodity producing sectors (services, construction, 
and transport), which will be loosely referred to here as non-traded sectors.21 
This is reflected in Table IV.2.2.2-3: the share of agriculture and irrigation, 
mining and manufacturing, and energy and electricity sectors in ex ante 
investment for 1973-75 amounted to only one-third, while the remaining two- 
thirds went mainly to transportation and construction. The two sectors differed 
even more markedly in terms of ex post investment, with the traded sector 
accounting for only 30% of total investment.
Similar conclusions can be reached from Table IV.2.2.2-4 which gives 
gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) values and shares for different periods. 
Over 1973-75 the average GFCF in building and construction for the three years 
was 67%, that for transport equipment was 11% and for other machinery 21%. 
However, this is merely a continuation of an already established pattern. The 
share of building and construction in GFCF in the preceding periods ran as 
follows: 1954-61, 58%; 1962-66, 66%; 1967-72, 66%. The explanation of large 
expenditures on building and construction in the concerned period thus may not 
be found in the boom conditions, but rather in more enduring factors, some of 
which may include the high risk involved in other types of investment, given
20Development planning in Jordan started as early as 1953, but was not taken seriously then. The 
fifties and sixties plans were mainly designed to attract aid. In the seventies and eighties, on the other 
hand, when aid to Jordan became substantial, the intent of planning was to regulate its use.
21This division between the traded and non-traded sectors is rather arbitrary, but is useful in a Dutch 
disease analysis. For example, "trade" is a largely non-tradeable item, as it incorporates activities such as 
those of financial institutions. Yet this activity is crucial to the promotion of exports, and any growth in 
exports would induce investment in financial services. Transportation can be considered both traded and 
non-traded, not only because it directly supports the traded sector, but also because transit fees are an 
important item in Jordan's foreign exchange receipts (mainly from Saudi Arabia for the transport of oil 
through the Tapline, and from Iraq for commodities shipped via Aqaba). Finally, Jordan has always 
exported military services - personnel training, etc. - to some of the Gulf states.
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Table IV.2.2.2-3
The Distribution of Investment by Sector 1973-1975 (000 000 JD)
Public
Investment Ex Ante 
Private Total
Value % age
Investment
Value
Ex Post 
% age
Commodity Producing Sector 35.1 28. 5 63. 6 35.5% 68.0 29.7%
Agriculture 8.9 4.1 13.0 7.3
Water & Irrigation 14.6 - 14.6 8.2 23.0 10.0
Mining & Manufacturing 5.8 20.3 26.1 14.6
Energy & Electricity 5.7 4.1 9. 8 5.5 45.0 19.7
Non-Commodity producing Sectors 64.3 51.1 115.4 64.5 161.0 70.3
Transport 27.8 8.1 35.8 20.0 57.0 24. 9
Communication & Trade 6.7 0.8 7.5 4.2 7.0 3.1
Tourism 2.1 5.1 7.2 4.0 6.0 2.6
Social Services 24.1 5.8 29.8 3.9 41.0 17.9
Education 7. 7 3.2 10.9 6.1
Health 0.9 0.6 1.5 0.8
Social & labour 1.4 0.1 1.5 0.8
Municipal & rural affairs 14.1 14.8 8.3
Religious 1.2 1.2 0. 7
Housing & government buildings 3.4 31.5 34. 9 19.5 50.0 21.8
Other Services 0.3 0.3 0.2
Total Investment 99.4 79.6 179.0 100.0 229.0 100.0
Source: Three-year D evelopm ent Plan 1973-197$: 36; Five Year D evelopm ent Plan 1976-1980 : 19.
Table IV.2.2.2-4
Gross Fixed Capital Formation by Type of Expenditure, 1954-1975 (% of total)
1954-61 1962-66 1967-72 1973-75
Dwelling & building 33.0% 31.0% 27.0% 21.4%
Public construction 25.0% 35.0% 39.0% 43.2%
Other construction 2.4%
Total building & construction 58.0% 66.0% 66.0% 67.0%
Transport equipment 24.0% 18.0% 24.0% 11.6%
Other machinery 18.0% 16.0% 10.0% 21.4%
Grand total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100%
Source: Five Year Developm ent Plan 1975-1980: 18.
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Jordan's political instability. Also, as Jordan is largely aid dependent, with aid 
normally attached to investment in sectors that are not directly productive, such 
as schooling, health, community services, roads, bridges, railways, etc., a high 
ratio of aid to GDP would mean a larger proportion of GFCF in construction and 
building than would normally be expected.
In the following period 1976-1980 (Table IV.2.2.2-5), there was a 
perceptible shift in the sectoral distribution of both ex ante and ex post 
investment, with more emphasis on the traded sector than in the previous period. 
Priority was given to mining and manufacturing, but agriculture and irrigation 
also received more attention than previously. The share of the traded sector in 
total ex ante investment was now 53.4%, instead of 35% for the previous period. 
Ex post investment in mining and manufacturing, although it did not meet its 
targeted level of 29.9% of total investment, was still impressively high at 
25.9%.22 The same is true of agriculture and irrigation, whose share in ex post 
investment stood at 10.3% of total investment (rather than the planned 17.9%).23 
Sixty percent of that investment came from the government, much of which was 
directed into irrigation. As a percentage of GDP this figure represents 2.3%,24 
which compares favourably with Nigeria (1%); closely with Mexico (2%); and 
unfavourably with Iran (3%) and Indonesia (5%) during the boom period (Majd, 
1991: 401). Private sector investment in agriculture and irrigation in this period 
was concentrated in imported technology (green houses, drip irrigation, etc.), as 
foreign exchange became more available to the private ventures, via remittances.
22Public investment in mining and manufacturing did, however, exceed its target by a large margin 
(with an actual over planned ratio of 206), but this was mainly because of cost overruns in major projects 
(World Bank, 1983a, Table 10: 20).
23The figures for planned investment in irrigation may be slightly misleading. The major irrigation 
project 'Al-Maqarin' dam was only included in national plans as a statement on Jordan's riparian rights 
with Syria and Israel, and was never actually implemented. The total current cost of this project was JD 
25 million. To exclude it, therefore, means the share of irrigation in total investment has to be scaled 
down by 3.3%, making planned investment in agriculture and irrigation 14.6%, instead of 17.9%.
24This figure is slightly exaggerated as the "water and irrigation" item is inclusive of water supply 
projects not necessarily used in irrigation.
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Table IV.2.2.2-5
Distribution Of Investment By Sector, 1976-1980 (000 000 JD)
Investment Ex Ante 
Value % age
Public
Investment Ex Post 
Private Total
Value % age
Total commodity 
producing sector 409.3 53.5 % 188.1 353.5 541.6 44.3%
Agriculture 40.0 5.2 4.7 47.0 51.7 4.2
Water & irrigation 97.4 12.7 73.8 - 73.8 6.0
Mining & 
manufacturing 229.1 29.9 15.3 301.5 316.8 25.9
Energy & electricity 42.8 5.6 94.3 5.0 99.3 8.1
Total Non-commodity 
producing sector 355.7 46.5 312.0 368.4 680.4 55.7
Transport 119.9 15.7 175.6 77.8 253. 0 20.7
Communication & 
trade 26.8 3.5 39.5 _ 39.5 3.2
Tourism 24.4 3.2 4.9 28.6 33.5 2.7
Social Services 88.9 11.6 83.6 10.9 94.5 7.7
Education 34.6 4.5 40.0 4.9 44.9 3.67
Health 9.0 1.2 3.0 3.0 6.0 0.5
Social & labour 1.0 0.1 1.2 - 1.2 0.10
Municipal & rural 
affairs 5.5 0.7 39.4 _ 39.4 3.2
Religious 38.8 5.1 % - 3.0 3.0 0.3
Housing & 
government building 86.0 11.2 % 7.5 250.2 257.7 21.1
Other Services 9.7 1.3 % 0.9 0.9 1.8 0.2
Total Investment 765.0 100.0 % 500.1 721.9 1222.0 100.0
Source: Five Year D evelopm ent Plan 1975-80: 3; and World Bank, 1983a: 105.
In the non-traded sector, investment in transport, including infrastructure and 
equipment was 20.7%, with the bulk of the public programme being in roads and 
airports (World Bank, 1983a: 21). This type of investment significantly enhanced 
production efficiency in Jordan, as the productive sector had until then been 
subject to transport and freight constraints. Housing and building achieved a high 
21.1%, which was accounted for almost entirely by the private sector. Yet this 
share was still 0.7% less than that achieved in the previous plan period (although 
in absolute terms it was more than five times greater). It is worth noting at this 
point that investment in construction has spin-off effects on the productive
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sector, because of its strong backward linkages to the labour-intensive building 
industries, such as paints, tiles and mosaics, insulation material, etc., which all 
thrived during the boom period. The real decline in the share of the non-traded 
sectors in total investment in this period was almost entirely at the expense of the 
social services, such as health, social welfare, labour and vocational training, as 
well as in the area of rural and municipal affairs. In these sectors investment was 
low, both ex ante and ex post, as it did not exceed 7.5%. Achievement in these 
projects was hindered by institutional bottlenecks, relating to the ability of the 
government to implement projects effectively (World Bank, 1983a 21).
In the third five-year plan period, 1981-84, the share of the commodity 
producing sector declined slightly from 44.3% in the previous plan to 40%. The 
difference is almost entirely accounted for by the increase in private sector 
investment in construction.
The exposition thus far has shown the great influence the government has 
had in channelling investment into the different sectors, most notably along 
traded-non-traded lines. In both planning periods, achievements were largely in 
line with the emphasis the government put on sectors: on infrastructure in the 
first period (1973-75) and on the productive sector in the second (1976-80). A 
similar shift in investment patterns occurred between the periods 1955-60 and 
1961-66. In the former period the government aimed to reinforce infrastructure 
after the loss of Palestine, while in the second period it stimulated investment in 
production, mainly in the agricultural sector (e.g. the East Ghor Main Canal 
project, e.g.).
The government's ability to influence investment behaviour stems mainly 
from its status as a major investor. This status partially arises from the fact that 
all foreign aid is channelled through its agencies (this is similar to the case where 
oil rents accrue largely to governments, as in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Nigeria, 
Indonesia, etc.); and partially because government external borrowing is high in 
Jordan. Over the period 1973-75, the share of state investment in total 
investment was 55%. The upsurge of remittances after 1974 made large 
quantities of investible funds available to the private sector, increasing the 
latter1 s share in total ex post investment to 60% in subsequent plans periods, still 
leaving a high 40% share for public investment.
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The increase in private sector participation in investment after 1975 was 
across the board, though was concentrated in industry. In the second plan period 
1976-80, 41% of private sector investment went into mining and manufacturing, 
compared with 34% in construction, and 6.5% in agriculture (Table IV.2.2.2-5). 
It should be noted that while investment in agriculture was in proportion to the 
sector's share in aggregate output, investment in mining and manufacturing was 
disproportionately larger. Most of the private investment in the latter sector went 
into small and medium industries, while government investment was 
concentrated in large capital-intensive industries (potash, fertilisers, extension of 
the oil refinery and the cement plant). In agriculture, private sector investment 
was concentrated in on-farm irrigation and modern production techniques 
(greenhouses, mulch, and fertilisation). It appears that private investment in 
these sectors (agriculture and mining and manufacturing) was encouraged by 
earlier state investment in infrastructure, which reduced the cost of, and 
increased the return to, private investment in productive sectors. In agriculture, 
for example, private investment was stimulated by the high returns in irrigated 
farming of high value export crops after the government's heavy investment in 
irrigation facilities, partly in the previous plan period, but mostly in the sixties. 
Likewise, government investment in the port of Aqaba and in feeder roads in the 
late seventies significantly reduced the cost of transporting intermediate and final 
industrial goods, and increased productivity and thus profitability in this sector.
The foregoing shows that investment during the boom period was more 
balanced than would have been envisaged by the Dutch disease theory, since 
investment in the productive sectors, agriculture and manufacturing, was 
forthcoming especially after 1975. It follows that throughout the boom period the 
return to capital, assumed to be the specific factor in manufacturing and 
agriculture, was at least as high as that in non-traded sectors.
Data on return to capital are available for the early eighties from the 
records of the Amman Stock Exchange (1983: 410 & 728). Comparisons 
between 14 general service companies, 22 insurance companies, 19 banks, and 
44 manufacturing companies in 1982/83 give the following returns on investment 
(net income after tax over total assets): services 6.1% , insurance 6.2%, banks 
3.7%, and manufacturing 7.1% (Guide to shareholding companies in Jordan, 
vol. 3). This sample is biased as it includes only shareholding companies and no
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privately held companies. But the results should be accepted as indicative of the 
fact that investment in manufacturing was still more profitable than in services, 
and not the other way around. Data for 1990 revealed even more disparity 
between the return on investment in the different sectors: services 2.6%, 
insurance 4.8%, banks and financial companies 0.88%, and manufacturing 
8.6%; however, this is less surprising under non-boom conditions.
IV.2.3 Productivity Growth and Technical Change
As we have seen, Jordan's labour supply grew at about 3.5% p.a. over the 
period 1968-87, despite the continuous out-migration. This was due to a high 
population growth rate; and, to a much lesser extent, in-migration from the late 
seventies. Employment growth rates were about half a percentage point lower 
than those of labour supply, except during the boom years when the growth was 
4% p.a. Capital accumulation was much faster than employment growth, 
especially during the boom period when the compounded rate of growth of total 
fixed capital was 17.2% p.a. (at 1975 prices).25 As Pack (1971: 29) puts it, 
"Factor growth does not necessarily lead to increasing output per capita, nor to 
increasing output per unit of combined input. Growth in this latter sense may be 
taken as one measure of the level of development of an economy and its capacity 
for fruitfully utilising increasing inputs, especially foreign inflows".
Measures of productivity could be either partial or total. Whilst the 
former is not entirely satisfactory conceptually, because it does not take account 
of changes in other than the factor considered, the latter is not entirely 
satisfactory empirically, because of data and measurement problems. For Jordan, 
data are a major constraint. Therefore, both measures will be used to increase
25Capital stock data do not exist for Jordan. I made an estimate using a 1:1 ratio of capital stock to 
GDP in the base year 1967. This ratio was selected in the light of other countries' experiences as 
calculated by Maddison (1991: 67), and is similar to Japan's ratio in 1913 (Japan's per capita income in 
that year was $ 1,114, and Jordan's per capita income in the base year 1967 was $ 1,186 - both in 1985 
prices). GFCF data from the national accounts (in current prices ) was then used to estimate capital stock 
for the whole period nnder study. To deflate current prices, a composite price index for capital was 
constructed using unit value imports for equipment and machinery; and wholesale prices for construction 
material ( from Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Bulletin, various issues). The weights used are 75% for 
equipment and 25% for construction (based on industrial census data).
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the confidence with which conclusions are made regarding productivity gains in 
the economy.
The most critical period for the analysis of productivity is the boom 
period, when resources were absorbed especially rapidly: labour resources in the 
period 1973-75, and capital resources in the period 1976-82. Thus neither partial 
nor total productivity values are predictable during this period. It is conceivable, 
for example - in fact, it is highly probable - that the rapid absorption of 
resources, especially capital, led to organisational and management problems. 
Also, in the Jordanian context, about 40% of total investment was undertaken by 
the government. Since this was a period of rapid out-migration to the Gulf, 
serious institutional bottlenecks, in dispensing the funds and acquiring the 
managerial and engineering skills required for project implementation, occurred. 
A typical problem that faced the Ministries of Planning and of Public Works 
during this period was major time delays and cost overruns in project 
implementation. Another factor that might have undermined productivity was the 
quality of labour absorbed in the economy, since the out-migrating labour was 
mostly highly skilled, while the in-migrating labour possessed much lower skills, 
and was mostly unmodernised (agricultural labour and petty trading - see 
following chapter section V.3.1 on labour migration). In the industrial sector, 
problems of choosing the right technology and its absorption arose because of the 
rapid deepening of capital during 1979-82, while industrial managers did not 
have the expertise to make the right choices (see Dar Al-Handasah, 1982a on 
industrial technology transfer). These shortcomings almost certainly pushed 
productivity down in Jordan. Under ideal situations (e.g. where institutional 
bottlenecks do not exit) by contrast, a high growth rate of primary inputs can 
lead to productivity gains, either directly if the new investment and labour is of 
better quality, or indirectly from the rapid increase in output (Verdroon's law).
In measuring partial productivities, for labour the real value added per 
worker is used. The results shown in Table IV.2.3-2 indicate that throughout the 
boom period growth in labour productivity was high, while in all other periods it 
was either negligible (in the immediate post boom period), or negative.
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Table IV.2.3-1
Growth of Labour Productivity (Value added per worker at 1975 prices)
1969-72 1973-82 1983-91
-1.59 8.25 -3.39
Sources: For value added in current prices Central Bank o f Jordan (1989), Yearly 
statistical Series 1964-89\ and Monthly Bulletin, various issues. For deflation Appendix 
A IV .l. For labour Royal Scientific Society (1989).
Assessment of capital productivity is more problematic, not least because of the 
difficulty of defining and measuring capital. Furthermore, because of the 
intertemporal nature of investment, periodisation of the variables involved adds 
to the precariousness of the measure. The measure is least satisfactory in the 
Jordanian context, because a high proportion of government investment went into 
a few large capital intensive projects with long gestation periods (seaports, 
highways, fertiliser plants, etc.). The measure used is the incremental capital 
output ratio (ICOR), or the incremental growth in output attributed to a certain 
amount of investment.26 The results (Table IV.2.3-1), which should be treated 
with caution, seem to indicate that capital absorption may not have been efficient 
during the boom, with an ICOR value of 3.1. It is especially the period of rapid 
capital intensification, 1979-82, that has a high ICOR. More generally, if the 
ICOR measure is to be given any credit, Jordan does not seem to be an efficient 
user of capital.
Tabic IV.2.3-2
Incremental Capital Output Ratio (ICOR)
1969-72 1973-79 1979-82 1973-82 1983-91
13.2 1.9 11.0 3.1 19.2
Source: Calculated from Central Bank o f Jordan (1989), Yearly statistical Series 1964-89-, 
and Monthly Bulletin, various issues. See footnote 26 for methodology.
26 The concept of ICOR is based oil the Harrod-Domar model of growth that accounts only for 
capital as an input. Therefore, AY = v.AK; where Y is gross domestic product, K is the total stock of 
capital net of depreciation; and v is AY/AK or the efficiency of capital (the inverse of ICOR). Then A 
Y/Y = v.(AK/Y). Or ICOR = (AK/Y)/(AY/Y). Thus ICOR is a quotient the numerator of which is the 
ratio of investment to GDP, and the denominator is the rate of change in GDP over the period 
considered. In the present calculation the denominator period was lagged by one year from the 
numerator's period.
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For total factor productivity growth (TFPG) calculations, a geometric 
productivity measure is used, assuming in the background a homogenous 
production function, with constant returns to scale. Factor shares27 are used as 
weights, on the assumption that factor elasticities are represented by factor 
shares.28 The results are shown in Table IV.2.3-3.
The negative value for the period 1969-73 is understandable, in light of 
the political upheaval that led to production disruptions. TFP growth was also 
negative in the post boom period as inputs grew at moderate rates, while output 
failed to grow. During the boom, growth in output can be accounted for largely 
by factor inputs, while TFP growth at 0.8% p.a. accounted for only 4.4% of 
total growth. Thus productivity gains were insubstantial during the boom period 
despite Jordan's access to imported technology. This result is particularly 
surprising since there was idle capacity in the economy prior to the boom. An 
increase in capacity utilization in this period almost certainly took place, as 
evidenced from the rapid decline in unemployment, and the slow increase in 
capital build up in the immediate aftermath of the boom. The failure of 
productivity to grow under these circumstances seems to indicate that there were 
organisational difficulties in absorbing the rapid build up of inputs, and that 
problems of technology choice, transfer and absorption may have been 
experienced. Another explanation for the low value of the residual may be that 
over-investment might have taken place in the latter period of the boom, in 
anticipation, perhaps, of the continuation of the boom's buoyant demand. If this 
is true, then there would have been excess capacity in the economy towards the 
tail end of the boom. These TFP growth results are in line with the calculated
27 Labour share is taken as the wage share in totaJ value added, and capital share is the residual of 
value added over wages (calculated from Department of Statistics, National Accounts, various issues).
28This is not an entirely fair assumption for labour, for although the labour market is characterised by 
minimal state interference and weak trade unions, unemployment in the pre-boom (1969-72) and post­
boom (1983-91) periods was high in Jordan. For capital the assumption is even less fair, especially 
during the boom period (1973-82) the minimum rate of interest on loans was set by the state at a level 
that made the real cost of capital negative. The assumption is nevertheless maintained to facilitate the 
analysis.
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ICOR, whose high value over 1973-82 is indicative of inefficient utilization of 
capital.
Table IV.2.3-3
Factor Input and Output Growth for Jordanian Economy, 1969-1991
Output Labour Capital Residual
1969-72 -1.8% 2.8% 7.7% -7.0%
1973-82 11.4% 4.0% 17.2% 0.5%
1983-91 0.0% 2.6% 5.5% -4.1%
Source: Output and capital are calculated from Central Bank of Jordan (1989), Yearly Statistical Series 196 
89\ and Monthly Statistical Bulletin, various issues. Factor shares from Department o f  Statistics, National 
Accounts. Labour from Royal Scientific Society (1989); and Central Bank o f Jordan, Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin, various issues.
Note: Capital is estimated by assuming a 1:1 ratio o f capital stock to GDP in 1967, the base year. GFCF is 
then added yearly to obtain the capital stock.
IV.3 Sectoral Shifts and The Dutch Disease
IV.3.1 The Sectoral Interplay
The intersectoral analysis will be started from 1954, the first year for which 
national accounts data exist. The initial relative importance of the various sectors 
conditioned the ensuing growth process. In particular, the service sector's 
exceptionally large share in aggregate output (about 60%) did not leave much 
room for the expansion of the industrial sector. In fact the share of services 
increased further to 70% on the eve of the first oil boom. In parallel, the sector's 
share of employment rose from 55% in 1955 to 63% in 1975. These shares are 
very high by international standards. Thus, despite the substantial amounts of 
capital devoted to manufacturing in the seventies, the manufacturing sector 
contribution remained modest, contributing only 15% to total domestic output. 
By comparison, Chenery's (1960, Figure 1: 636) analysis of the process of 
industrialisation predicts a manufacturing share of about 30% at the stage of 
$500 per capita income (in 1953 prices), which is approximately the level Jordan 
attained in the early eighties.
Many factors underlie the unusually high contribution of services. The 
most important factor is perhaps the extremely narrow resource base in Jordan 
(very scarce water and land for agriculture, and a very narrow range of
104
industrial raw materials for manufacturing. The scarcity of water also meant only 
limited hydroelectric potential and high cost of power for manufacturing). The 
supply response of the traded sectors were thus 'naturally' constrained.
There were also economic constraints further limiting the industrialisation 
potential in Jordan. The small size of the domestic market deprived Jordanian 
industries of economies of scale, and discouraged investment since low 
profitability was expected. Only when the government was forthcoming in 
granting monopoly rights, and/or when exports became a possibility did 
investment in manufacturing rise significantly. The limited potential for 
industrialisation kept Jordan's per capita income low and accumulation 
proceeded at a slow pace throughout the fifties, sixties and until the early 
seventies. Thus industrial activities could not have compensated for the declining 
share of agriculture, as normally happens in industrialising countries. Juxtaposed 
with Jordan's poor natural resources and dearth of capital was a large pool of 
skilled human resources, which further encouraged the bias towards services. 
These combined factors meant that the 'growth' elasticity of services was high, 
and of traded commodities low.
With services being highly non-tradeable, the bias in home production 
towards services invited a higher than usual level of import penetration, which in 
turn induced a higher supply of complementary and auxiliary services.29 A high 
import penetration was also helped by the historically high level of foreign aid 
combined with the receipt of factor income from abroad, especially workers' 
remittances. Foreign aid to Jordan was historically of the 'untied' type, which 
meant it could be used directly for consumption. A large proportion of this aid 
went directly to government consumption, for 'budget support' purposes, and 
was recorded under "current aid", as opposed to the project tied aid, named 
"capital aid". Per capita income was thus much higher than the country's
29In this connection, there are other hypotheses put forward. One is that a high import surplus is 
normally matched with a high service sector to restore the balance between goods (traded sector) and 
services (non-traded sector) in the economy. A  second hypothesis is that the increase in the total 
resources available in the economy from a high import surplus would increase services just as a higher 
income level would. A  third hypothesis is that the increase in income, through demand elasticities and 
changes in supply responses, would change relative prices in the economy to the advantage of services: 
their share in the economy would thus rise. For a discussion of these hypotheses see Mazur (1979: 70- 
71), on Jordan, and Pack (1971: 162-3), on Israel.
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resources allowed, which enabled a higher level of imported consumption and 
services.
Finally, a relatively sizeable public administration, and high expenditure 
on defence in Jordan directly influenced the size of the services sector. 
According to the Ministry of Planning, the government sector employed 45% of 
the total labour force in the early seventies, 73% of which were in services 
(Three Year National Plan 1973-1975: 11; Fariz, 1976: 35-36 & 38). The 
civilian public administration seems to have been concentrated in education and 
health. It was shown, under the supply of labour section, that educational 
attainment in Jordan is quite high. This is due in part to the population structure, 
with 50% under 15 years of age, and partly to the desire of the Jordanian 
population to attain high levels of education. The level of health services are less 
explicable, although a plausible cause may be the need to offer these services to 
the influxes of refugees. This was in a large part initiated by international 
organisations such as UNRWA, but was only sustainable when the local 
government took over. Another reason may be simply that high health 
standards30 were set by the national authorities, and with Jordan's high 
population growth this inevitably meant a large civil service administering this 
activity.
IV.3.2 The Dutch Disease Counterfactual
In this section the counterfactual to the Dutch disease is established. The 
necessity and difficulty of this task have been noted in chapter two, and both are 
related to the continuous shifts in the structure of production: because of de­
industrialization in developed economies, and industrialisation in developing 
economies. The task is particularly difficult for Jordan for three main reasons. 
First, Jordan has a demonstrably atypical structure for a developing country, 
with a very large services sector, and a small agricultural sector. Its structure, 
therefore, cannot be compared with other developing economies at similar stages 
of development, and some ingenuity is required in determining the "what would 
have been" scenario. Second, the political upheaval in the region of the world
30Tordan's mortality arid morbidity rates are the lowest in the Arab world (World Bank, World 
Development, various issues).
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where Jordan is located has always manifested itself most strongly on the 
Jordanian society and economy, by repeatedly subjecting it to exogenous shocks 
and introducing serious breaks in its historical pattern of development. Third, 
and perhaps most important, data prior to 1967 relate to both the Jordanian 
economy as well as the 'West Bank'. Although the degree of homogeneity 
between the two economies is high, it is not entirely accurate to compare pre- 
1967 with post-1967.
These difficulties notwithstanding, the counterfactual will be established in 
two stages. First, the historical trends of sectoral growth and shares in total 
output for the period preceding the boom years, i.e. 1952-73 are established (an 
exponential growth rate is assumed). Second, these historical patterns are 
projected on the boom and post-boom period, thus establishing the 
counterfactual. The result is then compared with the actual pattern of sectoral 
development to say something about the economy's response to the boom 
conditions, insofar as relative price changes have had impact on the supply 
response in the different sectors. Because the theory makes a distinction between 
traded and non-traded sectors, the analysis will be organised along these lines 
which is, admittedly, arbitrary.
Figure IV.3.2-1 shows the results. For the traded goods sector, 
agriculture's share during the boom period was lower than 'expected' (the trend 
line), and mining and manufacturing share was significantly higher than 
'expected'. Results for the non-traded goods sector are equally mixed, with 
construction performing better, and other non-traded goods worse, than 
expected. Not too much importance should be attached to the actual magnitude of 
deviation but rather to their order of magnitude, because of the qualifications 
made to establishing the counterfactual discussed above. All that needs be noted 
is that sectoral shifts are not entirely in accordance with the predictions of the 
Dutch disease. The theory predicts a decline in the output and employment of 
the traded sectors, which in the Jordanian is comprised of the mining and 
manufacturing and agriculture, and an increase in the share of the non-traded 
goods sector, which is largely made up of services.
After this general background, in the following chapters I shall bring the 
study of economic history of Jordan into more focus by considering the impact of
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Figure IV.3,1-1 
Sectoral Shares in Aggregate Output: 
Actual & Counterfactual, 1954-1992
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the seventies oil-induced shocks on the economy's structure. To that end, I shall 
demonstrate in the next chapter that, as a starting point, the Dutch disease model 
is an appropriate theoretical construct for the analysis of economic performance 
in Jordan.
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CHAPTER V
The Dutch Disease and De-industrialisation in Jordan: Some Indications
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Introduction
I have argued that the Dutch disease model may not be entirely adequate for the 
study of booming industrialising economies like Jordan. On the one hand, the 
Dutch disease model offers valuable insights as to how the spending effect and the 
resource movement may change the structure of prices. On the other hand, how 
this change in relative prices and, more generally, the booming conditions may 
influence the structure of production cannot be assessed accurately by using the 
Dutch disease model. The reasons for this shortcoming are related to the static 
general equilibrium nature of the model, and will become clearer as this study 
proceeds. First of all however, a case does need to be established for the 
appropriateness of testing the Dutch disease model against the Jordanian experience 
in the first place, since Jordan does not produce the natural resource - oil - that was 
responsible for its booming conditions in the seventies. Instead, the boom was the 
result of sudden and large foreign exchange inflows, themselves induced by the 
two oil price socks in the Gulf.
I shall make my case, first, by demonstrating that these inflows constituted a 
favourable exogenous shock to the Jordanian economy (section V .l). Comparisons 
with other industrialising economies, who themselves are oil producers and who 
have been discussed in the Dutch disease literature, are made in the same section to 
strengthen further the case for the appropriateness of the model. Second, by 
showing that the boom's effects were fully transmitted to the economy via the 
spending effect (section V.2) and the resource movement (V.3); and that change in 
the structure of prices was as would have been predicted by the model (section
V.4). In section V.5 I will examine whether or not the process of adjustment to the 
boom implied a deterioration in the performance of exports.
V.l Oil Prices And The Boom In Jordan: A Case For The Dutch Disease
While Jordan is not an oil exporter,1 it does have strong ties with the major 
Arab oil producers: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq and 
Libya. These ties are political in origin, and have always brought into Jordan a 
stream of 'Arab aid', especially after the loss of the 'West Bank' in 1967. In 
addition, as a labour-surplus country Jordan has always exported manpower to 
these oil-rich but labour-short countries. With the advent of oil booms, the
1Jordan does extract some oil from El-Reesheh in the Eastern part of the country, but the volumes 
extracted do not permit a commercially viable export-oriented oil industry.
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wealth of Arab oil exporters increased substantially, and so did their level of 
economic activity. Consequently, the previously established patterns in the 
Jordanian economy of aid inflow and labour outflow intensified.
The strong correlation between oil prices and received Arab aid is readily 
demonstrable: between 1973 and 1975, Arab aid to Jordan doubled; in 1978, Arab 
aid to Jordan was half that of the previous year, reflecting the oil recession; in 
1979 with further oil price increases, the value of Arab aid trebled; since 1982 with 
the fall in oil prices Arab aid has fluctuated with a downward trend.2
Table V.l-1
Annual Growth Rates of Remittances and Transfer Payments1'', 1967-1991
1967-72 1973-76 1977-79 1980-81 1982-91
Remittances 3% 108% 6% 52% -3%
Transfer payments 0% 28% 38% 8% 1%
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Bulletin, various issues.
1/ Data on Arab aid are available up to 1982 only, transfer payments will be used instead to indicate the 
effect o f oil prices on increasing the country's foreign exchange earnings. The share o f Arab aid in 
transfer payments in the early seventies was 50%, and rose to 90% in the late seventies. Growth in 
transfer payments is therefore almost entirely due to Arab aid.
The increase in oil prices was also associated with a massive movement of 
Jordanian labour to the Gulf. The number of Jordanians working abroad in 1961 - 
mostly in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait - was 64,000 or 23% of the total Jordanian 
labour force. This number had risen by 1975 to 264,700, which comprised 43% of 
the Jordanian labour force. A dramatic increase in remittances ensued,3 implying a 
strong, but lagged, correlation between oil prices and remittances.4 Over the period 
1964-1973 remittances ranged between JD 4.1 million and JD 7.4 million; in 1974 
they doubled; in 1975 they increased by 121%, and again by 143% in 1976,
2The correlation coefficient between oil prices and Arab aid over the period 1968 to 1984 is 0.94.
3For a discussion of the impact of labour emigration and remittances on the Jordanian economy (the 
labour market, domestic consumption, imports and the monetary system) see Fariz (1976), chapter five: 
176-217.
4This applies to the period that covers the two oil booms. Subsequently, as a large proportion of the 
Jordanian labour force was in permanent or semi-permanent employment, the correlation became much 
weaker. The correlation coefficient between oil prices and remittances, lagged by two years, was 0.97 
for the period 1968 to 1982, and dropped to 0.47 for the period 1983 to 1992.
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reaching JD 129.6 million. With the slowdown in oil prices in the late 1970s 
remittances growth decelerated, then leapt forward again in 1980 and 1981, 
following the second oil boom. The peak was reached in 1984 when remittances 
amounted to JD 475 million.5 As a source of foreign exchange, remittances 
accounted for about one-third in the late seventies, up from only about 7% on the 
eve of the first oil boom.
Table V .l-2 shows the absolute and relative value of grants and remittances 
(as ratios to GDP, exports and imports). It can be seen that the ratio of grants and 
remittances to GDP has always been significant in the Jordanian economy, but 
increased noticeably in 1974 and again in 1979, when it peaked at 73%. 
Subsequently, the ratio declined continuously and in 1990 it constituted 33% of 
GDP, a rate that is comparable with the pre-boom period. As a ratio to exports and 
imports, grants and remittances averaged 317% and 71%, respectively, over the 
period 1970-1981. There is no apparent upward trend in these ratios during the 
boom years although grants and remittances' growth was substantial, indicating 
that both exports and imports experienced significant growth rates over this period.
Table V.l-3 depicts the effect of these foreign exchange inflows on the 
balance of payments. The current account balance is dominated by merchandise 
and transfer payment balances; the latter consisting of workers' remittances and 
unrequited transfers. The increase in workers' remittances and Arab aid after the 
first oil boom brought the current account into surplus over the period 1972-76. 
Jordan's stock of foreign assets was growing. Subsequently, both the upsurge in 
imports from 1977 and the decline in unrequited government transfers in 1978 
(when oil prices declined) turned the current account surplus into a deficit. Over 
the period 1979-1980 the current account position improved as transfer payments 
increased with the second oil boom, but this only had a short-term effect; and from 
1981 onwards - with the exception of 1989 - the current account was in deficit
Statistics oil remittauces should be treated with caution. Officially published data on remittances 
include only the sums remitted through the banking system. Official sources on the other hand exclude 
foreign currency brought back into the country either by individuals or through mouey changers, and 
these remittances are thought to be substantial. They also exclude remittances in kind which Jordanian 
expatriates often bring home as personal import items, such as cars, which may be re-sold freely in 
Jordan. These items may add an estimated 60% to the value of officially declared remittances. On the 
other hand, not all of the remitted money remains in Jordan: an unknown proportion of remittances 
passing through the Jordanian banking system is destined for the Israeli-occupied 'West Bank1 where 
the Jordanian Dinar is legal tender (Seccombe & Wilson, 1982: 28 & 31). From the above it is clear 
that any adjustment to the officially published data on remittances would be haphazard and will not, 
therefore, be attempted.
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Table V .l-2
T rends in G row th o f Grants and R em ittances, 1970-1992
________ V alu e  (m illio n  JD)___________  R atio o f  G ran ts & R em itta n ces to________
G rants & (P ercen tage)
G ran ts R em itta n ces R em ittan ces______________ G D P _______ E xports_______ Im p orts
1970 40.7 5.5 46.2 26.5 379.5 70.5
1971 36.6 5.0 41.6 22.3 363.5 54.6
1972 6S.3 7.4 75.7 36.5 445.0 79.8
1973 64.6 14.7 79.3 36.3 328.4 73.6
1974 86.7 24.1 110.9 44.8 222.9 71.2
1975 139.8 53.3 193.1 61.9 394.9 82.9
1976 126.6 129.6 256.2 60.8 372.8 75.6
1977 165.S 154.8 320.6 62.3 390.7 70.8
1978 106.5 180.4 286.9 45.4 315.6 62.5
1979 314.4 236.7 551.1 73.2 455.8 93.7
1980 398.8 236.7 635.4 64.6 370.6 88.9
1981 430.8 340.9 771.7 66.3 318.1 73.7
1982 373.3 381.9 755.2 57.2 285.5 66.2
1983 294.9 402.9 697.8 49.0 331.4 63.3
1984 278.8 475.0 753.8 50.3 259.3 70.5
1985 315.0 402.0 717.0 44.6 230.6 66.9
1986 238.0 414.5 652.5 37.0 254.9 77.0
1987 199.3 317.7 517.0 28.2 163.8 56.7
1988 232.2 335.7 567.9 29.9 174.9 55.5
1989 371.1 358.3 729.4 35.3 136.6 59.3
1990 409.4 331.8 741.2 32.6 121.1 42.9
1991 337.1 306.3 643.4 26.6 107.5 37.6
1992 279.0 573.1 • 852.1 30.6 134.4 38.5
Source C alculated from Central Bank of Jordan 'Yearly Statistical Series 1964-88'; 'M onthly Bulletin', various
issues.
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Table V .l-3
Sum m ary of Jordan's Balance of Paym ents (on cash basis). 1967-1992
(000 000 TD)__________________ _ _________________ __________
Trade
Balance
fl)
Services 
Balance 1 /  
(2)
Net
Workers
Remittances
(3a)
Net
Unrequited
Transfers
(3b)
Total
Transfer
Payments
f3)
Current
Account
Balance
f4)
Capital
Account
Balance
t5)
Overall
Balance
(6)
1967 (42.9) 8.6 6.6 53.9 60.5 26.2 2.0 28.1
1968 (43.0) (5.4) 4.1 54.5 58.6 10.1 5.0 15.1
1969 (52.8) (17.8) 6.9 47.4 54.3 (16.2) 5.3 (10.9)
1970 (53.4) 1.2 5.5 40.7 46.2 (5.9) 0.3 (5.7)
1971 (64.8) 1.9 5.0 36.6 41.6 (21.3) 6.7 (14.5)
1972 (77.9) 3.5 7.4 68.3 75.7 1.3 6.3 7.6
1973 (83.7) 8.1 14.8 64.6 79.4 3.8 6.5 10.3
1974 (105.9) (2.0) 24.1 86.7 110.9 2.9 10.9 13.8
1975 (184.1) 12.5 53.3 139.8 193.1 21.5 44.1 65.6
1976 (270.0) 31.2 129.6 126.6 256.2 17.3 (14.7) 2.7
1977 (371.1) 63.0 139.8 165.8 305.6 (2.5) 50.2 47.7
1978 (368.0) 36.3 139.4 106.5 245.9 (85.8) 90.9 5.1
1979 (467.4) (5.5) 156.4 314.4 470.9 (2.1) 58.3 56.2
1980 (543.3) 65.5 190.7 398.8 589.4 111.6 32.0 143.7
1981 (803.7) 70.4 288.9 430.8 719.7 (13.7) 69.0 55.4
1982 (876.6) 65.6 319.5 373.3 692.8 (118.3) 113.4 (4.9)
1983 (891.4) 125.0 330.1 294.9 625.0 (141.4) 156.8 15.4
1984 (778.5) 18.1 377.5 278.8 656.3 (104.1) 64.4 (39.8)
1985 (761.6) 36.7 310.0 315.0 625.0 (99.9) 137.6 37.7
1986 (591.8) 9.8 328.1 238.0 566.1 (16.0) 51.0 35.0
1987 (596.9) 23.9 255.3 199,3 454.6 (118.4) 75.9 (42.4)
1988 (638.5) 22.2 278.5 232.2 510.7 (105.5) 32.8 (72.7)
1989 (585.3) 122.1 306.3 371.7 678.0 214.8 113.3 328.1
1990 (1,008.6) 166.0 285.0 409.4 694.4 (148.2) 353.9 205.7
1991 (994.1) 123.3 264.7 337.1 601.8 (269.0) 733.2 464.2
1992 (1,461.7) 147.5 514.6 279.0 793.6 (520.6) 482.7 (37.9)
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, M onthly Bulletin, vairous issues
1 /  Includes factor incom e (investm ent incom e and oil transfer dues).
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again. In the boom period 1973-81, transfer payments covered 92% of the trade 
deficit; in the period 1983-92, 75%.
The expansion of foreign exchange reserves in the economy (from JD 80 
billion in 1972 to JD 353.9 billion in 1981) was not accompanied by any significant 
increase in investment abroad. The economy was thus not sterilised of the foreign 
exchange effect, entailing full adjustment to the boom. In fact, the economy's 
monetisation increased even further during the boom, with the government 
significantly increasing its borrowing from abroad (see following section).
To reveal the potential impact of foreign exchange earnings on the Jordanian 
economy more clearly, comparisons with other developing economies cited as 
examples of Dutch disease cases will be made. The results are given in Table V .l- 
4.
Table V .l-4
Comparisons of Booming Sector Foreign Exchange Earnings, in 1979
Ratio of Foreign Exchange Receipts1/to: 
GDP Total Exports 21
Jordan 73.0 80.0
Nigeria 24.8 95.1
Indonesia 21.8 65.4
Iran 27.8 89.4
Source: Central Bank of Jordan (1989), Yearly Statistical Series, 1964-1988 for Jordan; World 
Bank, World Tables for Indonesia, Nigeria, and Iran.
^  Grants and remittances for Jordan, and oil export revenues for the other economies.
For comparative reasons, grants and remittances in Jordan have been treated as a source of export 
earnings, and have thus been added to real exports in the denominator.
The above exposition shows that Jordan was potentially under booming conditions 
in the seventies and very early eighties, as evidenced by the following two 
observations: i) a sudden and significant increase in its foreign exchange earnings 
as the price of oil rose in 1973/74 and again in 1979; and ii) a massive resource 
movement to the Gulf, which itself became an important source of foreign 
exchange flow into Jordan. It seems appropriate therefore to model the Jordanian 
economy with the aid of the Dutch disease theory since the necessary conditions 
are met, despite the fact that Jordan is not an oil exporter. One can imagine the oil 
producing sector (the source of the boom) to be loosely linked to the Jordanian 
economy; it transmits foreign exchange to the rest of the economy, and draws on 
its labour resource - the mobile factor in the Dutch disease model for Jordan. This
116
sector, however, is an enclave in all other respects; its output is not a function of 
any resource in the economy other than labour.
The ultimate criterion as to whether or not the Dutch disease model is 
applicable to Jordan is the impact effect foreign exchange flows have had on the 
structure of prices, which will be examined in section V.4. In the following 
sections (V.2 & V.3), the two mechanisms that transmitted the boom effects to the 
economy will be studied. These are, first, the spending effect and, second, the 
resource movement.
Y.2 The Spending Effect
V.2.1 Public Spending
As Arab aid to Jordan was channelled through the government, the latter's 
spending was a crucial determinant of the process of adjustment to the new 
economic conditions. Jordan's experience in this respect is similar to that of other 
countries - e.g. Iran, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia - to whose government 
large proportions of the windfall foreign exchange gains have accrued, either 
through direct ownership of oil and gas resources or from royalties, taxes, etc.
Faced with higher immediate and anticipated income after 1973, the 
government chose to increase both current and future consumption by 
accumulating. Generally, the choice between consumption and investment depends 
on the social rate of time preference; the relative rate of return on physical assets; 
and expectations regarding receipts of foreign exchange. In the Jordanian case, 
there is evidence that the government wished to spread income evenly between the 
present and the future, as evidenced from the high rate of investment during the 
boom (averaging 35% of GDP during 1973-83).
It is less clear, however, what rate of return on investment was used in 
government calculations. According to Anani (1987) return on public investment 
was barely 2% while the average cost of borrowing was more that 7%. If this is 
true, government investment must have had considerable externalities, otherwise 
public investment decisions would have been irrational. It would be quite 
formidable, and beyond the scope of this study, to internalise all externalities 
related to government investment and recalculate its rate of return. Suffice it to say 
that, on the one hand, there is ample evidence that some public projects had 
significant externalities, such as primary and secondary roads, the expansion of the 
port of Aqaba, the irrigation schemes in the Jordan Valley, etc., which benefited
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the productive sectors directly by increasing their efficiency and lowering their 
production costs; and, on the other hand, government projects which were largely 
capital-intensive almost invariably overran their budget and time schedules, thus 
increasing investment costs and lowering the social rate of return. Moreover, rent- 
seeking and corruption are known to have been rife during the period of very high 
public spending (i.e. 1974/75-82/83), further reducing the economic efficiency of 
public investment.
Regarding expectations of foreign exchange earnings, it can be argued, based 
on its rate of public consumption, investment, and borrowing, that the Jordanian 
government expected the oil boom in the Gulf to be perpetual.
Pinto (1987) argues that government spending during a boom is biased 
towards construction services; capital-intensive investments in protected sectors, 
which are essentially non-tradeable; and wages and salaries. In what follows, these 
assertions will be tested against Jordanian data.
Table V.2-1
Trends in Government Expenditure (Ratio to GDP)
Current Capital Total
Average 1967-68 35.4 16.4 51.8
Average 1969-73 34.4 14.2 48.6
Average 1974-79 40.1 23.0 63.1
Average 1980-92 33.2 13.2 46.4
Average 1967-92 35.2 15.9 50.5
Source: Calculated from Central Bank o f  Jordan, Monthly Bulletin, various issues.
Table V.2-1 above shows that government spending as a ratio to GDP has always 
been very high in Jordan, with an average of 50.5% for 1967-92. There are 
distinct periods, however, when this ratio has been higher than usual: 1967-68 
(51.8%) and, more notably, 1974-79 (63.1%). Both these periods witnessed an 
upsurge in Arab aid, in the former period to help Jordan with its post-1967 war 
reconstruction, and in the latter simply because the Gulf states were flush with oil 
money. From 1975 to 1979 - the second national plan period - government 
spending grew annually at 25.9%, which outstripped growth in GDP of 23.8% 
(both in current prices). In real terms, this growth represents 15% p.a., which is
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faster than the already very high rate for Iran during the first oil boom period 
(12.2% p.a.) (Jazayeri, 1988: 44)
As to the proportion of capital and current in total government spending, 
although current spending continued to be larger than capital spending, the latter's 
share was perceptibly higher during the boom compared with other periods: 1967- 
73, 30%; 1974-81, 39%; and 1982-92, 26%. This indicates that the rate of growth 
in government capital outlays was faster than the growth in its current outlays 
(27.1% and 22.7% p.a., respectively, over 1975-79) (see Table V.2-2). These 
trends were reversed in the post-boom period: capital expenditure experienced a 
sluggish growth of only 1% p.a. over 1980-90, with a decline in most years; while 
current expenditure, and because of its nature, continued to grow at 12.8% under 
conditions of economic slowdown.
Table V.2-2
Government Budget Expenditure: 1972-79 (in current prices)
Annual Growth Rates In percentage of GDP
1972-73 1975-79 1973 1979
Total Expenditure 25.0 25.9 54.7 76.1
Qirrent Expenditure 21.3 22.7 36.0 47.1
Defence 7.0 24.1 19.2 17.5
Civil Service n.a. 18.6 15.0 16.6
Wages 12.5 14.9 23.4 17.3
Transfers n.a. 38.3 1.8 9.4
Capital Expenditure 32.9 27.1 18.7 29.1
GNP 15.9 24.8 109.6 125.9
GDP 10.3 23.8 100.0 100.0
Source: World Bank (1980), Country Economic Memorandum on Jordan: 12.
Table V.2-2 above gives some insights into the growth and distribution of 
government current spending. The most remarkable changes between 1973 and 
1979 were: i) a decline in the share of military spending in GDP from 19.2% (53% 
of current spending) to 17.3% (35.7% of current spending); ii) an increase in the 
share of transfer payments from 1.8 to 9.4% of GDP; iii) a significant decline in 
the share of wages by 6% over 1973-79; and iv) a slight increase in the share of 
civil service (i.e. public administration, excluding the military) payments.
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The decrease in military spending is explained by the political stability 
Jordan enjoyed in the oil era. The increase in transfer payments is mainly due to a 
rise in subsidies made to food and energy, from a negligible share prior to the 
boom to 5.1% of GDP in 1979. This is in line with the practice in most other 
booming LDCs. To combat inflation and make "essential commodities at 
reasonable prices, sufficient quantities, and acceptable quality" available to the low 
income groups, the Jordanian Ministry of Supply was created in 1974 (Central 
Bank of Jordan, 1975, Annual Report). The Ministry's approach to controlling 
inflation was to monopolise imports of major food items, especially wheat flour, 
sugar, rice, and meat, and resell them to the public at subsidised rates. Energy 
subsidies became significant only after the second oil price rise. Both food and 
energy subsidies peaked in absolute value in 1982 at JD 56.2 million, which 
amounted to 12.2% of current spending and 4.2% of GDP. Subsequently, energy 
subsidies were stopped in 1985; and food subsidies declined considerably, until the 
economic crisis of 1989 when they were increased substantially to reach 7% of 
current spending (2.7% of GDP) in 1991.
The decline in the share of wages is explained largely by the labour 
movement into the booming sector (the Gulf states), which drew labour from all 
sectors of the economy, including the public sector. Furthermore, since the 
government put no effort to bring its remuneration in line with the rest of the 
economy, the rapid increase in wages in the boom period was an inducement for 
workers to join private sector employment.
As regards capital expenditure, the general trend in sectoral distribution of 
investment was discussed at length in chapter IV. It was shown that during the plan 
period 1976-80 a perceptible shift in investment distribution in favour of the 
commodity producing sectors took place as relative to the previous period 1973-75, 
and that this trend continued during the third plan period 1981-85. Table V.2-3 
recapitulates the argument, from the public investment point of view. The share of 
the commodity producing sectors, largely traded goods with the exception of 
energy and electricity, increased from 29.4% in 1973-75 to 35.3% in 1976-80, and 
declined to 30.6% in 1981-84. Investment in transport has been consistently high 
at about one third of total public investment in all plan periods. The same can also 
be said of communication, although spending on this item did increase in the third 
plan period, 1981-84. The most remarkable change in the non-traded sectors' 
outlays is perhaps the dramatic decline in the share of social services (education,
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health, etc.) from 37.8% in the first plan period (1973-75) to 15.4% in the third 
plan period (1981-84).
Table V.2-3
Sectoral Distribution of Public Investment, 1973-75, 1976-80 & 1981-84
(Value in million JD, share percentage in total)_________________________
1973-■1975 1976-■1980 1981-84
Value Share Value Share Value Share
Commodity Producing Sector 30.0 29.4 188.1 35.3 320.1 30.6
Agriculture 5.0 5.6 4.7 0.9 33.2 3.2
Water & Irrigation 13.0 14.4 73.8 13.9 139.1 13.3
Mining & Manufacturing 15.3 2.9 40.9 3.9
Energy & Electricity^ 12.0 13.4 94.3 17.7 106.9 10.2
Non-commodity producing sector 72.0 70.6 344.5 64.7 725.0 69.4
Transport 30.0 33.3 175.6 33.0 354.9 34.0
Communication & Trade 7.0 7.8 39.5 7.4 116.4 11.1
Tourism 1.0 1.1 4.9 0.9 8.2 0.8
Social Services 34.0 37.8 124.5 23.4 160.9 15.4
Housing 74.8 7.2
Other 9.8 0.9
Total Investment 102.0 100,0 532.6 100.0 1,045.1
Source: Five Year Development Plan, 1976-80: 19 & 38; World Bank (1983a), Special Economic Report: 
Jordan Review o f Five Year Plan, 1981-1985: 105; and (1980), Countiy Economic Memorandum: 38  
1/Including mining and manufacturing for 1981-84.
The expenditure behaviour of the Jordanian government thus contrasts with that of 
other booming economies' governments, where the increase in internal funds 
invariably lead to an expansion of spending on wages, social benefits, and social 
services. Chapter IV has shown that this obtained in the majority of booming 
economies reviewed, including Holland (Ellman, 1981); Trinidad and Tobago 
(Gelb, 1986); Iran (Jazayeri, 1988); and Nigeria (Struthers, 1990). The Jordanian 
experience, rather, was not only that the government desired to aid in particular the 
commodity producing sectors, but also the boom period was one of relative 
political stability, where none of the demographic shifts experienced in the pre­
boom occurred, thus easing the pressure on health, education, and other social 
services. Furthermore, with the government unable to compete with wages paid in 
the private sector, and certainly not with those paid in the Gulf, public 
administration activities did not expand.
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Generally speaking, public investment was concentrated in capital-intensive 
projects, especially in the period 1976 to 1980. In this latter period five mining and 
manufacturing projects accounted for 78% of total investment in the sector. These 
were: the chemical fertiliser industry (JD 61 million), expansion of petroleum 
refining (JD 39 million), potash extraction (JD 25 million), expansion of phosphate 
production (JD 24 million), the South cement factory (JD 21.3 million), and 
extension of Fuheis cement (JD 8 million) (Five Year Plan 1976-80: 189).
Implementation of these projects in turn necessitated large-scale capital- 
intensive investment in social overheads. For example, the transport of phosphate 
and potash to the port of Aqaba, which handles 90% of total exports of these 
commodities, made investment necessary in major roads (Ma'an-Wadi Yutum and 
Yutum-South Aqaba for phosphate, and Safi-Aqaba road for potash); extension of 
railways (between El-Hasa phosphate mines and the port of Aqaba); and the 
expansion of Aqaba port facilities (phosphate stores, cargo berths, floating cranes, 
etc.) (Five Year Plan 1976-80: 181-9; 236-49; & 250-9).
Such investment had significant positive externalities that mainly benefited 
small-scale producers in agriculture and manufacturing, especially those who 
exported. In the immediate aftermath of the boom, serious bottlenecks were created 
at Jordan's only sea port, Aqaba, as the port facilities were inadequate for the 
rapidly increasing tonnage handled. Heavy investment undertaken by the 
government in expanding the port facilities relieved this constraint significantly, 
and by the end of the seventies the port's capacity had increased five-fold (Dar Al- 
Handasah, 1982h: 28). Further expansion took place in the early eighties, with the 
financial, technical and institutional support of Iraq,6 who was the major 
beneficiary of this expansion because of its transit traffic through Aqaba during the 
war with Iran.7 Iraq also extended financial support to Jordan in the late seventies 
and early eighties, in the form of soft loans, for the construction of feeder roads.8 
The result was to increase Jordanian producers' competitiveness by reducing the
6Iu 1980, Iraq advanced a JD 7 million loan for the expansion of the Port facilities. JD 4 million was 
for the development of the free zone; JD 2 million for the development of the storage yard; and JD 1 
million for the purchase of equipment for goods handling (Ministry of Industry and Trade, 1985: 156).
7Out of 3.8 million tons handling capacity of the Aqaba port, 1.5 million tons was dedicated to Iraq 
for its transit goods (Dar Al-Handasah, 1982h: 28).
8A JD 15 million loan, with 2.5% interest and a 12-years repayment period including two years' 
grace, was advanced to Jordan for the purpose of financing roads connecting Aqaba with other towns 
along the commercial route to Iraq (Ministry of Industry and Trade, 1985: 172, 192, 157, & 220).
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cost of imported intermediate inputs, as well as the price of final output in their 
main export markets - i.e. the Gulf states.
On the other hand, the rapid implementation of government projects was 
faced with serious institutional constraints thereby reducing the economic efficiency 
of public investment. The most important of these constraints was, perhaps, the 
mobilisation of managerial, technical and professional skills, which were 
continually being drained out of the public sector into the private sector within 
Jordan, and out of the Jordanian economy altogether into the booming economies 
of the Gulf (Five Year Plan 1967-80: 48). Another factor that may have reduced 
the social benefits from government projects was the rent-seeking and corruption 
associated with rapid disbursement of large amounts of funds.
Table V.2-4
Finance of Government Budget, period totals (million JD)
Domestic
Revenues^
(1)
Domestic
Expenditure
(2)
Financing
Requirements
(3)
External Financing Requirements 
Grants Loans Total
Internal
Financing
Requirements^
(7)
Ratios
(4) (51 (6) (4)/(3) (5)/(3)
1967-73 240.5 621.8 381.3 279.9 43.7 323.7 57.8 73.4 11.5
1974-80 1,287.2 3,039.2 1,752.0 1,055.4 383.0 1,438.4 313.4 60.2 21.9
1981-91 7,012.0 10,894.6 3,882.6 2,173.0 1,395.2 3,568.3 314.2 56.0 35.9
Source: Central Bank of Jordan (1989), Yearly Statistical Series: 1964-1988; and Monthly Bulletin, various issues, 
1/ Includes repayment o f loans to the government.
2 / Includes accounting errors and omissions.
Together, capital and current government spending exceeded the current additions 
to income from Arab aid (Table V.2-4). The government's budget deficit thus 
expanded (Table V.2-5). This situation obtained because Jordan's credit-worthiness 
increased with the inflow of foreign exchange to both the government and the 
private sector, which allowed an increase in the rate of borrowing from 
international markets.
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Table V.2-5
Trends in Government Budget Position 11 (Ratio of Balance to GDP)
(Period average) _____________________________________
1 9 67-72 1973-82 1 9 8 3 -8 8 1 9 8 8-93
Deficit before assistance -30% -34% -22% -8%
Deficit after assistance -7% -13% -14% 1%
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Bulletin, various issues.
1/ The above figures pertain to the central government, and do not include parastatal organisations. If those were 
included, Anani (1990: 32) estimates the increase in total expenditure at 50%.
A 13% ratio of budget deficit after financing to GDP represents a far less 
disciplined fiscal behaviour than has obtained in most other booming LDCs with 
which comparisons are made. Even in Nigeria, known for its profligate 
government spending during the boom, the government deficit did not exceed 11% 
of GDP. Comparisons with Indonesia are far less favourable as the budget deficit 
to GDP ratio was less than 5% (and indeed, for two years during the boom there 
was a budget surplus) (Pinto, 1987).
To sum up, comparisons with other developing countries whose experiences 
have been discussed in a Dutch disease context, namely Nigeria, Indonesia, and 
Iran, show that the sudden increase in foreign exchange earnings in Jordan had a 
potentially stronger impact on its economy than on the other economies. Also by 
comparison, the Jordanian government's response to the sudden change in 
economic conditions was far less disciplined than in the other economies 
considered, in terms both of the size of the budget deficit and increased borrowing 
from abroad, which meant that the economy had to undergo more adjustment than 
was necessitated by the boom conditions alone. The higher-than-usual government 
spending during the boom in Jordan was caused mainly by, on the capital 
expenditure side, the government's high degree of involvement in investment 
projects, and its own choice of large capital-intensive development projects; and, 
on the current expenditure side, the subsidies granted to major food items and oil 
products. No bias towards construction, other services, and protected traded 
sectors was found during the boom. On the contrary, compared with the pre-boom 
period, government spending was biased towards industry (mining, manufacturing, 
electricity, and energy). Pinto's finding on Nigeria and Jazayeri's on Iran, where 
spending was highly biased towards the non-traded sector, are thus not borne out 
by Jordanian data. Rather, Jordan’s experience resembles very much that of
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Indonesia, which saw in higher foreign exchange earnings an opportunity to 
increase the efficiency of the productive sectors, especially agriculture.
V.2.2 Private Spending
An increase in private spending during the boom was to be expected from a rise in 
remittances, which increased disposable income. A survey carried out by 
Seccombe and Wilson (1982: 45-47) to study remittances behaviour of households 
in seven villages in the highland areas of Irbid governorate in the early eighties led 
the authors to the conclusion that "the main impact of emigration is largely 
confined to improving the living standards, through consumer spending and new 
housing of emigrant households, rather than leading to any re-structuring of 
production potential. The experience of the villages appears to mirror that of the 
economy as a whole" (46). More specifically the survey gave the following results: 
68% of the households recorded that the major use of remittances was for daily 
expenditure; 45% of the households were engaged in building a new house a 
further 13% were using remittances to purchase land for building, and 8.3% to add 
rooms or facilities to existing property. Overall, almost two-thirds of migrant 
workers were involved in investment in improved housing. Another survey for the 
capital, Amman, gave similar results. The researchers concluded that "the strong 
bias towards investment in housing, which is consistent across all educational and 
occupational groups, reflects a lack of alternatives: a point of view supported by 
the lack of variation in remittance expenditure pattern by migrants with different 
socio-economic and demographic characteristics" (ibid).
These results are similar to findings on remittances behaviour in other labour 
exporting countries, namely Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand. In 
these countries, a large proportion of remittances went into increased consumption, 
mainly food items, clothing and consumer durables (60% in Pakistan, 85% in the 
Philippines, 55% in Sri Lanka and 42% in Thailand). Furthermore, the bulk of 
investment was in housing - either renovation, repairs or construction (50% in 
Pakistan, 50% in the Philippines, 40.6% in Sri Lanka, 45% in Bangladesh and 
57% in Thailand) (Amjad, 1989: 15-16).
However, macro-level data on Jordan do not entirely bear out Wilson and 
Seccombe's argument. Private expenditure on constmction during the boom years 
was indeed very high in Jordan, amounting to 20% of total private investment 
during the second National Plan period 1976-80 (Table IV.2.2.2-6 in the previous 
chapter). But even this high percentage was exceeded by private investment in
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mining and manufacturing which amounted to 40.8% of total private investment 
over the same period. It is a gross inaccuracy, therefore, to say that remittances 
were not instrumental in restructuring production potential in Jordan. Furthermore, 
investment in constmction is not entirely unproductive, since the sector has 
relatively strong backward linkages to building industries (paints, tiles and 
mosaics, insulation material, etc.) which thrived in the period 1976-80, the height 
of the boom in Jordan.
Another important area of private sector ventures during the boom was 
agriculture, which accounted for 6.4% of total private investment during the same 
period, namely 1976-80. Considering that agricultural output constituted only 9% 
of aggregate output at that time, this level of private sector involvement in 
agriculture, typically a government domain, is quite considerable. The private 
sector also contributed to investment in transport including infrastructure and 
equipment, which again, as a social overhead, is normally undertaken by the 
government.
In conclusion, private spending during the boom period was much more 
balanced than would have been envisaged by the Dutch disease theory, since 
investment in productive activities (largely tradeable) was forthcoming; this 
indicates that such activities were still relatively profitable under booming 
conditions, which is contrary to the theory's predictions. Chapters VI & VII will 
discuss the causes behind this investment behaviour. What is worth noting at this 
point is the leading role government investment has played in inducing private 
investment in productive sectors. At the beginning of the boom, 1973-75, public 
investment in irrigation accounted for 5.6% of total public capital spending (Table 
V.2-3). In the following period private investment in agriculture was considerable 
at 6.4% of total private capital spending. Similarly, heavy public investment in 
mining and manufacturing which invariably took the form of joint ventures with 
the private sector (e.g. petroleum refining, potash, fertilisers, cement, etc.) by 
necessity meant a high level of private investment in these sectors during the 
second plan period 1976-80, which covers most of the boom years.
V.3 The Resource Movement
In discussing the Jordanian labour market, a word of caution is in order regarding 
data availability and quality. Labour migration statistics are especially weak, since 
neither Jordan nor the receiving countries systematically collect data on the
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volume, composition and characteristics of migrating labour. Moreover, the 
receiving states, with the exception of Kuwait, do not distinguish in published 
statistics between Jordanians and Palestinians, making it difficult to unambiguously 
identify Jordanian manpower abroad. Analysing the Jordanian labour market from 
a historical perspective is thus handicapped. For example, time series data, 
including those on which this section is based, involve a high level of 
extrapolation, interpolation and other statistical manipulations, and must therefore 
be considered as merely indicative.
On the other hand, certain characteristics of the labour market in Jordan are 
very strongly manifest, which adds an element of confidence to conclusions made 
in their regard, despite the weakness of the data. A good example to cite in this 
context is the massive labour out-migration, and the rapid rise in wages after the 
first oil boom. However, such aspects as labour market segmentation are, although 
apparent enough, more difficult to analyse in terms of magnitude, cause, and 
effect, in the absence of an adequate data base.
V.3.1 The Tradeability of Labour in Jordan
During 1973-83 two large international, and one domestic, labour migration 
movements took place in the Jordanian economy. The early 1970s saw the 
intensification of Jordanian labour emigration to neighbouring Arab oil producing 
countries. This resource movement was of such magnitude that, by the end of the 
seventies, over 40% of all actively employed Jordanians worked outside their home 
country. Inevitably, extreme labour shortages were created within Jordan. This 
large emigration was compensated to some extent, starting from the late 1970s, by 
a sizeable inflow of foreign workers into Jordan, particularly Egyptians. By 1985, 
about 12% of the total population and 28.5% of the domestic labour force 
comprised foreigners.
These international labour movements into and out of Jordan, depicted in 
Table V.3.1-1 and Figure V.3.1-1, made Jordanian labour highly tradeable. 
However, if it is argued that tradeable factors' prices must be entirely determined 
in international markets, labour cannot be considered as truly tradeable in Jordan. 
The imperfection of information regarding labour markets is partly responsible for 
this outcome, as are institutional, regulatory and social considerations. 
Nevertheless, it is equally inaccurate to treat labour as a non-tradeable factor of 
production, because its international mobility has the effect of reducing the
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Table V.3.1-1
Trends in Labour Migration in Iordan, 1968-87
1968 1973 1981 1984 1987
Annual Growth Rates 
1968-73 1973-81 1981-87
1. Total labour force in Jordan (000) 279.4 332.8 435.4 484.7 555.7 3.56 3.42 4.15
2. Foreign workers in Jordan (000) 0.0 0.4 93.4 153.6 120.0 0.00 99.25 4.27
3. Jordanian workers abroad (000) 87.5 152.9 312.3 334.0 339.0 11.81 9.34 1.38
4. Total Jordanian labour supply  1 /  (000) 366.9 485.3 654.3 665.1 774.7 5.75 3.80 2.86
5. Percentage o f Jordanian workers abroad 2 / 23.8% 31.5% 47.7% 50.2% 43.8%
6. Percentage o f foreign workers in  Jordan 0.0% 0.1% 21.5% 31.7% 21.6%
Source: Calculated form Royal Scientific Society (1989), 'The Data Base For The Jordanian Labour Market', vol III. 
1 / (1) - (2) +(3)
2 / (3) /  (4)
Figure V.3.1-1 
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insulation of domestically determined wages. Thus wages are brought more in line 
with internationally prevailing wages than would otherwise have been the case.
The boom period also witnessed a significant rural-urban migration. The 
large inflows of rural population into cities, especially the Greater Amman area, 
coincided with the rapid build up of government civil and military services in the 
capital area, and the boom in the construction sector. This rural movement 
deprived the agricultural sector of manpower, and was partly responsible for the 
foreign labour inflows into Jordan, the majority of which was absorbed by 
constmction and agriculture (World Bank, 1989: 4).
V.3.1.1 Out Migration
Out-migration has always existed in the Jordanian economy, albeit at moderate 
rates in the 1950s and 1960s, as Jordan was one of the first countries to export 
labour to the Gull. When the first oil boom took place, the major Arab oil 
exporting countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain 
and Libya) adopted ambitious economic plans which required manpower they did 
not possess.9 They selectively imported manpower, which was already employed in 
the sending countries, and which possessed skill and experience. Jordan, among 
many other countries, supplied the Gulf states with professional, technical, skilled 
and experienced manpower. In 1977 the 'Technical Committee on Manpower 
Migration' of the National Planning Council in Jordan cited the following evidence 
of the continued emigration of educationally qualified Jordanian manpower:
(i) In 1976: 34% of doctors; 24% of pharmacists; 66% of engineers; and 
48% of agricultural engineers registered in Jordan were employed outside 
the country.
(ii) In 1976: 750 teachers were suspended by the Ministry of Education after 
absenting themselves without leave, the majority appearing to have 
emigrated to oil producing neighbouring states.
(iii) Over the years 1975-77, the Jordanian army was obliged to recruit 
women for administrative tasks in response to manpower shortages (Dar Al- 
Handasah, 1982i: 45).
9In addition to their small indigenous populations, those countries suffer from low crude 
participation rate in economic activities and low literacy rates (El-Akel, 1985: 100).
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Out-migration thus mainly deprived the Jordanian economy of highly skilled 
and well-trained labour10 taken from different sectors and industries in the 
economy. In the second wave of out-migration, after the 1979 oil price rise, semi­
skilled labourers were also seeking higher paid jobs in the Gulf11 (El-Akel, 1985: 
97 & 105; World Bank 1989, Annex E: 83).
The main reason for this resource movement is the wage differential between 
Jordan and the Gulf countries (see Labour Cost in section V.3.2 below). Another 
reason may have been the historically high rate of unemployment in Jordan.
V.3.1.2 In-migration
The Jordanian labour market was by the mid-to-late seventies characterised by 
imbalances and excessive demand for labour, as a result of massive out-migration. 
To close the gap between the supply of and demand for labour the Jordanian 
government facilitated in-migration of foreign labour. An attractive wage structure, 
and a strong currency induced increasing numbers of Arab non-oil country 
nationals, mostly Syrians and Egyptians, to seek employment in Jordan. In 1975 
foreign labour inowfi increased by more than four-fold over 1974; and between 
1975-79 the annual rate of growth of foreign labour averaged 200%; it diminished 
subsequently; and started declining from 1985. Thus the most intense period of 
labour immigration coincided with the height of the boom in Jordan.
The number of foreign workers and their share in the Jordanian labour force 
were shown in Table V.3.1-1 and Figure V.3.1-1 above. This share increased 
from 0.1% in 1973 to 31% in 1984, but declined to 23.6% in 1987. Over 1974-84 
about 70% of the labour supply in Jordan was contributed by in-migration. Thus, 
out of the 3.5% p.a. growth in labour supply in that period, 2.4% was provided 
from abroad.
10A study doue by ESCWA (the United Natious Economic and Social Committee for Western Asia) 
has shown that western nationals are the most educated amongst all immigrant workers in the Gulf. 
These are followed by Palestinians and Jordanians who are mainly employed in professional, technical, 
administrative, managerial and related occupations requiring advanced skills and high educational 
standards (El-Akel, 1985: 103)
^The basic difference between the two types of migrant workers is that the professional workers had 
long-term contracts (and were accompanied by family), while the skilled and semi-skilled were on short 
term contracts (and were single men). Also, many of the former type migrated under the umbrella of 
bilateral agreements, and were seconded for a given period, normally five years. On their return, they 
assumed their public sector employment; whereas the latter group, the skilled workers, are not 
officially sponsored, except those under an agreement with Saudi Arabia.
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Table V.3.1.2-1 gives the sectoral distribution of foreign labour in Jordan. 
The leading sector in employing foreign labour was construction up until 1982, 
which accounts for the rapid growth of employment in this sector over 1973-79 
(see Table IV.2.1.2-2 in previous chapter). In 1983 agriculture took the lead, when 
it employed 43,478 out of the 130,000 foreign workers (34%) mostly of Egyptian 
origin, while construction employed 40,661 workers (30%). The high elasticity of 
foreign labour supply to agriculture has prevented any significant depressing effect 
on the volume of agricultural output that might have been generated by out­
migration, as will be shown in chapter (VI). In 1983, on the other hand, mining 
and manufacturing employed only 7.3% of all foreign workers, nearly three- 
quarters of which were concentrated in 'Non-metallic Mineral Products' (World 
Bank, 1989).
Table V .3 .1.2-1
Sectoral Distribution of Foreign Labour In Jordan, 1968-1987
1973
Number 
1979 1984 1987 1973
Percentage in total 
1979 1984 1987
Agriculture 33 3,615 46,280 41,189 8.8 8.8 30.1 34.3
Mining & manufacturing 25 2,735 11,949 9,676 6.6 6.7 7.8 8.1
Electricity & water 2 168 1,475 1,200 0.5 0.4 1.0 1.0
Construction 158 17,336 48,449 37,200 42.0 42 .2 31.5 31 .0
Trade 36 3,965 13,331 10,057 9 .6 9.7 8.7 8.4
Communication & 
transport
6 616 7,198 6,600 1.6 1.5 4.7 5.5
Finance & business 4 415 2,705 2,400 1.1 1.0 1.8 2.0
Social & administrative 
services
112 12,192 22,204 11,678 29.8 29.7 14.5 9.7
Total 376 41,042 153,591 120,000 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Royal Scientific Society (1989), The Data Base o f  the Jordanian Labour Market, vol. III.
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In terms of the share of foreign labour in sectoral employment, the highest 
percentage also seems to be in agriculture.12 According to EI-Akel's survey (1985: 
111) conducted in 1982/83, the percentages of foreign manpower in the different 
economic sectors in Jordan was as follows: agriculture 79.8%, construction 56%, 
hotels, small businesses and sub-contracting 43.4%, trade and storage 30.6%, and 
manufacturing 11.1%. The Department of Statistics Employment Survey (1985) 
for establishments employing five persons or more gave the following percentages 
of foreign manpower: mining 6%, manufacturing 20%, construction 31%, and 
overall 11%. However, as the survey excludes agriculture, the overall percentage 
must have a significant downward bias. A downward bias is also expected in all 
sectors since the survey does not include small establishments that employ less than 
five persons, where the proportion of foreign labour is expected to be high.13
The concentration of foreign labour in agriculture and construction, both of 
which are labour-intensive, is an indication of the low level of skills amongst 
foreign labour in Jordan. Tables V.3.1.2-2 & 3 compare the educational and skill 
levels of foreign labour in Jordan with those of out-migrating labour. More than 
60% of foreign workers in Jordan have educational qualifications below secondary 
school, compared with only 23% for out-migrating labour. Only 6.3% of foreign 
workers in Jordan have university degrees, compared with 25% for out-migrating 
labour. As regards skill levels, the following comparisons are illuminating: the 
ratio of white collar workers (administrators & specialised workers) and 
technicians to total out-migrating labour increased from 15.7% in 1973 to 29.4% 
in 1986. The same ratio for foreign labour working in Jordan declined from 23.7% 
to 5.2%, for the same years; and rose for Jordanian labour employed in Jordan 
from 9.7% to 14.7% only, despite the rapid increase in education enrolment.
Thus it would appear that Jordan was not receiving foreign labour with skills 
that would fill the particular gap created by its out-migrating labour. In other 
words, in-migration could not have worked towards equilibrating the labour market 
imbalances in Jordan during the boom, since there was no match between 
'required' and 'acquired' skills. On the contrary, it seems more plausible that in- 
migrating labour competed with skills that were already abundant in the economy,
12For anecdotal evidence, see Khouri (1983: 3).
13Records of the Amman Chamber of Industry (1991, Table 13: 41-2) show the percentage of 
foreign to total labour employed in firms registered with the Chamber and employing 50 persons or 
more to be only 2,7% . It appears, therefore, that at least in manufacturing foreign labour is 
concentrated in small industries, probably due to its lack of skills.
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Table V.3.1.2-2
Distribution by Function of Jordanian Workers and of Foreign Workers in Jordan.
1. D istribution b y  function o f Jordanian w orkers in  Jordan
1968 1973 1976 1981 1986
(000) % (000) % (000) % (000) % (000) %
Specialized and technicians 15.1 6.0 24.9 8.4 38.0 10.5 55.8 13.3 66.9 13.6
Administrators 2.5 1.0 3.7 1.3 5.3 1.5 6.6 1.6 6.6 1.3
Secretarial 14.0 5.6 17.6 5.9 22.6 6.3 25.3 6.0 27.9 5.7
Retail 18.2 7.2 22.1 7.5 28.0 7.7 35.5 8.5 47.5 9.6
Services 15.7 6.2 18.3 6,2 22.5 6.2 26.6 6.4 31.0 6.3
Agriculture 55.3 22.0 46.8 15.8 47.6 13.2 39.1 9.3 31.2 6.3
Production and unspecified 130.8 52.0 162.6 54.9 197,3 54.6 229.4 54.8 281,4 57.1
Total 251.6 100.0 296.0 100.0 361.3 100.0 418.3 100.0 492.5 100.0
2. Distribution by function of Jordanian workers abroad
1968 1973 1976 1981 1986
(000) % (000) % (000) % (000) % (000) %
Specialized and technicians 10.5 12.0 21.0 13.7 34.3 15.8 70.2 22.5 88.5 25.8
Administrators 1.8 2.1 3.1 2.0 4.3 2.0 7.3 2.3 12.5 3.6
Clerical 4.5 5.1 8.5 5.6 12.5 5.8 18.4 5.9 20.0 5.8
Retail 6.1 7.0 9.4 6.1 9.8 4.5 8.6 2.8 16.0 4.7
Services 4.4 5.0 6.5 4.3 7.4 3.4 6.4 2.0 13.0 3.8
Agriculture 0.7 0.8 1.4 0.9 2.0 0.9 5.1 1.6 12.9 3.8
Production and unspecified 59.6 68.1 103.0 67.4 147.0 67.6 196.2 62.8 180.4 52.5
Total 87.57 100.0 152.9 100.0 217,3 100.0 312.2 100.0 343.3 100.0
3. Distribution by function of foreign workers in Jordan
1973 1976 1981 1986
No. % No. % No. % No. %
Specialized and technicians 79 21.0 793 16.6 5,557 5.9 5,850 4.5
Administrators 10 2.7 115 2.4 1,028 1.1 909 0.7
Secretarial 13 3.5 166 3.5 2,195 2.4 2,340 1.8
Retail 40 10.6 421 8.8 4,343 4.6 7,800 6.0
Services 58 15.4 702 14.7 11,909 12.8 22,230 17.1
Agriculture 52 13.8 627 13.1 19,997 21.4 43,472 33.4
Production and unspecified 124 33.0 1,967 41.1 48,373 51.8 47399 36.5
Total 376 100.0 4,791 100.0 93,402 100.0 130,000 100
Source: Royal Scientific Society, 1989, ‘The Data Base for the Jordanian Labuur Market', vol. 111.
Table V.3.1.2-3
Distribution by Education of Jordanian Workers and of Foreign Workers in Jordan
1. Distribution by Education of Jordanian Workers in Jordan
1968 1973 1976 1981 1986
(000) % (000) % (000) % (000) % (000) %
Less than secondary 204.0 81.1 232,5 78.5 279.6 77.4 291.7 69.7 272.3 55.3
Secondary 23.3 9.3 29.9 10.1 37.5 10.4 62.2 14.9 131,2 26.6
Intermediate Diploma 8,8 3.5 14.3 4.8 20.5 5.7 32.1 7.7 41.7 8.5
Bachelor 14.2 5.6 17.3 5.8 21.0 5.8 28.6 6.8 43.1 8.8
Higher Education 1.3 0.5 2.0 0.7 2.7 0.7 3.8 0.9 4.2 0.9
Total 251.6 100.0 296 100.0 361.3 100.0 418.4 100.0 492.5 100.0
2. Distribution by education of Jordanian workers abroad
1968 1973 1976 1981 1986
(000) % (000) % (000) % (000) % (000) %
Less than secondary 29.9 34.2 49.5 32.4 64.0 29.6 82.0 26.3 89.5 26.1
Secondary 51.7 59.1 86.1 56.3 120,6 55.8 168.0 53.8 171.0 49.8
Intermediate Diploma 1.9 2.2 5.0 3.3 8.9 4.1 19.7 6.3 30.9 9.0
Bachelor 2.6 3.0 9.3 6,1 17.9 8.3 34.6 11.1 43.5 12.7
Higher Education 1.4 1.6 3.0 2.0 4.9 2.3 8.0 2.6 8.4 2.4
Total 87.5 100.0 152.9 100.0 216.3 100.0 312.3 100.0 343.3 100.0
3- Distribution by education of foreign workers in Jordan
1973 1976 1981 1986
No. % No. % No. % No. %
Less than secondary 229 60.9 3,080 64.3 64,354 62.1 79,716 61.3
Secondary 59 15.7 737 15.4 14,963 14.4 26,689 20.5
Intermediate Diploma 52 13.8 537 11.2 7,463 7.2 15,406 11.9
Bachelor 31 8.2 376 7.8 5,473 5.3 6,473 5.0
Higher Education 5 1.3 60 1.3 11,419 11.0 1,716 1.3
Total 376 100.0 4,790 100.0 103,672 100.0 130,000 100.0
5ourci*: Royal Scientific Society, ibid.
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for example services, thus increasing unemployment in those sectors employing 
such skills. This is evident from the continuous rise of overall unemployment from 
1.6/a in 1976 to 8% in 1984, the height of the labour in-migration.
It follows fiom the above that the high overall unemployment level in the 
mid-eighties may have hidden excess demand for labour in certain segments of 
the Jordanian labour market. The continuing in-migration of foreign labour, 
despite the existence of unemployment in the segments receiving foreign 
labour, can only be explained by the differential wage system between 
indigenous and foreign labour working in Jordan, as well as differential 
working conditions accepted by the two groups (see section V.3.2 below). This 
particular aspect of labour market segmentation was the direct outcome of the 
government open border' policy, coupled with weak labour legislation and 
almost non-existent trade unions. In the early years of the recession, 1982-85, 
there was no overt competition between Jordanians and non-Jordanians, 
especially since rentier income from the boom propped up the income of many 
Jordanians. As the recession deepened, however, and the unemployment of 
Jordanians grew, competition between nationals and non-nationals increased 
and created pressure on the government to take action. Such action, however, 
was not forthcoming,14 and consequently labour market segmentation, in the 
form of a differential wage system and differing work conditions, had become 
quite visible by the mid- to late-eighties.
IV.3.2 Labour Cost
Average weekly pay in Jordan in 1979 was estimated to be only about 38% of 
that in Saudi Arabia (which is broadly equivalent to the pay in Kuwait). The 
difference was particularly pronounced for managers and administrators, where 
Jordanians at home were paid only 20% of their counterparts in Saudi Arabia. 
Professionals and technicians received about 37% of their counterparts' salaries 
in Saudi Arabia (World Bank, 1989: 15). This was the main reason for the 
intensification of out-migration after the first oil boom, and the ensuing rapid 
rise in wages in Jordan.
Apart from limited intervention, such as requiring work permits where they were not required 
previously, 01 increasing the fees for acquiring permits. The most important measure that could have 
beeu taken, namely abandoning the policy of open borders, was not considered for political reasons.
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Within Jordan wage differentials between nationals and foreign workers 
had always existed. A survey undertaken by the Royal Scientific Society (RSS) 
in the early eighties showed that about 60% of foreign workers enjoyed wages 
equal to or lower than Jordanians. The informally quoted wage rate for an 
Egyptian farm worker in November 1987 was JD 2 per day, with some 
rudimentary benefits as well. Evidence from the contracting industry suggests 
that Jordanians earn much more than these sums at even modest skill levels, 
and at a basic level JD 3 per day (World Bank, 1989, Annex E: 89).15 
Similarly, a survey by Seccombe (1981: 94) on foreign labour in the Jordan 
Valley, a predominantly agricultural area, showed that a Jordanian working in 
the Valley in the late seventies would earn something between JD 80-100 a 
month, while a non-Jordanian doing the same job would earn JD 50-55 a 
month. However, by comparison with wages in either Egypt or Syria, these 
rates are very attractive when converted into local currencies. Non-nationals in 
service occupations and petty trading are believed to earn very little per hour, 
but to work long anti-social hours: "this group certainly occupy a niche in the 
market which is particularly unattractive to Jordanians on account of the 
conditions of employment" (World Bank, 1989, Annex E: 89).
As regards wage movement during the boom period, the most 
comprehensive study was undertaken by El-Akel (1985). The study's analysis of 
wage differentials and wage movements is based on functional and educational, 
rather that sectoral, categorisation; and along public sector vs, private sector lines. 
This study shows that over the period 1975-1983 the average (weighted) median 
wage in constant 1975 prices rose at a minimum of 0.6% and a maximum of 
14,3% for females; and at a minimum of 1.0% and a maximum of 10.1% p.a. for 
males.16 As regards wage differentials among skill groups, the general trend was 
one of narrowing down between highly qualified and qualified professionals on the 
one hand, and technicians and skilled workers on the other.17 The differential
15These rates apply for those in employment only, while unemployment in contracting is highly 
likely (ibid).
16E1-Akel (1985) found other strong indications of labour market segmentation in Jordan. The 
improvement in real wages was not equal for employees with identical specialisations, qualifications, 
and skill levels; it differed within the same establishment, sector, and between sectors.
17For the medical and engineering professions this was explained by the high salaries they had 
received since the 1960s, when the brain drain for this group started. As labour shortages became 
significant in the mid 1970s, other groups and skills had their salaries adjusted, and the former group's 
position thus deteriorated in relative terms. However, in absolute terms both engineers and doctors 
were still the best paid in the country.
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between the latter group and unskilled workers however widened as the 
immigration of unskilled workers eased the pressure on their wages.18 This means 
that the technician and skilled workers group was to benefit most from wage rises 
in this period, in both private and public sectors. The wage differential between the 
private and public sectors declined in some sectors (notably banking and 
insurance), and increased in others, especially for technicians, skilled and unskilled 
workers. Unskilled workers' wages in the informal sector - mainly construction, 
subcontracting and small businesses - improved relative to both the public and 
private sectors (El-Akel, 1985: 250-285).19
Table V.3.2-1
Annual Growth Rates of Real Wages in Manufacturing Industries
Jordan Egypt
1973-79 2.3% 6.1%
1979-85 1.3% 4.1%
Source: Wages in current prices are calculated from ILO, Yearbook o f Labour Statistics, various 
issues. Wholesale price deflators from IMF, 1FS, various issues.
Note: These figures do not tally with the figures presented in Table V .1.2-2 because different 
deflators are used.
It is clear from Table V.3.2-1 that in-migration has tempered wage rises in Jordan 
but maintained them at a relatively high rate in Egypt, the main source of foreign 
labour in Jordan (about 70% of foreign labour in Jordan is from Egypt), during a 
regional recession period (early-to-mid eighties).
Table V.3.2.1-2 below shows how the wage rise during the boom influenced 
Jordan's wage competitiveness. The wage level in manufacturing industries in 
Jordan in the early eighties was equal to the level of the upper middle-income 
countries South Korea and Singapore; much higher than that of Egypt and India;
18This is true despite the fact that unskilled workers witnessed a rapid increase in their wage level 
during the period 1977-1983.
19Between 1975 and 1983, real wages of unskilled workers in the urban informal sector rose at 9.1% 
p.a. Real wages for the same group in the private and public sectors increased at 5.2% and 4.5% p.a. 
respectively (El-Akel, 1985, Tables 9.7 & 9.9: 270 & 282).
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and much lower than Cyprus and Kuwait. Thus despite the potential negative effect 
of the resource movement - labour out-migration - on the wage level in Jordan, 
labour in-migration seems to have alleviated the problem to the point where 
Jordan's manufacturing wages were still relatively competitive.
Table V.3.2-2
Average Hourly Earnings^ in Manufacturing (US$)_______
Kuwait 3.35
Cyprus 2.25
Singapore 1.22
Jordan 1.20
S. Korea 1.17
Egypt 0.40
India 0.30
Source: ILO (1984), Yearbook o f Labour Statistics, Table 17.
1/ Includes family allowance and wage in kind
However, an assessment of cost competitiveness requires the measurement of wage 
cost per unit of production; that is, in addition to the absolute level of wages, 
labour productivity has to be considered. Ceteris paribus, higher labour 
productivity represents lower wage cost per unit output. Data of this kind are not 
available for cross country comparisons, but measurements of unit cost of labour 
over time were made for Jordan.
The unit cost of labour, /, can be expressed as a ratio of the wage bill, w, 
and the quantity produced, q , as follows:
The wage bill is the product of the wage rate per hour, 5, and the total number of 
hours worked, h, in the period under review (w =  s.h); and the quantity produced, 
q , may be expressed as the product of man-hour productivity, a, and the total 
number of hours worked (q =  a.h). This can be expressed as:
(1)
s.h s (2)a.h a
The rate of change in unit cost of labour may then be written as:
AI = A s-  A a (3)
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Table V.3.2-3
Annual Growth Rates of Real Wages, Labour Productivity, and Unit Wage Costs, 1968-87
Real wage per worker Labour productivity ^  Unit wage cost 21
1968- 1973- 1983- 1968- 1973- 1983- 1968- 1973- 1983-
1973 1983 1987 1973 1983 1987 1973 1983 1987
Agriculture -6.24 13.33 4.22 -0.88 9 .94 8.03 -5.36 3.40 -3.82
Mining & 
manufacturing
0 .04 S.03 -0.58 -4.04 8.41 3.60 4.08 -0.39 -4.18
Electricity & water -4.93 11.98 -11.84 5 .62 3.45 1.69 -10.55 8.53 -13.53
Construction -1 .47 4.65 2.49 -0.37 -0.95 -6 .17 -1.10 5.60 8.65
Trade -2.92 6.49 3.72 -2.34 6.65 1.83 -0.58 -0.16 1.88
Communication & 
transport
-5.70 5.61 -1.44 -7.22 8.88 4 .82 1.53 -3.27 -6.27
Finance & business -2.71 7.68 0.01 -5.02 -0.66 -2.69 2.32 8.34 2.70
Social & administrative 
services
-5.55 0.82 2.17 -1.94 5 .62 3.28 -3.61 -4.80 -1.11
Total -3 .2 6 4 .82 1.52 -2.37 6.88 1.57 -0.89 -2.06 -0.05
Source: For wages and labour, Royal Scientific Society (1989), The D ata B ase o f  the Jordanian Labour 
M arket, vol. III. For value added, Central Bank o f Jordan ( 1989), Yearly Statistical Series 1964-1988 ; and 
(1992) Monthly Bulletin, December. For deflators, Appendix A IV .l.
1/ Value added at constant 1975 prices per worker.
2 / Rate o f change in real wage per worker minus rate o f change in labour productivity - equation (3).
Table V.3.2-3 gives the results of these measurements. It can be seen that the rate
at which labour productivity grew exceeded that at which wages rose for most 
sectors in the economy, especially during the boom period, with a resulting decline 
in unit labour cost for the economy as a whole. In agriculture, however, despite 
substantial gains in productivity the rapid rise in wages still yielded a positive rate 
of change of labour unit cost.20 In mining and manufacturing both the real wage 
rise and labour productivity were substantial during the boom period 1973 to 1983 
(over 8% p.a.) thus annulling each others' effect. The freeze on government 
salaries resulted in very slowly rising wages, and per unit wage costs that declined
20Data on labour in agriculture are highly unreliable iu Jordan because of the high proportion of 
foreign labour in the sector and its seasonal nature. Any conclusions in this regard will be reserved for
chapter VI where a more rigorous analysis of unit costs in this sector is given.
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most rapidly over this period. The reverse is true of water and electricity where 
wages rose most rapidly during 1973 to 1983, while labour productivity growth 
was relatively modest.
It was shown in section V.3.1.2 that the proportion of foreign labour was 
lowest in mining followed by manufacturing, and highest in agriculture followed 
by construction. Thus, there does not appear to be any pattern relating growth in 
unit wage cost and the proportion of foreign labour in the sectors considered. The 
rapid rise of unit wage cost in construction may indicate the low level of skills the 
sector attracted during the boom, which is believed to have downgraded the 
technology employed in production by adopting capital-saving techniques.21
In view of the above observations, we may conclude that in-migration has 
not restored what is called in Corden's model the "true real wage", or W*,22 to the 
pre-boom level.23 We may not conclude, on the other hand, that Jordan's traded 
goods lost competitiveness, since there were significant gains in terms of labour 
productivity which reduced unit wage cost in most sectors during the boom.
Comparative levels ol unit wage costs for Jordan and its major trade 
competitors cannot be made, due to problems of data availability. This has 
prevented a real testing of the squeeze on Jordanian exports. However, some 
insights were gained from interviews I conducted with industrialists during my 
firm-level survey that constitutes an integral part of this research. The majority of 
industrialists revealed that Jordanian exports were unable to compete with exports 
from Far Eastern developing countries, especially China and South Korea during 
the boom period. Turkey also posed difficulties for Jordanian exports in that 
period. On the other hand, competition with Middle Eastern countries like Syria
21 With the influx of low cost foreign labour into Jordan, technologies employed in the service and 
construction industry adjusted to this change in factor prices: roads were cleaned by hand by cheap 
immigrant workers; building techniques relied on cheap foreign labour; small establishments relied on 
cheap labour enabling them to remain open for long hours, etc. (World Bank, 1989, Annex E: 92).
2w This is nominal wage measured in terms of a consumption basket of T (traded) and N  (non-traded) 
goods.
-3The dampening effect of in-migration on wage rises stems not only from relieving excess demand 
conditions, but also from the existence of wage differentials between nationals and non-nationals in 
Jordan.
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and Egypt was lean, as it is generally believed that labour productivity in these 
countries compares unfavourably with Jordan.24
V.4 Relative Prices and The Real Exchange Rate
The most commonly used measure of relative price change in Dutch disease 
literature is the real effective exchange rate (REER). The REER is a composite 
index of trade weighted bilateral nominal exchange rates with major trading 
partners, adjusted by the ratio of inflation in the domestic economy to inflation in 
the respective trading partners' economies.
Table V.4-1 shows both trade and import weighted REER for Jordan over 
the period 1970-1992. The year 1972 is taken as the base year, since the Jordanian 
Dinar was devalued by 7.89% to realign it with the US dollar, which was devalued 
by the same amount in that year.25
Most of the appreciation during the boom period took place between 1972 
and 1978, as the import weighted REER had appreciated by 13%, and the trade 
weighted REER appreciated by 17%. Apart from minor fluctuations, the REER 
remained stable from 1978 to the end of the boom in 1983. It started depreciating 
slowly from the early eighties until 1988, when a major devaluation took place, 
and the JD in 1990 was worth 50% its 1986 value. By comparison, the import 
weighted REER of Nigeria's Naira appreciated by 48%, and that of Indonesia's 
Rupiah by 24% over the boom period 1973-82 (Pinto, 1987, Table 3: 427). 
Judging from these two countries’ experiences, appreciation in Jordan appears to 
have been moderate. The main reason for this moderation is that many of Jordan's 
trading partners are oil-exporters: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq, who themselves 
suffered from high inflation in the wake of the first oil boom. In addition, the 
control of domestic prices of major food items which started in 1974 must have 
played an important role in moderating domestic inflation, which is precisely the 
purpose of such a practice.
24A Royal Scientific Society study (1989, Table 6-1-4: 227) shows that labour productivity in Jordan 
is at least two and half times that of Egypt. Moreover, while labour productivity in Jordan declined by 
3.9% p.a. over 1980-83, it declined by 20.3% p.a. in Egypt over the same period.
250ver 50% of Jordan's foreign reserves were in US dollar denomination in the early seventies. 
When the US. devalued its currency Jordan followed suit and the JD remained unchanged vis-a-vis the 
dollar (Central Bank of Jordan, 1974, Annual Report'. 69).
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Table V.4-1
Real Effective Exchange Rate (JD per 100 US$)
REER REER
Import
weighted
Index
1972=100
Trade
weighted
Index
1972=100
1970 29.93 79% 21.33 67%
1971 31.94 85 22.76 71
1972 37,71 100 32.07 100
1973 38.27 101 32.85 102
1974 36.82 98 31.24 97
1975 34.04 90 28.46 89
1976 32.31 86 26.80 84
1977 32.99 87 27.39 85
1978 32.54 86 26.72 83
1979 33.50 89 27.47 86
1980 34.92 93 28.92 90
1981 33.25 88 27.27 85
1982 32.66 87 26.76 83
1983 32.38 86 26.58 83
1984 34.13 91 28.80 90
1985 34.39 91 28.77 90
1986 34.14 91 28.38 89
1987 35.40 94 29.54 92
1988 53.72 142 48.11 150
1989 65.41 173 60.13 188
1990 68.92 183 62.77 196
1991 61.52 163 55.99 175
1992 58.33 155 51.63 161
Appreciation
1972-1978 13% 17%
1979-1982 0% 0%
1983-1992 -79% -93%
Source: Calculated from IMF, IFS, various issues. See Appendix A V .l lor details
The REER, developed in an international economics context, may not be a true 
measure of relative price changes in the economy for the same reasons that make 
the law of one price not operable at all times. Moreover, the index, even assuming 
the law of one price prevails, incorporates both traded and non-traded goods in the 
measure for domestic inflation which, as Warr (1992) has rightly argued, make the 
REER understate the degree of inflation in the domestic economy.
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Other proxies can be used to measure the change in relative prices. Export 
and import prices are obvious examples of proxies for traded goods. The structure 
of exports and imports determines which measure is more appropriate. In the 
Jordanian case, the high import penetration (79% of GDP in 1980) means that 
imports cover a wider range of goods than do exports, which are concentrated in a 
few goods (phosphate exports were 30% of total exports in 1980). The implication 
of this concentration is that export revenues will be subject to fluctuations which 
are extraneous to our Dutch disease model, making imports a better measure of 
traded goods' prices. For non-traded goods the easiest measure to use, in terms of 
availability, is the cost of living index (COL). This measure, however, is flawed as 
it incorporates traded as well as non-traded goods. The ability to construct a cost of 
living index for non-traded goods only depends on the availability of disaggregated 
data relating to domestic prices. If no such data are available, housing indices can 
be used so long as they do not include traded items like fuels, otherwise rents alone 
can replace them as a proxy for non-traded goods prices. The disadvantage of the 
latter measure lies in its narrowness, which renders it unrepresentative of 
movement in the price of all domestic non-traded goods. For Jordan the level of 
dissagregation of price data allowed me to construct a non-traded goods price index 
(COLn) composed of four items: rents (56%), housing services (19.1%), medical 
care (6%), and education (18.9%). The weights used are in accordance with the 
disaggregated COL data available from the Central Bank of Jordan (Central Bank 
of Jordan, 1984a). I constructed a similar measure for rural areas (COLR) to help in 
finding the effect of the boom on farmers' real income (calculated from Central 
Bank of Jordan, 1984a).
Table V.4-2 shows indices of some aggregate price series. The first five 
series shown are for traded goods' prices, and the remaining are for non-traded 
goods. In Table V.4-3 these data are converted to relative price form, by using the 
appropriate indices, and setting 1975 at 100 (see also Figure V.4-1). The indices 
for import and export prices have declined significantly relative to the consumer 
price index over 1975-82. The decline is more pronounced when the COLn is used, 
rather than the general COL. Prices of agriculture and manufacturing, in terms of 
non-traded goods, have also declined, as did the ratio of agricultural prices to 
COLr, entailing an erosion of farmers' real income. It is worth noting that the 
REER index gives lower rates of decline of traded to non-traded goods than other 
indices (because of its inclusion of both traded and non-traded goods in its 
measurement of domestic inflation).
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T able V.4-2
A ggregate Price Ind ices for Jordan, 1976-82 (1975=100)
1975 m u 1977 1971! 1979 1990 1981 19S2 1983 19B4 1985 1986 7987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Im p o r t  p r ic e s  11 too KM 91 SK 94 117 143 145 133 139 136 102 106 112 163 219 219 207
I- \p o r t  p r ic e s  1 / HX) w 90 H7 K7 104 119 130 11K 129 125 108 100 117 1K2 217 242 233
A g r ic u ltu r a l  ( l :P l ) . v KK1 157 174 195 215 246 231 241 276 2K5 26H 256 251 276 395 401 461 436
M a n u f a c tu r in g  (W PI) 3 / 100 106 115 121 136 163 IKK 203 2oy 210 220 222 22H 237 276 314 352 352
C O l .g 4 / 11X1 112 12K 157 156 173 193 207 211 219 225 225 225 240 301 350 379 394
C O L h  5 / too 10fi 12(1 155 170 176 1H2 193 210 230 240 237 239 245 261 2K0 294 309
C O L n  6 / 100 iom 125 13K 164 174 191 211 213 251 249 252 255 265 295 313 330 347
C O L r 7 / UX) 110 125 154 156 173 IKK 201 212 220 227 227 225 240 29H 346 374 3K9
S o u r a s C i l c u l . i u x i  h u m  C e n ir .il  II,m l, i . l  J u rd .m . 1 9X 9,Y early  S ta tis tic a l S e rie s  1964-SK; 19H3, I 'r ice  In d ex  fur A n ric u llu ra l P ro d u c tio n  in  J o r d a n ';  19B4, 'C o s t o f  L iv ln j; In d e x  for J n rd a n .
I^KS‘8 3 ; it m l M nn th lv  B u l le t in , v a r io u s  is su e s
1 In d e x  o i u n i t  p r ic e  n l im p o r t  ( e x p o r t)  T h e  s tr ip s  is c o n v e r te d  to  197?»b.ise y e a r , in s te a d  o f  1W 5 in  CBJ,
2 h u m  g a te  p r ic e  in d e x  to r A g ricu ltu re  (fo r fo o d  p n r d u c tm n  o n ly , e x c lu d in g  a n im a l p ro d u c tio n )
? W h o le sa le  p r ic e  in d e x  fo r m a n u fa c tu r in g
■I G ene i a l c o s t o f  In  in g  in d e x  for th e  w h o le  k in g d o m .
5 H o u s in g  ite m  in  th e  C O L , e x c lu d in g  fu e ls  a n d  u t il it ie s  w h ic h  a re  im p o r te d
e C iM  o t In  m g  in d e x  for n o n - tr a d e d  g o o d s  T h e  in d e x  in c lu d e s  r e n ts  h o u s in g  se rv ice s; (19.1% ); m e d ica l c a re  (5% ); & e d u c a tio n  (1K.9). 
7 S a m e  s tr u c tu re  ,«s C O L g  w ith  w e ig h ts  for ru ra l a re a s .
T able V.4-3
Selected  A ggregate R elative Price Ind ices in  Jordan, 1976-82 (1975=100)
1975 I97(. 1977 197S 1979 1980 198! 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1.989 1990 1991 19 92
(11 E x p o rt /  M a n u f a c tu r in g  W P I 100 K5 78 72 64 64 63 64 57 62 57 49 44 49 66 69 69 66
(2) im p o r t  /M a n u f a c tu r in g  W P I 100 K4 79 73 69 72 76 72 63 66 62 46 47 47 59 70 62 59
(3) A g r ic u ltu r e  F r i  /  C O L r 100 144 139 140 130 141 121 114 130 114 108 102 98 104 134 128 140 126
(41 M a n u f a c tu r in g  W P lm  /  C O L n 100 9K 92 K7 K3 94 99 96 98 84 KK KM 89 K9 94 100 107 101
(51 R EER 1 / 100 96 97 96 99 103 98 97 96 101 101 101 104 15K 192 203 1KI 172
(6) E x p o rt /  COL.g 100 HI 70 63 56 60 62 63 56 59 56 48 45 49 60 62 64 59
(71 Im p o r ts  7 C O L h 100 K4 75 66 56 66 7K 75 63 hi 56 43 44 46 62 7K 75 67
's o im e  ir ik u l .u e d  from  \  .4-?
1 • R eal e t te c t iv e  e x c h a n g e  ra te
Figure V.4-1 
R elative Price Indices for Jordan, 1975-1992
Legend: Line num bers in figure m atch those in Table V.4-3
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V.5 The Effect of Foreign Exchange Inflows on The Tradeables Balance
Chapter IV gave ample evidence that on the eve of the first oil boom, the Jordanian 
economy had substantial under-utilised resources (Section IV. 1-2, Table IV. 1-2 & 
Table IV.2.1.2-1). The sudden receipt of large sums of foreign exchange revenues 
presented two opportunities to the Jordanian economy: an improvement in the 
balance of payments, which relieved the foreign exchange constraint, and an 
increase in real national income. These two factors together allowed the economy 
to operate at a higher level of activity. Given that, and given the government's 
choice of 'growth strategy' with a focus on increasing the share of productive 
sectors in aggregate output (agriculture and manufacturing, both of which are 
import intensive), a significant pressure was exerted on the commercial balance.
Table V.5-1 shows the manifold effect of the rise in overall economic 
activity during the boom period, 1974-82, on the balance of commodity trade. The 
deterioration in the food balance reflects the limited supply response of this sector 
due to its narrow resource base. The beverage and tobacco trade position, on the 
other hand, improved because of substantial growth in tobacco exports to the Gulf. 
A similar result obtained for basic material balance due to the fortuitous upsurge in 
the exports of Jordan's main export item, phosphate, in 1974.26 The five-fold 
increase in the importance of the fuel balance to GDP was to be expected, given 
that Jordan is a non-oil producer. Finally, the manufactures trade position 
experienced the most remarkable change, and therefore merits further attention.
The increase in overall economic activity increased the demand for 
manufactures, some of which was satisfied by foreign suppliers; as a result, there 
was an increase in manufactured imports. Prior to the boom, import controls 
restrained the propensity to import manufactures, but after the boom, and given the 
increase in foreign exchange availability, the government embarked on a policy of 
trade liberalisation and the replacement of import quotas by tariffs in 1976 (see 
section VII.2). The boom thus increased the propensity to import manufactures.27 
The increase in propensity to import may also have arisen from bottlenecks in the 
economy due to the high level of economic activity following a period of unusually
26Responsible for this outcome was the four-fold increase in world phosphate prices, and the 
doubling of Jordan's output, in response to the price increase.
27Change in average propensity to import (total value of imports over GNP) over time was as 
follows: 36% (1964-73), 63% (1974-82) and 58% (1983-92) (Calculated from Central Bank of Jordan, 
Monthly Bulletin, various issues).
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Table V.5-1
Trends in Jordan Commodity Trade, 1967-1992 
(net exports as a % of GDP at current prices)
Food 1 /
Beverages 
& Tobacco
Basic
Material Fuel Manufactures Total
1967 -7.8 -0.3 1.0 -2.6 -31.1 -38.3
1968 -7.4 -0.5 1.6 -2.3 -26.3 -32.6
1969 -7.6 -0.4 0.7 -2.3 -26.9 -34.2
1970 -9.0 -0.1 0.1 -2.4 -27.2 -36.3
1971 -9.9 -0.5 0.0 -2.9 -30.2 -40.6
1972 -12.3 -0.4 0.5 -2.5 -32.8 -45.0
1973 -13.8 -0.1 0.7 -2.1 -36.5 -49.7
Average 1967-1973 -9.7 -0.3 0.6 -2.4 -30.2 -39.5
1974 -13.7 0.0 6.5 -2.1 -40.8 -48.0
1975 -12.9 -0.1 4.7 -8.1 -55.2 -63.6
1976 -17.2 -0.2 2.6 -9.6 -61.6 -76.4
1977 -12.6 -0.4 1.8 -9.8 -78.1 -89.3
1978 -12.9 -0.6 1.4 -8.5 -59.6 -71.6
1979 -13.0 -0.2 1.4 -11.1 -63.9 -75.6
1980 -10.7 0.0 3.7 -13.6 -59.7 -66.6
1981 -13.0 0.1 2.6 -17.5 -74.1 -84.3
1982 -13.1 0.1 2.3 -20.5 -70.9 -81.7
1983 -11.6 -0.4 1.7 -17.1 -65.5 -75.8
Average 1974-1983 -13.2 -0.1 3.0 -11.2 -62.7 -73.0
1984 -10.8 -0.3 4.3 -16.2 -54.7 -61.4
1985 -9.5 -0.2 4.7 -16.1 -53.8 -58.8
1986 -7.0 -0.3 3.9 -6.6 -31.7 -35.1
1987 -6.7 -0.3 3.4 -8.5 -32.7 -36.2
1988 -7.5 -0.3 5.7 -8.3 -34.5 -36.6
1989 -7.2 -0.3 8.9 -11.3 -34.7 -33.3
1990 -15.1 -0.2 8.4 -13.7 -41.5 -48.5
1991 -13.7 -0.1 7.0 -10.1 -41.4 -48.2
1992 -11.6 -0.2 6.2 -10.8 -51.2 -56.8
Average 1984-1992 -9.9 -0.2 5.9 -11.3 -41.8 -46.1
Source; C alculated form Central Bank of Jordan (1989), 'Yearly Statistical Series (1964-1988)'; 'M onthly Bulletin', various issues. 
1 /  Includes processed food.
Table V.5-2
Annual Growth Rates in Commodity Trade, 1967-73; 1974-82; & 1983-92
 __________________________ 1967-1973_________________ 1974-1982 1983-1992
Food
Exports -2.3 17.9 9.7
Imports 14.0 19.7 11.6
Beverage & Tobacco
Exports -0.1 29.2 7.3
Imports -0.9 24.1 4.4
Basic
Exports -0.9 17.7 17.7
Imports 3.0 24.1 6.7
Fuel
Exports n.a. n.a. n.a
Imports 7.0 49.8 5.0
Manufactures
Exports 23.9 35.0 18.6
Imports 12.1 28.8 7.7
Total
Exports 2.8 23.4 16.7
Imports 12.1 26.8 8.4
Source: Calculated from Central Bank of Jordan, ibid.
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low investment, and too rapid an acceleration in the rate of growth of demand (see 
Singh, 1981: 146).
The deterioration in the commodity trade balance masks substantial 
expansion in commodity exports. Given the regional nature of the boom there was 
a rapid increase in demand in the Gulf states for imports from Jordan, which 
increased Jordan's propensity to export.28 Table V.5-2 shows that the annual 
growth rate in manufactured exports during the boom period, 1974-82, was 
substantial and far exceeded that for imports. A deterioration in the manufacturing 
trade balance occurred, nevertheless, because the initial trade gap for this item was 
substantial (imports were a staggering 1,900% of exports in 1973).
Thus, while imports may have indicated that the boom squeezed domestic 
production of tradeables via relative price changes, the rapid expansion in exports 
negates this fact, as it indicates that Jordanian producers were able to maintain, if 
not increase, competitiveness in their traditional export markets. This observation 
has serious implications for any Dutch disease analysis. It reflects how a sudden 
change in foreign exchange revenues influences the structure of the economy 
depends on more than just relative price changes, with the additional factors falling 
under both macro- and micro-economic effects. At this point I shall only present 
the relevant hypotheses: they will be discussed in more detail, including empirical 
analysis, in the following two chapters.
At the macro-level, changes in foreign exchange availability relieved a 
foreign exchange constraint with two major outcomes. First, the availability of 
foreign exchange in turn made available imported raw, intermediate and capital 
inputs to production, which were likely to embody better technologies than those 
used under conditions of foreign exchange constraints. Second, the improved 
balance of payments position as mentioned above allowed an expansion of overall 
economic activity, thus increasing income and employment. If the economy had 
started from an idle capacity situation, expansion in economic activity allowed 
increasing capacity utilization and benefits from economies of scale where they 
existed, thus increasing productivity and eventually the competitiveness of exports.
At the micro-level, the increase in national income increased demand for all 
commodities. The pattern of demand growth depends on the level of development 
the country is at, and for early-stage development countries (such as Jordan in the
28Change in average propensity to export (total value of exports over GNP) over time was as 
follows: 5% (1964-73), 16% (1974-82) and 17% (1983-92) (ibid).
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early seventies) the expansion in demand for manufactured output may be 
substantial. The change in the pattern of demand will therefore have a significant 
impact on the structure of production, and resources will move into those sectors 
where the increase in demand is most rapid. It is highly likely that the growth of 
output in any sector, say manufacturing, itself leads to increasing productivity and 
competitiveness (Verdoorn's law). Such gains would have been compounded if 
expansion in domestic demand occurred at the same time as increased demand for 
exports, which represents Jordan's case. Section IV.3.1 revealed, with the aid of 
trend analysis, that manufacturing's share in aggregate output was significantly 
above the historical trend line. The rapid growth in manufacturing output over the 
boom period may have been the cause of the rapid expansion in exports (through 
productivity gains) or the outcome of the rapid increase in exports. Whatever the 
direction of causation, the observed growth of output and exports of manufactures 
runs counter to Dutch disease predictions.
To conclude, the increase in oil prices in 1973/74 and 1979 created booming 
conditions in Jordan as the country's foreign exchange earnings expanded very 
rapidly with each shock. The boom effects were transmitted to the economy via 
both the spending effect and the resource movement, while immigration mitigated 
these effects. The general movement of prices in the economy, as measured by the 
change in terms of trade between traded and non-traded sectors, was as would have 
been expected by the Dutch disease model (in favour of the latter and against the 
former), albeit more moderately than experienced by other developing economies 
under similar economic conditions. However, commodity producing sectors 
(agriculture and manufacturing) managed to increase their exports substantially 
during the boom period, in response to the rapid rise in demand originating in the 
Gulf states.
The following two chapters will examine how the adverse impact effect of 
relative price movement on the production of tradeables was overcome (agriculture 
VI & manufacturing VII).
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CHAPTER VI
The Squeeze on Tradeables: The Performance of Agriculture
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Introduction
The previous chapter has established that the two oil price shocks of the seventies 
created booming conditions in Jordan, via workers' remittances and Arab aid 
inflows; the 'spending effect' and a massive 'resource movement' were well 
observed; and the real exchange rate appreciated by 17% in less than a decade. Yet, 
in contrast to what the Dutch disease model would have predicted (a decline in 
traded goods output and exports) Jordan's agricultural output grew by 4.4% p.a. 
and agricultural exports by 22.5% p.a. in real terms over the boom period 1973- 
1982. This chapter discusses why this discrepancy between the theory and empirical 
observations occurred.
The question is of particular interest, given the many factors that constrain 
the sector's supply response. For, in addition to a narrow physical resource base, 
the historical developments of Jordan rendered an agrarian structure that, in 
general, is not conducive to the generation of large profits in the majority of its 
farms. Other institutional factors, such as credit availability, research and extension 
services, and organisational issues have exacerbated, rather than relieved, the 
constraints on agricultural production.
The main finding of this chapter is that, despite the existence of a scenario 
within the Dutch disease theory that could give a satisfactory explanation of 
Jordan's agricultural performance, namely the 'paradox model', there is strong 
evidence that the real reason lies elsewhere, namely in the technological advance 
achieved by the sector during the boom, which enhanced the supply response of the 
sector and provided the conditions necessary for production at higher profit rates.
The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section is a theoretical 
discussion of the suitability of the Dutch disease model for the study of agriculture 
in less developed economies. The second section outlines the agricultural sector's 
general performance indicators (change in trends of production and trade). The 
third section is a quantitative analysis of the sector's factor input and output growth. 
Changes in relative prices, production cost and farm enterprise profitability are 
discussed in the fourth section. The fifth section concludes.
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VI. 1 The Dutch Disease Model for Developing Countries: A Theoretical 
Discussion
The applicability of the Dutch Disease theory to less developed economies has 
already been discussed in a considerable body of literature (see for example Pinto 
(1987), Scherr (1989), Jazayeri (1988), Karshenas (1990), Struthers (1990), and 
Majd (1991). The theory was developed within a general equilibrium framework, 
to explain intersectoral shifls in an industrialised economy under booming 
conditions. The emphasis of the model, when used for developed economies, has 
been on manufactures as the lagging sector. This in itself cannot be criticised, but 
ambiguities arise when the same model is used for less developed economies.
It must be stated at the outset that Corden (1984) has addressed some of 
these ambiguities with success. The 'enclave' nature of the booming sector is not 
peculiar to less developed economies, and its existence does not alter the analysis: it 
only means that the spending effect will prevail. The lagging sector need not 
produce only exportables, but may also produce importables, so long as they are 
perfect substitutes for imports; otherwise, if there are prohibitive tariffs and/or 
quantitative restrictions, their prices will be determined domestically rather than 
internationally; and they will become effectively nontradeables. Finally, the 
lagging sector is not only composed of manufactures, but also of agricultural goods. 
This last point, however, is not without its problems.
To what extent is the behaviour of agricultural producers comparable to that 
of manufacturers? Historical, political and social variables often influence the 
structure and supply response of agricultural producers in ways that differ from 
industrial producers. The subject is currently the focus of energetic debate in the 
economic development literature, so we need not dwell on it. Suffice it to say that 
evidence from less developed countries suggests there may be different reactions to 
a profit squeeze in farms than in industrial firms, for reasons to do with the method 
of employing factors, factor intensities, and factor mobility. Furthermore, 
responses within the farm sector may be more variable than within industrial firms, 
precisely because socio-economic variables differ more widely amongst them. This 
becomes important when the analysis is done within the extended model 
framework, and where decomposition of the lagging sector is the issue under 
discussion (see section II.3.3). Thus, systematic evaluation of the micro-economic
See Jazayeri (1988: 2-4) for a discussion on the limits between which a commodity is exportable, 
importable or non-traded.
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mechanisms by which the boom effects are transmitted to the agricultural economy 
is important (Scherr, 1989, Majd, 1991). For example, in Mexico, Ecuador and 
Iran, production of peasant farmers expanded, while that of commercial producers 
contracted (Majd, 1991), in conformity with the theory. Corden (1984) has dealt 
with a similar case theoretically. Taking as a starting point the work of Snape 
(1977) and Cassing and Warr (1982), he showed that variations in the performance 
of industries within the lagging sector are possible: "it is perfectly possible that 
some of the non-boom tradeable industries actually expand, even though the sector 
as a whole contracts" (Corden, 1984: 363). Corden's explanation for this outcome 
is wholly based on factor intensities and the Rybzcynski (1955) effect. Those 
industries that are relatively better endowed with capital than with labour will be 
able to expand; while labour-intensive industries will contract as a result of labour 
moving out of the lagging sector and into the booming sector - the resource 
movement - and the subsequent reorganisation of capital and labour within the 
lagging sector." The Rybzcynski (ibid) theorem can be extended further to allow for 
the whole tradeable sector to expand, if it was relatively more capital-intensive than 
services, and if both capital and labour were mobile between the two sectors; but 
provided the overall stock of capital and labour in the economy does not change - 
the "paradox model" (Corden, 1984: 363).
The Rybzcynski-based explanations of decline in agricultural activities, 
whether they relate to commercial farming or to the sector as a whole, are not 
entirely satisfactory, for three main reasons. First, as argued in chapter III it is not 
clear whether the relative decline of agriculture in developing economies is 
symptomatic of the Dutch disease, or just the 'normal' level of decline for a 
developing country, to be compensated for by the expansion of industry. In other 
words, since it is difficult to establish the counterfactual of the Dutch disease for 
agricultural performance in developing economies, it is equally difficult to assert 
that the performance of this sector is a contraction only in a Dutch disease sense, or 
one that is due to more enduring effects. Second, Corden's case assumes that the 
sector, or indeed the economy as a whole, has a fixed stock of capital, which is an 
unlikely condition for developing economies under booming conditions, especially 
if they were quantity-constrained in capital markets prior to the boom. Third, and 
more importantly, perhaps, is that the reason for the ability of peasant agriculture to
2
Struthers (1990) seems to have missed this point. He questions the applicability of the model for 
LDCs since there exist different industries employing capital and labour in different intensities within 
the same sector.
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resist the squeeze on profits may not be a matter only of the intensity with which it 
employs factors but, rather, with the method of their employment. It is highly likely 
that peasant farms are more labour-intensive than commercial farms. But if they 
were in fact more capital-intensive, then the immobility of their capital may have 
prevented them from reallocating their resources elsewhere. A more convincing 
reason for peasant farms' continued production under boom conditions is their 
ability to employ family labour, and to engage in non-farm employment while, at 
the same time, continuing to apply their labour on farms. One can argue further that 
peasant farmers may accept more squeeze on profits than commercial farmers 
before they move into other types of production.
The implication of that argument is that socio-economic factors do matter. 
So do institutional factors, as Jazayeri (1988) and Karshenas (1990) have shown for 
Iran, insofar as land tenure, credit markets, etc. can influence the supply response 
of farmers under boom conditions. Government policies are also influential, 
especially trade and price policies, but also the quantity and quality of public 
investment in the sector. This was demonstrated by Scherr (1989) in her 
comparison of the performance of Nigeria, Mexico, and Indonesia, and by Gelb 
(1986) in his comparison of seven capital-importing, oil-exporting countries 
(Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Algeria, Ecuador, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago).
There are other analytical problems of the Dutch disease theory as it relates 
to agriculture in less developed economies. The resource movement must be 
distinguished from urban-rural migration, which is analytically different in 
causation, but produces similar results. Since the phenomenon of labour leaving 
agriculture to join urban employment does not of itself permit unequivocal 
attribution of cause, the testability of the Dutch disease theory is weakened.
Another difficult distinction is between the ’spending effect' of the boom and 
the natural urban bias of government spending. Whereas the increase in government 
spending may have only been enabled by the boom, its urban bias may be a 
continuation of an historically established trend. Such bias will not only squeeze 
agriculture but also manufacturing, as some of the government spending is bound to 
spill over into industrial purchases which, with imports made cheaper by the boom, 
may wipe out a range of import substitutes. The analysis becomes more intricate if 
urban bias entails increased spending, not only on construction and services but also 
on industry; or indeed, if the government decides to protect both agriculture and 
industry by increasing its investment in these sectors. The Dutch disease model 
does not allow for a change in its outcome, a squeeze on tradeables, under these
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circumstances: it merely sees the adjustment forced on a smaller section of the 
traded goods sector, namely those industries that are unprotected. However, this 
analysis is only possible if we assume, as the model does, that technical coefficients 
of production are fixed. Thus government spending is only important insofar as it 
impacts on the non-traded sector and eventually changes relative prices. Once the 
assumption of fixed technical coefficients is relaxed, however, we can easily see 
how government spending on the traded sectors, if it embodies technological 
changes, can change the outcome from that of the model.
We may find structuralist models to be of more use in this context. Such 
models anticipate that the extra income from the boom gained in foreign currency 
would relieve two main constraints facing the economy: the foreign exchange and 
savings constraints. This may explain the existence of a 'latent growth sector' in 
Nigeria (I shall argue later that a similar phenomenon was observed in Jordan) 
which benefited from cheap imports as a result of currency appreciation during the 
boom period. More important, the relative abundance of foreign exchange implies 
the availability of modern imported technologies to local producers. Technological 
advances normally work themselves out in the economy through increased 
productivity, which in turn reduces unit costs and increases profitability3 (see 
Karshenas, 1990). A good catalyst for this process, as Ishikawa’s (1972) model for 
Eastern Asia shows, is government investment in what he calls 'basic technology' 
(e.g. flood control and water distribution for agriculture). Therefore, abstracting 
from both the government sector and technological change may yield erroneous 
results regarding the performance of the traded sectors during and after the boom. 
And, in countries where the government captures a significant part of the oil rent, a 
theory of adjustment to booms becomes "primarily an abstraction of observed 
government behaviour following massive windfall gains" (Gelb, 1981).
The ultimate determinant of the squeeze on tradeables is firm profitability. 
What the Dutch disease model does not allow for, being a static general equilibrium 
model, is analysis of the cost function facing individual producers, and its change 
over time, not only because of changes in producers' prices, but also because of 
technical change. Thus the Dutch disease model should be augmented by both 
microanalysis and dynamic analysis.
3
This is especially true for technology embodied in material and capital such as IIYV, irrigation, 
fertilisers, etc. It may also be true for disembodied technology, transferred through better training and 
management (which may be considered as technology embodied in human capital).
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Aggregate analysis of the boom shows the rise in cost of labour and other 
non-traded inputs as squeezing profits in the traded goods sector. But since firms 
are heterogeneous in their use of inputs, rate of return on investment, etc. it is 
unlikely that a whole sector would lose its competitiveness. It is constructive, 
therefore, to investigate the distribution of unit costs across firms, and see what 
happens during the boom. A good analytic tool here is the Heckscher diagram, used 
in his study of Swedish economic problems caused by foreign competition in 1918. 
Heckscher has shown that with non-malleable capital such diagrams are fairly stable 
from one year to another, and indicate the firms about to be squeezed out by cost 
increases or product price decreases (Forsund, 1981). If capital is malleable, and if 
technical changes do take place, such diagrams will become less stable and more 
complex. The problem that faces any analyst in this respect is that nothing short of 
a highly disaggregated input-output matrix for the sector as a whole and for the 
main industries within it would answer the question, 'How do changes in prices, 
costs and technology during the boom change a firm's profitability?'.
VL2 The Performance of Agriculture: 1973-1982 
VI.2.1 Growth Trends
In chapter four it was established that from 1921 and until the early 1950s the 
Jordanian economy was predominantly agricultural. Subsequently, it started 
changing into an economy that produced other commodities and services, and 
agriculture's share in GDP continuously declined, reaching 12% in the early 
seventies. During the boom (1973-82) agriculture's share in aggregate output 
declined further, standing at 6.8% in the early eighties, and in the post-boom period 
it increased to reach 10% in the early nineties. Historical trends in the sector's 
growth and share in output and employment are shown in Table VI.2.1-1 below:
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Table VI.2.1-1
Agriculture's Growth and Contribution to GDP and Employment: 1955-92
Real Annual Growth Rates Agriculture's Share in ^
Agriculture____________GDP___________ Employment___________ GDP
1954-60 5.04% 10.01% - 24.1
1961-66 6.32% 8.16% 22.3 22.8
1967-72 -0.28% 4.06% 16.8 13.5
1973-82 4.39% 11.89% 10.0 7.9
1983-91 10.00% -0.12% 7.4 8.8
Sources: Growth and share in GDP calculated from Appendix AIV.l, Employment calculated from Royal Scientific 
Society, 1989, The Data Base of the Jordanian Labour Market, vol. III.
1/ Period average.
It was shown in section IV.3.1, with the aid of trend analysis, that the sector's share 
during the boom period was below its historic trend line, which may appear to 
indicate that agriculture in Jordan suffered from Dutch disease symptoms, in 
relative terms (since the sector's output did not decline in absolute terms). Yet three 
considerations militate against this conclusion. First, the counterfactual is merely an 
intellectual exercise, and no conclusions based on it can be absolute. Second, given 
the limited supply response of the sector, a 4.4% p.a. growth over 1973-82 is 
significant, implying an increase of 148% in the sector's output. This growth rate, 
moreover, compares favourably with most booming developing countries during the 
same period: Nigeria (1.7%), Mexico (3.2%), Ecuador (3.4%), Venezuela (3.9%), 
Indonesia (4.3%), Iran (4.6%), and Algeria (4.8%) (Majd, 1991).4 Third, and far 
more importantly from a Dutch disease point of view, the sector's exports growth 
was phenomenal (at 22% p.a. in real terms) over the period 1973 to 1982. Since the 
Dutch disease model concerns above all the performance of tradeables, it would 
seem that the behaviour of agriculture in Jordan during the boom period does not 
accord with the theory's predictions.
4Compared with the rest of the world during the seventies, Jordan has done even better. According 
to the World Bank, the average annual rate of growth of agricultural output for low-income, rniddle- 
income, and developed countries was 2.3%, 3%, and 1.8%, respectively during the decade 1970-1980 
(World Bank, 1983, World Development).
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VI.2.2 Domestic Consumption, Production and Exports
Under boom conditions income increases rapidly and, with it, the spending on non­
traded and traded goods including food. Because of currency appreciation imports 
become cheap relative to domestically produced items, and the demand for imports 
thus increases. However, because of the low income and price elasticities of the 
demand for food compared to manufactures, this relationship may not be very 
pronounced.
The impact of the increase in per capita income on the demand for food in 
Jordan is shown in Table AVI. 1-2 in Appendix AVI.l. The most significant 
changes were observed for cereals, meat, and eggs, whose consumption per head 
doubled, while per capita consumption of sugar more than trebled. Jordan does not 
produce sugar, and has a low elasticity of supply for cereals, meat, and eggs. The 
ratio of imports to domestic consumption during the boom period averaged 100% 
for sugar, and 85% for cereals (see Table AVI. 1-3 in Appendix AVI.l). This 
means that a significant portion of the increased income was spent on food imports. 
By contrast, the income elasticity of demand for fruit and vegetables, which have a 
high elasticity of supply, seems low.5 Over the period 1973-1981 production of all 
vegetables increased at 11% p.a., while consumption increased at 4.5%. The 
surplus was marketed internationally, which increased the ratio of agricultural 
exports to GDP from 2.4% in 1973, to 3.3% in 1981.
Jordan is a traditional supplier of winter fruit and vegetables in regional 
markets in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, it imports 
all other types of agricultural commodities, in substantial quantities for wheat and 
flour. This was and has persisted to be the case before and after the boom, with two 
qualifications. First, the self-sufficiency factor (the ratio of domestic production to 
consumption) decreased for cereals; and increased for vegetables and fruit. Second, 
exports of fruit and vegetables increased significantly during the boom. The change 
in exports and imports is reflected in Table VT.2.2-1 below.
5The estimated income elasticities of demand for vegetables in Jordan ranges between 0.2 and 0.4 
while price elasticities fall between 0.31 and 0.74 (Tech International, Table III. 1: 65).
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Table VI.2.2-1
Indices of Food and Live Animal Imports and Exports (1985=100)___________
Exports Imports
1970-72 1980-82 change________ 1970-72 1980-82 change
Price 48.9 98.7 48.8 43.3 110.0 66.7
Volume 15.4 64.7 49.3 32.8 79.7 46.9
Source: Calculated from Central Bank o f Jordan 1989, tables 30-33.
Further desegregation of trade in agriculture is given in Tables AVI. 1-4 to AVI. 1-6 
in Appendix AVI.l. In this part of the paper, analysis will be narrowly confined to 
the main exports, fruit and vegetables, and an import-substituting commodity, 
wheat.
The trade deficit in cereals, the main component of which is wheat, more 
than trebled over 1973-1981, reflecting both an increase in domestic demand and a 
decline in production. On the other hand, Jordan improved its vegetables trade 
position significantly, by increasing its exports. From being a net importer of 
vegetables in 1973 with a trade deficit of JD 0.08 million, Jordan became a net 
exporter in 1981, with a trade surplus of JD 12.5 million. This was the single most 
important change in the performance of the food trade position in the period 
studied. The stimulus came mainly from tomato exports, which increased seven­
fold, and also from eggplants and onions, whose exports increased four- and five­
fold, respectively. Jordan also increased its exports of fruit and citrus more than 
six-fold, but remains a net importer of this item.
There are both supply-side and demand-side factors responsible for this 
performance. Because of the oil boom, demand in regional markets was buoyant, 
and food export prices continued to rise.6 On the supply side, investments in flood 
control and large irrigation schemes by the government during the sixties, which 
continued in the seventies and early eighties, yielded high returns during the boom 
period; especially since the private sector responded strongly to government 
investment, by investing in high technology plasticulture with improved irrigation
6Because Jordan is a regional supplier of fruit and vegetables rather than an international one, the 
assumption of small country is not valid in the short run, and demand for these commodities leads to an 
improvement in its terms of trade. In the long run, however, this is not sustainable, and the assumption 
of small country will prevail.
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and agrochemical inputs (Section IV.2.2.2, Table IV.2.2.2-5, & Section V.2.1, 
Table V.2.1-3). Output growth was very rapid, particularly that of certain 
vegetables such as tomatoes (more than two-fold), squash (four-fold) and cucumber 
(six-fold), which used up more than 50% of the total irrigated land area in Jordan. 
Tomatoes alone covered about 30% of irrigated land, whilst squash and cucumber 
took about 8% each.
The picture on the demand side changed after the boom, although supply 
conditions remained unchanged. Beginning in the eighties, structural changes in 
regional trade patterns began to alter Jordan's favourable position as the primary 
supplier of these commodities. That is, demand in the Gulf began to be met by 
other non-Jordanian sources, including domestic producers in the respective 
importing countries; while, at the same time, demand in the Gulf was less buoyant 
than in the seventies. These factors combined to suppress regional demand for 
Jordanian exports at a time when its own agricultural productivity was still 
expanding through technological transformation. By the mid-eighties, the gap 
between domestic supply and demand had widened enough to level off farm-gate 
and wholesale prices for vegetables, which actually declined in real terms (Table
V.4-3).
Numerous factors caused these structural changes in the demand for Jordan's 
produce, among which appear to be quality, change of taste in the Gulf, and 
administrative problems (Huneidi & Qudah, 1991: 19-22). The source just cited 
refuted the argument that the upward exchange rate adjustment of the Jordan Dinar 
against other regional currencies, and the high relative cost of Jordanian agricultural 
labour with respect to regional labour costs rendered Jordanian produce more 
expensive to import than those of its main rivals in the region, namely Egypt and 
Turkey. Even in 1988, just before the major currency devaluation, the ratio of 
import prices of Jordanian vegetables to those of her rivals in Gulf markets were as 
follows:
___________________ Tomatoes_________ Cucumbers & Courgettes________________________________________
Egypt 0 .64
Turkey 0.90 0.65
The importance of the foregoing analysis is two-fold. First, it emphasises the 
importance of demand, in addition to relative price changes, in determining
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fanners' income. This in turn highlights a limitation of theories that consider 
supply-side factors only such as the Dutch disease when demand conditions are far 
from stable. Second, it shows that, despite increases in real wages and currency 
appreciation, the production cost of vegetables in Jordan was still competitive in 
regional markets. This result obtained because, although wages increased rapidly 
during the boom in all sectors in Jordan, unit wage costs declined in most sectors, 
and increased very slowly in agriculture (3.4% p.a.) because of significant gains in 
labour productivity (Table IV.3.2.1-3). The last point cannot be over emphasised in 
relation to Dutch disease analysis. The wage differential, between Holland and its 
major trade partner Germany, was the definition that Corden (1983: 441) used for 
currency appreciation, implying that it was the main mechanism through which the 
squeeze on Dutch exports was effected. Thus we must conclude that the reasons for 
the expansion of vegetable production and exports in Jordan are not to be found in a 
Dutch disease analysis, which does not allow for productivity changes, as technical 
coefficients are assumed constant. The subject will be further explored in section 
VI.4.
This ends the discussion of the performance of agriculture during the boom 
period. In the rest of the chapter I shall investigate the factors underlying this 
performance. The following section analyses factor input and its relation to output 
growth during the boom.
VI.3 Factor Inputs and Output Growth 
VI.3.1 Arable Land
The first relevant question regarding inputs to agricultural production is that of the 
arable land frontier. There are no historically recorded data on the expansion of 
arable land in Jordan before the seventies. However, it appears that land 
reclamation through major investments in the Jordan Valley did take place during 
the sixties, while available data for the seventies suggest not only that the land 
frontier has stagnated, but that it has actually declined.
While the total agricultural area in Jordan was 390,400 hectare in 1974, it 
was only 364,200 hectare in 1983. The difference - 26,200 hectare - seems to have 
been lost to the uncontrolled urban expansion of the seventies, which pushed real 
estate prices to historical levels. The increase in land prices in Jordan is a stark 
example of how relative prices under booming conditions change, in favour of non­
traded goods. There is no documentation of the increase in land prices in Jordan, 
but anecdotal evidence suggests an order of magnitude of between 100 and 1000%,
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depending on location, with the higher percentage pertaining to central areas inside 
and adjacent to the capital Amman, including agricultural land.
Land speculation was a direct outcome of the rise in remittances and Arab 
aid after 1973. The combined effect of the two flows was to increase spending on 
building and construction which in turn led to a rapid increase in the demand for 
land, thus inviting land speculation. The latter peaked in 1975, when "land became 
virtually equivalent to any other liquid asset" (Fariz, 1976: 303).8 How this 
eventually impacted on investment in agriculture is hard to assess. It can be argued, 
nevertheless, that land speculation has increased total production costs, since land is 
an important input, and diverted resources away from agriculture, since "good 
agricultural land was left fellow because of the lure of real-estate speculation"9 
(Five Year Plan 1986-90).
Despite the contraction in total cultivated land area, the period under study 
witnessed an expansion in the total irrigated area, and a change in the method of 
irrigation from open channels to drip and sprinkle irrigation, especially in the 
Jordan Valley. The use of fertilisers, pesticides, and herbicides as well as improved 
seeds also increased during the boom. Expenditure on fertilisers increased from an 
annual average of JD 0.86 million in the period 1967-1969, to JD 3.95 million in 
the period 1976-1979; and on pesticides from JD 0.44 million to JD 2.58 million 
for the same periods (all at constant 1975 prices) (Department of Statistics, 
Agricultural Survey, various issues).
These inputs and techniques are land-augmenting. They allow double 
cropping; increase the yield per hectare cultivated; and permit farmers to change 
the cropping pattern away from cereals cultivation, in which Jordan has no 
comparative advantage, towards more lucrative enterprises like fruit and vegetables. 
These issues will be discussed in further details in section VI.4 below.
7 • »Fariz has shown that credit extended to building and construction increased from 8.5% of total 
credit in 1966, to 21.7% in 1975 (Fariz, 1976: 303).
sFariz (ibid) saw land as "A market enjoying all the characteristics of a feasible financial market - 
namely breadth, width, and liquidity".
9Another side effect to land speculation is the creation of a dominant wealthy group - the 
speculators - with a high propensity to consume. This further increased inflationary pressure in the 
economy, via the spending effect, one important element of which is building and construction. 
However, as Fariz (1976: 207 & 304) believes this group's consumption to be influenced by the 
"demonstration effect", where a large portion of demand is met from imports, we would expect a 
mitigating effect on inflation.
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VI.3.2 Labour Supply
Between 1961 and 1982, the labour force in agriculture declined from about one- 
third to less than one-tenth of total employment in Jordan. This decline took place 
while the total labour force in Jordan grew at 3.5% p.a., implying rural-urban 
migration, as well as international out-migration, both of which are considered in 
our model as a domestic resource movement. As a countervailing force, labour 
immigration increased from the end of the seventies to the mid-eighties. The 
numbers of foreign workers employed in agriculture rose from a negligible 400 in 
1973 to 43,478 in 1983 (see section V.3.1.2).
Labour shortages seem to have had different consequences for rain-fed and 
irrigated agriculture. In irrigated areas, most farmers tended to rely more on 
foreign labour (Aydin, 1990: 201), so the majority of foreign labour went to the 
irrigated sub-sector. A survey by Steitieh and Musa in 1980 showed that more than 
90% of permanent workers employed in the production of fruit and vegetables in 
the Jordan Valley were Egyptian guest workers (Ibid). "It is only through this 
replacement migration that the agricultural sector in Jordan maintained the increase 
in its production" (Birks and Sinclair, quoted in Lanzendorfer, 1985: 39).
This conclusion seems to be born out by Seccombe (1981: 80-81) whose 
analysis of migrant workers in the Jordan Valley shows that, despite the decline in 
the number of Jordanians employed in agriculture in the Valley, there has been an 
increase in total agricultural employment, as a result of immigration of non- 
Jordanians. The corollary of the above is that the rain-fed sub-sector bore the full 
brunt of the decline in the number of workers employed in agriculture as a whole; 
and that the decline of labour in this sub-sector was more serious than aggregated 
employment figures suggest. We conclude, then, that the resource movement was
very serious for the rain-fed sub-sector, while it was largely, or perhaps even
10completely, mitigated by labour immigration in the irrigated sub-sector. This 
seems to be due to the low productivity of rain-fed agriculture, which meant that 
the increase in wages and other costs had no counterbalancing forces to offset it.
Section VI.2.1 demonstrated that output from the whole sector expanded 
during the boom, that is, 'pro-agriculturalisation' rather than 'de-agriculturalization' 
took place. This result is interesting, because labour immigration on its own would
l0Depending on what would have been the rate of growth of labour in the sub-sector without the 
boom.
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not have enabled this outcome to occur, according to the extended model of the 
Dutch disease. Corden (1984) has shown that so long as there is any spending effect 
in the economy, which would be augmented by immigrant workers' spending, real 
appreciation and higher wages will not be completely countered by labour 
immigration, and some de-industrialization is inevitable. Immigration, in other 
words, would only increase output in the lagging sector relative to pre-immigration 
conditions, but would not restore it to normal pre-boom conditions, and definitely 
would not increase it, i.e. overshooting is not possible (see section II.3.1).
VI.3.3 Capital
There are, broadly speaking, two categories of farms in Jordan, differentiated from 
each other by the amount of capital investment devoted to production. Irrigated 
vegetables are examples of the relatively high capital input crops, while rain-fed 
field crops require only relatively low capital input. Since field crops are grown 
mainly in the highlands, while vegetables are grown in the Jordan Valley, most 
agricultural investment took place in the Valley, thus giving agricultural production 
a permanent dual structure. On average - for the boom period as a whole - the area 
cultivated in the Jordan Valley accounts for 10% of the total area cultivated in 
Jordan, but produces about 60% of the total agricultural value (World Bank, 1990).
Large-scale investment11 undertaken in the irrigated sub-sector took the form 
of flood control and major off-farm irrigation schemes, the details of which are 
given in Appendix VT.2. These projects were financed by the government, 
considering they are social overhead. “ On the other hand, small-scale investment, 
mainly in on-farm irrigation and plasticulture, was entirely financed by the private 
sector, having admittedly been encouraged by public investment.
The importance of Government investment in agriculture stems from the fact 
that it may mitigate the 'spending effect', insofar as the expression refers to the 
impact of additional spending on non-traded goods. If government investment 
embodies technological change, the supply responses of the sector will be altered,
uArbitrarily defined as any investment larger than JD 0.5 million per annum, which takes into 
consideration Jordan's small GDP (JD 303 million in 1975).
12The milestone in public investment in irrigation was the construction of the East Ghor Main Canal 
(EGMC) in the northern part of the Valley in the early sixties, which was extended in the mid-seventies 
and again in the mid-eighties. The project irrigated about 10,000 hectare, or roughly 15% of the total 
Valley area.
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through the effect of investment on productivity. This effect is as 'real' as the 
'spending effect' and yet it cannot be accounted for in the Dutch disease model 
because the model abstracts from the government sector, and ignores technological 
changes. To the extent that government investment induces private investment, 
taking only government investment into account understates the degree to which the 
'spending effect' is mitigated by investment. (This is especially true if private 
investment involves a multiplier effect). Accordingly, both sources of investment in 
agriculture should be considered.
The discussion of capital accumulation (section IV.2.2.2) showed investment 
in agriculture and irrigation in the period 1976-80 to have been 10% of total 
investment. Investment in irrigation alone accounted for 60% of this total, 
amounting to 6% of investment in all sectors of the economy, and was entirely 
financed by the Government (Table IV.2.2.2-5).13 A concomitant feature with 
public investment in irrigation has been the fast introduction and absorption of 
advanced technologies, especially in irrigation and agriculture under plastic, as well 
as a continuous upgrading of irrigation, fertilisation and disease control techniques 
by the private sector (Five Year Plan 1986-90: 532).14
Over 1976-1980 private sector investment in agriculture accounted for 6.5% 
of total private investment, or 3.9% of total investment, both private and public. 
The significance of these figures for private investment in agriculture stems from 
the low share of agriculture in GDP during the period of study, which averaged 
9%, compared with 71% for all services including construction (which received 
55.5% of total investment, 54% of which was private; part of this investment may 
have also benefited agriculture). Furthermore, this level of private sector 
involvement in the sector is unprecedented. From about JD 5 million over 1973- 
1975, private investment in agriculture rose to JD 47 million over 1976-1980, and 
further to JD 140 million during 1981-85. These absolute figures represent 21.7%, 
40%, and 78% of total investment in the sector (Five Year Plan 1986-90: 532).
13Majd (1991) cites the following percentages for government expenditure on "agricultural 
development" during the oil boom: Nigeria 1%, Mexico 2%, and Irau 3% of GDP. It is not clear 
whether this includes expenditure on irrigation or not. If it does, then Jordan compares very favourably 
with those countries; if not, she compares unfavourably to all but Nigeria.
14Plasticulture was started by the Valley farmers in the mid-seventies, and by 1981 there were 1,500 
hectare, or 6% of total irrigated area under either plastic houses, plastic tunnels or mulch (Abu 
I-Iowayej, 1985: 89).
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Private investment decisions were responses mainly to government 
investment in basic technology - flood control and irrigation.15 This can be inferred 
from the fact that private investment was directed mainly towards (1) on-farm 
irrigation systems, (2) increasing inputs per unit of cultivated land, and (3) adopting 
palsticulture. The first type of investment is only possible when main irrigation 
schemes are in place, while the second and third are encouraged by the reduction in 
risk associated with rain-fed farming. Furthermore, investment in basic irrigation 
schemes permits the use of other embodied technologies such as fertilisers, 
pesticides, and improved seeds, through their complementarity relationships. There 
are no data on irrigated crops and area for the whole of Jordan, but there are data 
on the Jordan Valley alone, which can be used to show the degree of spread of 
irrigation in Jordan. A 1961 study conducted by the Jordanian Department of 
Statistics (DOS) showed a total of 15,271 hectare to be irrigated in the Valley - 
either partially or totally (Khouri, 1983: 91).16 The main technology used was 
surface irrigation. By 1975, the irrigated area had increased to 18,659 hectare, and 
by 1979 to 24,286 hectare, of which 9,397 hectare (39%) were under pressurised 
irrigation. By the mid-eighties total irrigated area had reached 30,590 hectare, of 
which 44% was under pressurised irrigation (24% drip irrigation, and 20% sprinkle 
irrigation) (Department of Statistics, 1983, Agricultural Census). Accordingly, the 
irrigated area in the Jordan Valley increased by 163% over 1975-1985. This made 
possible an increase in cropping intensity from 106% to 120%, for the same period 
(Khouri, 1983: 20).
As for the highlands, available data show irrigated areas there in the late 
eighties to be 24,812 hectare,1718 up from 11,741 hectare in 1975,19 or an increase
15It is relevant to mention that government investment in irrigation was supplemented by investment 
in rural infrastructure and in industries serving agricultural production needs, such as fertilisers, 
veterinary medicines, agricultural and drip irrigation equipment and plastic houses. A number of food 
processing facilities were also established (Five-Year Plan 1986-90: 532-533).
16The total area farmed in 1961 was 20,794 hectare (ibid).
17 20,781 hectare of which were irrigated by the use of tubewells, while the rest utilised springs and 
wadis (World Bank, 1990, Table 6.16: 109).
lsAccording to these figures the sum of the irrigated area in both the highland and the Jordan Valley 
in the mid-to-late eighties was 51,000 hectare, which exceeds the 44,000 hectare officially declared as 
the total irrigable area in Jordan (see Khouri, 1983: 104). This reflects the inaccuracy of official 
statistics on agriculture and, more importantly, these statistics reflect the exhaustion of irrigable land in 
Jordan.
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of 112%20 (World Bank, 1990, Table 6.16: 109). If these figures are accurate, then 
the irrigated area in Jordan as a percentage of total cultivated area rose from 7.8%
92
to 15%.“ By the mid-eighties irrigable land in Jordan was more or less exhausted, 
and the only possible increase in irrigation was through vertical expansion; that is 
by increasing the efficiency of irrigation through modernising technology, for 
example by converting surface irrigation to pressurised irrigation, which the 
government embarked upon intensively from the mid-to-late 1980s.
The question arises now as to what extent the investment in flood control 
and irrigation contributed to the increase in agricultural output per hectare of 
cultivated land in Jordan. A related question concerns how this investment in 
irrigation stimulated other improvements in cultural practices, further increasing 
land productivity. To answer the first question I shall compare the increase in 
irrigated area under vegetables with the change in output per hectare.22 Table 
VI.3.3-1 reveals with sufficient significance the existence of an interrelationship 
between irrigation and yield: the increase in the former is associated with an 
increase in the latter. These results are similar to Ishikawa's (1972, Chart 2-3: 74) 
findings for East Asia. Comparisons with rain-fed vegetables reveals a stark 
difference in output per cultivated hectare between irrigated and rain-fed vegetables, 
leaving no doubt about the superiority of irrigated agriculture in terms of 
productivity in Jordan.23
19 * *This figure is derived as follows: the 1975 agricultural census shows 30,700 hectare to have been 
irrigated in the whole of Jordan (Lanzendorfer, 1985, footnote 10: 78). Thus the irrigated area in the 
highlands in 1975 must be the difference between this figure and that for the Jordan Valley (18,659 
hectare) or 11,741 hectare.
20To the extent that an increase in irrigated agriculture is expected to raise demand for labour, the 
remaining non-irrigated area must have suffered disproportionately from the decline in labour in the 
highlands.
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~ Note, however, that part of the increase in this ratio is due to the decrease of total cultivated area 
by 26,000 hectare.
22"Ishikawa (1972) has argued against the existence of a correlation between investment in irrigation, 
proxied by proportion of irrigated to total cropped laud, and land productivity, proxied by the total 
cereal output per unit of cultivated land, for the Near East region. The above measures are not only 
crude but the proxy used is illegitimate, at least for Jordan which showed the lowest respouse to 
irrigation in Ishikawa’s analysis. As late as 1983, only 1% of total cereal area in Jordan was irrigated, 
while the majority of irrigated area was under vegetables and fruit. Thus, it is the yield of the latter that 
should be measured against the increase in irrigation.
23This relationship between irrigation and productivity is particularly pronounced in Jordan because 
of its semi-arid climate.
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Table VI.3.3-1
Irrigation and Land Productivity for Vegetable Production, 1973/74-1983/84
Summer 
irrigated 
area (ha)
Ratio of 
irrigated 
to total 
area (%)
Productivity (ton/ha) 
Irrigated Rain-fed
1973/74 7.74 20.5 14.72 6.65
1974/75 9.30 23.0 18.60 4.74
1975/76 9.92 20.7 16.70 4.61
1976/77 9.26 26.8 14.91 5.08
1977/78 9.48 24.2 16.97 4.01
1978/79 11.65 35.5 14.40 1.28
1979/80 15.22 32.4 14.24 4.99
1980/81 15.45 34.0 23.84 4.72
1981/82 20.78 44.3 24.30 4.18
1982/83 24.75 37.7 22.47 5.13
1983/84 25.95 39.0 23.02 4.99
Source: Calculated from World Bank, 1990, Statistical Appendix.
The effect of irrigation on land productivity goes beyond the straight forward matter 
of increasing water availability and its supply reliability. With the advent of 
irrigation the adoption of modern techniques becomes possible, not only for 
technical but also for financial reasons: the increase in productivity increases 
profitability, which enables investment in more technologies, as advance capital 
becomes available. Moreover, irrigation can make possible the introduction of
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another crop, thus increasing cropping intensity. These factors combine to enable 
production at different input-output combinations, and at higher productivity.24
In the Japanese context Ishikawa (1972: 90) has argued, with the help of 
empirical analysis, for the existence of successive levels of productivity increase, 
paralleling the increasing role irrigation plays: first in stabilising harvest 
fluctuations; next in making possible the introduction of a second crop; and then by 
enabling the introduction of improved farming techniques and inputs, such as 
fertilisers and seeds. The Jordanian case does not fit this conceptualisation, but 
similarities do exist between Jordan's experience and that of Korea and Taiwan, 
where the introduction of improved seed varieties and increased application of 
fertiliser and other improved farming techniques occurred almost simultaneously 
with the improvement in irrigation. This was mainly because of the integrated 
development approach adopted by the Jordanian government for the Jordan Valley, 
where expansion in irrigation and drainage, dissemination of improved seeds, and 
spread in the use of fertilisers and manure were all energetically attempted by the 
Jordan Valley Authority in the seventies.
VI.3.4 Agricultural Output
9 5
Despite the decline in land and labour, and the stagnation in machinery,” the 
increase in capital, with its ensuing increase in productivity gave agriculture enough 
drive to increase its production from JD 57.8 million in 1975, to JD 80.6 million in 
1981 (and further to JD 105.4 million in 1983) in constant 1983 prices. This 
represents a growth of 5.7% p.a. over 1975-1981, although individual commodity 
performance was highly variable, and some commodities did not perform well at
24The effect of the introduction of uew inputs on productivity is available for cross-sectional data 
from the work of Qasem and Taqieddin (1986). The researchers have shown per hectare yield of 
vegetables to change under different types and levels of inputs as follows:___________________________
M ethod o f  Production_____________________ Productivity (ton/hectare)
Tomato Cucumber Squash Eggplant
Plastic house /  high input 1 .6 1.0 - -
Plastic house /  normal input 1 .2 0 .7 - -
Plastic tunnel /  drip or mulch 0 .6 - 0 .3 0 .4
Open field /  drip or mulch 0 .6 - - -
Traditional open field 0.1 - 0 .1 0 .1
Source: Qasem (1986), Tables 7 .6  & 7 .7 : 95-96.
25 See notes 29 and 30 below.
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all. The total volume of output of major crops is given in Table VI.3.4-1 for the 
period 1973-1981. Over this period, vegetable output increased by 80%, that of 
fruit by 30%, while field crops output declined by 20%. The growth of cucumber 
production at 456% is worth noting, since most cucumber is grown under plastic in 
the Jordan Valley. The increase in tomato production, at 91.5%, is equally 
important in view of the fact that it is the main export commodity.
Table VI.3.4-1
Change in Crop Production in Jordan, 1973-1981
Average production Change in Production Share in
(000 MT) (1973-1981) Total
Value
1973-75 1976-78 1979-81 (000 MT) Percmt (1981)
Field crops 149.07 65.34 118.91 -30.16 -20.23 6%
wheal 100.71 41.39 75.93 -24.78 -24.60
Vegetables 426.50 424.40 767.33 340.83 79.91 65%
tomato 160.60 184.03 307.60 147.00 91.53
eggplant 64.20 55.63 86.87 22.67 35.31
cucumber 15.43 29.60 85.81 70.38 456.03
squash 15.14 15.50 44.20 29.06 191.88
Fruit trees ^ 96.23 107.871 127.17 30.97 32.18 29%
grapes 36.50 37.87 45.17 8.70 91.53
citrus 59.73 70.00 82.00 22.27 35.31
Source: Calculated from World Bank, 1990, Statistical Appendix
1/ No total is available for this group in terms o f volume (MT), figures in this row pertain to grapes and citrus only. 
However, the share in total value (value in last column) pertains to the group as a whole.
VI.4 Changes in Prices, Costs, and Profitability
The Dutch disease model depicts a decline in the return to the specific factor in the 
lagging sector, which is interpreted as a fall in profitability. This is because the rise
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in the wage rate (relative to producers' prices) itself brought about by the resource 
movement effect, squeezes profitability in the sector in absolute terms.26 If 
profitability also falls in relative terms, resources will in the medium run move out 
of the sector, and into the non-traded sector.
How changes in input prices affect resource allocation, however, depends 
not only on the relative changes in input and output prices in a static manner, but 
also on change in the technical coefficients of inputs, which ultimately disturb the 
old input-output relations. That is, a dynamic analysis is necessary to understand the 
relationship between changes in prices, costs, and profitability.
Assuming a linear cost function for the farm sector - both for simplicity and 
because empirical evidence supports it (see Labini, 1957, and Staehle, 1942 on
general cost functions) - producers' profit, G, can be expressed in terms of
revenue, R , and total cost, C, as follows:
G = R ~C  (1)
Total cost in turn is composed of constant cost, a , plus variable cost, which itself is 
composed of labour cost, L , and material cost, M, while revenues are the product 
of producers’ price, p , and the quantity sold, q :
G = p .q~(A + L+M)  (2)
To reflect supply side changes, unit costs are taken. Expressing above variables in 
lower case to represent per unit values:
g= p - ( a  + l + m) (3)
That is change in profit per unit output (profit margin) depends on change in labour 
and material cost, and on producers’ prices.
I shall first examine how changes in the prices of material inputs and labour 
cost affected change in variable cost, taking changes in input-output coefficients into 
consideration. Next, I shall look at changes in producers' prices and relate them to 
unit cost changes to arrive at an indicator of profit margins. To simplify the
26The same may not be true in relative terms, that is relative to profits obtainable in the non-traded 
goods sector. The ultimate result depends on factor intensities in terms of value shares. If the share of 
labour in the value of the lagging sector output is smaller than that in the non-traded goods sector, then 
a given rise in the wage rate reduces its profitability by less than it reduces it in the non-traded sector 
(Corden and Neary, 1982).
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analysis, wheat will be taken as representative of field crops production, tomato of 
vegetables, and citrus of fruit.
Tables AVI.3-1 to AVI,3-3 in Appendix VI.3 show the cost structure for 
representative irrigated farm enterprises in the Jordan Valley in 1975 and 1982. 
Tables AVI.3-4 and AVI.3-5 in the same Appendix show the technical coefficients 
of production for these two years. The tables suggest, based on cost shares, that 
fruit and vegetables are more labour-intensive than wheat, although all enterprises 
were more capital-intensive in 1981 than in 1975, because of the resource 
movement. Material inputs for fruit and vegetables increased significantly over the 
period, due to the adoption of modernised techniques; and they were more 
significant in the production of fruit and vegetables than in the production of wheat. 
Before we take the analysis any further, we need to look at changes in the prices of 
these inputs, to see how they may have influenced changes in the cost of 
production.
Prices paid by farmers for material inputs in Jordan are generally market 
determined for most crop production inputs.27 This include fertilisers and agro­
chemicals as well as investment items such as plastic houses and drip irrigation 
equipment. All agricultural inputs are sold by private firms who import directly 
from international companies. The Jordan Cooperative Organisation (JCO) provides 
some inputs to dryland farmers at subsidised prices, but apparently this support is 
very limited, given the extent of Jordan's rain-fed sub-sector. Rates for machinery 
hire from cooperatives are at cost-recovery (World Bank, 1990: 42). Government 
support for agricultural inputs includes exemption from import tariffs and duties for 
all inputs, and subsidised provision of irrigation water in the Jordan Valley (one m3 
of water costs only JD 3/1000)." The change in prices paid by farmers for these 
inputs is shown in Table VI.4-1.
27During implementation, some specific projects like fruit tree planting and terrace building receive 
direct government aid (Hurani & Duwairi: 1986: 61).
“ To put this figure in perspective, operation and maintenance costs for irrigation in the valley was 
estimated by the World Bank in the mid-eighties at JD 15/1000 per m^ of water, and supply cost at JD 
50/1000 per m3 (World Bank, 1986a: 33). Water charges to farmers in the valley were doubled in 1988 
to JD 6/1000 per m3. In the highlands, farmers dig wells and supply themselves with water and, 
therefore, water costs are entirely borne by them. Cost to the latter group of extracting one m^ of water 
was estimated at JD 56/1000 in the mid-eighties (ibid).
170
Table VI.4-1
Index of Prices Paid by Farmers, 1975-1981 (1975=100)
Land Machinery Fertilisers Seed Pesticides Material Wages
1975 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1976 112 107 73 110 104 99 20
1977 125 112 59 111 80 90 144
1978 140 118 50 140 67 99 173
1979 157 120 74 128 88 105 207
1980 176 272 109 166 107 137 249
1981 197 272 116 186 116 151 299
Annual
Growth 12.0% 18.2% 6.7% 11.7% 4.3% 7.8% 20.0%
Source: FAO, Yearbook, various issues.
Notes: Wages are assumed to increase at 20% p.a. (based on El-Akel, 1985, results); land prices are assumed near the 
COL index, but slightly higher; materials index is composed of 50% fertilisers, 25% pesticides, 25% seeds.
The overall increase in the prices of all these inputs is quite modest especially for 
pesticides (4.3%) and fertilisers (6.7%), while seed prices grew at 11.7%. The 
general price level in the economy increased at 10.9% over the same period, 
meaning that the cost of fertilisers and pesticides fell in real terms, while the cost of 
seeds did not change. More importantly, according to FAO, prices received by 
farmers for crops increased at 11 %29 over 1975-81. Taking 1975 as the base year, 
the purchasing power of farmers vis-a-vis pesticides, therefore, increased at about 
7% p.a., and vis-a-vis fertilisers at about 4% p.a., while it remained unchanged for 
seeds. The same, however, does not apply to machinery which, despite being 
imported, experienced a price increase of 24% p.a., much faster than the rate of 
output price increase. This may explain the near stagnation in adopting machinery 
in agriculture in the seventies.30 31
29According to Central Bank of Jordan figures, wholesale prices for all food items increased by 7% 
over 1975-81 (calculated from Central Bank of Jordan, 1989, Table 50).
30Tke reason for the rapid increase in the price of machinery during the oil-induced boom may lie in 
the fact that their production is fuel-intensive.
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The high share of land (58%) in the total cost of production of wheat, 
compared with that of fruit and vegetables (17% and 19%, respectively, see Tables 
AVI.3-4 and AVI.3-5 in Appendix VI.3) means that the change in relative prices 
must have squeezed wheat much more than the other two crop-types. The same is 
true of machinery (6% for wheat, 0.9% for tomato, and 0.6% for citrus). The low 
level of land input per unit output for fruit and vegetables, relative to field-crops, 
mitigated very considerably the effect of wage increases.
The other term in equation (3) is prices received by farmers. Producers' 
prices were affected both directly, through specific policies, and indirectly, through 
macro-economic policies. There is no explicitly stated government policy for the 
sector in general, nor for prices in particular. The latter change continuously and 
sometimes erratically, and it is thus not analytically useful to follow them in detail. 
My discussion will therefore continue to be highly stylised, concentrating on the 
major exported commodities, fruit and vegetables, and the import-competing 
commodity, wheat.
In general, Jordan's macroeconomic policies have been designed to protect 
domestic producers from cheap imports, while pricing policies had the objective of 
supporting incomes by ensuring an adequate net return, and stimulating production 
to improve self-sufficiency. The focus of the pricing policy has been on field crops, 
the bulk of which are imported (World Bank, 1990).
Both agricultural production and income are, de facto, subsidised by the 
exemption of agricultural income and land from tax. The sector was, however, 
taxed indirectly through currency appreciation. Appreciation reduces farmers profit 
margins because it lowers the value of exports in domestic currency, while it raises 
the price of non-traded domestic inputs such as labour and land, relative to the 
traded output. Alternatively, if the output is not exported, it is still taxed by 
appreciation which makes competing imports cheaper. Over the 1972-1978 real 
currency appreciation, as measured by REER, amounted to 17%.
More directly, wheat was taxed from 1974-1976 when the controlled price 
offered to local producers was below international market prices. The percentage 
ratio of the domestic producer price of wheat to the imported c.i.f. price - Nominal
31 ♦On the question of mechanization, Lazendorfer (1985) claims that agriculture in Jordan was fully 
mechanised by the mid-seventies. This may be another plausible explanation for the stagnation of 
mechanization.
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Protection Coefficient (NP) - was 61% in 1974, increasing to 79% in 1976.32 
During the same period, exports of wheat were controlled, and the government had 
a monopoly over wheat imports. Gotsch has argued that this policy distorted the 
relationship between input and output prices, and curtailed the incentive to wheat 
farmers to adopt improved technology (Mazur, 1979: 164). However, in the 
subsequent period this policy was reversed with heavy subsidies on domestic 
production of wheat. The NP was 130% in 1977, and escalated to 270% in 1986 
(FAO, 1989, Yearbook, Table 3: 21).
The government supported producers' prices for other commodities: barley, 
chickpeas, lentils, potatoes, onions, and tomatoes. The support price objective 
varied with the crop. For tomatoes the floor price was paid during periods of 
production glut (which started occurring in 1982/83) to produce a minimum return
33to growers/ Floor prices for onions and potatoes were provided as a means to 
stimulate production of these two commodities for which Jordan had a comparative 
advantage: it was only the farmers' lack of familiarity with their production that had 
necessitated imports. Incentive prices were also paid, temporarily, to stimulate the 
adoption of appropriate production technology. This policy succeeded in increasing 
Jordan's exports of onions. Exports of fruit and vegetables were also supported 
through trade policies. Import duties were imposed on imported fresh vegetables 
(23%) and fruit (18-23%), as well as quantitative restrictions. These tariff barriers 
kept domestic prices for those commodities generally high, which more than 
compensated for the appreciation of the exchange rate during the oil era, which 
would otherwise have worked as a subsidy to imports. No such duties were 
imposed on imports of cereals and lentils, which are import-competing 
commodities. On the contrary, wheat and wheat flour imports were heavily 
subsidised by the government, through the Ministry of Supply while, as mentioned 
above, domestic producers were protected though support prices.
These policies combined with demand trends during the boom were reflected 
in an increase in wholesale prices of: 6.9% p.a. for wheat, 15% p.a. for fruit, and 
17.7% for vegetables, over 1975-81.
32Since NP is calculated using official exchange rates, overvaluation understated the disincentive to 
farmers. FAO's calculations of the exchange rate corrected NP showed it to be not significantly 
different from the uncorrected one, because FAO's calculations erroneously show the Jordanian 
currency overvaluation to be negligible (about 1%).
33Surplus production is processed at substantial losses in a government owned canning operation.
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Synthesising the change in input and output prices, and taking dynamic 
changes of the input-output relationships into consideration, a composite index of a 
profitability (price/cost ratio) has been constructed (Table VI.4-2).
Table VL4-2
Composite Index of Price/Cost ratio
Cereals Vegetables Fruit
1975 100% 100% 100%
1976 153% 174% 146%
1977 144% 181% 159%
1978 170% 226% 181%
1979 153% 185% 168%
1980 109% 189% 148%
1981 97% 156% 139%
Source: Calculated from tables in Appendix VI.3.
The favourable price/cost ratios for vegetables and fruit can be explained, firstly, in 
terms of increased output prices resulting from buoyant demand, and, secondly, in 
terms of the reduction in costs associated with increased labour productivity.
Table VI.4-3
Trends in the Yield of Crops Grown in Jordan (ton/hectare)
1973 1980 1986
Wheat 1.01 2.04 1.53
Tomatoes 7.52 16.93 26.24
Cucumber 4.81 16.23 26.61
Eggplant 7.52 19.39 18.69
Oranges 12.33 13.30 21.37
Lemon 6.31 9.16 16.13
Banana 4.39 31.18 14.91
Source: The Jordan Valley Dynamic Transformation: 1973-1986, tables 11.18,
11.19, & 11.20: 49, 50 & 52.
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That demand was buoyant during the boom has already been mentioned in 
Section VI.2.2. Data on yield per hectare of individual crops for the period 1973- 
1986 are given in Table VI.4-3. Both fruit and vegetables yields, expressed in tons 
per hectare, increased much faster than for field crop yields. How this affected 
labour productivity depends on changes in employment in each enterprise. When 
employment declines, the increase in land productivity is expected to be magnified 
when expressed in terms of labour productivity. The reverse is of course true. 
Analysis of the resource movement suggests that, in general, employment declined 
in rain-fed farming, and increased slightly in irrigated farming in the Jordan Valley. 
But even allowing for this factor, it is unlikely that productivity results would have 
changed significantly, since capital was increased considerably in the fruit and 
vegetables enterprises, while labour increased only slightly. This argument is 
difficult to support with historical data, since a breakdown of labour productivity by 
enteiprise is not available. Other routes to the same result are possible. Cross- 
sectional data for vegetable production using different techniques show that a move 
from traditional farming to modern high input farming brought about substantial 
gains. As shown in Table VI.4-4 below for tomatoes, a move from traditional open- 
field cultivation to cultivation under plastic and using high input production 
techniques reduced unit production cost by 24%, and increased profit margin per 
unit output by a factor of three, and per hectare by a factor of forty-eight. Since this 
move away from traditional to modern farming techniques has been the historical 
trend for fruit and vegetables, but not for cereals, we would expect the effect of 
increasing land productivity on reducing per unit production cost to be highly 
salient in the first two enterprises, and not in the latter.
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Table VI. 4-4
Profitability for Vegetables Grown Under Different Techniques of Production
Yield
(ton/ha)
Price
(JD/tou)
Gross
Revenue
(JD/ha)
Total Cost 
(JD/ha)
Net Profit 
(JD/ha)
Tomatoes
Plastic houses/high input 160 119 19,040 12,850 6,190
Plastic Tunnels/Drip or mulch 60 119 7,140 3,580 3,560
Traditional /Open field 10 119 1,190 1,060 130
Cucumber under plastic
High input 100 228 22,800 12,340 10,460
Normal input 70 228 15,960 9,450 6,510
Squash
Drip/mulch 30 163 4,890 2,120 2,770
Open field 10 163 1,630 1,260 370
Eggplant
Drip/mulch 40 113 4,520 2,770 1,750
Open field 14 113 1,582 1,290 292
Potatoes
with manure 30 120 3,600 2,570 1,030
without manure 10 120 1,200 1,540 (340)
Source: Qasem, 1986: 95,
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VL5 Conclusions
The study of agriculture's performance during the boom period in Jordan gives 
results that contradict the expected outcome of the Dutch disease 'core model', 
since agricultural output increased in absolute terms, and agricultural exports grew 
exponentially. We conclude that the Dutch disease was not manifest in the 
agricultural sector of Jordan..
There are two arguments by which this outcome may be compatible with the 
Dutch disease 'extended model', both of which are based on Rybczynski's theorem. 
The first is the 'paradox model': if both capital and labour are mobile across 
agriculture and the non-traded sector, and if agriculture is relatively better endowed 
with capital, the movement of labour out of agriculture and the non-traded sector to 
the booming sector will lead to an expansion of agriculture, on account of its 
relative capital-intensity, and a contraction of the non-traded sector, on account of 
its relative labour-intensity. The spending effect will have a counter-balancing 
effect, but on balance pro-agriculturalization is possible. Agriculture is more 
capital-intensive than service activities, especially construction. The paradox model 
may, in theory, therefore be accepted as an explanation of the performance of the 
sector as a whole.
The second argument is connected with the concept of 'decomposition of the 
lagging sector'. If agriculture is composed of industries that employ factors with 
differing intensities, then the movement of labour out of the sector leads to a 
reorganisation of capital and labour in favour of the capital-intensive industries 
whose output expands. Taking the technical coefficients for agricultural production 
in 1975, fruit and vegetables were relatively more labour-intensive than wheat, yet 
the output of the former two enterprises expanded significantly while that of wheat 
contracted. This contradicts the extended model of the Dutch disease, and 
Rybczynski's theorem on which it is built.
Critical analysis of production in the sector shows technical coefficients to be 
changing during the boom, because new techniques of production embodying 
technological change were adopted. Evidence obtained from such analysis suggests 
strongly that technological advances increased productivity and therefore 
profitability in the production of vegetables and fruit. It is highly plausible that this 
is mainly responsible for the continued increase in supply; while the expansion of 
external demand originating in the Gulf assured that no excess supply conditions 
were created, thus maintaining a high level of profitability in the sector. This is a
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more plausible explanation for the divergence from the core model expectations 
than the 'paradox model' hypothesis.
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CHAPTER VII
The Squeeze on Tradeables: The Performance of Manufacturing
179
Introduction
The growth of output and exports of manufacturing in Jordan over the boom period 
was considerable; that is, in terms of Corden and Neary's model (1982), 'pro­
industrialisation’ rather than ’de-industrialization’ took place. It was argued in 
Chapter m  that some expansion of manufacturing during the boom must be allowed 
for in developing economies, because of the industrialisation process. However, 
trend analysis in Chapter IV, which established the counterfactual to the Dutch 
disease, showed manufacturing output to have been much higher during the boom, 
and much lower after the boom, than would have been 'expected' from the 
projected historical trend line. It would appear, therefore, that performance of 
manufacturing in Jordan was counter to the predictions of the Dutch disease model, 
even when assessed in relative terms. This chapter substantiates this assertion.
The previous chapter established that 'pro-agriculturalisation' was due 
mainly to technological progress embodied in irrigation and other technology, 
which was made possible by heavy government investment in major irrigation 
schemes prior to the boom. In manufacturing, it will be shown that 'pro­
industrialisation' was made possible, not only by technological progress embodied 
in imported plant and equipment, but also by the rapid expansion of demand for 
manufacturing output originating both domestically and in the Gulf states. The 
increase in demand for manufactures made possible the use of hitherto idle 
capacity; the adoption of more sophisticated production techniques; and allowed for 
dynamic economies of scale to come into play. All of these new conditions 
increased production efficiency, which more than offset the adverse effect of 
relative price changes. This chapter will show that the divergence of the results for 
Jordan from those that would have been predicted by the Dutch disease model lies 
in productivity growth, and will investigate the source of this productivity growth.
The chapter is divided into three main parts. Part I offers: i) a theoretical 
discussion of why the Dutch disease model is not the most suitable theoretical 
framework for the study of manufacturing performance in industrialising booming 
economies (section VII. 1); ii) an overview of market conditions and the policy and 
institutional framework governing manufacturing activities in Jordan (section
VII.2); and iii) an examination of manufacturing performance and the sources of 
demand growth in the sector, in terms of domestic demand, export expansion and 
import substitution (section VII.3). Part II provides a quantitative account of the 
sector's growth in terms of: i) factor input (section VII.4.1); ii) total factor 
productivity (section VII.4.2); and iii) discusses the sources of productivity growth
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(section VII.4.3). Part III sets out to: i) establish a methodology for the construction 
of profitability indices, taking into account trends in relative prices of inputs and 
outputs and in productivity growth (section VII.5.1); ii) present estimates of 
profitability in 12 manufacturing firms in Jordan (section VII.5.2); and iii) 
concludes with remarks on the implication of productivity growth for the Dutch 
disease theory (section VII. 6).
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PA R TI
v n . l  Industrialisation and the Dutch Disease: A Theoretical Discussion
Pro-industrialisation is not completely ruled out by the Dutch disease model. Under 
strict assumptions of a fixed national stock of primary factors, and of differing 
factor intensities in the three main sectors, 'pro-industrialisation' becomes a 
possibility.1 If the lagging sector (manufacturing) is relatively more capital-intensive 
than the non-traded sector (services), while the total stock of capital and labour in 
the economy is fixed, the economy behaves in a Heckscher-Ohlin fashion. The 
resource movement, which draws labour out of both sectors into the booming 
sector thus making the resource structure facing both sectors more capital-intensive, 
entails a decline in the output of the relatively labour-intensive sector and an 
expansion of the relatively capital-intensive sector - the Rybczynski (1955) theorem. 
The spending effect, which increases the price of services relative to that of 
manufacturing, counters this trend, but 'pro-industrialisation' remains a possibility. 
A similar process may take place within the manufacturing sector, if different 
industries employ factors in different proportions: the relatively capital-intensive 
industries expand, even if the sector as a whole contracts.
There are two problems with this explanation as applied to the sector as a 
whole: one is practical and the other theoretical. On the practical side, it is quite 
difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain the relative capital intensity at a sectoral 
level, given the patchiness and sometimes total absence of data on capital stock in 
developing economies. On the theoretical side, the concept of capital intensity for a 
sector as a whole may not be meaningful: the manufacturing sector may include the 
highly labour-intensive industries of clothing, footwear and leather tanning, side-by- 
side with the highly capital-intensive industries of pharmaceuticals and petroleum 
refining. Similarly, the non-traded sector may include petty trading and 
telecommunications. These differentials in capital-intensity within sectors, on the 
other hand, allow the application of the Heckscher-Ohlin model and the Rybczynski 
theorem at an intra-industry level. As will be shown later for Jordan, the relatively 
capital-intensive industries tended to fare better than the relatively labour-intensive 
industries under boom conditions. However, differing factor-intensities constitute 
only a partial explanation of why 'pro-industrialisation', rather than 'de-
1 This is a necessary repetition from the previous chapter on which a different argument for 
manufacturing is built.
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industrialization1, took place in many developing economies, including Jordan, 
during the seventies oil boom. More important is the chain of interlinked supply - 
demand effects, normal to the process of industrialisation, which were augmented 
from the mid-seventies to the early eighties by the boom conditions.
Under booming conditions, aggregate demand rises rapidly, thus leading to 
an acceleration of the process of industrialisation, which is underpinned by the rise 
in per capita income and the greater-than-unity elasticity of demand for 
manufactures. This process is further helped by the fact that under booming 
conditions capital is abundant, which makes rapid capital accumulation possible. In 
turn, if the generally observable phenomenon of relatively higher productivity 
levels in manufacturing (i.e. as compared with the rest of the economy) is present, 
industrialisation itself will lead to increases in the rates at which aggregate demand 
grows: the process of industrialisation will become self-sustaining.
Increases in the level and rate of growth of productivity in manufacturing are 
more likely to happen under booming conditions than otherwise, because of the 
buoyant demand conditions which enlarge the extent of the market. The two most 
important means by which demand may influence the growth of productivity are 
increased capacity utilization and economies of scale.
The rapid rise in incomes ensures that demand for final output is sufficient to 
keep capacity installed in the economy fully utilised, whereas a pre-boom 
developing economy with low per capita income is, by contrast, more likely to be 
operating under excess supply conditions. A developing economy that has just 
entered a booming phase, then, may increase its output by moving towards the full 
capacity utilization state without any loss of competitiveness, even in those sectors 
against which relative prices have moved, since while output is expanding, unit 
costs of production are declining because of increased production efficiency. This 
increase in productivity could more than compensate for the decline in tradeables' 
prices relative to non-tradeables, arising from the spending effect. Furthermore, 
abstracting from the spending effect, the existence of unemployed labour prior to 
the boom would also dampen the effect of the resource movement, since the 
booming sector would be absorbing what is otherwise an idle resource. The 
assumption of the Dutch disease theory of full employment of resources at all times, 
i.e. including the pre-boom phase, does not easily accommodate this outcome, 
although Corden has discussed it (1984).
Economies of scale are expected to impart substantial gains in efficiency in 
developing economies that start from low per capita income and therefore small
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markets, through greater specialisation. The size of these gains depends greatly 
upon the distribution of increased expenditures among products as per capita 
expenditures rise; and shifting consumption patterns have a great deal to do with 
observed differences in growth rates (Denison, 1967: 9). Ceteris paribus, the 
smaller the existing market the larger, presumably, are the gains from economies of 
scale as markets expand. The importance of these changes will diminish if the 
expansion of markets is not accompanied by changes in managerial and technical 
knowledge (ibid).
Economies of scale need not be looked at in a static manner only. Adam 
Smith, Alfred Marshall, and Allyn Young have all stressed the interplay of static 
and dynamic factors causing returns to increase in response to an increase in the 
scale of industrial activities. These scale economies include aspects like learning by 
doing, embodied technology, new entrepreneurs, etc., which are derived not only 
from the expansion of any single industry, but also from a general industrial 
expansion, which should be seen, as Young put it, "as an interrelated whole" 
(Young, 1928; see also Kaldor, 1966: 13-15; and Matthews, 1982: 275). The 
statistical basis of the hypothesis is the so-called Verdoorn Law, or the observed 
correlation between the rate of growth of productivity and the rate of growth of 
production. Because of its neo-classical nature, the Dutch disease theory cannot 
easily accommodate increasing returns into the prevailing framework of perfect 
competition and marginal productivity factor pricing.
The effect of a larger market may be to increase efficiency in yet another 
way, namely by allowing the application of techniques that could not have been 
adopted until per capita incomes were sufficient to provide a market justifying the 
cost of their use. This was the case in many European economies that were able to 
adopt American technology only after their per capita incomes had, to some extent, 
caught up with that of the US. The possibility of this outcome was enhanced when 
capital became abundant, since American technology had developed in an 
environment where capital was more abundant than in Europe. The rapid increase 
in capital availability in Europe in the post-war period facilitated the transference of 
technology and reduced the amount of adaptation required. This process was not the 
result of any technological lag between the US. and Europe; rather, it flowed from 
the increase in per capita income, combined with a disproportionate allocation of 
purchasing power to products where existing techniques for larger scale output 
could be adopted with an above average decline in unit costs (Denison, 1967: 237).
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The importance of demand goes beyond income elasticities and the level of 
per capita income to include total demand for consumption goods. The sudden 
increase in domestic purchasing power may allow the economy to cross a 
'consumption threshold' whereby the income available for consumption goods, 
especially manufactures, is magnified. This in turn has two major outcomes. First, 
it leads to a rapid increase in total profits which will most probably induce more 
investment in the sector, as internal financing in firms becomes a possibility. 
Second, the demand pull may be so large that some of it is bound to spill over into 
domestic production, which enjoys natural protection against imports. It is worth 
noting that domestic products do not always have to be perfect substitutes for 
imports, if consumer tastes allow it. To put it another way, in many developing 
economies where incomes are much lower than in industrial economies, consumers 
are content with lower quality domestic products, so long as they are cheaper than 
imports. That is, the elasticity of substitution between domestically produced and 
imported products is lower than what is implied in the Dutch disease theory - where 
perfect substitution is assumed. In this case, the law of one price does not hold, and 
domestically produced tradeables may be able to compete well in their own 
markets.
Finally, the demand pull effect on output of tradeables will be magnified if 
the boom is regional rather than domestic. In such a case the demand from nearby 
countries for domestic exports will compound the effect of domestic demand; 
while, at the same time, if the whole region is booming the adverse relative price 
effects will be dampened, since differential inflation will be less pronounced than 
otherwise. A multi-country, rather than a single-country, model may be more 
efficient in predicting the outcome of tradeable goods' performance in this case.2
The supply response of manufacturing may be influenced by factors other 
than demand, but which are nevertheless related to the boom conditions. The two 
most important of these factors are abundance of foreign exchange and change in 
relative prices. Both these factors would be consistent with the importation of new 
technology, in the form of plant, equipment and even managerial skills, which 
might impart technological progress and thus increase productivity through shifting 
production possibility frontiers. The two factors are also consistent with the
2A hint of how these models may be constructed can be glimpsed from Forsyth and Kay (1981). Their 
very simple model was developed for the UK. Germany, and Saudi Arabia, although for a different 
purpose than our present one.
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importation of improved intermediate inputs to production, thus increasing 
productivity through enhancing production efficiency.3
Government policy and action can greatly influence the performance of 
manufacturing, both directly and indirectly. In most developing countries 
governments do not remain neutral to the process of industrialisation but try to 
direct its pace through an explicitly adopted 'development strategy', which in a 
large number of developing economies take the form of 'unbalanced' growth, i.e. 
with the emphasis on increasing the share of industry. Indirectly, government 
consumption and investment behaviour, which determines the vector of final 
demand, will through the usual interindustry links influence the structure and 
performance of manufacturing. This latter aspect is especially important when the 
foreign exchange earnings of the boom accrue to the government (see sections
IV.2.2.2 & V.2.1).
Government trade policies are also important. It is to be expected that when 
foreign exchange is abundant, governments are likely to embark on trade 
liberalisation. This policy may have two opposing effects. On the one hand, it will 
increase competition from imports and thus further exacerbate the inter-sectoral 
effects of relative price changes; but, on the other hand, the very fact of increased 
competition may have the positive effect of increasing efficiency in manufacturing 
production.
Industrial and pricing policies are also relevant. In a large number of 
developing economies the seventies oil price rise brought about the adoption of 
price controls, at least for fuel oil, to protect consumers and industrial production. 
In booming economies with generally high domestic inflation price controls extend 
to manufactured commodities, thus exacerbating price movement against 
tradeables. On the other hand, if investment in manufacture is directly supported by 
the government, with, for example, exemption from income and profit tax, tariffs 
and duties, this would alleviate the relative price effect.
To sum up the argument, the limitations of applying the Dutch disease 
model to the study of manufacturing performance in industrialising economies 
arises from three main shortcomings: first, its assumption of fixed technical
■fit has been suggested by Keesing (1979) that a high price of foreign exchange will generally 
speaking correspond to a faster growth rate, although the means by which this is achieved, namely the 
increase in production efficiency, is not discussed.
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coefficients of production;4 second, and linked to the first aspect, its neglect of 
demand effects - apart from the allowance for elasticities of demand to work 
themselves out in the model - which may significantly influence supply conditions 
(by increasing productivity which alters technical coefficients of production); and 
third, its failure to take account of government action.
There is not, as our knowledge of economic modelling stands, one model 
that can on its own adequately study the short-to-medium effect of favourable 
exogenous shocks on the production structure of industrialising economies. Yet all 
the above aspects must be carefully considered in any such study. This is why the 
analysis of manufacturing performance under boom conditions cannot be 
encompassed in one overarching argument, such as the one advanced by the Dutch 
disease theory. In fact the reverse is true: this chapter shows that an analysis which 
encompasses all the above points is multi-faceted to such an extent that, at times, 
sustaining an integrated analysis is difficult.
VII.2 The Manufacturing Sector in Jordan: An Overview
The manufacturing sector in Jordan faces two major disadvantages. The first is a 
small domestic market, both in breadth and depth, which necessitates a strong 
export performance to achieve economies of scale in production. The second is the 
absence of domestically available raw materials on which to base production. These 
two factors combined have the effect of increasing production costs and lowering 
profitability. During the boom, Jordanian manufacturing suffered further from the 
familiar adverse intersectoral effects of, on the one hand, rising prices for labour 
and other non-traded inputs, and, on the other hand, declining output prices, 
relative to services. This was further exacerbated by trade liberalisation, which the 
government had embarked upon because of the improved external balance position.
On the other hand, manufacturing production in Jordan enjoys a number of 
advantages. First, Jordan's proximity to the large and prosperous markets of the 
oil-exporting countries in the Middle East and the Gulf gives them a significant 
transport cost advantage. Second, strong cultural ties with these countries benefit 
Jordanian producers in these markets, not least because of the homogeneity of
^More accurately, the Dutch disease model does allow for change in technical coefficients through the 
elasticity of substitution between labour and capital in the model, but not through technological progress. 
It is precisely this latter aspect of change in technical coefficients that leads to a reduction in unit costs, 
when the assumption of zero change in its value is dropped (see chapter VIII for an elaboration).
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tastes. Third, reasonably well-developed financial institutions and instruments are 
available to channel financial resources to industries. During the boom three further 
effects - two supply-side and one-demand side - helped to increase manufacturing 
profitability. First, government investment in physical infrastructure such as roads, 
reliable electricity and telephone services, and industrial estates in the seventies (and 
eighties) facilitated increases in industrial productivity and reductions in production 
costs (section V.2.1). Second, the inflow of large sums of foreign exchange relaxed 
the foreign exchange constraint, which gave Jordanian manufacturers an advantage 
over their major regional competitors, Egypt and Syria, by ensuring better access to 
imported inputs and technology. On the demand side, the rapid rise in incomes 
(GNP per capita rose at 8% p.a. in real terms over 1974-82), given the greater- 
than-unity income elasticity of demand for manufacturing in developing economies, 
relaxed the small market constraint on efficient size of plant, and allowed 
economies of scale to work. This process was enhanced by the rapid rise in demand 
for Jordanian manufactured exports originating in Gulf states, where incomes were 
rising much faster than Jordan's. Idle capacity in the economy (unemployment 
stood at 14% in 1972) was rapidly utilised, and by 1976 the economy seems to have 
reached full capacity utilization (unemployment stood at 1.6% in 1976). These 
factors combined to lower production costs by increasing productivity.
On balance, the boom's favourable effects, namely the relief of the foreign 
exchange gap, gains in productivity from better infrastructure, and the effect of 
demand pull on unit production costs, appear to have succeeded in completely 
reversing the adverse intersectoral effects of the boom, as evidenced by the 
impressive growth of manufacturing output and exports during 1974-1982.
Before the analysis starts, a word on government action is in order, since 
limited space has prevented a detailed exposition of the policy and institutional 
framework that governed the growth of the manufacturing sector in Jordan.
Generally speaking, the Jordanian government's stated position vis-a-vis the 
economy is one of laissez-faire. Nevertheless, as in almost all developing 
economies, a certain level of intervention in the market economy has always 
existed, which inevitably encroached on manufacturing activities. For example, in 
addition to direct government ownership in manufacturing which amounted to 
18.4% in 1984, the government has indirect ownership through equity participation 
by autonomous public institutions and mixed enterprises, whose capital is partly 
owned by the government. Furthermore, the government often appoints 
representatives on boards of directors in companies in which it owns equity, and
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solicits loans for these companies. Finally, the government's close relationship with 
the private sector in manufacturing often compels it to bail out loss-making firms 
(World Bank, 1983c, Annex A, Table A-l: 79; 1986a, Table 4.2: 40; & 1988: 6).
Policies explicitly stated to enhance the contribution of industry in national 
income include investment encouragement, investment licensing, and control of 
external trade. As regards investment encouragement in the sector, the government 
has always relied on the 'Encouragement of Investment Law', which grants tariff 
exemption for imported fixed assets, and income and social security tax breaks for 
industrial, and other, projects if they meet certain criteria, most important among 
which is the fulfilment of national plan objectives. An assessment of these 
exemptions has shown their effect on investment to be only marginal (see Dar Al- 
Handasah, 1982e for detailed analysis). More important has been the effect of 
investment licensing and the granting of monopoly rights, which were pursued 
vigorously in the sixties and early seventies. Tobacco, leather tanning, petroleum 
refining, and cement have been enjoying monopoly rights and a ban on competing 
imports since the fifties. Monopoly rights were given on the grounds that these 
industries enjoy economies of scale of which they would be deprived in the 
presence of competition, given Jordan's small market. Prior to the boom, 
investment licensing was often withheld from applicants for many prospective 
manufacturing industries on the same grounds. However, regulating the market 
through investment licensing came to halt in the wake of the first oil boom since the 
rapid expansion of domestic demand enlarged the extent of the market, but 
monopoly rights remain even to date. Where these monopoly rights are granted the 
government reserves the right to dictate output prices, which are invariably lower 
than free trade import prices. In addition, prices for six other manufactured 
commodities were under control during the boom period when inflation rates were 
historically high (grain milling, baking, pharmaceuticals, soft beverages, batteries 
and detergents). In aggregate, the influence of price controls on profitability is not 
significant.
The single most effective policy in influencing profitability in manufacturing 
in Jordan is trade regulation. Prior to the first oil boom import substitution was 
pursued explicitly, and the effective rate of protection (ERP) was about 72%; this 
was significant enough to turn many otherwise unprofitable enterprises into profit- 
making ones by increasing their value added.5 In addition, quantitative restrictions
'’For comparisons with other developing economies during that period, which show Jordan's ERP to 
be mid-range, see Bdour (1990) Table 6.4: 148; Amerah (1982), Table 4.7: 169.
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and outright import bans were also common. From 1974, restrictive trade policies 
were abandoned in favour of tariffs, which were reduced across the board to bring 
the ERP down to 42% by 1979 which, although still significant, helped only a 
small section of manufacturing as a whole.6 This trade liberalisation was, to a 
certain extent, reversed in 19837 under intense pressure from the private sector for 
more protection, as the regional recession deepened (Alawin, 1978; Dar Al- 
Handasah, 1982c; World Bank, 1988).
Finally, trade agreements, both bilateral and multilateral, were one of the 
trade policy tools through which the government furthered its industrial strategy. 
Some of these agreements were quite effective, notably with the Arab oil-exporting 
countries, but most were not. It is especially with Saudi Arabia and Iraq that trade 
agreements, which treat Jordanian imports preferentially, helped Jordanian 
manufactured exports (Ministry of Industry and Trade, 1985). Although these 
agreements were mostly entered into in the fifties and sixties, and their status did 
not change considerably during the boom, the rapid expansion of demand in the 
Gulf states, resulting from the inflow of oil revenues, must have enhanced the 
opportunities for Jordanian exporters to benefit from these agreements.
The important point to make from the foregoing is that during the boom 
period manufacturing activities were conducted under relatively liberal industrial 
and trade policies, compared with the pre- and post-boom periods, since the only 
form of manufactures protection during the boom was nominal tariffs which, by 
historical standards, was low.8 In other words, government action was not a 
significant explanatory factor of manufacturing performance under booming 
conditions in the case of Jordan, because of the reasons mentioned above.
6See Dar Al-Handasah (1982c), Table 25: 84; Amerah (1982), Table 5.10: 271.
7 For 1983 rates, see World Bank (1988) Table 2.4: 22.
®It is plausible that under conditions of buoyant demand a lower ERP would have had a similar effect 
on profitability to higher ERP under conditions of suppressed demand, and may still, therefore, be 
considered as a determining factor of growth of output and exports. In Jordan's case no apparent 
correlation exists between these variables for manufactures. The correlation coefficient between ERP and 
exports growth was 0.08 for 1974-82 and -0.2 for 1983-91; between ERP and output growth 0.31 and 
0.02 for the same periods (ERP for 1979 from Bdour, 1990, Table 6.3: 148; ERP for 1983 from World 
Bank, 1988, Table 2.4: 22; export and output growth from Tables VII.3.1-2 and VIL.3.1-3.
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VII.3 The Performance of Manufacturing Under Booming Conditions 
VII.3.1 Growth Trends
It was demonstrated in Chapter IV that from the early fifties until the early eighties 
the Jordanian economy went through continuous industrialisation (section IV. 1). 
The share of agriculture in total employment and output declined, and was 
compensated for by the growth in industry (mining, manufacturing, utilities and 
construction). By 1982 manufacturing was contributing 13.1% to aggregate output. 
Employment in manufacturing increased much more slowly during the boom than 
did output, and in most years lagged behind the growth of employment in mining, 
the utilities sector and construction, but it surpassed employment in agriculture 
where it actually declined. The manufacturing sector had thus unambiguously 
experienced ’pro-industrialisation' during the boom period, rather than 'de- 
industrialization' .
The index of manufactures' production (by quantity, weight or volume) 
grew at 15.9% p.a. over 1974-81, compared with 9.8% p.a. over 1968-74. From 
1982, growth of manufacturing output decelerated, and in many years between 
1983-92 it suffered a real decline, reflecting poor adjustment to the post-boom 
conditions. The index of manufactures' production thus grew sluggishly at 3,3% 
p.a. over 1983-91. Table VII.3.1-1 and Figure VII.3.1-1 summarise these general 
trends in manufactures performance.
Table Vn.3.1-1
Manufacturing Growth and Contribution to Employment and GDP: 1954-92_____________________
Real Annual Growth RatetV Manufacturing Share
__________________________ Manufacturing_____________GDP_______ Employment___________ Output
1954-1960 9.38 10.10 - 5.7
1961-1966 17.85 8.16 - 7.3
1967-1972 2.18 4.06 9.03/ 10.1
1973-1982 16.66 11.89 6.9 13.3
1983-1992 0.77 -0.12 8.1 11.6
Source; Appendix ATV.l for growth and share in output; Department o f Statistics, Industrial Census; Industrial Survey, 
various issues, for employment.
1/At constant 1975 prices.
2 / Period average.
3/ Including mining.
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figu re  Vn.3.1-1 
Index o f M anufacturing Production: 1968-92 
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Source: Calculated from Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Bulletin, various issues.
Notes: The index is a weighted average o f production indices for 18 manufacturing industries, based on 
weights for individual industries as given in above reference. This is different from Central Bank of 
Jordan's index o f industrial production which includes mining industries.
The expansion in manufacturing was experienced over a wide range of industries, 
as can be seen from Table VII.3.1-2 below. The industries with outstanding 
performance during the boom, in terms of growth rates and contribution to growth 
(the addition of total value added attributed to the industry concerned), were: non- 
metallic minerals, tobacco, chemicals, non-electric machinery (although the latter 
started production in 1979, its contribution was equal to that of chemicals at 14%). 
On the other hand, wearing apparel, leather, basic metal, electrical machinery, and 
transport equipment, all of which are labour-intensive in Jordan, experienced 
serious declines.
In the immediate post-boom period 1983-1986 growth patterns for many 
industries were reversed: most industries that had experienced rapid growth during 
the boom performed poorly after it (tobacco, paper, and petroleum) or even 
declined (beverage, footwear, chemicals, and non-electric machinery); while some 
industries that suffered during the boom had exhibited impressive performance 
immediately following the boom (food, textiles, wearing apparel, basic metal, and 
electric machinery). The sector as a whole managed to grow at 4.3% p.a. over 
1983-86. In the following period (1987-1991) the majority of industries experienced 
a real decline, and the value added for the sector declined at 3.3% p.a.. The
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Table VII.3.1-2
Growth & Contribution to Growth of V alue A dded in M anufacturing Industries,
1969-1992
___________________________________ (at constant 1979 prices)__________________________________
Annual Percentage Growth Rates Contribution to Growth I f
1969-73 1974-82 1983-86 1987-91 1969-73 1974-82 1983-91
A ll M anufactures (300) 9.8% 15.8% 4.3% -3.7% 100% 100% 100%
Food products (311-312) 8.2 0.6 15.1 3.7 17.6 0.5 22.4
Beverages (313) 7.2 25.0 -2.7 0.6 1.0 3.5 4.0
Tobacco (314) 2.9 38.6 0.8 -0.5 3.7 15.4 4.5
Textiles (321) 11.4 -0.4 15.4 15.9 8.3 -1.6 13.7
Wearing apparel (322) 11.4 -2.6 9.3 4.3 5.0 1.3 3.7
Leather products (323) 79.2 -20.9 1.4 2.6 10.7 -0.8 2.0
Footwear (324) 79.2 21.4 -18.0 -11.3 3,0 2.6 -4.7
W ood products & furniture (331-332) 79.2 24.5 10.6 -14.5 13.6 3.6 -4.0
Paper & products (341) 2.5 39.7 0.4 -0.4 0.3 5.5 9.9
Printing & publishing (342) 2.5 18.2 13.6 -6.8 0.5 2.3 2.2
Chemical & products (351) 20.5 32.4 -9.0 11.8 5.3 14.2 51.5
Petroleum refining (353) 11.2 9.9 0.0 -28.8 13.9 4.6 3.7
Rubber products (355) 9.8 23.9 11.5 -2.3 0.0 0.3 1.0
Plastic products (356) 9.8 -11.2 0.0 3.3 3.7 3.5 3.4
Non-metallic mineral products (369) 11.2 27.6 4.5 -10.8 9.2 35.1 -34.6
Basic metal products (371-372) 3.4 -6.5 15.3 -5.1 3.4 -3.5 9.4
Fabricated metal (381) -4.1 28.1
Machinery, except electrical (382) 20.3 -44.9 26.6 14.3 -27.7
Machinery, electric (383) 3.4 -7.1 20.6 40.7 0.5 -0.6 12.3
Transport equipment (384) 3.4 -22.0 -10,6 -36.3 0.4 -0.3 -0.9
Source: Department of Statistics (DOS), 'Industrial Census'; 'Industrial Survey’; and 'Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ), M onthly Bulletin, various issues.
N otes: Value added from DOS is available from 1974 onward. Tire 1969-1973 values are extrapolated backward w ith the help  
of 'Industrial Production Index' from CBJ. All values from above sources are given in current prices. For deflation an index of 
w holesale prices w as constructed from CBJ, 'M onthly Bulletin', various issues, see Table AV11.4- (l.a ) in A ppendix AV1I.4.
1 /  A ddition to total value added attributed to the industry, or (V i2 -V il)/{V 2 -V l), w here Vi is value added in industry i, V is 
total value added, and 1& 2 are the end years for the respective period.
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foregoing suggests that manufacturing performance during the boom was the 
outcome of distinct economic conditions, which were apparently reversed in the 
post boom period.
Jordan's manufacturing experience during the boom and post boom periods 
is closer to that of Indonesia than to Nigeria or Iran. Indonesia's manufacturing 
performed well during the boom, albeit under relatively high ERP (66%), and 
sluggishly in the post-boom period, but did not decline. In Nigeria, the 
manufacturing sector expanded at 13.4% p.a. over 1973-82, while it declined very 
rapidly over 1982-84. Struthers (1990) explains this in terms of availability of cheap 
imports in the first period and their scarcity in the second period. In Iran, the 
manufacturing sector grew at 5.9% p.a. in real terms immediately after the first 
boom, and started declining from 1977 onward (Jazayeri, 1988, Table A.9: 173). A 
combination of Dutch disease effects, in terms of rising costs and declining relative 
prices (of tradeables to non-tradeables), led to that outcome. In addition, 
government action augmented the sectoral influence of the boom (ibid).
It is important to note that, performance in the post-boom period 
notwithstanding, all of these industrialising economies experienced 'pro- 
industrialisation' during the boom period rather than 'de-industrialization', which 
runs counter to both what the Dutch disease model envisages, and the experiences 
of industrial booming economies (UK., Holland, and Noiway, for example. See 
Barker and Brailovsky, 1981). It is plausible, therefore, that whether 'pro- 
industrialisation' or 'de-industrialization' takes place under booming conditions 
depends, either directly or indirectly, on per capita income levels and the degree of 
industrialisation at the start of the boom (see chapter El, section III.4).
VII.3.2 Exports Expansion
The expansion of manufacturing output was accompanied by an expansion in 
exports, as can be seen in Figure VII.3.2-1. In 1967, the value of manufactured 
exports amounted to JD 0.5 million (5.5% of total exports), increasing to JD 7.1 
million in 1974 (18% of total exports), and further to JD 86.4 million (51% of 
total exports) in 1982 (Table VII.3.2-1); the annual rate of growth of manufactured 
exports was thus 43% over the boom period 1974-82. In real terms this amounts to 
30.6% p.a., compared with 23.9% p.a. in the pre-boom period of 1970-73, and 
5.0% p.a. in the post-boom period 1983-91 (Table VII.3.2-2).
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Figure VII.3.2-1 
Jordan Manufacturing Output and Exports, 1970-1991
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Source: Department of Statistics, External Trade Statistics; Industrial Survey; and 
Industrial Censuses, various issues.
The expansion of exports was on a broader base than the expansion of output, since 
with the exception of petroleum refining all manufactures experienced export 
growth between 1974-82, for most quite substantially. Thus there is no necessary 
correlation between output growth and export expansion; a notable example being 
food products, whose exports expanded at 30% p.a. while its value added barely 
grew at all. Other such examples include textiles, clothing, basic metal, indicating 
that Jordanian exports may have become more competitive in export markets than 
domestically, perhaps because of bilateral trade agreements.
The largest contributor to export expansion was food products, which alone 
contributed 27.3% to total value of manufactured exports, followed by chemicals, 
whose contribution amounted to 21.3%. Metal products, plastic products and non- 
metallic minerals also contributed substantially to export expansion, and so, but to a 
lesser extent, did wood and tobacco. Like manufactured output, manufactured 
exports experienced serious fluctuations in the post-boom period, especially from 
1983-86; but continued their upward trend nevertheless. The most noticeable 
fluctuations were in construction industries (non-metallic minerals, and wood 
products), beverage, tobacco, clothing and rubber products.
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Table VII.3.2-1
Iordan's Exports of Manufactures; Value and Ratio to Domestic Output, 1970-1991
Value (000 JD, current prices) Proportion of Domestic Output
BTN IS1C 1970 1974 1982 1991 1970 1974 1982 3992
11-21 311-312 Food products 960 1,735 12,351 14,878 0.09 0.12 0.24 0.10
22 313 Beverages 11 36 1,538 3,268 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.09
24 314 Tobacco 520 832 4,912 4,138 0.56 0.24 0.15 0.06
50-59 321 Textiles 145 1,107 2,596 13,664 0.18 0.28 0.26 0.37
42-43 322 Leather products 4 13 2,748 338 0.01 0.01 2.05 0.03
60-62 323 Clothing 90 448 1,132 8378 0.05 0.18 0.14 0.46
64-67 324 Footwear 38 85 751 2,617 0.08 0.14 0.14 0.46
44-46 331-332 Wood products 7 12 5,345 1,246 0.00 0.01 0.39 0.04
47-48 341 Paper & products 241 436 2,982 8,134 0.27 0.43 0.17 0.17
49 342 Printing & publishing 10 6 405 146 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.01
28-38 351 Chemical products 302 1,178 22,923 162385 0.18 0.31 0.45 0.65
27 353 Petroleum refining 11 232 29 22 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
40 355 Rubber products 2 31 25 50 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.02
39 356 Plastic products 30 161 6,870 17,339 0.04 0.15 0.53 0.36
68-71 369 Non-metailic mineral products 31 73 8,421 8,013 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.06
73-81 371-372 Metals & products 15 144 9,971 15,675 0.00 0.02 0.37 0.18
82-83 381 Metal manufactures 1 7 120 480 0.06 0.08
84 382 Machinery, non-electric 1 45 2,038 5,091 0.59 0.43 0.33 0.09
85 383 Electric machinery 304 542 449 1,677 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.39
86-89 384 Transport equipment 0 0 782 676
Total Manufactured Exports 2,737 7,121 86,388 268,414 0.04 0.12 0.13 0.20
Total National Exports 9,320 39,438 185,581 598,627
Ratio of Manufactured to total Exports 0.29 0.18 0.51 0.62
5ource. Departm ent nf Statistics, 1970-1991, 'External Trade Statistics' for exports; Industrial Survey and Industrial Censuses, various issues for output.
Table VII.3.2-2
Iordan's Export of Manufactures (constant 1979 prices)
BTN 1SIC
Annual Percentage Growth Rates (exponential) Contribution to Growth 1 /
1970-73 1974-82 1983-86 1987-91 1970-73 1974-82 1983- 86 1987-91
11-21 311-312 Food products 19.2 31.5 (9.2) 21.9 33.1 27.3 (217.2) 5.7
22 313 Beverages (42.8) 25.6 (33.5) 117.4 (0-3) 2.1 (3-2) 3,0
24 314 Tobacco 27.4 25.2 (39.9) (15.8) 12.5 5.2 (40.4) (2.3)
50-59 321 Textiles 44,6 13.9 (14.2) 11.4 6.3 2.2 (30.9) 9.2
42-43 322 Leather products 164.7 75.6 (9.1) 10.7 5.9 2.7 (0.4) 0.1
60-62 323 Clothing (8.4) 17.8 (22.7) 23.6 (0.6) 0.4 (15.6) 3.2
64-67 324 Footwear (3.7) 3.9 (6.3) 27.1 (0.3) 0.1 0.3 1.9
44-46 331-332 Wood products (6.4) 114.1 (25.1) 14.7 0.0 5.7 (21.0) 1.7
47-48 341 Paper & products 0.1 10.3 24.5 (8.9) 0.1 1.6 16.1 (2-1)
49 342 Printing & publishing (14.2) 54.2 31.5 (22.3) (0.4) 1.1 5.0 (0.8)
28-38 351 Chemical products 9.0 43.6 26.2 7.0 1.7 21.3 449.1 50.9
27 353 Petroleum refining 59.4 (49.2) 11.9 (51.0) 11.6 (1-3) 0.2 (0.1)
40 355 Rubber products 120.2 2.0 (25.9) 53.6 0.4 0.0 (0.1) 0.1
39 356 Plastic products (16.3) 35.7 (0.3) (8.2) (0.2) 9.3 10.7 (9.7)
68-71 369 Non-metallic mineral products (24.6) 74.3 (34.0) 44.5 (1.7) 8.9 (48.3) 20.1
73-81 371-372 Metals & products 85.8 52.2 (2.1) 3.5 3.3 10.7 (0.3) 0.8
82-83 381 Metal manufactures 115.6 39.5 42.8 4.7 0.2 0.1 1.6 0.0
84 382 Machinery, non-electric 385.6 52,7 (10.5) 70.7 6.0 2.1 (3.2) 13.5
85 383 Electric machinery (13-7) 11.0 63.9 47.6 (2.8) (0.3) 5.4 3.4
86-89 384 Transport equipment (34.3) 27.6 (7.8) 1.3
300 Total manufacturing 23.9 30.6 3.2 8.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Departm ent of Statistics (DOS), 1970*1992, 'External Trade Statistics'; Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ)> Monthly Bulletin, various issues 
Note Current price exports from above sources are deflated by unit export value series constructed from DOS and CBJ. See note 20 for melhodnlony 
1 /  Addition to total value of exports attributed to the industry, o r (Xi2*Xil)/(X2-Xl), w here Xi is value of exports in industry i, X is value of total exports, and 1 & 2
are end years tn the period considered
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The expansion of manufacturing exports at twice the speed at which their 
domestic value added grew during the boom led to a rapid change in the status of 
exports, from that of a minor activity accounting for only 4% of manufactures' 
output in 1970 to that of a significant aspect of the national economy accounting for 
15% of manufacturing output in 1982 (this was further increased to 28% in 1991).
From the mid seventies to 1978, manufactured exports received their main 
impetus from the booming oil-exporting Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia 
(which imported nearly one-half of the total), while from the late seventies to the 
early eighties the most dynamic factor was the steep increase in exports to Iraq, 
which accounted for 46% of Jordan's total manufacturing exports as compared with 
only 9% in 1977 (World Bank, 1983b: 4). On average, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and 
Syria accounted for nearly 80% of Jordan's manufacturing exports during the boom 
period in Jordan (Department of Statistics, External Trade Statistics, various 
issues).
The sudden increase in Iraqi demand for Jordanian exports9 was more a 
result of its war with Iran than the oil boom itself (Iraq’s use of Jordan as a transit 
route for its trade was rewarded by increasing imports from Jordan). Nevertheless, 
the impetus this demand gave to Jordanian exports had a profound impact on the 
structure of industrial production, and in fact many enterprises were created in the 
late seventies and early eighties, either as joint ventures between the Jordanian and 
Iraqi governments or on private initiative, for the sole purpose of serving the Iraqi 
market. Iraq's financial difficulties after 1982, combined with the end of the oil 
boom which had financed a large part of Iraq's war machine, led to a real decline in 
Jordanian exports in 1984. The coming on stream of additional capacity in a large 
number of industrial firms (e.g. paints, aluminium profiles, glass) coincided with 
the collapse of these markets, resulting in low profitability and widespread capacity 
under-utilization (World Bank, 1988: 10).
The special ties Jordan had with Iraq during the second oil boom 
notwithstanding, the performance of Jordanian exports reflects increased 
competitiveness. This remains the case despite the fact that Jordan has a locational 
advantage, and had entered into trade agreements giving Jordanian manufactures 
preferential treatment in these two and other Arab countries. Since these agreements 
had been signed in the fifties and sixties and did not change in nature during the
^From JD 3.4 million in 1978 Jordanian exports to Iraq rose to JD 12.7 million in 1979, of which JD 
11 million (78%) were manufactures (Department of Statistics, External Trade statistics, various 
issues).
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boom period, they cannot be considered a variable determining export performance, 
although they undoubtedly boosted Jordan's position in these markets.
VII.3.3 Import Substitution
To more accurately reflect the impact of the boom on Jordan's trading position, 
import substitution must also be considered. Import substitution can be measured as 
a change in the ratio of imports to total available supplies a la Chenery (1960), i.e.
TCX M 2 M\
1- 2 = -----------
Si Si
where M  and S  stand for imports and total supply respectively, and total supply in 
turn equals domestic production Q plus imports M: S = (Q +  M). Subscripts 1 and 
2 denote successive time periods.10
The results of import substitution calculations can be traced in Table 
VII.3.3-1, which shows that the reverse of import substitution took place, i.e. there 
was increased import penetration, by 13% between 1974-82 (or 1.6% p.a.), 
although some industries (beverages, tobacco, rubber products, paper products, and 
non-electric machinery) succeeded in substituting imports. The increased import 
penetration for the sector as a whole is hardly surprising given the liberalisation of 
trade that had taken place in the mid-seventies, the currency appreciation by 17%
measure of import substitution that accounts for spill-over effects upon the rest of the economy 
from imports would be based on input-output tables as follows: define M, Q and S as above, let A be the 
relevant input-output matrix for the period and I be the identity' matrix, so that:
[ I - A ] Q + M  =S 
Q + [ l - A ] ”1 M =[ l -A]"1 S
1  ^ 1
calling [ I - A ] “ M the new vector of redefined imports M and [ i - A ]  S the new vector of total 
supply S*, import substitution of good i is then computed as:
* * 
M. M,
IS . = i -11 sf: #s. s. i 
1 1 - 1
Input-output tables for Jordan are available for 1967 (from Department of Statistics, 1967), 1979 (from 
Dar Al-Handasah, 1982b) and for 1987 (Ministry of Planning, 1992). However, the treatment of imports 
in each of these tables is different, insofar as they are considered as perfect substitutes for domestic 
output or uncompetitive. Furthermore, the 1979 tables are given in purchaser's prices, rather than 
producers' prices, which further reduces their comparability with the other tables. This has prevented the 
use of the above described methodology in calculating import substitution.
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Table VII.3.3-1
Annual Growth Rates of Import Substitution in Manufacturing Industries,
1974-19911/
1970-73 1974-82 1983-91
F ood  p rod u cts -1.61 2.74 -1.68
B everages 9.73 -2.38 -8.80
T obacco -3.62 -8.07 -6.12
T extiles 1.07 2.27 0.35
W earin g  apparel 1.69 2.43 0.12
L eather p rod u cts -11.62 39.16 -10.47
F ootw ear -21.21 0.87 7.58
Furniture, and  w o o d  produ cts 5.14 4.12 -2.40
Paper and p rod u cts -3.73 -1.72 0.23
P rin ting a n d  p u b lish in g 12.22 2.19 -2.88
Industrial chem ica ls 0.76 2.05 -11.71
P etro leu m  refin in g -1.43 6.70 -0.23
R ubber p rod u cts 0.68 -0.34 -0.23
P lastic produ cts -9.46 6.70 0.90
N o n -m eta llic  m in erals -0.90 1.24 -1.93
Basic m etal p rod u cts -1.67 4.18 -1.79
M ach inery, non -electrical 3.30 -0 .52 1.27
M ach inery, e lectrical 1.03 0.29 -1.70
T ransport eq u ip m en t 10.55 0.40 -0.05
T ota l M a n u fa ctu r in g 0.04 1.57 1.23
Source: Department of Statistics, 'External Trade Statistics', various issues, for imports & exports; 'Industrial Survey'; 
'Industrial Census', various issues, for output
1 /  A negative sign indicates that import substitution has taken place. See text for methodology.
Table VII.3.3-2
Jordan Net Trade Balance of Manufactured Products, 1974-1991
1974-84 1984-91
F ood prod u cts -19,694 -67,621
B everages -1,270 2,273
T obacco -2,166 -1,820
T extiles -17,611 -36,867
W earing apparel -8,460 -8,834
Leather p rod u cts -1,284 762
F ootw ear -4,100 4,291
Furniture, and w o o d  produ cts -7,126 -22,846
Paper and  p rod u cts -9,810 -25,928
P rin ting and p u b lish in g -6,310 433
Industrial ch em ica ls 23,190 74,778
P etroleum  refin in g -208,450 -33,746
R ubber p rod u cts -10,370 -13,140
Plastic p rod u cts -12,897 -25,071
N o n -m eta llic  m in eral p rod u ct -56,007 36,802
B asic m etal p rod u cts -61,699 -31,963
M ach inery , non -electrical 3,245 -89,772
M ach inery, electrical -45,129 10,509
T ransport eq u ip m en t -75,605 -58,361
O th er m an u factu res -37,559 1,692
T ota l M a n u fa ctu red  Exports -564,290 -290,173
Source: Department of Statistics, External Trade Statistics’, various issues.
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between 1972-78, and the abundance of foreign exchange which made imports 
more readily available in the economy. In view of the fact that no import 
substitution took place in the pre-boom period, despite the relatively high protection 
offered to industrial production during that period, the boom's low rate of import 
penetration may be considered an achievement. If this proposition is accepted, it 
follows that domestic producers maintained, if not increased, competitiveness under 
adverse booming conditions.
A close examination of the manufactured trade balance (Table VII.3.3-2) 
shows that the most significant increase in deficit over 1974-82 occurred in capital 
goods (non-metallic minerals, metal products, transport equipment and electric 
machinery) which accounted for 66% of the manufactures trade deficit, against 
43% in the pre-boom period. This is to be expected because Jordan was going 
through a rapid process of industrialisation, while her technological abilities in 
producing capital goods were still limited. The weak and rudimentary inter-industry 
linkages that ruled out the production of capital goods were the result of Jordan's 
dependence on a small number of export markets, coupled with a narrow range of 
domestic product lines, mainly concentrated in engineering and construction 
material. Structural weaknesses in manufacturing became more apparent from 1983 
onward, when Gulf markets began to be adversely affected by the rapid decline in 
oil prices.
Thus far it has been shown that domestic output and exports of 
manufacturing grew substantially during the boom period in Jordan, while import 
substitution declined relatively slowly. In part II a quantitative account of the 
sector's growth in terms of factor input and total factor productivity is given, 
followed by an investigation of the sources of productivity growth.
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PART II
VII.4 Factor Input and Total Factor Productivity
VII.4.1 Factor Input
Labour
Our examination of the Jordanian labour market in sections IV.2.1 and V.3.1 has 
shown its most salient features to be: (1) a substantial resource movement - 
labour out-migration - immediately following the first oil boom, especially of 
highly skilled labour; (2) a rapid labour absorption in all sectors during the 
period 1973-75 (6.9%) which, combined with labour out-migration, lead to a 
rapid decline in unemployment from 14% in 1972 to 1.6% in 1976; and (3) an 
inflow of foreign labour, mostly unskilled, from the late seventies. The boom has 
thus had two opposing effects on labour input; on the one hand the increase in 
economic activity increased labour input quantitatively, notwithstanding labour 
out-migration since the economy started from excess supply of labour 
conditions and, on the other hand, the boom and the consequent labour 
migration led to a slower growth in the quality of labour than would have been 
expected given the rapid increase in education. This is evidenced from the more 
rapid increase in the percentage of highly educated and highly skilled labour 
among the out-migrating labour than among Jordanian labour working within 
Jordan; while the same percentage for in-migrating labour declined (Tables
V.3.1.2-2 and IV.3.1.2-3). It is believed that the industrial sector suffered most 
from the latter effect (Al-Akel, 1985). However data available on labour supply 
in Jordan do not allow adjustments for quality.
Labour input to manufacturing is shown in Figure VII.4.1-1 and growth 
rates between benchmark years in Table VII.4.1-1.11 The most rapid absorption 
of labour occurred during the oil boom period 1974-82 at 11.3% p.a., which is 
accounted for by a large number of small labour-intensive industries (food, 
clothing, wood and furniture, rubber products, etc.), and a small number
H lh e  figures for growth of labour in manufacturing in the above referred to Table (from 
Department of Statistics - DOS - Industrial Survey; Industrial Census, various issues) are not 
entirely in agreement with Table (IV.2.1.2-2) which uses a different data base (Royal Scientific 
Society - RSS - 1989). For manufacturing, it is highly likely that DOS is a more reliable source 
that RSS - RSS w as used as a source in chapters IV & V for com prehensivenesss since it covers 
the w hole econom y, and no adjustment for labour in manufacturing w as attempted then as it 
w ould have lead to internal inconsistency in the data base.
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Table VII.4.1-1 
G rowth o f labour In M anufacturing Industries
(A nnual p ercen tage  g row th  rates, by  num ber)
1969-1973 1974-7982 7983-1991
Food products -2.5% 12.8% 9.9%
Beverages 10.0 7.6 -5.5
Tobacco -1.7 3.1 7,3
Textiles -4.5 -2.6 4.2
Wearing apparel 3.9 11.4 2.4
Leather products -3.7 -1.4 2.1
Footwear 2.5 3.3 5.3
Furniture & Wood 6.8 7.2 1.7
Paper and products 3.7 10.2 7.0
Printing & publishing -2.7 8.0 3.1
Industrial chemicals 15.7 22.4 5.2
Petroleum refining 6.7 6.7 2.8
Rubber products 9.1 11.2 107.4
Plastic products 9.3 8.8
Non-m etallic minerals 7.7 11.5 3.7
Basic metal products 7.5 9.2 -0.5
Machinery -0,8 38.3 -26.9
Transport equipm ent 20.1 9.7 40.0
A ll M anufacturing 3.3 11.3 6.6
Source: D ep artm en t of S ta tistics, 'In d u s tria l C ensus'; 'Ind  ustriai Su rvey1 
v arious issues
Table VII.4.1-2 
Growth o f Fixed Capital in  M anufacturing Industries
(A nnual p ercen ta g e  g ro w th  ra tes, at constan t 19S4 prices)
7969-7973 1974-1982 7983-7997
Food products 36.3% 10.9% 16.2%
Beverages 17,3 13.4 -0.9
Tobacco 10.8 5.8 -10.6
Textiles 3.9 10.5 2.5
Wearing apparel 43.2 15.7 8.0
Leather products 4.0 7.8 10.6
Footwear 2.1 30.9 3.8
Furniture & Wood 5.7 15.7 -3.1
Paper and products 2.2 25.7 7.3
Printing & publishing 19.6 9.5 9.9
Industrial chemicals -2.4 33.2 -8.8
Petroleum refining 36.7 19.1 5.8
Rubber products 18.9 7.2 23.0
Plastic products 0.0 13.6 3.4
Non-m etallic minerals 3.6 11.2 9.7
Basic metal products 8.7 14.5 -4.7
Machinery 16.2 58.7 -9.0
Transport equipment 12.7 19.1 19.6
All M anufacturing 9.3 17.4 4.2
excluding N R ls 1/ 10.5 15.9 5,5
Source Ibid
1 /  C hem icals, pe tro leu m  refin ing  and  n on-m eta llic  m inera ls
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of very large capital-intensive projects (non-metallic minerals, and fertilisers - 
under industrial chemicals).
Capital
The concept of capital stock (K) here used is total fixed assets at constant prices, 
net of depreciation (to give greater relative weight to investment of more recent 
date).12 Annual data relating to accumulation of capital as defined are charted in 
Figure VII.4.1-2, and the corresponding annual growth rates in Figure VII.4.1-3. 
Growth rates between benchmark years are given in Table VII.4.1-2. A 
comparison of the boom period with earlier and following periods yields two 
outstanding conclusions: (1) the growth rate of the fixed capital stock in the 
boom period was markedly higher than in other periods, and (2), within the 
boom period, there was a pronounced acceleration from 1979 which spilled over 
the post-boom period as it continued up to 1984. The high rate of investment in 
manufacturing has to be viewed against the background of the pre-boom 
period, when investment was low (due to political instability). Nevertheless, 
taking the entire period 1968-91, the growth rate of capital during 1979-84 
remains higher than any other period, suggesting it was not a catching-up 
phenomenon since it has no historical parallel.
^ C ap ita l stock in manufacturing w as obtained from the Department of Statistics (DOS). The 
value of capital stock for 1974-91 is published in Industrial Survey; Industrial Census; and 
Statistical Yearbook, various issues. For 1968-73 capital stock was obtained from unpublished  
records of DOS. In all these sources capital stock is given in current prices. Deflating capital to 
constant prices proved difficult as DOS evaluates total fixed assets as beginning of the year 
assets plus net additions to capital (purchased assets, plus assets of ow n account, plus 
im provem ents m inus sold assets) during the year with depreciation netted out. The difficulty 
stems from estimating beginning of the year value of an asset as book value at purchase time, 
rather than take dow n time. Converting this book value to a m eaningful m easure of capital stock 
is what usually gives rise to erroneous estimates of physical capital in general, since total stock of 
capital is com posed of assets of different vintages. To overcome the problem, I took the year 1979 
as a base year as it is a m iddle point in the span of time for which capital stock is considered  
(1968-1991) and also because it is a census year. Total fixed assets for 1979 were then considered 
to reflect capital stock in current prices for that year, I then deflated net fixed capital formation to 
1979 prices and added and subtracted it forward and backward to obtain an estimate for the 
capital stock for the remaining years. The method follows directly from DOS's procedure in 
estim ating capital stock as can be seen from the following formula:
Cl—</),,Kn = Ko + ------
0 + / )
where K is capital stock, 0 and n represent base year and current year respectively, I is 
investm ent, d is depreciation and / i s  inflation rate.
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Rather, it is the conditions of the boom that are responsible for the rapid 
capital accumulation. Most important perhaps is the negative cost of borrowing, 
as the Central Bank of Jordan fixed interest on investment loans at 9%, while 
inflation averaged 10.5% over 1970-82 yielding a negative real lending rate of - 
1.5%; compared with +6.0% over 1983-87 (Table IV.2.2.2-1). The second factor 
responsible for thq rapid capital build-up is the large inflow of funds from the 
Gulf for the private sector (remittances) and the public sector (Arab Aid). Both 
sources made investible funds readily available in the economy which 
previously suffered from an investment gap. Furthermore, since these funds 
were in foreign currency, the boom also relieved a foreign exchange gap thus 
enabling the import of capital goods that Jordan does not produce. Finally, the 
accumulation of foreign exchange increased Jordan’s creditworthiness, which 
allowed the escalation of an already high level of foreign borrowing, making 
investible funds even more available. The latter factor is important in explaining 
investment behaviour in Jordan since all the borrowing was made by the 
government which did not necessarily follow market signals in making 
investment decisions. For example, whilst signs of demand slackening were 
visible as early as 1981/82 heavy investment continued in late 1984. The 
influence of government investment behaviour on capital accumulation can be 
seen from the high concentration of gross fixed capital formation in natural 
resource based industries (NRI), which are largely government financed; three 
NRI industries (chemicals, non-metallic minerals, and petroleum refining) 
accounted for 72% of total gross fixed capital formation in manufacturing over 
the period 1974-84 (see Figure VII.4.1-2). Petroleum refining is a monopoly in 
which the government holds shares, and both chemicals and non-metallic 
minerals are dominated by one capital-intensive, government-owned enterprise, 
viz. fertilisers for chemicals and cement for non-metallic minerals.
The measures of physical capital discussed above relate to capital stock, 
and not capital in use, unlike the measure of labour input.13 There are no 
continuous statistical series on the degree of utilization comparable to the 
unemployment percentage for labour. Therefore total factor productivity (TFP) 
as I calculate it should be interpreted to account for changes in capital 
utilization, since the latter is not included in total factor input (TFI).
l^For a discussion of the utilization of capital and a differentiation between economic and 
physical utilization see M atthews et ah, 1982:151-9.
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VII.4.2 Total Factor Productivity
The advantage of TFP over partial productivity measurement, which lies in its 
comprehensiveness, has already been mentioned in chapter IV when the 
economy's performance was assessed. For manufacturing, the case is equally 
strong: growth in capital exceeded that of labour by 6% p.a. over the boom 
period which would have necessarily meant a rapid growth in labour 
productivity (since output was expanding at least as fast as labour); yet, that 
growth partly reflects a rising capital-labour ratio rather than productivity 
increases (Figure VTI.4.2-1). Furthermore, the exceptionally high rate at which 
capital grew might have undermined capital productivity because of 
organisational problems, and because of difficulties in choosing technology (see 
Al-Handasah, 1982a). This was further exacerbated by the serious shortages of 
skills from out-migration, mainly engineers, but also managers and skilled 
manual labour. With in-migration consisting mainly of - unskilled and semi­
skilled labour, less skills were available to deal with more sophisticated 
machines.14 Thus a true measure of productivity should reflect both labour and 
capital productivity, which is captured by TFP, or output per unit of input.
Figure VII.4.2-1
Labour Productivity, Capital Productivity and Capital-Labour 
Ratio in Manufacturing Industries
300
250 -■
/  \  
'Capital-Labour Ratio200  -
'L a b o u rjjro d u c tiv ity
150 -
100
Source: Department of Statistics, Industrial Survey and Industrial Censuses, various issues.
l^It is argued som etim es that mechanization requires less skills than m anual work. Although  
this may be true of some processes, in the majority of Jordanian industries, scarcity of managers 
and of skilled manual labour was a serious constraint on the effectiveness of technology transfer 
in the boom  period (see Al-Handasah 1982a for a detailed discussion based on a 74-firm survey).
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MA fully comprehensive measure of TFI would include inputs of all scarce 
resources, direct and indirect (i.e. embracing all externalities and unintended by­
products, insofar as they affected measured output). The rate of growth of TFI, 
so defined, would be little if at all lower than the rate of growth of output" 
(Matthews, et al. 1982: 200). Any positive value for growth in TFP must then be 
held to be due to either errors of measurement, or to increases in output due to 
the borrowing of innovations that were ultimately traceable to inputs of scarce 
resources in other countries than the country in question. Since a statistical 
estimation of TFI in its fullest sense is not a practical proposition, more 
restricted measures of TFI have to be used, and the lines of demarcation 
between TFI and TFP are bound to be to some extent arbitrary (ibid: 201). The 
most elaborate use of TFP concept, as presented above, is Denison's (1967), who 
was able to account for 23 sources of American growth over 1950-1962, 
including change in age-sex composition of labour, education, hours worked, 
advances of knowledge, economies of scale, cyclical effect of demand, and 
improved allocation of resources. Other economists like Jorgenson and Griliches 
have adjusted not only for labour but also capital inputs for efficiency changes 
and thus have further narrowed the residual (Kendrick 1977:18).
Kendrick (ibid), on the other hand, has taken a different position. Instead 
of adjusting inputs for quality or efficiency to narrow 'the measure of our 
ignorance', he measures inputs unadjusted so that the residual brackets the 
entire change in productive efficiency. He then tries to quantify all the variables 
that explain productivity change. I will adopt Kendrick's approach for two 
reasons. One is convenience, since no data on input quality or the efficiency of 
their use are available. Second, and more to the point, given that my objective is 
not to quantify TFP as such, but rather to show the effect of the boom conditions 
on changes in its value, I would like to capture all boom-related changes, 
especially those of production efficiency, in the residual. I will then try to 
decompose this residual to show the different components of productivity 
change and, when possible, their order of magnitude.
In estimating TFP in manufacturing industries in Jordan, I first attempted 
an econometric approach but problems of choosing the mathematical form of 
the production function soon arose, and the econometric fitting of production 
functions exhibited marked instability in the face of minor modifications in data, 
specification, and observation period. I decided to stay as unspecific as possible 
in respect of the form of production function and just calculate TFP using the
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growth account technique a la Matthews et al (1982), which corresponds to that 
used by Solow (1971), adapted for changes in discrete time instead of 
instantaneous rates of change. This is expressed in the following formula which 
decomposes output growth into the growth TFI and the growth of TFP:
where the circumflexes denote the average annual rate of change between two 
benchmark years, p is TFP,/ is TFI, q is output, I is labour, k is capital, and a is a 
weighting term, taken as equal to the average share of labour in income for the 
period considered.
Matthews' et at. (ibid) justification for this growth account approach is 
based on macro-economic and other grounds, since 'the growth accounting 
method involves saying "let us see what remains unexplained if we assume that 
in the base year the factors of production, as defined, are paid the value of their 
marginal product", rather than asking "what remains unexplained if we assume 
that the production function at any time is q = (0.25 k'0J + 0.75 I0-75)'1-4?" (202). 
Moreover, Matthews et al. argue, in making comparisons between periods using 
the growth accounting method, that it can readily be seen whether differences in 
TFP growth are the result of differences in output growth, or in the growth of 
one or more of the inputs, or in first year factor shares. This would not be true of 
a more complicated system (ibid). Nevertheless, the growth account method still 
assumes certain properties for the production function: constant returns to scale; 
homogeneous labour and capital; growth in TFI and TFP mutually independent; 
marginal productivity pricing; and no discontinuities (ibid: 203; Krueger and 
Tuncer, 1980 Nishimizu and Page, 1982). The appropriateness of these 
assumptions is discussed in a considerable body of literature, and I need not 
repeat the discussions here. Griliches (1971) has criticised the growth account 
method on the grounds that the underlying production function is not a stable 
function, since there are large unexplained shifts in it; this should be interpreted, 
according to Griliches, as measurement errors, rather than technological change. 
(Interestingly, Griliches' suggested alternative econometric approach accounts 
for differences between inputs and output entirely in terms of changes in quality 
of inputs and economies of scale). However, as Pack (1988) has observed, 
despite the imperfections in the measurement of TFP growth, sustained learning 
at an industry-wide level should be reflected in the growth of measured TFP 
(Ahluwalia, 1991: 35). The absence of an alternative framework for analysing the
A  A  /i
p = q - f
g = cl.I + ( \ -a ) .k
a )
(2)
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issues of growth and productivity makes it necessary for us to analyse the trend 
in TFP, while recognising the limitations imposed by the methodological 
framework (ibid).
I have estimated TFP at both two-digit manufacturing level using 
officially published data, and at firm level using data I gathered for ten firms in 
the process of conducting a survey that forms an integral part of this study. The 
two sets of TFP measurements are presented in Tables VII.4.2-1 and VII.4.2-2. 
Details of the methodology and measurement are given in Appendix AVII.l.
In my calculations of TFI in two-digit manufacturing industries I did not 
include raw materials because of data unavailability. However, at the firm level 
material was included as an input, since the differing conditions of foreign 
exchange abundance and currency value during the boom period compared 
with the pre- and post-boom periods are expected to influence the availability 
and quality of imported material input, and consequently productivity 
(especially after the devaluation by 50% of the Jordanian Dinar in 1988). Of 
course, the inclusion of raw material in TFI meant that the measured output was 
gross of raw material.
At the firm level, in seven firms out of ten TFP was positive for the 1974- 
82 period, and in six it was both positive and significant.15 In Jordan Dairies and 
Arab Pharmaceuticals the negative value was due to very rapid capital build­
up. Thus despite the exceptionally high growth rates of output (17% p.a. in 
Dairies and 14% p.a. in Pharmaceuticals), the abnormally high growth rate of 
capital especially in the former (44% p.a.) but also in the latter (22% p.a.) gave 
negative TFP.
In the post-boom period most firms that experienced positive TFP during 
the boom continued to exhibit positive and significant TFP, with the exception 
of Fabricated Aluminium and Society Publishing. Jordan Dairies continued to 
have negative TFP indicating inefficient use of resources, while Arab 
Pharmaceuticals' negative TFP during the boom turned positive and significant 
in the post-boom period.
At the two-digit level the sector as a whole experienced 0.5% p.a. growth 
in TFP over the boom period 1974-82, compared with a decline of 0.7% p.a. in
l5The pre-boom period was one of major political upheaval, and its results will therefore not be
discussed.
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the pre-boom period and of 3.4% p.a. in the post-boom period. In the boom 
period, almost all industries that experienced a very high growth rate of output 
also experienced a substantial growth in TFP: beverage 13.5% p.a., tobacco 
33.2% p.a., wood and furniture 11.6% p.a., paper 21.2% p.a., printing and 
publishing 10.2% p.a., rubber products 14.2% p.a., and non-metallic minerals 
16.1% p.a.. These values may seem unreasonably high, but, obviously, output 
growth in all these industries was even higher. Furthermore, remembering that 
capacity utilization is unaccounted for in TFI, and that idle capacity in the pre­
boom period was substantial (see next section), TFP is expected to be very high 
to reflect increases in capacity utilization. Conversely, those industries whose 
output declined during the boom (clothing, leather, basic metal and transport 
equipment) or almost stagnated (food products and textiles) experienced a rapid 
decline in TFP. There are few exceptions to this rule of association between 
output growth and productivity growth, notable amongst them are footwear 
whose output grew at 21.4% p.a. but TFP declined at 0.2% p.a.; and petroleum 
refining whose output grew at 9.9% p.a. and TFP declined at 3.9% p.a.. It is also 
worth noting the performance of machinery and chemicals whose TFP growth 
(1.4% p.a. and 4.5% p.a., respectively) was not commensurate with growth in 
output (52.3% p.a. and 32.4% p.a., respectively (it is interesting to compare the 
result for the chemicals industry with that of Arab Pharmaceuticals firm, whose 
TFP declined because of the excess of capital input at 44% p.a. over output 
growth at 14% p.a. It is worth noting that Arab Pharmaceuticals controls a large 
share of the pharmaceuticals market, which itself, until 1982 when fertiliser 
production commenced, dominated industrial output).
Our conclusion thus far is that productivity increases in those industries 
that experienced rapid growth in output during the boom were substantial, 
which may explain their ability to resist a squeeze on profits stemming from 
adverse relative price movement and wage rises. This will be further 
investigated in section VII.5 which addresses relative price movement and 
profitability. The question addressed in the following section is whether 
productivity growth was related to the boom conditions, or whether it was 
more autonomous.
VII.4.3 Sources of Productivity Growth
Many hypotheses have been advanced in the literature on the possible sources 
of TFP growth, including output growth, trade liberalisation, relieving the
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foreign exchange constraint, and economies of scale. These hypotheses are not 
mutually exclusive; they may all be true, and the postulated effects need not be 
independent of one another.
To investigate which of these hypotheses is relevant to manufacturing in 
Jordan, I ran a simple correlation analysis on sixteen variables; this included, in 
addition to TFP growth: growth in output (to test Verdoorn's law), growth in 
factor inputs (to test for economies of scale), and the proportion of output 
exported and export expansion (to test the trade liberalisation hypothesis). In 
addition, I included relative prices (of tradeables to non-tradeables), wage levels 
and wage rises, the import content of total cost, and factor intensities, to test the 
Dutch disease hypothesis of possible links between these variables and output 
growth. The results are given in Appendix AVII.2 with a discussion of the 
correlations' most salient features. Although it is not possible to discriminate 
finely among these hypotheses using such simple correlations, or indeed to 
determine the direction of causation, they should indicate areas meriting further 
investigation.
The most remarkable aspect of Table AVII.2-2 in Appendix AVIL2, which 
gives within-period correlation between 18 manufacturing industries for the 
boom, pre- and post-boom periods, is the existence of strong correlation 
between growth in productivity (both labour productivity and TFP) and output; 
and the lack of correlation between productivity growth and any other aspect 
investigated. The same is true for growth in output, which does not seem to be 
influenced by wage levels, wage rises, capital intensities and the import content 
of total cost, all of which have been suggested, explicitly or implicitly, by the 
Dutch disease hypothesis as explanatory of tradeables1 performance.
This finding supports the existence of dynamic economies of scale 
associated with output expansion, or, in other words, that Verdoorn's law is 
operable. The law states that there is a positive and linear relationship between 
productivity growth p and output growth q (a view that is strongly supported 
by Kaldor 1966; 1975). Mathematically, this can be expressed as:
p = a  + p.g
where a  and P are constants, and p >0. Estimating P by OLS regression of 
p and q for pooled data (for 18 industries and across three periods as given in
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Table VTL4.2-2 above) gave the following results:
p = -5.58 + 0.819 q
(2.58) (0.075) R2 = 0.645
With R2 = 0.645 and the t value = 10.9, a significant relationship between output 
and productivity can be said to exist, which further supports Verdoorn's law in 
the context of Jordanian manufacturing.16
Which way the causation runs, from output to productivity or the other 
way round, is a subject of intense debate in the literature (see the exchange 
between Rowthom and Kaldor in Economic Journal 1975; Matthews et al, 1982: 
276). It is difficult to accept Kaldor’s proposition that growth in output can be 
exogenous, except when there are peculiar features to the period in question 
(Rowthorn, 1975). Such features certainly existed for Jordan over 1974-82, 
namely the boom conditions, which were exogenous to the Jordanian economy. 
Nevertheless, that productivity growth in turn did not influence output growth 
is hardly a tenable position. Productivity increases raise output not only 
through their effect on relative prices and demand, but also through making 
exports more competitive; through increasing profits, ceteris paribus, and causing 
firms to invest more; and, through stimulating domestic demand for industrial 
goods, by making them relatively cheaper (ibid). Under these circumstances, 
the effect of dynamic economies of scale cannot be identified from a single­
equation model, and what is required is a simultaneous model (ibid), "though 
whether one could be constructed satisfactorily for comparisons over a long 
period of time is problematical" (Matthews et al: 982).
The strong correlation between output growth and productivity change 
in Jordan is more readily understandable when we examine the level of 
domestic demand and the constraints it placed on the utilization of productive 
capacity, and on the efficiency of production in general in the pre- and post­
boom periods. On the eve of the first oil boom the population of Jordan was 1.83 
million people, and current GNP per capita (at market prices) was only JD 132.0 
($ 395.9); it had risen to JD 708.12 ($ 2,124.3) by 1983, which amounted to an
16Lest these results are spurious because of errors in measuring TFP, (3 was estimated again 
using labour productivity, for which more reliable data exist. The results were as follows: (3 = 
0.632, Rl = 0.6446 and t value = 7.79; the fit is reduced but R  ^ and t are still sufficiently good to 
convey som ething significant between output growth and productivity growth.
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annual increase of 7,4% in real terms; but only to JD 789.7 ($ 1,128.1)17 by 1992, 
which amounted to an annual decline of 5.4% in real terms. The constraint on 
growth caused by small market conditions is well recognised in economic 
development literature, and leads many economists to advocate export 
expansion as a growth strategy since it relieves this particular constraint on 
production and allows for economies of scale. This condition was present in the 
Jordanian economy from 1974, as the boom presented the opportunity for 
manufacturers to expand beyond national boundaries when incomes in 
neighbouring oil-exporting countries rose at much higher rates than in Jordan. 
The similarity of tastes, language and customs between Jordan and the Arab 
Gulf states, combined with bilateral trade agreements with these states giving 
Jordanian exporters preferential treatment, significantly reduced barriers to 
product markets in Jordan imposed by borders; this explains the export growth 
of 30.6% p.a. in real terms, and the consequent rapid enlargement of product 
markets. The potential effect of cyclical changes in demand on productivity 
growth should thus be apparent, since the rates of utilization of fixed plant and 
overhead labour as output rises or falls significantly influence productivity, by 
changing production efficiency.
That resources were under-utilised in the pre-boom and post-boom 
periods in the Jordanian economy is supported by unemployment figures (the 
unemployment rate was 14% in 1972,1.6% in 1976, 6% in 1986 and 17% in 1992). 
In manufacturing, the 1970 Industrial Survey (Department of Statistics, 1971) 
revealed idle capacity of fixed plant and machinery to be of substantial 
proportions in most industries, with an unweighted average (for 32 industrial 
groups) of 55%. This was mainly due to the loss of the 'West Bank' in 1967, 
which shrank commodity markets for Jordanian products by an order of 
magnitude of 50%. But even in 1974, the first boom year, unused capacity in 
most industries, as given by the Industrial Census (Department of Statistics, 
1974), was still of significant proportions (e.g. leather tanning 66%, plastic 
products 57%, rubber products 40%, paints 61%). In the post-boom era, an 
examination by the Royal Scientific Society of industrial capacity utilization in 
1985 concluded that only about 50% of total installed capacity in the sector was 
actually being used (World Bank, 1988). This large magnitude of capacity under­
utilization is explained by the rapid capital build-up after the second oil boom 
(at 24.3% p.a. between 1979 and 1982), on the assumption, apparently, that
^ N o tice  that this is a decline in nominal dollar terms, because of the 50% devaluation in 1988.
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demand will remain buoyant. Thus, the decline in oil prices in the early eighties, 
which led to a reversal of the boom in a sudden manner, in turn led to a collapse 
of commodity markets for Jordanian manufactures both domestically and 
abroad.
The intervening years between 1974 and 1985 cover the boom period for 
which no data on capacity utilization is available (see Appendix AVII.3 for an 
estimation). One fragment of evidence, however, allows me to suggest, 
tentatively, that the level of demand imparted varying degrees of capital 
utilization during the boom compared with pre- and post- boom. The measure I 
adopted relies on the phenomenon that the slower the demand the more 
overhead per unit output is incurred by enterprises. Therefore, the ratio of fixed 
to total cost should roughly indicate the degree to which available capacity is 
being utilised. I used data at the firm level from my own survey, since 
aggregation of cost at the industry level would most probably mask such a 
relationship.
Table VII.4.3-1
Ratio of Fixed to Total Cost in  12 M anufacturing Firms in Jordan
(unweighted arithmetic mean fo r )____________________________________
1970-73 1974-82 1983-91
_________25%____________________ 21%__________________ 35%_________
Source: Own firm-level survey
As shown in Table VII.4.3-1 above, the ratio for the boom period was slightly 
lower than that of the pre-boom, but significantly lower than that of the post­
boom. This is consistent with the observation that although plant capacity 
under-utilization in the pre-boom and post-boom periods were of similar 
magnitudes, the rate of growth of output in the pre-boom period was higher 
than that of the post-boom period (the average annual rate of growth was 10.4% 
for the pre-boom and 3.5% for the post-boom), and output fluctuations were far 
less pronounced in the former period than in the latter (coefficients of variation 
for average annual rates of growth were 1.33 and 2.54, respectively); labour 
overhead (e.g. financial management) is thus expected to be lower in the pre­
boom than in the post-boom period.
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I attempted to adjust for capacity utilization at the sector level, to show 
the order of magnitude of the contribution to TFP made by cyclical effects. In 
Appendix AVII.3 rates of capacity utilization for all the years between 1967 and 
1992 were estimated, the values obtained used to adjust for capital input, and 
TFP recalculated. The results are shown in Table VII.4.3-2.
Table VII.4.3-2
Total Factor Productivity Growth
(exponential annual growth rates)
1969-73 1974-82 1983-91
(1) W ithout adjustment for capacity in use -0.7% 0.5% -3.4%
(2) With adjustment for capacity in use 0.4% 0.9% 1.0%
(3) Difference, (2) - (1) 1.1% 0.4% 4.4%
Source: TFP growth from Table VII.4.2-2. Adjustment for capacity from Appendix AVII.3.
As is to be expected, the smallest difference between capacity-adjusted and 
capacity-unadjusted TFP growth occurred in the boom period, and the largest in 
the post-boom period. This is because the boom represents a period when 
resources approached full utilization.18 The 1% p.a. growth in TFP during 1983- 
91, after capacity is adjusted for, is an indicator of the sector's potential 
productivity growth under conditions of buoyant demand.
These counterfactual values for TFP growth clearly show the significant 
effect on output growth of cyclical changes associated with the boom conditions. 
The utilization of hitherto idle capacity during the boom period increased 
output per unit input, or, conversely, reduced input per unit of output - real 
costs.
Abstracting from business cycles, part of the rise in TFP during the boom 
as compared with the pre-boom period is still not accounted for (line 2 in Table
■^To be sure, only the period 1975-78 represented more or less full resource absorption. As 
can be seen from Appendix AVI.3, resource slack began its upward trend in Jordan from 1979, 
w hen unem ploym ent exceeded 3%.
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VIL4.3-2).19 One of the plausible explanations for this rise is economies of scale. 
A study by Alawin (1978) of the manufacturing sector in 1974 conducted at the 
firm level has shown that many firms' actual plant size fell short of efficient size 
of plant. In that period, government industrial policy was oriented to 
controlling market structure through restrictive investment licensing: where 
market size was thought to be a constraint, investment licensing was withheld 
on the pretext of 'market saturation'. In a few cases where market size was a 
binding constraint that investment was not forthcoming, monopoly rights were 
granted (petroleum refining, cement, leather tanning and vegetable oil), and 
competing imports were banned. Although monopolies remain today, 
investment licensing as a regulatory measure was stopped soon after the boom 
began.
Given this evidence, economies of scale may have made a contribution to 
increasing output per unit input, through greater specialisation and dealing 
with larger units (longer products runs, larger transactions, etc.). The 
measurement of economies of scale effects is quite difficult, and I have not come 
across a satisfactory methodology of isolating the effects of economies of scale 
on growth that could be used for Jordan - barring extensive research into the 
engineering and the economics of production processes in single plants, as done 
by Pratten (1971) for British manufacturing. Econometric estimates of Cobb- 
Douglas and CES production functions were adopted by Griliches and 
Rringstad (1971) for Norwegian industries, to find that on the average these 
industries enjoyed economies of scale of the order of 6-7%. For Jordan, available 
data did not lend itself to econometric analysis, with the main problem 
originating from capital input.20 Finally, Denison's (1962) roundabout approach 
to measuring the effect of scale economies on growth relied on the effect of 
increases in per capita consumption (the source of enlarging markets) on the 
composition of consumption via income elasticities of demand, and eventually 
on relative prices. By measuring consumption in Europe using US. relative
l^Ln addition, of course, to errors of measurement, which may be due to: misspecification of 
variables - inputs - influencing output; errors in the measurement of their quantity; failure to 
account for changes in their quality; and using wrong weights in estimating their contribution.
^ T h is  may be due to the fact that the Government contributed substantially to capital input in 
the sector, especially between 1979 and 1984; while its investment was not in synchroneity with 
demand conditions (see "capital" under section VI.4.1 above). Another reason may be, as 
revealed by m y ow n firm survey, that dum p pricing - to drive competitors out of market - and 
profit mark-up are w idely practised in Jordan, which would invalidate som e of the assumptions 
underlying production functions, in regard to product and factor pricing.
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prices (since US. prices should reflect the effect of larger markets on unit costs 
and therefore prices), and comparing the result with that obtained from using 
European prices, he was able to measure economies of scale associated with 
income elasticities and their contribution to growth in national output (in other 
studies, e.g. 1976 of the Japanese growth, Denison simply assumes the 
contribution to growth by economies of scale). This approach could not be used 
for Jordan, not least because of unavailability of per capita consumption data.
More important, perhaps, than static economies of scale is the effect of a 
larger market on the application of techniques that could not have been adopted 
until per capita incomes were sufficient to provide a market justifying the cost of 
their use, as happened in many European economies in the post-war period 
when they adopted American technology. Similarly in Jordan, many 'known 
techniques' could not be adopted prior to the boom because of the small market, 
as well as the dearth of capital. As incomes rose very rapidly and capital was 
abundantly available in the economy, many techniques well known in industrial 
countries as well as in those countries that were ahead of Jordan in terms of 
development stage, where transferred to Jordan. As expected, since most of 
these techniques were developed in countries with much more available capital 
than Jordan, this process inevitably meant a rapid change in capital-labour 
ratios in favour of capital (this was enhanced by the relative price change, when 
capital became relatively cheaper and labour relatively more expensive during 
the boom compared with the pre-boom period).21
In addition to growth in income and output, booming conditions may 
allow other factors to increase TFP, namely: foreign exchange abundance and 
the strong value of domestic currency. Both these factors are consistent with 
rapid advances in technological and managerial knowledge, including business
21One exam ple elucidates the point. JUWICO (Jordan Universal W ood Industries Co.) 
manufactures w ooden furniture, concentrating on kitchen outfits. Prior to the boom , JUWICO 
used to manufacture sim ple kitchen cabinets which were not capital-intensive. With the advent 
of the boom, the rapid rise of incomes and the change of tastes m ade American-style kitchens 
quite fashionable in Jordan (despite the fact they are very expensive). JUWICO seized the 
opportunity of satisfying this demand and embarked on the large-scale capital-intensive 
enterprise of manufacturing complete American-style kitchens, w ith technology imported from 
the US. but very much adapted to Jordanian tastes, especially in terms of materials used. In 
addition, JUWICO was able to meet very large orders from the Gulf and Iraq for the same 
product. JUWICO, like m ost manufacturers of w ood furniture in Jordan, w ere one of the most 
rapidly expanding industries during the boom  period, and one that suffered trem endously in the 
post-boom  period, w hen incomes in real terms declined (This exposition is the result of an 
extended interview I conducted with the production manager of JUWICO).
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organisation, and permit more production with the same inputs. This is 
especially true under conditions of rising demand, since it is easier to innovate 
when adding to capacity than when replacing capacity (Kendrick, 1977).
Technological advance should be distinguished from increases in the 
efficiency with which known technology is applied to production (discussed 
above), although the two are not neatly separable either in theory or in practice 
(Nishimizu and Page 1982).22 Technological progress is the change in the best 
practice production frontier. All other types of productivity change, for example 
learning by doing, diffusion of new technological knowledge, as well as short 
run adjustment to shocks, external to enterprises, which change techniques of 
production from average to best-practice, result in increasing technical 
efficiency. There is growing evidence that the productivity gain due to 
'technological mastery' may be substantial in developing countries and may 
outweigh gains from technological progress as Nishimizu and Page (ibid) have 
shown Yugoslavia's experience to be over 1965-78. Nevertheless, under 
conditions of abundant foreign exchange, technological progress is also 
expected to impart positive TFP growth; with capital input growing at 17.4% 
p.a. in real terms during the boom, it is expected that substantial technology 
transfer took place in Jordanian manufacturing. Al-Handasah's (1982a) inquiry 
shows that such a transfer mainly took the form of purchases of imported 
equipment and plant machinery, but managerial assistance was also, on 
occasions, imported. Time and space has prevented an investigation of the 
question of separating TFP into technical progress and technical efficiency, 
which is usually done by frontier estimates, either parametrically or 
nonparametrically, by using operation research methods (see Journal of 
Econometrics, special issue 1992, Production Frontier Estimates).
Finally, the trend towards a rising TFP - when cyclical changes are 
adjusted for - reflects the secular forces underlying productivity advance. This 
would include intangible investment designed to improve the quality and 
efficiency of tangible human and non human factors, such as investment in 
education, labour training, health care, etc., which becomes embodied in the 
work force and capital goods (Kendrick, 1977). This view has experienced a 
comeback in more recent literature that examines the effect on growth of 
externalities associated with investment in human and capital resources; the
See the source cited for a methodological approach to separating technological progress 
from technical efficiency in the measurement of TFP.
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emphasis is on the accumulation of knowledge which becomes endogenous to 
the growth process as an intangible capital good, while, at the same time, 
exhibiting increasing returns to scale (Romer, 1986; see also Lucas, 1993, who 
emphasises the role of human embodied knowledge accumulation).
The foregoing suggests that rising demand and availability of relatively 
cheap foreign exchange during the boom created conditions that were 
conducive to productivity growth through increases in technical efficiency and 
technological progress, neither of which can be accommodated in the Dutch 
disease model; the former - change in technical efficiency - because of the 
model's assumption of full employment of resources at all times, and the latter - 
technological progress - because of its assumption of fixed coefficients of 
production. Yet it is precisely these kinds of change that explain the 
performance of manufacturing under booming conditions, through their effect 
on unit costs and eventually on profitability; a subject that will be investigated 
in the following section.
219
FART III
VII.5 Relative Prices, Cost Pressure and Profitability
The Dutch disease model depicts the effect of relative price changes on the 
production structure via changes in profitability. In the tradeable goods sector, 
rises in wages and other non-traded inputs relative to producers’ prices squeeze 
profitability in that sector - in absolute terms. Furthermore, if the tradeable 
goods sector is labour-intensive - in terms of value share - relative to the non- 
tradeable goods sector, the rise in wages reduces its profitability by more than it 
reduces that in services; in the medium term, therefore, resources will move out 
of tradeables to non-tradeables, and a decline in tradeables output results (this is 
especially true if the resource movement dominates the spending effect).
Given the above, it is customary for the Dutch disease literature to test 
the degree of the squeeze on tradeables by a general index of relative prices of 
tradeables to non-tradeables. Corden (1983: 441) has made the faster rate of 
increase in wages in Holland than in Germany, its main trading partner, pivotal 
to his argument of de-industrialization in Holland. This differential rise in 
production cost, Corden argues, squeezed profits in Dutch manufacturing, since 
output prices were internationally determined and therefore did not change in 
Holland relative to Germany. More generally, the real effective exchange rate 
REER, which was discussed in section V.4, has consistently been used in 
traditional Dutch disease literature as an indicator of competitiveness.
However, this and other similar indices of tradeables' to non-tradeables1 
prices are crude measures of competitiveness, and indeed of profitability, and 
for booming industrialising economies can be quite misleading, as will be 
shown in Jordan’s case. The inadequacy of these measures stems from three 
main causes. First, they do not accurately consider the structure of production 
cost in the denominator, as they either deflate output price by one variable only, 
namely wages, as Corden does, or the deflator may be a general index of 
domestic prices, as the case is for REER. Second, underlying these measures is 
the implicit assumption of fixed technical coefficients of production, thus 
disregarding growth in productivity which may arise either from increased 
technical efficiency, or from technological progress, or indeed from externalities 
associated with investment either directly in the sector or in its supporting 
infrastructure. Third, these measures are proxies for profit margins and give no
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information on total profits, which may be rising even when profit margins are 
falling, if demand is expanding rapidly.
Better indicators of profitability may be devised by investigating the 
relationship between profits, output and input prices, and productivity, as 
shown in the following equation, already introduced in the previous chapter:
Change in unit profits g is directly proportional to change in output prices, p, 
and labour productivity, a, and inversely proportional to change in fixed costs, 
x, per hour wages, s and material costs, m. An expression similar to that devised 
for labour can be devised for material so that productivity is accounted for, 
which will be done in the following section.
VII.5.1 Relative Price Movement for Manufactures in Jordan
I shall first consider changes in manufacturing output prices relative to output 
prices in non-tradeable sectors, to show that manufactures did suffer from 
adverse terms of trade vis-a-vis those sectors during the boom period. Then I 
shall investigate the movement of manufacturing output prices relative to prices 
of inputs that go into their production, taking into consideration productivity 
growth, related to both labour and material. This will be done on a two-digit 
manufacturing level, with the result that the indices obtained are industry- 
specific. The purpose of this disaggregation is to investigate the causes 
underlying the differential performance of industries, i.e. to see why some 
industries expanded output and exports while others contracted. The reasons 
for this differential performance may be (inasmuch as such indices allow us 
insight) the experiencing of different relative prices, productivity growth, or 
both.
As regards output prices it was shown in section V.4 that, in the 
aggregate/ export and import prices declined relative to non-traded prices over 
the boom period, as would be expected by the Dutch disease model. This is 
shown again in Figure VII.5.1-1 which gives indices of import, export and 
wholesale prices for Jordan manufactures over 1967-91; and Figure VII.5.1-2 
which turns these indices into ratios. From the mid-seventies growth of 
manufactures import and export prices has generally lagged behind that of 
domestic wholesale prices (all indices exclude petroleum prices), with the result
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that by the mid-eighties the ratios of imports and exports to domestic prices had 
declined by about 20%. The ratios continued their downward trend until the 
major devaluation of 1988, when the import ratio was 70%, and that of exports 
was only 60%, their 1975 levels. Thus the serious competition from imports that 
domestic producers faced continued well beyond the boom period, as the 
government did not correct for currency overvaluation until 1988. The recovery 
of export prices after the 1988 devaluation was less pronounced than that of 
imports.
At a more disaggregated level, Tables VII.5.1-1 and VII.5.1-2 show the 
ratio of unit value of exports and imports to domestic wholesale prices for 20 
manufactures groups and for the sector as a whole over 1967-1991.23 Whilst the 
overall indices declined over the boom period, the same is not true for many 
industries within the sector. For example, paper products export price index 
rose over 1974-82, and printing and beverage indices rose over the first oil boom 
1974-79. For imports as well, leather, paper, printing and publishing, chemicals 
and non-metallic minerals indices showed an upward, rather than a downward, 
trend (in some of these cases output prices were controlled by the government: 
leather, and cement).
The task of constructing indices for input prices that take account of the 
structure of production costs for individual industries is more difficult. The 
need to construct such indices at all is apparent from Figure VH.5.1-3, which 
shows the distribution of total cost over labour, material and other costs for 
certain years that cover the pre-boom, boom and post-boom periods.
On the average, the share of labour in total production cost is 16%, and 
that of material is 72%. The remaining 12% is composed of various other cost
^ U n it  values of exports and imports (value over volume) are given in Central Bank of 
Jordan (CBJ), Monthly Bulletin, for five manufactures groups that do not coincide w ith the two- 
digit International Standards of Industrial Classification (ISIC) adopted in this study. This 
necessitated the laborious process of calculating unit values of exports and imports for 87 
manufactures groups (BTN 11 to 98) over 22 years (1970-91) from Department of Statistics 
(DOS), 1970-1991, External Trade Statistics; the 1967-1969 values were then obtained through 
backward extrapolation. The 87 BTN groups were aggregated into 20 ISIC groups using value 
shares in the current year as weights. For the sector as a w hole 1979 value shares in total 
exports (imports) were used as weights in finding an overall index of unit values. For certain 
years volum es of trade are not given in DOS, in which case unit values w ere interpolated from 
adjacent data. For petroleum and few other industries, volum es were not given at all, in which 
case unit values were taken from CBJ directly when available; otherwise unit values for the 
closest industry were adopted (e.g. basic metal for fabricated metal).
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items, including transport (2%) and electricity (2%). Material inputs have a high 
import content in Jordan due to it's limited natural resources, with the exception 
of the cement industry. The share of directly imported to total material input to 
manufactures production was 67% in 1979, a representative production year. In 
addition, it is believed that a large portion of the remaining 33% of material 
purchased locally is actually imported, either wholly or in part.
Figure V II.5.1-3 
Structure o f Production  Cost in M anufacturing In du stries
in  Jordan
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Source: Department of Statistics, Industrial Snn>ey; Industrial Census, various issues.
Thus, production costs in Jordan are far more sensitive to changes in import 
prices than to wages. It is likely, therefore, that the conditions of the boom 
alleviated the costs squeeze by reducing material input prices through currency 
appreciation, i.e. by increasing manufacturers' purchasing power vis-a-vis 
imported inputs, and the need to account for material input in profitability 
indices is thus apparent.
In constructing a composite index of input prices for individual 
industries, I allocated total costs to three main inputs: (1) labour, (2) imported 
material and (3) locally purchased material, and took the weights of each input 
for individual industries from the 1979 Industrial Census; which gives a 
Laspeyres index with the following structure:
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where P( is the composite input price index for industry i at time t: a  • is theJ ' 1^979
cost share of input j  in year 1979;24 pj is the price of input j; and o and t are the 
first year and current year in the series, respectively.
The main difficulty in constructing input price indices arises from lack of 
knowledge of the type of material input that enters into any industrial 
production process, which may be obvious for some products (e.g. clothing uses 
textiles as inputs), but the same may not be true for others (o.g. beverages uses 
inputs from chemicals, food and agriculture; leather products uses material 
input from clothing, food and chemicals, and so forth). For this purpose the 1979 
input-output tables (Dar Al-Handasah, 1982b) were consulted (See Tables 
AVIL4- (2.a), (2.b) & (2.c) in Appendix AVIL4).
As to movement in input prices pj, the following indices were 
constructed: for labour, an index of the wage rate, or -total wage bill over 
number of workers in each industry; for imported material input, an index of 
unit value of imports; and for domestically purchased material input a 
wholesale price index (see Tables AVII.4- (l.d), (l.b) & (l.a), respectively, in 
Appendix AVII.4).
From all the above the composite index of input prices for single 
industries was constructed (see Table AVII.4-3 in Appendix VIL4), and relating 
this index to those of output prices (unit value of exports; see Table AVIL4- (l.c) 
in Appendix VII.4) gives a first approximation of changes in profitability. The 
final results are shown in Table VII.5.1-3. For the sector as a whole, the price 
index of profitability declined by 25% over 1975-1982, it recovered slightly over 
1983-84, but continued its decline thereafter, with a noticeable dip in 1989, 
following the 1988 devaluation, as import prices rose substantially. However, 
for some industries within the sector, the index had an upward trend over the 
boom period: paper, printing and publishing, and chemicals, all of which 
achieved rapid rates of growth in exports during the boom. In all of these
24 A true Laspeyres index w ould weight prices by quantities in the base year. Had this been 
done, the results w ould differ only slightly in magnitude, but not direction.
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industries, input costs are largely accounted for by imported material: paper 
71%, printing 55%, and chemicals 81%. The rapid rise in wages notwithstanding, 
the high content of imports in industrial production costs benefited those 
industries under boom conditions as the price of imports became relatively 
cheap.
This result would not have been predicted by traditional Dutch disease 
measures of profitability, which deflate the unit value of exports by domestic 
wholesale prices (Table VII.5.1-1 above) or by wages, and invariably find 
profitability of traded goods to have declined during the boom period. In fact 
deflating by wages gives erroneous results for Jordan as shown in Table VH.5.1- 
4. For some industries whose price index of profitability increased during the 
boom, indicating good export performance, the wage-based index of 
profitability declined (e.g. paper products and chemicals). Over 1975-81 the 
wage-based index shows profitability to have declined by 60%, as opposed to 
only 24% according to my total-cost-based index of profitability, which is a 
substantial difference. Thus according to the wage-based index, most of 
manufacturing industries in Jordan should have been wiped out during the 
boom, when in fact we know that most of them prospered.
We conclude that including the price of imports in the profitability 
deflator yields results that are contrary to Dutch disease wisdom, precisely 
because the boom leads to relative price changes in favour of imports. And the 
higher the import content in production costs, the less is profitability squeezed. 
For industrial economies, deflating by import prices is less important since the 
import content of production costs is likely to be much lower than for an 
industrialising economy, due to the highly developed inter-industry structure of 
production. A wage rise in this case becomes a deciding factor in export 
competitiveness under boom conditions. The same is not true of industrialising 
economies, as we have seen for Jordan.
Thus far the analysis has abstracted from any growth in output per unit 
input, which would lower unit production costs and increase profitability, ceteris 
paribus. To address the question of productivity growth in measuring 
profitability, I constructed a quantity deflator relating the quantity of output 
(gross output in real terms) to the quantity of inputs used in the production of 
this output. Similar to the price index of profitability, the inputs considered in 
the quantity index of profitability were: quantity of labour (number of workers); 
quantity of imported material input (imported material deflated by unit value of
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imports); and quantity of locally purchased material input (locally purchased 
material input deflated by wholesale prices). The resulting index is a Laspeyres 
index, similar to the price index of profitability, with the following structure:
where Qi( is the composite quantity index for industry i at time t; olJi9 is the
cost share of input j in year 1979; q is the quantity of i n p u t a n d  o and t are the 
first year and current year in the series, respectively.
The results are shown in table VII.5.1-5. For the sector as a whole, the 
index rose by 111% over 1975-82;25 and for most industries whose exports 
increased rapidly during the boom (tobacco, furniture and wood, paper 
products, printing and publishing, chemicals, and non-metallic products) the 
index indicates substantial gains in productivity. It is worth noting that these 
results are in total accordance with those obtained from TFP calculations, shown 
in Table VIL4.2-2 above.
The combination of the price index with the quantity index gives an 
index that I shall call the 'hybrid' index of profitability - hybrid because it 
combines two concepts that are not homogeneous, namely prices and 
productivity. This hybrid index should give an accurate measure of the relative 
change between output prices and production costs of manufactures over time, 
all on per unit basis. Table VIL5.1-6 shows without any doubt that - with the 
exception of beverages - profitability had increased in all the sectors where both 
output and exports expanded during the boom.
The hybrid index of profitability measures profit margins, and therefore 
reflects supply-side effects only on profitability. It is worth investigating, at the 
same time, the effect of demand pull on investment decisions, which may be 
done by constructing an indicator of total profits. In a very straightforward 
manner this is done by deflating total revenues by a domestic price index, say
25This exceptional rise in productivity, which amounts to an annual increase of 11.3% p.a., may 
indicate that there were substantial gains in productivity stem m ing from the use of better 
material during the boom; and that my TFP calculations, which were based on labour and 
capital inputs only, and rose at 0.5% p.a. for the sector as a whole, may have a downward bias.
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the consumer price index, to show investors' total profits in real terms. Such an 
indicator is shown in Figure VII.5.1-4.
Figure VII.5.1-4 
Total Profits in Manufacturing Industries in Jordan 
1967-1991
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Source: Department of Statistics, Industrial Survey; Industrial Census, various issues, 
for profits. Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Bulletin, various issues, for deflators.
The index of profitability as constructed above would have been unnecessary 
had data on profitability existed for manufacturing industries in Jordan, but 
such data do not exist. Moreover, it is perhaps not a meaningful exercise to 
measure profitability at the aggregate level of two-digit manufacturing 
industries, which includes a large number of firms that are heterogeneous in 
size, techniques of production, management styles, efficiency and so forth. Only 
at a firm level can profitability be grasped conceptually, to which I shall turn in 
the following section.
VII.5.2 Profitability in Jordanian Manufacturing Firms
Because profits are not things but rather abstract concepts, they may be 
measured in any number of ways" (Haber, 1989: 103). I shall use two measures 
of profits, both of which are based on cost accounting, but each is the outcome of 
a different conceptualisation, and therefore serves a different purpose. These 
are, namely, profit margin and rate of return on capital stock. In the Dutch 
disease model, return to the specific factor (capital in the present context) is the
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measure of profitability, and so, therefore, also, is the use of return on capital 
stock. This measure is useful for an understanding of the movement of factors 
between sectors - in the medium-to-long run - if differential rates of return on 
these factors exist (which is the case after an exogenous shock such as the oil 
boom: currency appreciation and the rise in wages increase return to the specific 
factor in the non-tradeable goods sector, relative to the tradeable goods sector). 
Profit margins, on the other hand, clarify the profit-squeezing effect of increases 
in costs, and so they are more useful when comparisons over time for the same 
firm, or across a number of firms at the same time, are made. Firms whose profit 
margins were small prior to the boom are likely to be more tightly squeezed by 
the boom effect of increasing labour costs than those whose profit margins were 
wider.
The body of evidence employed in this analysis of profits is the financial 
accounts of the twelve firms I surveyed in the process of conducting this 
study.26 The data relating to profit include net profits, gross revenue, and total 
fixed assets, and cover the period 1970-92. The sample represents a broad range 
of industries, spanning dairy products, tobacco, textiles, footwear, leather 
tanning, printing and publishing, soap, pharmaceuticals, metal furniture, and 
fabricated aluminium. Hie sample also covers a wide range of firm sizes 
(whether in terms of paid-up capital or labour employed), technology used, and 
choice of technique. Type of ownership in these firms is also diverse, and 
includes family-owned firms, simple partnerships, privately held joint-stock, 
and jointly - public and private - held joint-stock. Finally, the influence these 
firms have on the market also varies widely from monopoly (leather tanning), 
oligopoly (tobacco), and firms holding a large share of the market (dairy and 
pharmaceuticals), to very small firms with insignificant market power (the 
remainder). The sample is thus unbiased in every respect except one: obviously 
the firms chosen are winners, in that they were able to secure a position in the 
market even in the uncertain environment of the post-boom period. No data 
exist in Jordan on firms that were squeezed out of the market either because of 
the boom or post-boom conditions. As to sample size, although the number of
2^Data series on profits at the two-digit manufacturing level in Jordan are incomplete, and 
what is recorded seem to be highly unreliable. They are available from Department of Statistics 
industrial surveys and censuses, which cover 1974 and 1979-1991. Regarding assets, only fixed 
assets are recorded. Dividing profits, gross of taxes, by physical capital yields very high rates of 
return, in m any cases unreasonably high, of the order of 200%. It is possible that problems of 
aggregation are arising here. This vindicates the point made earlier regarding the lack of 
meaning of the concept of profit at the aggregate industry, rather than at the firm, level.
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firms is not large (twelve),27 the population from which the sample was drawn 
was itself not very large in 1970. The total number of manufacturing 
establishments in Jordan in 1970 employing five persons or more - which are the 
firms most likely to retain records - was only 485 (Department of Statistics, 1971, 
Industrial Survey). The percentage of total manufacturing revenue contributed 
by the twelve firms was 14.1% in 1970 and 8.2% in 1992.28 In conclusion, the 
survey sample is quite representative and analysis based on information 
relating to it is quite illuminating for the purposes of the present study; but the 
results cannot be generalised.
The rate of return on capital stock, which is one measure of the rate of 
profit, compares a firm's net profits to the value of the physical assets - 
inventories, land, machinery and other equipment, and buildings - and cash 
assets - cash and other negotiable instruments. Unfortunately, only physical 
stock data were recorded in the survey, so the measure of profit rate has an 
upward bias; this would not cause problems if the ratio of physical to total 
assets remained constant, since we are concerned with the trend in profit rates 
in the boom and pre- and post-boom periods. However, this ratio is more likely 
to change than not; but on the plausible assumption that the proportion of 
physical in total assets changes randomly over time, the trend of profit rate as 
calculated here should be representative of the actual trend. Profit rates were 
estimated for three distinct periods: 1970-73, representing pre-boom conditions, 
1974-82, representing boom conditions; and 1983-92, representing the 
adjustment to post-boom conditions. The results are given in Table VII.5.2-1 
below. The arithmetic mean of profit rates rose from 19.6% in 1973-73 to 40.8% 
during 1974-82 and declined to 35% in 1983-92. (These rates are high because 
capital includes fixed assets only instead of total assets).29 Profit rates in eleven 
out of twelve firms rose in the boom period from their pre-boom levels; and in 
seven firms profit rates were higher during the boom from both pre- and post­
boom levels, leaving no doubt that profitability increased under boom
■^The number of firms was determined by three factors: the start of operations prior to the 
boom  of 1973/74 to enable comparisons; the existence of records that go back to 1970; and the 
willingness of the firm to disclose information, especially in relation to profits. For Jordanian 
firms the latter factor was as critical as the former two.
2®The reason for this high contribution, despite the small number of firms in the sam ple, is 
that the sam ple includes the monopoly and oligopoly referred to above, in addition to firms 
controlling a large share of the market.
^Standard deviations for profit rates are high because of the w ide variation in these rates 
among firms; for example, during the boom  profit rates ranged betw een 17.6% and 73.4%.
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Table VII.5.2-1
Profit Rates For Twelve Manufacturing Firms in Jordan 1/: 1970-1992
I5IC (3115)
Woollen
Textiles
132U)
QwAJLMllI
Textiles
132111
BATA 
Fool went 
(3240)
Publishing
(342(1)
Al-Tawfkj
Publishing
(342(1)
Al'M
Dunmabe-
IkaLs
(3523)
AI*Ni}ah
&U|1
(3523)
Fabricated
Metal
{3*12)
Fabricated
Aluminium
0*13)
Tobacco it 
Cigarette* 
J3H0)
Tanning
(3231)
1970 8.2 11.5 9.5 12.7 24.2 17.5 22.4 (13.2) 3.0 2.2 -18.2 11.19
1971 1.4 17.9 11.7 7.2 13.4 53.4 42.7 26.8 1.6 22.3 40,0 26.57
1972 9.5 3.7 10.9 15.6 15.9 61.1 37.9 31.4 3.4 23.0 23.9 46.77
Average
1970-72 6.3 11.0 10.7 11.8 17.8 44.0 34.3 15.0 2.7 15.8 15.2 28.18
1973 36.1 34.4 16.9 18.7 37.7 17.6 52.8 38.3 5.0 10.6 108.5 58,30
1974 36.0 41.4 17,5 32.9 63.6 15.4 128.1 44.2 22.0 20.1 30.8 50.30
1975 33.1 54.8 18.9 34.6 62,5 39.2 151.9 32.5 31.0 19.2 27.9 58.75
1976 74.2 61.6 29.5 39.0 38.9 34.1 59.8 37.0 23.5 22.3 47.4 13.15
1977 9.0 6.5 30.9 22.8 37.2 46.2 69.2 43.1 10.7 34.5 20.7 32.77
1978 8.4 1.3 19.5 24.9 40.3 21.6 69.7 38.6 11.0 21.8 10.8 25.73
1979 4.8 -5.5 50.1 59.5 43.7 23.7 69.8 49.6 11.7 39.3 27.9 37.41
1980 5.7 18.6 48.8 56.4 41.7 22.7 56.4 57.8 20.2 76,9 33.2 24.84
1981 11.8 36.1 28.4 243.2 43.0 28.7 41.8 81.5 26.7 71.4 10.1 19.01
1982 5.2 114.9 12.3 145.4 32.7 40.0 34,3 45.4 14.3 62.4 -6.4 16.68
Average
1973-82 22.4 36.4 27.3 67.7 44.1 28.9 73.4 46.8 17.6 37.9 31.1 33.69
1983 2.4 -3.0 15.0 114.2 20.7 9.7 16.2 223.1 14.2 32.3 25.6 16,20
1984 9.4 -12.5 13.8 137.2 20.2 19.5 15.1 96.0 12.8 9.6 48.1 15.80
1985 26.2 -9.9 15.2 35,8 9.6 12.8 16.6 29.7 11.8 23.3 28.0 20.01
1986 16.7 -12.6 34.4 -30.5 3.8 -7.5 0.6 72,8 5.0 29.3 24.5 15.00
1987 8.7 -2.6 21.0 14.5 47.7 15.6 6.1 65.1 9.8 38.5 64.2 41.35
1988 4.0 1,9 31.6 4.6 50.4 32.4 8.8 139.7 11.5 18.2 23.5 64.50
1989 22.7 42.0 1.4 87.8 31.7 56.6 36.4 45.8 82.5 24.5 -65.9 84.97
1990 31.5 19.8 0,3 70.3 34.9 47.5 39.0 32.2 76.0 36.1 95.8 96.07
1991 56.4 47.5 31.5 -51.6 0.0 49.9 20.4 28.5 52.6 0.0 180.1
1992 27.4 20.4 18.5 71.9 0.0 34.0 22.9 30.1 110.5 0.0 10.9 0.00
Average
1983-92 20,5 9.1 18.3 45.4 21.9 27.1 18.2 76.3 38.6 21.2 43.5 39.32
(1970-72) 
Mean SD
19.6 12.3
(1973-82) 
Mean SD
40.8 17.8
Source: O w n  firm -level su rvey . 
1 /  N e t p ro f its /T o ta ) f'ued  asse ts
(19B3-92) 
Mean SD
35.0 18.0
Table VII.5.2-2
Profit Margins For Twelve Manufacturing Firms in Iordan V : 1970-1992
ISIC
Jordan
(3112)
tYixillcn
Textiles
(3211)
Qwaasnii
Textiles
(3211)
DATA
Fixetvear
(324U)
Stvirt)
Publishing
(J42U)
AtTjV/iq 
Publishing 
CM 20)
Al’M
I’harm-wue-
tkal*
(3522)
Al-naph
Soap
(3523)
Ayoubi
Fabricated
Metal
(3*12)
Fabricated
Aluminium
(3*13)
Tobacco & 
Cigarettes 
(31-10)
Tanning
(3271)
All Firms
1970 25.6 28.9 28.0 20.4 13.9 36.5 50.5 4.0 32.9 12.4 -18.2 8.86
1971 32.4 17.7 30.0 26.4 11.0 34.3 45.0 9.0 35.7 8.9 40.0 13.06
1972 34.2 14.5 30.0 27.8 11.2 33.5 46.2 9.0 31.2 21.4 23.9 14.85 (1970-72)
Average
1970-72 30.7 20.4 29.3 24.9 12.0 34.8 47.2 7.3 33.3 14.2 15.2 12.3
Mean SD  
23.1 12.9
1973 46.4 33.4 27.0 25.7 14.2 34.7 52.6 9.0 33.1 8.7 108.5 16.45
1974 47.8 29.2 23.0 24.0 23.9 25.0 55.4 9.0 45.2 8,0 30.8 11.36
1975 44.6 32.4 20.0 25.3 18.8 36.6 54.8 9.0 50.3 7.0 27.9 14.10
1976 17.0 35.3 24.0 27.5 17.3 31.2 44.5 9.0 47.5 4.9 47.4 8,36
1977 48.0 30.8 23.0 26.7 18.4 32.4 39.0 9.0 42.7 4.8 20.7 17.92
1978 49.2 28 6 22.0 26,8 19.2 24.4 40.7 9.0 42.4 5.3 10.8 12.82
1979 21.6 19.2 26.0 27.4 15.0 19.6 50.1 10.0 40.7 4.6 27.9 18.41
1980 23.2 21,4 25.0 28.8 16.2 16.7 41.1 9.0 47.6 5.3 33.2 12.30
1981 26.9 39.2 21.0 36.2 20.8 15.5 42.4 10.0 48.9 8.7 10.1 10.57
19S2 26.8 40 4 20.0 33.5 25.3 17.3 44.7 10.0 39.8 8.0 -6.4 10.70 (1973-82)
Average
1973-82 35.1 31.0 23.1 28.2 18.9 25.3 46.5 9.3 43.8 6.5 31.1 13.3
Mean SD 
24.6 13.5
1983 23.2 28.5 15.0 32.6 7.7 14.4 47.4 10.0 43.0 7,7 25.6 7.53
1984 29.1 3.0 18.0 33.4 9.8 13.2 42.0 11.0 40.9 6.9 48.1 10,02
1985 31.8 6.9 18.1 27.2 14.8 12.0 37,8 14.0 42.1 8.9 28.0 12.44
1986 28.1 9.4 19.0 24.2 19.7 6.6 31.6 9.4 36.1 13.4 24.5 13.53
1987 22.1 12.6 15.6 31.1 30.1 12.8 30.4 9.1 29.0 9.3 64.2 15.81
1988 17,7 18.5 16 9 25.8 26.7 15.4 37.7 5.7 37.7 8.7 23.5 9.07
1989 20.9 29.9 23.4 28.2 21.9 15.1 35.9 9.1 64.1 7.8 -65,9 14.75
1990 18.6 18.6 25.8 28.6 21.9 15.1 33.1 7.5 41.4 6.2 95.8 13.97
1991 20.0 29 6 15 8 26.6 0.0 15.7 33.7 7.9 40.8 0,0 180.1 8.76
1992 18.1 18.1 13.0 30,4 0.0 14.0 37.2 7.4 51.1 0.0 10.9 8,47 (1983-92)
Average
1983-92 23.0 17.5 18.1 28.8 15.3 13.4 36.7 9.1 42.6 6.9 43.5 11.4
Mean SD  
22.6 14.1
S ource O w n firm -level su rv ey
1 /  N et p ro f its /T o ta ! rev en u e
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conditions. The return to the specific factor in the tradeable goods sector - 
manufacturing - thus increased rather than declined during the boom, as the 
Dutch disease model would have predicted, which explains the rapid capital 
build-up in the sector as a whole.
The second measure of profitability is the profit margin, calculated as net 
profit over total revenue. Tautologically, profit margins measure producers’ 
shares in total revenues, and therefore enable us to see the position of a firm vis- 
a-vis change in price relatives. If output prices do not change (since commodities 
are tradeable and therefore have their price determined in international 
markets), while labour and other non-traded input prices increase, then profits 
are squeezed and profit margins decline. This happens regardless of the level of 
demand (if change in demand does not affect production cost, i.e. assuming 
constant returns to scale and fixed technical coefficients). As I have done with 
profit rates, I shall estimate profit margins over the three periods 1970-73,1974- 
82, and 1983-92, representing pre-, during and post-boom conditions (Table 
VII.5.2-2). Again taking the arithmetic mean for the twelve firms, profit margins 
increased from 23.1% in the pre-boom period to 24.6% in the boom period and 
declined to 22.6% in the post-boom period. In eight out of twelve firms profit 
margins increased during the boom from their pre-boom period; and in six 
firms they were higher than both pre- and post-boom levels. Although the rise 
in profit margins during the boom and its decline in the post-boom periods are 
not substantial, they indicate clearly that profits were not squeezed during the 
boom, despite the rapid rise in wages.
How did firms manage to increase profitability, despite the rapid rise in 
wages (on average 10% p.a. in real terms)? The answer lies, as the hybrid index 
of profitability devised above has indicated, in productivity growth such that 
unit wage costs actually declined. One example illustrates the point, which is 
taken from Bata, an international company that operates a small-scale plant in 
Jordan manufacturing footwear. The example is given in Table VII.5.2-2.
The growth of labour productivity (12.8% p.a.), by exceeding wage rate 
growth (8% p.a.), reduced real labour cost during the boom and increased profit 
margins by an amount proportional to the difference, since material cost and 
output price increased almost at the same rate. The pre-boom period was one of 
major political and economic dislocation, and no importance should be attached 
to its figures. In the post-boom period, because of the devaluation, material costs 
increased rapidly; but, more important, labour productivity growth was much
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lower than in the boom period because of low demand and excess capacity 
problems, leading to a decline in profit margins.
Table VII.5.2-3
Analysis of Profit Margin for Bata (footwear manufacturing firm)___________________________
Annual rate of Growth (exponential) 
_______________________  1970-1973 1974-1982 1983-1992
Shoe w holesale price 13.6% 7.7% 6.8%
Real w age rate -9.5% 8.0% -0.1%
Labour productivity 2/ -17.2% 12.8% 8.2%
Material Cost 2.8% 7.3% 21.6%
Profit margin -2.0% 4.3% -1.3%
Source: Own firm-level survey.
1 / Total wage bill, in constant prices, over number of workers. 
2 / Value added, in constant prices, per worker.
VII.6 Conclusions
Starting from a small base, the manufacturing sector in Jordan experienced 
outstanding growth during the seventies oil boom, growing at 16.7% p.a. in real 
terms. Manufacturing exports, starting from a smaller base, experienced yet 
more outstanding growth of 30.6% p.a. in real terms. Furthermore, import 
substitution declined only slowly, given currency appreciation. Clearly, 
Jordanian manufactures competed well not only in their own market but also 
internationally. This is especially true as Dar Al-Handasah (1982h) was able to 
show that the share of Jordanian manufactured exports in traditional export 
markets (viz. Arab oil-exporters) actually increased from the mid- to late- 
seventies. We can only conclude that Jordanian manufactures gained, rather 
than lost, competitiveness during the boom period.
Without prior knowledge of the trend in relative price movements 
during that period, it is plausible to suggest that manufacturers faced 
favourable relative prices, such as a weak currency relative to trading partners, 
declining wage rates, etc. Yet investigation of price relatives in Jordan has 
shown their movement to have been against tradeables, just as would have been 
predicted by the Dutch disease model. One explanation, therefore, remains for 
the gain in competitiveness: Jordanian manufacturing was becoming more
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efficient during the boom period, compared with the pre-boom and certainly 
with the post-boom periods.
Investigation of output growth per unit of input has shown productivity 
gains to have been substantial in all the industries whose output and exports 
expanded during the boom. These gains were obtained not only from 
technological change, but also from increases in production efficiency arising 
from full employment of hitherto idle resources in the sector. The logical 
conclusion follows, with significant implications for the Dutch disease model: 
the study of industrialising booming economies within the framework of a 
model that assumes away growth in output per unit input, either because all 
resources are assumed to be fully employed at all times, or by assigning zero to 
changes in production coefficients, is of limited usefulness.
Another conclusion follows from the above: if price indicators are to 
replace thorough investigation of the effect of the boom on the supply response 
of manufacturing enterprises at all, these indicators have to take account of 
productivity growth. A major contribution of this chapter has been to show that 
traditional relative price measures developed in Dutch disease literature are not 
only inefficient, but may be quite misleading in this respect; and to suggest a 
methodology of constructing a new measure that is based on the actual 
structure of production cost, and on productivity growth.
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Chapter VIII 
Conclusions
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This study offers a new approach to the examination of the effects of favourable 
exogenous shocks on the structure of industrialising economies. Whilst the study is 
based on research done on Jordan, there is a presumption that its conclusions may 
be relevant to the experience of a large number of industrialising economies 
benefiting from favourable exogenous shocks. Nevertheless, further research is 
needed before its conclusions can be generalised.
The study's analytical approach has benefited in some ways from the Dutch 
disease model itself. Specifically, the model's two mechanisms, namely the 
spending effect and the resource movement, have proven to be valuable in 
examining the structure of prices under booming conditions. Yet, these analytical 
aspects are not sufficient to explain the structure of production at the end of the 
boom; hence the new approach.
The framework of analysis in my approach is no longer one of static general 
equilibrium. Rather, it is dynamic and starts from disequilibrium conditions in the 
pre- and post-boom periods. Only during the boom, when demand is buoyant, are 
resources fully employed. Each tradeable sector is analysed individually, since the 
technological conditions of production differ considerably between the two. 
Furthermore, whilst the relative price effect on the supply response is similar in the 
two sectors, the effect of new demand structure under booming conditions differs 
considerably, inducing a different supply response. In contrast with development 
economics literature that applies Dutch disease analysis, my approach does not 
take either agriculture or manufacturing as the tradeable sector, but the two sectors 
simultaneously. Partial analysis of only one sector leads to erroneous 
interpretations of the boom effect on tradeables' production, a point that I will 
return to later. Finally, although my approach adopts Dutch disease analysis in 
examining the structure of prices, it develops a new methodology in constructing 
relative price indices that are used as indicators of profitability. The methodology 
follows directly from the dynamic analysis employed, and thus considers 
productivity growth in constructing these indices.
In what follows I will elaborate these points. I will first show the limitations 
of the Dutch disease model in analysing the Jordanian experience, from which will 
follow the method of developing the new approach. I will finally suggest how this 
approach can be developed further with new research.
In analysing the Jordanian experience of favourable exogenous shocks using 
the Dutch disease model, the effect of the boom on changing the structure of prices, 
via the spending effect and the resource movement, was accurately predicted. The
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same is not true of predictions about the composition of output, which is what the 
theory sets out to do in the first place. On the contrary, the actual sectoral outcome 
in Jordan was the reverse of what the theory would have predicted, as rapid 
industrialisation took place during the boom. Further investigation revealed that 
this outcome is mainly due to the static nature of the Dutch disease model, and 
above all its failure to take into consideration the effect of productivity growth on 
resource allocation. As a consequence, the model was also inadequate in assessing 
the effect of changes in the demand vector on altering the structure of production, 
by influencing in different ways the level and growth rate of productivity in the 
different sectors of the economy. In the case of Jordan, rapid industrialisation was 
achieved by rapid expansion of demand, which instigated significant productivity 
growth in manufacturing through dynamic economies of scale.
A theoretical ambiguity arises from the model's neglect of demand 
conditions in the analysis of sectoral shifts in industrialising economies. As the 
boom gives a disproportionately large stimulus to manufacturing, through the 
greater-than-uruty income elasticity of demand for manufactures, resources will 
flow into manufacturing out of agriculture, whose share in aggregate output is 
relatively large in the initial stages of industrialisation and whose income elasticity 
of demand is less than unity. Thus a decline in agriculture's share in output and 
employment cannot be interpreted solely as the result of the Dutch disease, or as 
the adverse effect of relative prices on tradeables' output, but also as the outcome of 
successful industrialisation. It follows that, despite being a common practice among 
development economists, to consider agriculture and manufacturing in one 
category of analysis under booming conditions is inaccurate since, although the 
two sectors' supply responses are influenced in the same way by adverse relative 
price changes, they are influenced in opposite ways by the income-demand effect. 
Corden's (1984: 362-3) assertion that the theory can be applied equally to 
agriculture and manufacturing is correct only within the Dutch disease 
formulation, where there is neither growth nor change in productivity over time. 
Once the model's assumptions are relaxed and dynamic analysis is adopted, it 
becomes clear that the analytical treatment of the two sectors needs amendment.
In addition to the effect of changes in consumption patterns, two more 
aspects of change in the structure of demand can influence the structure of 
production. These are growth in investment, and changes in the trade position. 
Faster growth induced by the boom increases the share of investment in GDP, 
which implies a relative increase in the demand for manufactures. While the
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majority of capital goods may be imported in a developing economy such as 
Jordan's, there must be a spill-over effect to domestic manufactures so long as there 
exists a certain degree of inter-industry linkage. In Jordan, during the boom, there 
was a noticeable strengthening of inter-industry linkages not only confined to 
consumer goods, but also extended to investment goods. In fact, the industries that 
prospered most during this period were intermediate goods.
The position of the trade balance directly influences the structure of 
production, and vice-versa. By definition, an industrialising economy is in the 
process of improving its manufacturing trade balance, either through export 
expansion or import-substitution. This process will continue during the boom - and 
probably at an accelerating rate - provided the adverse relative price effect is 
overcome, possibly through the effect of demand expansion on increasing 
productivity. If, furthermore, the boom is regional, as in the case of Jordan, demand 
for manufactured exports is likely to rise (in Jordan's case this demand originated in 
the Gulf and was quite substantial). Production of manufactures must therefore rise 
to meet the additional demand. There is also the possibility that faster growth 
during the boom, by increasing non-manufactured imports and creating a trade 
deficit in this category, stimulates growth in manufactured exports to cover the 
deficit.
More generally, the effect of foreign trade on the structure of production 
should always be considered, even if the boom is not regional. In the case of North 
European oil exporters, such as the UK and Holland, manufacturing production 
was greatly hampered during the boom as a consequence of reduced US demand 
for their manufactured exports, since the oil-price shocks induced a recession in the 
US.
It should be noted that the demand effect on the structure of production 
becomes important only when dynamic aspects of growth and structural change are 
taken into consideration. Suppose, for example, that a static model is still 
employed, where the technical conditions of production do not change under 
booming conditions. In this case, the supply response of the different sectors is 
determined solely by relative prices. Changes in demand patterns are only relevant 
to the extent that they impact on the supply of non-tradeables since increases in 
demand for tradeables can be met from foreign supplies, whose prices decline 
under booming conditions. This is precisely the Dutch disease argument. Once 
productivity growth is introduced, on the other hand, demand expansion can have
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a significant impact on manufacturing supply, especially if the economy was 
constrained by the small size of product markets prior to the boom.
There are three other analytical aspects that undermine the usefulness of 
applying Dutch disease economics to Jordan. First, in the model there are only 
rational optimising agents, and no governments. Second, the economic conditions 
obtaining in Jordan at the start of the boom challenge the model's assumptions. 
Third, the model considers neither the effect of the new structure of prices on 
altering technical conditions of production, nor its effect on the structure of 
production cost, and, therefore, on profitability. I will take up each of these points 
in turn.
As in all countries reviewed under the Dutch disease literature, government 
action in Jordan is found to influence resource allocation either directly through 
investment, or indirectly through fiscal and monetary policies. Investment in 
irrigation and large industrial schemes enhanced the supply response of the traded 
sectors significantly. The same result obtained through complementary investment 
in infrastructure, which increased the production and distribution efficiency of the 
traded sectors. Fixing interest rates at a level that entailed negative financing cost to 
producers, while the regulatory framework had a built-in bias to investment in 
productive sectors, led to two phenomena. The boom-induced relative price 
movements were exacerbated by further increasing the cost of labour - a non­
traded input - and reducing that of capital - a traded input, and, as a consequence 
of this, capital accumulated rapidly in these sectors. New technology embodying 
investment in both agriculture and manufacturing enhanced their supply response 
and lead to an expansion of their profits.
The Dutch disease model assumes macro-equilibrium with full employment 
and perfect factor and product markets. Hie pre-boom Jordanian economy, 
however, had surplus labour of an order of magnitude of 14%, and its 
manufacturing sector had idle physical capacity of over 50%. Low economic 
activity was a function mainly of inadequate savings and balance of payments 
constraints, which also constrained Jordan in world capital markets. Foreign 
exchange availability during the boom relieved these constraints, with two major 
outcomes. First, the availability of foreign exchange in turn made available 
imported raw, intermediate and capital inputs to production, which were likely to 
embody better technologies than those used under conditions of foreign exchange 
constraints. Second, the improved balance of payments position allowed an 
expansion of overall economic activity, thus increasing income and employment.
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Since the economy had started from idle capacity, expansion in economic activity 
allowed increasing capacity utilization and benefits from economies of scale where 
they existed, thus increasing productivity and, consequently, manufactures’ 
competitiveness.
With regard to relative prices, the model fails to assess the effect of the new 
price structure on profitability in tradeables. The failure is a result, partially, of lack 
of appreciation of conditions of industrial production in developing countries, and 
partially the result of the theory's assumption of static technical conditions of 
production. As the price of tradeables declines relative to that of non-tradeables, the 
cost of imported raw and intermediate inputs to tradeables' production also 
declines accordingly. In developing economies where the industrial structure is not 
mature and inter-industry linkages are weak, the share of imported material may 
be greater than that of wages, as was shown for most manufacturing industries in 
Jordan. Thus, while the Dutch disease argument hinges on the loss of 
competitiveness in tradeables' production because of rising wage costs, it ignores 
the over-compensatory effect of the decline in the cost of imported material as the 
currency appreciates. In addition, and as mentioned above, if the new material 
embodies better technologies than those used previously, the rise in productivity 
will further alleviate the effect of wage rises.
There is yet another effect of the change in relative factor prices. As the 
booming sector pulls labour out of other sectors, the factor distribution profile 
facing producers in non-booming sectors, both traded and non-traded, becomes 
more capital-intensive. In the Dutch disease model this does not induce any further 
change, because the total stock of capital in the economy is fixed and there is no 
new capital, and because technological conditions of production are assumed to be 
unchanging. In industrialising booming economies, especially those that were 
capital-constrained prior to the boom, there is likely to be large capital inflow 
during the boom. In this case, the increase in capital-intensity of production may 
not only increase labour productivity, by definition, but also total factor 
productivity, if the new capital embodies technological progress. This is likely to be 
more true for manufacturing and agriculture than for services, as I have shown for 
Jordan.
The Dutch disease model investigates the effect of changes in factor prices 
on unit costs, and allows for changes in the capital-labour ratio, via the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labour as factor prices change. The model stops 
short, however, of considering how technological change can bring down unit
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costs. To borrow from Jones (1965), on whose work the Dutch disease model is 
partially built,
^  P t + K t (1)
QlN™ + Q k /  =  PN+KN
(2)
where a circumflex indicates relative change; 0  ^ is the share of factor i in sector /,
with k referring to capital, I to labour, T to tradeables, and N  to nontradeables; Pj is 
price of commodity /, which equals unit cost under perfect competition - the zero 
profit condition; w and r are labour and capital cost, respectively; and n is 
technological change. The Dutch disease assumes technology to be given and thus 
that 7t s equal zero. In this case unit costs depend on the cost of capital and labour, 
and their intensities in terms of value shares in each sector. If technological change 
is permitted, its effect in any sector is similar to a subsidy for that sector: it brings 
unit costs down. During the boom in Jordan, in both agriculture and 
manufacturing, but not in services, productivity growth was significant enough to 
outweigh the rise in wages. In the equations above, assuming zero % ]\f and 
positive 7i p we can see how the unit costs in tradeables will decline, pulling more 
resources towards the sector; and thus pro-industrialisation.
Still on the subject of relative prices, the common practice in empirical Dutch 
disease literature of using the real effective exchange rate as an indicator of 
profitability in tradeables needs to be refined because, in Jordan's case at least, it has 
given erroneous results. This is because the conceptualisation of this index follows 
directly from the theoretical construct of the model. Thus the same weaknesses 
found in the theory are reflected in this and similar indices; they do not adequately 
consider the effect of relative price changes on the structure of production costs, 
and they abstract from productivity growth.
The foregoing points of discussion make clear the limitations of applying 
simple comparative statics general equilibrium models, such as the Dutch disease 
model, in the study of booming industrialising economies. The static nature of the 
model is the most limiting aspect of the analysis, since the dynamics of demand 
expansion and productivity growth are the factors that determine growth and 
sectoral shifts over time. These forces work more powerfully during the boom, 
which translates into a demand shock if the windfall revenues are monetised. It is 
imperative, therefore, to employ a dynamic model in assessing the effect of booms
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on the structure of production. The general equilibrium assumption ignores 
prevailing economic conditions in the majority of developing economies, whose 
constraints in capital markets and balance of payments problems invariably entail 
that there be a large pool of surplus labour in the economy. How the boom can 
change these conditions and lead to rapid industrialisation is therefore overlooked 
by Dutch disease analysis. I have also noted that each of the tradeable sectors, 
agriculture and manufacturing, is a different unit of analysis, because technical 
conditions of production differ considerably between the two, and because changes 
in demand conditions induced by the boom influence their supply response 
differently. Dichotomising the economy into tradeables and non-tradeables is 
therefore not only a gross oversimplification, but actually a misrepresentation of 
booming industrialising economies.
The present study has gone some way towards offering an alternative 
approach to Dutch disease economics. There remains a need to formalise a 
theoretical model that incorporates all the analytical aspects considered in the study 
of industrialising economies that have benefited from favourable exogenous 
shocks. It should be noted, however, that the accumulation of theoretical Dutch 
disease literature - or more generally booming sector economics - without a parallel 
advance in empirical research, underlies some of the misconceptions about the 
applicability of Dutch disease economics to industrialising economies. Therefore, 
priority should be given to more empirical research on these economies to 
generalise some of the conclusions of the present study, and to bring to light other 
analytical aspects pertaining to booming industrialising economies. In this respect, 
the work of Bevan, Collier and Gunning (1990) is relevant. It shows the need to 
study trends in the terms of trade between exports and imports during a 
commodity boom. It also emphasises the need to formalise government action. 
Other conceivable points of discussion include the effect of changes in the monetary 
sphere on real production during a boom. Investment behaviour, and the market 
conditions that influence it, are also areas that merit further research. There is 
probably a need to distinguish between investment in the different sectors.
Finally, I have noted the confusion in the literature between the effect of 
changes in price relatives and of demand conditions on the structure of production. 
Whilst the former aspect may adversely influence the supply of tradeables, the 
latter may give a disproportionate stimulus to tradeables’ production. The 
confusion stems, first, from the complexity of processes unleashed by booming 
conditions in industrialising economies, which of course is no excuse, and, second,
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from neglect of the boom effect on changing the initial economic conditions of these 
economies, including the structure of demand. Future research on booming 
industrialising economies may, therefore, benefit from organising analytical issues 
in two distinct, and yet closely linked, areas. The first being the boom effect on 
relative prices and export competitiveness, which falls mainly in the realm of trade 
theories, and where the Dutch disease theory can be put to use. The second being 
the boom effect on changing the initial economic conditions (capital availability, 
buoyant demand, full employment of resources, etc.) which in turn changes the 
supply responses of the different sectors. This would generally utilise the economic 
literature on industrialisation.
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APPENDIX AIV.l 
Estimates of real GDP
A major problem encountered in the writing of this dissertation was the estimation of 
real growth in the Jordanian economy. All national accounts in Jordan are given in 
current prices up to 1985, when production of constant price national accounts started. 
This necessitated the construction of GDP deflators over a long time span, 1954-92, 
with the accompanying hazard of accumulating errors from both personal errors of 
judgement and from errors inherited in the statistics on which the estimates are based. 
Nevertheless, since any deflation is better than no deflation, I embarked on the 
process, using a number of data sources and cross checking with other scholars' work 
whenever possible. I cannot overstress, however, that these estimates should be 
treated with considerable caution.
AIV.1.1 Estimates of GDP by Sectoral Value Added
The estimates of GDP adopted in this study are production-based, for two reasons. 
Statistics on the production side in Jordan are more reliable than those based on 
expenditure or income. More important, tire choice of measuring national output by 
sectoral value added follows directly from the purpose of this study, which is to 
examine changes in the structure of production over time.
Porter (1961, in Mazur 1979) gives estimates of GDP by sector in current prices 
for the period 1954-59. These are adjusted by Mazur in light of later modifications 
made by the Jordan Department of Statistics (previously JDS, presently DOS) to make 
them more comparable to JDS estimates for a later period, 1959/60-65/66. GDP 
estimates by sector are also given by Sayigh (1978) for the period 1954-1973. For the 
earlier period 1954-59, however, Sayigh's estimates are comparable with tine 
unadjusted estimates of Porter, and for the later period 1967-73 they seem to include 
the West Bank. For these reasons Sayigh's estimates were not used in this study. For 
1964 to date, estimates of GDP by sector are available from the Central Bank of Jordan 
(CBJ). These are available generally in CBJ's monthly bulletins, while for the period 
1964-88 they are compiled in CBJ (1989).
The GDP estimates adopted in this study are Porter's adjusted figures for 1954- 
58; Mazur’s for 1959-1966; and CBJ's for 1967-1992 GDP estimates by sector at current 
prices are given in Table AIV.1-1, and at constant 1975 prices in Table AIV.1-3.
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AIV.1.2 GDP Deflators
As I mentioned in the introduction, there are no continuous price series by which to 
deflate GDP that cover the whole period under study, 1952 to 1992. There are, 
however, separate indices of price movements that provide partial coverage of the 
period in question. For this reason, it was necessary to piece together composite price 
indexes (Table AIV.1-2).
For the period 1959-66,1 adopted Mazur’s implicit price deflators that result 
when his current-price value added is divided by the deflated value added. Mazur 
deflates only those sectors where data is highly reliable, and thus deflates about 60- 
68% only of GDP. An overall GDP deflator is calculated by Mazur himself for those 
sectors that are deflated. I assumed that inflation in the undeflated sectors was the 
same as the average for the deflated sectors, or 1.5% p.a.. Also using this average rate 
of inflation, I extrapolated GDP deflators backward to cover the period 1954-1958 
(which Mazur's (ibid) analysis seems to indicate as the average rate of inflation for 
that period). For the period 1966-75, I used the CPI as given in CBJ (1989; and 
Monthly Bulletins) to deflate all sectors.
From 1975 onward, various price series have been published by CBJ,1 mainly 
wholesale prices indices (WPI) and cost of living indices (COL), from which I have 
constructed deflators for the various sectors. For agriculture, the composite price 
index is constructed from WPI for cereal, vegetable, and fruit production (CBJ, ibid; 
and 1983). For mining and quarrying, largely phosphate- and potash-based and 
mostly exported, I used the unit value of export of ’crude inedible material, except 
fuel'. For manufacturing I constructed a deflator composed of WPI for various 
manufacturing industries (CBJ, ibid), which was cross-checked with the World Bank’s 
(1989) deflator for the sector covering the period 1975-85 (see notes to Table AVH.4 
(l.a) in Appendix AVII.4 for details). For both agriculture and manufacturing the 
weights are as given in CBJ, adjusted to add up to unity in each sector. For water and 
electricity the deflator is the 'fuel and utility' item in the COL index. Hie value added 
of electricity accounts for the larger share in this item. The construction deflator is the 
WPI for 'construction material1. The government and other services deflator is 
available from 'GDP deflators' in World Bank (1984, Table 2.2: 110). The index is 
given for 1975-87, which I extrapolated it over 1988-92 using inflation rates implicit in 
'general services' in COL index. All GDP deflators covering the period 1975-82 were 
cross-checked with Naraplasingam's (1985) deflators for the same period, for which a 
clear methodology is given and as such seem quite reliable.
1 Unless otherwise m entioned, all CBJ price indices are from Yearly Statistical series: 1964-88 
(1989); and Monthly Bulletin, various issues.
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Table AIV.1-1 
Industrial Origin of GDP for Jordan, 1954-1992
_____________ (in million JD at current prices)_____________
GDP 1/ Agriculture Mining 2 / M anufacturing 2 /
Electricity & 
w ater supply 2 / Construction
G overnment
services
Transport it  
com m unication
Business 
& trade
Other
services
1954 53.03 15.73 0.50 3.19 0.30 1.50 8.50 4.70 10.90 7.70
1955 47.89 7.39 0.60 3.83 0,36 1.90 9.00 5.90 10.90 8.00
1956 66.76 20.46 0.73 4.63 0.44 2.10 10.70 7.20 12.30 8.20
1957 68.96 15.36 0.78 4.95 0.47 2.40 12.40 8.80 14.10 9.70
1958 77.80 16.60 0.85 5.43 0.52 3.00 14.50 9.80 16.90 10.20
1959 85.17 15.08 0.86 5.50 0.52 4.66 14.95 10.70 18.81 14.08
1960 89.40 14.62 0.95 6.05 0.58 4.50 15.75 11.12 20.44 15.39
1961 110.87 25.30 1.19 7.59 0.72 4.50 16.74 12.64 25.55 16.64
1962 108.62 20.90 1.10 7.03 0.67 6.15 17.06 12.53 25.09 18.09
1963 117.69 22.10 1.45 9.22 0.88 6.12 17.61 12.77 27.78 19.76
1964 135.55 34.14 1.70 10.83 1.03 5.45 19.70 12.03 29.52 21.15
1965 150.95 34.11 2.49 13.72 1.70 7.87 21.93 12.60 33.54 23.52
1966 149.61 27.65 2.50 14.80 2.00 9.28 22.53 14.42 31.69 25.30
1967 139.40 23.40 2.70 14.80 1.20 6.10 24.50 8.20 35.40 23.10
1968 162.95 16.20 3.14 16.91 1.50 9.70 36.40 12.90 40.60 25.60
1969 194.18 22.50 3.28 18.80 1.60 10.70 40.50 14.40 48.10 34.30
1970 183.76 15.60 3.46 15.90 1.90 7.70 42.50 14.30 50.20 32.20
1971 196.14 23.90 3.64 16.40 2.20 7.40 43.60 14.60 51.40 33.00
1972 214.82 26.60 3.82 18.50 2.50 9.20 45.90 17.30 55.30 35.70
1973 218.50 17.60 4.00 17.20 2.80 15.20 46.70 17.90 59.00 38.10
1974 274.80 30.30 10.80 29.70 3.00 16.80 54.30 22.80 64.80 42.30
1975 358.20 26.00 16.30 39.70 3.10 19.20 65.20 24.90 96.90 66.90
1976 443.80 37.30 17.80 50.00 3.90 26.60 81.70 32.50 113.90 80.10
1977 513.80 41.70 19.90 53.20 5.50 36.80 84.40 35.90 142.20 94.20
1978 637.60 58.60 22.90 71.40 7.20 51.00 95.00 59.30 169.60 102.60
1979 776.10 43.60 27.50 94.10 10.10 70.50 129.10 62.90 214.70 123.60
1980 1,039.90 69.40 39.90 127.20 17.10 97.50 170.20 79.70 272.40 166.50
1981 1,213.50 75.10 43.20 165.10 21.00 110.60 191.20 102.70 307.90 196.70
1982 1,352.20 81.80 45.30 184.90 25.30 121.90 218.50 123.50 340.10 210.90
1983 1,729.30 97.20 40.00 197.60 22,10 188.00 266.10 190.40 486.60 241.30
1984 1,837.30 79.60 60.80 233.70 32.00 177.60 289.50 191.10 520.70 252.30
1985 1,928.90 87.40 62.70 192.90 40.10 144.40 316.90 230.50 563.50 290.50
1986 2,014.40 96.20 63.10 193.90 44.20 144.30 365.10 274.70 559.40 273,50
1987 2,074.20 126.60 66.90 213.60 48.50 126.00 383.70 277.40 562.40 269.10
1988 2,134.80 114.50 82.40 197.00 50.60 118.40 415.00 294.50 605.20 257.20
1989 2,227.20 131.70 154.50 254.70 52.80 106.70 427.80 359.10 559.30 180.60
1990 2,445.70 179.60 158.80 345.20 53.30 111.60 444.90 362.00 582.40 207.90
1991 2,632.90 174.30 124.90 343.70 62.00 125.70 471.30 365.50 710.80 254.70
1992 3,010.90 204.00 116.10 426.00 70.90 152.40 555.00 428.00 788.60 269.90
Source: For 1954-66, M azur (1972), Table 11,1; 51; for 1966-92, Cental Bank of Jordan, 'M onthly Statistical Bulletin', various issues. 
1 /  At factor cost
2 /  For 1954-66 m ining, m anufacturing and electricity and water supply are aggregated in one category in the source (M azur, 1972). The disaggregation is m ade 
by assum ing a sim ilar sectoral contribution in pre-1966 to that in post-1966, for which data are disaggregated.
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T ab le  A IV .l-  2
G D P  D efla tors for  Jordan, 1954-92 (1975=100)
Agricultural
Mining k 
quarrying Manufacturing
Water & 
electricity Construction services
Other
services
1954 40.1 19.1 56.8 87.1 113.0 42.6 44.8
1955 40 .7 19.4 57 .7 88.5 114.7 43.2 45.5
1956 41.3 19.7 58.6 89.8 116.4 43.8 46.1
1957 41.9 20.0 59.4 91.1 118.2 44.5 46.8
1958 42.5 20.3 60.3 92.5 120.0 45 .2 47.5
1959 43.3 19.5 58.0 73.3 122.2 46 .0 47.6
1960 46.7 21.0 55.1 61.2 124.7 46 .9 49.1
1961 47.8 21.2 51.0 65.9 77.9 47.9 50.7
1962 44.3 20.6 51.4 59.5 45.8 48.9 48.4
1963 45.5 20.9 48.6 56.2 48.3 49.9 48.9
1964 45.2 20.9 48.6 56.2 45.5 50.9 48 .9
1965 45.3 21.1 50 .4 82.3 46.4 50 .4 50 .4
1966 49.2 21.6 49.2 80.4 45.4 49.2 49.2
1967 54.7 24.0 54.7 89.4 5 0 .4 54 .7 54.7
1968 55.8 24.1 55.8 89.6 55 .4 55.8 55.8
1969 55.8 24.3 55.8 90.1 60.6 55.8 55.8
1970 59.9 18.5 59.9 91.6 65.9 59.9 59.9
1971 64.2 18.7 64.2 95.6 71.6 64.2 64.2
1972 67.5 24.3 67.5 96.5 77.9 67.5 67.5
1973 71.5 25.0 71.5 99.0 84.6 71.5 71.5
1974 80.7 78.1 80.7 99.8 92.0 80.7 80 .7
1975 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 .0 100.0
1976 136.2 71.8 103.4 106.7 124.4 117.7 107.6
1977 148.3 59.5 111.0 106.9 131.2 127.9 118.8
1978 167.2 55.8 118.9 189.1 141.4 124.8 115.8
1979 175.9 59.8 131.5 158.8 154.6 142.8 147.6
1980 167.2 82.2 155.2 197.8 187.2 162.1 130.4
1981 179.3 94.8 175.8 220.5 192.7 196.4 161.3
1982 179.3 102.5 187.0 237.8 191.5 190.9 179.0
1983 194.8 90.1 196.0 244.4 195.2 190.9 194.7
1984 182.8 94.5 196.2 245.2 197.7 190.9 178.5
1985 150.0 90.8 207.0 254.3 197.7 203.4 176.5
1986 151.7 73.7 209.7 246.9 197.2 210 .4 175.6
1987 162.1 64.7 219.6 242.0 189.5 232.1 191.5
1988 150.0 82.6 229.9 242.2 231.4 253.0 208.8
1989 132.8 144.1 273 .7 249.1 329.8 341.6 281.9
1990 170.7 170.4 308.3 261.0 373.3 372.9 307.7
1991 177.6 177.6 339.8 283.2 368.0 390.2 322 .0
1992 186.5 186.4 356.7 297.4 386.4 409.7 338.1
Source: C en tra l Bank of Jo rd a n  (1989), 'Y early S tatistical Series: 1964-1988; M o n th ly  Bulletin , v a rio u s  issues. 'M az u r  (1972; 1979). ‘ W orld  B ank (1984; 1989). 
N n ra p la s in g am  an d  S h a k h a tre h  (1985).
N ote: See text fo r m eth o d  of co n stru c tin g  defla tors.
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Table AIV.1-3 
Industrial Origin of G D P for Jordan, 1954-92
__________(in million JD, at constant 1975 prices)__________
GDP 1/ Agriculture Mininn M anufactures
Electricity & 
water supply Construction
Government
services
Transport Sc 
communication
Finance 
business 
& trade
Other
services
1954 121.2 39.3 2.6 5.6 0.3 1.3 20.0 10.5 24.3 17.2
1955 105.4 18.2 3.1 6.6 0.4 1.7 20.8 13.0 24.0 17.6
1956 147.9 49.6 3.7 7.9 0.5 1.8 24.4 15.6 26.7 17.8
1957 148.9 36.7 3.9 8.3 0.5 2.0 27.9 18.8 30.1 20.7
1958 165.0 39.1 4,2 9.0 0.6 2.5 32.1 20.6 35.5 21.5
1959 177.4 34.8 4.4 9.5 0.7 3.8 32.5 22.5 39.5 29.6
1960 180.5 31.3 4.5 11.0 0.9 3.6 33.6 22.6 41.6 31.3
1961 223.5 52.9 5.6 14.9 1.1 5.8 34.9 25.0 50.4 32.9
1962 230.8 47.2 5.4 13.7 1.1 13.4 34.9 25.9 51.8 37.4
1963 247.3 48.6 6.9 19.0 1.6 12.7 35.3 26.1 56.8 40.4
1964 286.5 75.5 8.1 22.3 1.8 12.0 38.7 24.6 60.3 43.2
1965 315.3 75.4 11.8 27.2 2.1 16.9 43.5 25.0 66.6 46.7
1966 311.6 56.2 11.6 30.1 2.5 20.4 45.8 29.3 64.4 51.4
1967 261.3 42.8 11.2 27.1 1.3 12.1 44.8 15.0 64.7 42.2
1968 298.5 29.0 13.0 30.3 1.7 17.5 65.2 23.1 72.8 45.9
1969 353.0 40.3 13.5 33.7 1.8 17.6 72.6 25.8 86.2 61.5
1970 317.6 26.1 18.7 26.6 2.1 11.7 71.0 23.9 83.9 53.8
1971 317.0 37.2 19.4 25.5 2.3 10.3 67.9 22.7 80.1 51.4
1972 325.6 39.4 15.7 27.4 2.6 11.8 68.0 25.6 82.0 52.9
1973 311.6 24.6 16.0 24.1 2.8 18.0 65.3 25.0 82.5 53.3
1974 337.6 37.5 13.8 36.8 3.0 18.3 67.3 28.2 80.3 52.4
1975 358.2 26.0 16.3 39.7 3.1 19.2 65.2 24.9 96.9 66.9
1976 405.6 27.4 24.8 48.3 3.7 21.4 69.4 30.2 105.9 74.5
1977 438.0 28.1 33.5 47.9 5.1 28.0 66.0 30.2 119.7 79.3
1978 538.5 35.0 41.1 60.0 3.8 36.1 76.1 51.2 146.5 88.6
1979 556.6 24.8 46.0 71.5 6.4 45.6 90.4 42.6 145.5 83.7
1980 735.5 41.5 48.5 81.9 8.6 52.1 105.0 61.1 208.9 127.7
1981 722.2 41.9 45.6 93.9 9.5 57.4 97.3 63.7 190.9 122.0
1982 754.2 45.6 44.2 98.9 10.6 63.7 114.4 69.0 190.0 117.8
1983 911.6 49.9 44.4 100.8 9.0 96.3 139.4 97.8 250.0 124.0
1984 1021.7 43.6 64.4 119.1 13.1 89.8 151.6 107.1 291.7 141.4
1985 1079.4 58.3 69.0 93.2 15.8 73.0 155.8 130.6 319.2 164.6
1986 1136.8 63,4 85.7 92.5 17.9 73.2 173.5 156.4 318.5 155.7
1987 1109.7 78.1 103.5 97.3 20.0 66.5 165.3 144.8 293.6 140.5
1988 1052.1 76.3 99.8 85.7 20.9 51.2 164.1 141.1 289.9 123.2
1989 868.2 99.2 107.3 93.0 21.2 32.4 125.2 127.4 198.4 64.1
1990 854.5 105.2 93.2 112.0 20.4 29.9 119.3 117.6 189.3 67.6
1991 859.8 98.1 70.3 101.2 21.9 34.2 120.8 113.5 220.7 79.1
1992 1134.0 95.1 59.2 120.5 25.6 39.8 247.9 157.1 289.5 99.1
Source C alculated  from  Tables AIV.1-1 & AIV.1-2.
1 /  At factor cost
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APPENDIX AV.X 
The Real Effective Exchange Rate for Jordan
After a brief history of Jordan's exchange rate (AV.I.l), I shall discuss exchange 
rate measurements that reflect export competitiveness (AV.1.2), and finally I 
shall give the methodology for calculating the real effective exchange rate for 
Jordan used in this study (chapter V).
AV.1.1 History of Jordan's Exchange Rate
----------- Period—  ____ ______________ Exchange Rate Regim e
1. 1950-1956 Fixed
2. 1956-1961 Two-tier
3 1962-1970 Fixed
4- 1971 First devaluation
5. 1972-1988 P egged  to SDR
C____1988____________________M anaged float
(1) In the first and second periods, 1950-1956 & 1956-1961, Jordan 
belonged to the Sterling Zone and followed the sterling exchange standards. 
The Jordanian Dinar (JD) was at par with the pound sterling, i.e. JD 1.0 = £ 1.0.
(2) The two tier system began in 1956, with the free rate applying to 
"non-essentials" in order to compress imports, while the supported rate applied 
to all other imports and to exports.
(3) In 1967, when England devalued the pound sterling by 14%, the 
sterling share in Jordan's total gold and foreign reserves was about 30%, the rest 
being in US dollars, gold and Fund assets (Central Bank of Jordan, 1977, Annual 
Report: 131). At that point Jordan decided not to devalue, thus raising further its 
overvalued currency (Anani, 1990: 129). The JD was now worth one pound and 
three shillings - instead of one pound only.1 Subsequently, the JD was detached 
from the pound and pegged to the US dollar and, therefore, gold at the rate of 
JD 1.0 = $ 2.8 (Qandah, 1988).
I
Jordan’s loss from the devaluation, in terms of foreign reserves, was JD 6.43 million.
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(4) In 1971, when the US dollar was devalued by 7.89%, and since over 
50% of Jordan's reserves were in that currency (Anani, 1990: 25), Jordan 
followed suit and devalued by the same amount (Central Bank of Jordan, 1974, 
Annual Report: 69). Thus the value of the JD relative to the dollar remained 
unchanged.
(5) In the following period, 1972-1988, and to avoid the vagaries of the 
financial markets in the early seventies after the break down of Breton Woods, 
Jordan resorted to pegging the JD to a basket of currencies2 (Central Bank of 
Jordan, 1977, Annual Report: 131). The parity value was JD 1.0 = SDR 2.578 ± 
2.25% (World Bank, 1988: 32). The JD thus remained stable during the period of 
the two oil price shocks.
The desirability of a stable exchange rate, as far as the Jordanian 
government is concerned, stemmed from the need to attract Jordanian workers' 
remittances, which since 1976 financed over one third of total imports, and 
averaged one-third of GDP. It is precisely the receipt of remittances, and of 
Arab aid, that allowed this policy any chance of success, since these foreign 
exchange inflows propped up the JD by expanding Jordan's foreign reserves 
considerably. During this period the JD was completely convertible, and there 
were no significant controls on foreign currency movement. Thus the official 
price was effectively the market-determined price.
(6 ) Since the mid-eighties, however, remittances and unrequited 
transfers began to decline appreciably. To maintain the exchange rate at its high 
level, borrowing was increased and reserves were drawn down. The two 
arguments given by government officials' against devaluation, which succeeded 
in averting a devaluation until 1988, were as follows:
i) Devaluation would not lead to an increase in exports and a reduction 
in imports (because of low price elasticities for both imports and 
exports); instead the money supply would increase, creating inflationary 
pressure in the economy. Evidence from the first devaluation in 1971 was 
cited, when the balance of trade deficit increased by 22% in 1972 against
^Consisting of US dollar (42%); Sterling Pound (12%); Deutsche Mark (19%); Yen (15%); and 
French Franc 12%. In 1988, the Pound Sterling and French Franc shares were raised by 1% each, 
w hile the Yen’s was lowered by 2% (Hadad, 1987: 40).
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the 1971 balance. The explanation for this behaviour in the trade balance 
may be found in Jordan’s high import penetration, with a ratio of imports 
to GDP averaging 80% between 1975-1985.
ii) In addition to Jordan's low price elasticity of demand for imports, 
substitution between imports and domestic products does not take place 
in the short run, thus devaluation will merely increase the value of 
imports and lead to inflation (Anani, 1990:129, Qandah, 1988).
The artificially high value of the JD, however, was not sustainable in the face of 
mounting indebtedness, and eventually a second and more substantial 
devaluation (50%) took place on October 15 1988. The JD was detached from the 
SDR system, and its value was 'managed' through a controlled float. Under the 
new regime, the Central Bank of Jordan, in consultation with the main 
commercial banks, determines the exchange rate for the JD on a daily basis, in 
accordance with the availability of foreign exchange and the demand for it.
AV.1,2 Measurements of the Exchange Rate
The nominal exchange rate is not a very useful tool for measuring the country's 
competitiveness in export markets. A measure that reflects the strength of the 
domestic currency vis-a-vis trading partners' currencies is needed instead. Such 
a measure could be the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER), which 
measures the value of a domestic currency in terms of a trade weighted 
composite of foreign currencies, with domestic currency equivalent calculated 
via the US$ cross rate (World Bank, 1988).
However, since a fall in the NEER enhances exports' competitiveness only 
if the differential inflation between domestic and trading partners economies is 
less than or equal to zero, deflating the NEER with the appropriate inflation 
rates more accurately measures the degree of competitiveness of domestic 
exports than does the NEER. The resulting measure is called the real effective 
exchange rate REER, which is the NEER times the ratio of the domestic price 
index to a trade weighted composite of consumer price indices in trading 
partner countries (ibid).
Variations in this main exchange rate measurement are of course possible
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and enable the analysis to be focused on one policy issue rather than another. 
For example, using the wholesale price index (WPI) of the US vs. domestic 
consumer price index (CPI) times the nominal ER can be used as a proxy for 
measuring the price of tradeables relative to non-tradeables in Dutch disease 
analyses (Pinto, 1987). Another variation is to use an import-weighted, rather 
than a trade-weighted, composite. Pinto (ibid) argues for Nigeria that, since oil 
is Nigeria's major export item, an import weighted measure of the ER is more 
useful for the following reasons: a) it focuses on non-oil traded sectors; b) it 
abstracts from the impact of the large increases in oil prices on trade weights; 
and c) it makes economic sense since resource movements between oil and non­
oil sectors are absent. Furthermore, using an import-weighted measure for 
countries with deep import penetration reflects better the value of its exchange 
rate.
Another ER concept is the purchase power parity (PPP) doctrine which 
takes domestic price level as given and tries to depict the ER that equalises the 
purchasing power of domestic and foreign currencies units. That is, the PPP 
finds the change in the equilibrium ER from the base period that completely 
offsets the differential between changes in home and foreign price levels 
(Caves and Jones, 1985: 352).
AV.1.3 Measurement of Jordan's Real Effective Exchange Rate
I shall attempt in what follows to find Jordan's REER against its main trading 
partners. From the above, the import weighted REER seems to be the 
appropriate measure, considering Jordan's high level of import penetration. The 
step-wise calculations are given in the series of tables at the end of this 
Appendix numbered AV.1-1 through AV.1-1-6.
(1) Table AV.1-1 gives the nominal exchange rate (NER) for Jordan's 
main trading partners, measured against the US$.
(2) Table AV.1-2 converts these currencies into a JD equivalent via the 
US$ cross rate, thus giving the bilateral exchange rates between Jordan and its 
major trading partners.
(3) Table AV.1-3 lists the wholesale price index for Jordan and all its 
trading partners, taking 1980 as a base year.
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(4) Table AV.1-4 gives the bilateral real exchange rate (BRER), which is 
the bilateral nominal exchange (BNER) rate multiplied by the respective WPI of 
the domestic and trading partner’s economy. That is,
BRER = BNER (JD/foreign currency)
WPI foreign 
WPI Jordan
(5) Tables AV.1-(5.1) to AV.l-(5.3) give the weights for Jordan's trading 
partners. The weights are the value of trade transacted with the country over 
the total value of trade transacted in any specific year.
(6) Table AV.1-6 gives the REER which is the BRER calculated in step (4) 
times a trade/im port weighted composite of the foreign currencies of Jordan's 
trading partners. The weights used in the composite are those calculated in 
tables AV.l-(5.2) and AV.l-(5.3).
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Table AV.1-1
Nominal Exchange Rates for Iordan's Main Trading Partners, 1970-1992 (SUS to domestic currency)
Jordan U .S.l/ U.K. Japan Germ any Italy France Greece Spain S. Arabia Kuwait Syria Iraq Egypt India " h k k m M U Romania
1970 2JW W 1,KXX> 2.3937 01X128 0,2741 01X116 0.1811 0.0333 0,0143 0.2222 t m x ) 0 2 6 1 8 2.7849 231XX1 0.1320 01X126 0.0500
1971 2WXX) 1X1857 25525 01X132 0-3060 01X117 lUXXH 0,0333 0.0151 0.2410 31HIX1 0 2 618 2.9647 2-31XX) 0.1374 00024 0.05(X)
1972 2.8UX1 1.0857 23481 0.1X133 0-3124 01X1] 7 0.1953 01)333 0,0157 0.2410 3.0511 0 2 618 2 9792 22000 0.1238 01X124 0D500
197? 3,03911 1J0A3 23232 0.1X136 0-3 7lXl 01X116 0.2124 0.0333 0.0176 0.2198 3.37US 0.2632 3.3862 25556 0.1219 00024 0 0 500
1974 3.1746 1.2244 2 3 4 8 6 00033 0.4150 U.0015 112250 0.0337 0.0178 02198 3.4526 0 2 7 0 3 33862 25556 0,1227 0,0024 0.0500
197S 3.0303 1.1707 2.0235 0.1X133 0.3813 0.(X)15 (1.2229 0.0333 0.0167 02833 33996 0.2703 3-3862 25556 0.1119 0,0024 0.05UI
1976 3.0231 1.1618 1,7024 0.0034 0.4233 lUXJll 0.2012 0.0281 0 0146 0.2833 3.4849 0 2 5 4 8 32862 2 5 556 0 1 )2 6 0.0024 0.0500
1977 3.1746 1-3147 1.9060 0.1XM2 0.4751 01X111 02125 0112 A) 0.0124 IUH53 35703 02 5 4 8 33862 2 5 5 5 6 0.1218 0.0024 0.0500
197K 3.4130 15028 2.0345 0.1X151 0.5470 01X112 02392 0.0282 00143 (0 0 1 7 3.6792 02548 3.3862 25556 0.1221 0.0024 0,0556
1979 3.3898 13173 2.2240 (UXM2 0.5775 01X112 U-2488 0.0278 0.0151 0.2972 3.6615 0.2548 32862 25556 01265 0.0016 0.0556
1980 32415 U  754 2JH5U 1)1X149 05105 0.OUI1 0.2214 0.0261 0.0126 0.3077 3,6860 02548 3.3862 25556 0.1261 0.1X116 0.0556
198] 2 9498 I 1639 1 9OS0 IHXM5 04435 01XX18 0.1740 01)215 0.0103 0.2928 35535 0.2548 32862 1.4286 0.1099 0.0016 0,0667
1982 2X45(1 1.1031 1.6145 0.0043 0,4173 0.0073 0.1487 0.0174 01X180 0-2911 3.4838 02 548 3 2 169 1.4286 0.1038 0.0014 00667
1983 2.691 K 10470 1.4506 01XH3 0  3671 01XX16 0.1198 0.0142 0,0064 02861 3.4181 0.2548 3 2 169 1.4286 00953 o .no io 0.0546
19H1 2,469] 0.9802 1.1565 0.0040 03177 0.0005 0.1043 0.0101 01X158 02 797 32845 0 2 5 4 8 32169 1.4286 0.0803 0.IXXW 0.(1562
1985 2.7192 l.(W84 14445 111X150 0.4063 (KXX16 0.1323 0006H OtXXtf 02743 3.4601 02 548 32169 1.4286 O.OH22 0.1XXW 0.0636
1986 2,9061 1.2232 1.4745 00063 0.5153 01XX17 0.1549 01KJ72 0.0076 (12670 3.4206 02 548 32169 1.4286 0,0762 o.oooa 0.IXX17
1987 3.0395 1.41B? 1.8715 01X181 0.6323 01XXJ9 0,187? 01X179 U1XJ92 0 2 670 3.7051 02548 32169 1.4286 0 0 777 0.0006 0.0007
1988 2.0964 15457 V8095 01X179 03617 d.IXXW 0.1650 0,0068 01X188 0.2670 35384 0.0891 32169 1.4286 0.0669 0.0006 0.06%
1989 15432 1.3142 1,6055 (UX17U 03890 01XXW 0.1728 0.1X163 01X191 (1.2671) 3.4250 0.0891 32169 0.9091 0 0 587 00006 0,0690
m > 15038 1.4227 1 9280 01X174 0.6693 01XXN 0.1950 01X163 0.01113 0:2670 3.4714 0.0891 32169 05(XX> 00553 0.000t5 0.0288
1991 14815 U 0 4 0 1,8707 01X180 1101X17 0XXXN 0.1931 0.0057 001U3 0.26711 35178 0.0891 32169 0 5 003 0.UM7 0.0005 U.0053
1992 1.4472 1.3750 15120 01X180 0 6 196 01KX17 0 1 816 0.1XW7 01XW7 0.2670 3,3036 0 0891 3.2169 021X13 0.0382 0.0005 00022
Sourcer IM F, 1FS \-iirioi 
1 /  In  te rm s of SDK.
j s  issues
Table AV.1-2
Bilateral Exchange Rates with Iordan for Main Trading Partners, 1970-1992 ($ US per foreign currency)
U S, U.K. Japan Germany Italy France Greece Spain S. Arabia Kuw ail Syria Iraq EWP* India Indaneaia Romania
1970 0  3571 0.8549 01x 110 0.0979 0.CXX16 0.0647 0(1119 0.0051 0,0794 1.1KXX1 00 935 0.9946 0.8214 0.0471 U.IXXW 0.0179
1971 0.3878 09116 0.0(1) 1 0.1093 0 0006 (MXK12 0.(1119 0.0054 0.0861 1.0H57 0.0935 1.0588 0.8314 0.0491 O.EXXW 0.0179
1972 0.3878 0.8386 0.0012 0,1116 U.0006 0.0697 0.0119 (1.1X156 00861 1.0897 0,0935 1.0640 0.8214 0.0442 o ixxw 0.0179
1973 0.3970 0.7645 00012 01217 0.1XX15 0.0699 0.0110 ll.(X>5K 0.0723 1 1091 (1.0866 1.1142 0.84(8* 0.0401 O.IXXW 00165
1974 03857 0739K 0 0 010 0.1307 0.(XX15 0 0 709 00106 0,0056 00692 1.0876 0.0851 1.0667 otu iso 0.0387 (UXK18 0.0158
1975 03863 0.6678 O.(X)l) 0.1258 (101X15 0.0736 0.0110 00055 0.0935 1.1219 (1,0892 1.1174 0.8433 0.0369 0(XX)8 0.0165
1976 0.3846 Cl .5635 o w n 0.1401 (UXXM 0 0 6 6 6 IKX»3 OIXMH 0.0938 1.1535 0.0843 1 1209 08459 0.0373 U.(XX)8 0.0166
1977 0,3826 0.61X14 00013 0 1 4 % (HXXM 0067(1 0.1X585 0,1X139 0.0899 1,1246 0,0803 1.0667 0.8050 (1.0384 0(XX18 00158
1978 03817 0.5% 1 O.IX315 01603 O.IXKM 0 0  AO 01X183 (UXM2 00884 I 0780 0  0746 (1.9921 0 7488 0.0358 0  (XXI? 110163
197V 0388/i 06561 UD012 0.1AM 0 DUM 0.0734 0.1X182 IUXM5 00877 1 IW02 0.0752 09989 0.7539 00373 0.0005 0.0164
198(1 0 3 935 0.7358 01X115 01575 (UXX3.1 0 0683 01X181 (MX131* 0.0949 1,1371 00786 1.0446 0.7884 0 0 389 0.IXX6 00171
1981 0 3 946 0  6468 01X115 0.1503 m x x u 0  0590 (11X173 00035 0.0993 1.2047 0,0864 1.1479 0  4843 00373 01XX6 (10226
1982 0 3 877 05675 01X115 (11467 0,0026 0.0523 0.1X161 0.(X)2B 0.1023 1 -2245 0,08% 11307 05021 0.0365 0.(KX)5 (1,0234
WK3 0 3KH9 0  5389 01X116 01364 0.IXXI2 0  0445 0(X>53 (1 (8374 01063 1.2698 0.0946 1 1931 0.5307 0  0354 OIXXM 0 0203
19K4 0 3970 0.4684 01X116 01 287 00002 0.0422 0.IXM1 01X123 0.1133 13302 0.1032 1.3029 0 5 786 0.0325 (KKXW 0.0228
19H5 0.4CD9 03312 01X118 01494 0IKX12 0 0 486 0.(X>25 01X124 o u x w 1.2725 00 937 1 183(1 (1.5254 (1.0302 (KXXL3 00234
1986 0  4209 0  5074 01X122 01773 otxxi? (1.0533 01X125 1)1X126 0(1919 11770 0.0877 1 1069 0 4 9 )6 00262 (UKXI2 0.0002
19H7 (I 4667 06157 (11X127 0.20S0 0IXXI3 0,0616 01X126 0.1X130 (1.0879 1.2190 0.0838 111584 0  4700 (1,0255 01XX12 0W 02
1988 0 6 4 )9 0863 ] 01X138 0.2679 oixxm 11,0787 01X132 (l.(XM? 0.1274 1 6878 0.0425 1.5345 0.6815 (1.0319 IUKX13 11.0332
1989 0.8516 1 0404 0.IXMS 03817 0.IXX15 0 1 120 (UXM1 ()(X69 (11730 2.2194 0.0577 2.0846 05891 0 0 3 8 0 (KXXM 11.0447
m i 09461 1 282) 01XM9 0  445) O.IKXXt 01297 0(XM2 0.1X169 (1.1776 23084 0.0592 2 1392 05325 0.0368 0.IXXI3 0.0192
1991 08802 13627 01X154 0.0004 ().(XX»6 0.1303 0.1X139 00071) (11802 2.3745 0.0601 2,1714 03027 0  0261 (1.1XXU U (W36
1992 09501 1 0448 01X155 0 42H1 0(KX)5 01255 0(X132 01X160 [11845 2.2828 0 0 6 )6 22228 03075 0.0264 (KXX13 0.(M15
Source  IM F. IF S v a n tn iM M im
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Table AV.1-3
W holesale Price Index for Jordan's Main Trading Partners, 1970-1992 (19&0=100)
)onian U.S. U K. Japan Germany Italy France Greece Spain S. ArabJj Kuwait Syria Iraq Er>p ' Turkey India Romania
iy7 ii 51-9 41.1 27.7 48.4 61,0 23.y 45.9 23.4 29.2 31.6 34.4
1971 52.7 42.4 30 ,3 48.0 64.1 24,8 46.9 24.4 30.9 33.(1 37.7
1972 54.1 44.3 32.2 48.4 65.1 25.8 49.1 26,0 33.0 3 4 5 5 1 5 35.7 80.8 42.2 7.R 4 5 6
1973 56.2 H U 34.5 56.0 69.4 30,1 5 6 3 31.7 26.4 40.2 62.y 47,4 84.7 45.0 y.4 53  J 98.7
1974 60.4 sW.fi 42.fi 73-7 78.7 42.5 72,7 41.6 43.0 48.8 69.6 54 .0 9 1 3 5 1 5 12,2 68.2 9 9 5
1975 5 3 5 85.0 52-4 75.y 82.3 49,1 68.6 45.0 46.9 65.6 74.7 57.9 100.0 55.4 135 70.9 HXUI
1975 72.6 68.1 wi.y 7y.7 85,4 57.1 73.6 5 U 53.1 86.4 80.4 65-1 112.8 59.7 15.7 69-5 5.0
1977 7 7 5 72.2 72,0 81.2 87.7 A 65 77.7 5H J 63.8 yfi.2 86,(1 70.9 123.1 65.2 19.4 74.8 101.1
iy 7 « 8 1 7 77.9 7y .i 79.1 88.7 72.1 K l.l 64.4 74 J 94.7 8 5 5 K 06 12K.7 74.9 29.1 74.6 103.1
1979 87.11 87.fi 87.7 84.9 93.0 B3.4 91.9 77.y 85.1 96.4 9 0 5 81.0 62.2 47.9 83.1 105.0
iy s o 100.0 100.0 100.0 11X1,0 100.0 KX1.0 1IKM1 OHIO 1IXI.0 llKl.O 100.0 HXUI 11X1.0 KXI.O 100.0
1981 KN.1 109.1 109.6 101.4 107.8 116,6 111.7 126.0 115.6 102.7 106-9 u y .o 108,0 136 0 112.2
1982 112.5 n u 118.0 103.2 114,1 132.7 123.3 1 460 129.7 103.8 1 0 8 0 132.0 118.1 171.3 1 1 5 0
1983 117.1 112,7 124.4 ltxi.y 115 8 145.7 135.9 174 ,y 14K.2 104,8 108.2 136.(1 136.9 223.K 124.0
1984 l iy .o 115.4 132.1 11X1.7 119,2 160.8 155.1 212.4 166.3 103,7 12K.fi 148.0 150.7 340.2 134.6
1985 1 2 0 5 1 149 139 4 99.fi 121.9 182,6 161.3 256.1 179 5 KX1.2 124.4 1 4 0 5 170.6 477.1 142.4
1988 122-5 116.0 142.7 WL5 118.9 181.0 163.2 2y«.i 181.1 97.0 125.1 iyfi,7 200.1 618.3 15U4
1987 133.K 120,4 147.3 87.1 115.9 185.7 166.3 327.3 182.7 95-5 129 5 289.fi 227.4 816.3 160.8
1988 123-0 127.0 152.6 86.2 117.3 194.5 173.2 3 6 0 3 188.1 yfi.4 135.2 4 2 5 5 338.3 1 3 915 174 7
I9«y 129.0 130.2 153.2 88.4 121.0 206.9 1793 408.5 196.0 97.4 147,0 484.7 365.4 2281.5 186.7
iy y u 129.9 131,6 152.4 90.2 123,1 222.2 182.1 473.8 2(X).l yy,4 131.6 s y i . i 426.8 3474.7 2 0 3 5
1991 128.3 129.0 n ? . y 90.4 126.0 233.y 182.6 552.9 203.4 103.H 122 5 fi79.7 503-3 53y7.9 231.0
1992 1 3 8 3 131.0 1 4 7 5 89.1 127.8 238,7 182.4 615.7 205.9 103.4 145.8 678-3 564.2 875(1.0 2 5 8 3
Source IM F/JFS various issues
Table AV.1-4
Bilateral Real Exchange Rates for Jordan's Main Trading Partners, 1970-1992 (JD per domestic currency)
U.S. UK, Japan Germany lu ly France Graeci Spain S, Arabia Kuwait Syria Iraq E*ypi Turkey India Romania
1V7U 0-4262 0.6884 0.1X114 0.1736 OlXXU 0.0863 0,0081 0.0043 0.0729 0.0935
1971 (M 569 0.7673 04X115 0.1946 0.(XXH U.0002 O.tKWl 0.0046 0.0789 0,(J97y
1972 11.4427 0 .6960 U.(K)15 11.1872 IUXX14 O.OKK3 O.tXIKO 0.0048 0.0765 1.4464 tl.0860 2.2158 0.8934 0.0089 (1,0010
iy 7 3 0  4614 0 .6119 0.1X115 n . i y w 0.1XXU o .o y i3 0.0081 11.1X135 0.0675 1-6186 0.0952 2.1897 0.8780 03X187 (1.0.111) 0.0377
1974 0.4463 0 .6120 0.0015 0.1998 0.0004 O.ltXX) OJJOBfi (1.1X147 0.0656 1.4698 0.0893 1.891(1 0.8050 0.1X192 0.0010 0,0305
1975 0.3954 0 5 5 1 0 04X113 0.1631 lUXXM o.o7y5 0,1X178 0.0041 0.0966 1.3197 0 .0813 1.7598 0.7358 0.0079 ().(KXW 0,0260
1976 0.3607 0,4727 04X112 0.1648 0.0003 0.067? 0.(X>66 0.(X135 0.1116 1-2775 0.0756 1.7415 (1.6956 (1.1X181 (UXXW lu x m
1977 0,3565 0 5 5 7 8 0.1X114 0.1693 (UXX13 0.0671 0.1K1M tl.(X132 01 1 1 6 1,2480 0.0734 1.6943 0.6773 (UXWfi 0.IXX17 0.0205
1978 0-3640 05771 (UXI15 0.1740 (MXX13 0.0696 (1.0065 (1.1X138 O.KI24 1.1281 0.0736 1.5629 (1.6865 0.(1127 UIKXIfi 0-02(1?
1979 0 .3913 0.6614 01XU2 0.1821 (UXXM 0.077? 0.1X173 0.IXM4 0.0971 1.1236 0.071X1 (1.5390 0.0205 0.1XXM O-Oiys
1980 (13935 0.7358 0.0(115 0.1575 1UXX13 11.0683 (1.1X181 0.1X139 (MW49 1.1371 0,0786 0.7884 ().03fiV (UXX15
1981 IU3y46 0.6498 0.1X114 11.14 86 IUXKI3 0.0604 0.1X184 O.IK137 0,(1934 1.1804 o.oy42 0  4794 0.0464 (UXX15
1982 0 3 8 3 6 05 9 5 2 (1.1X114 0.1488 01X130 0,0573 0.1X179 0.1X132 0.0y44 1.1756 0.1051 05271 0.0556 0.1XX15
1983 (1.3743 0 5 7 2 5 (11X114 0.1349 01XX13 0,0516 0.1X179 0.1X130 0.0951 1.1733 0.1099 0.6205 0,0677 (UXXU
WK4 03K 50 052(X> 0.0014 0.1289 0.1KX13 0.1)550 0.1X173 0.1X133 UJWK7 1,4376 0.1283 0.7327 0.0930 (WXXH
1VK5 0.3K42 0.6130 1UXM5 0.1508 0.1KX13 0.0649 0.1X153 (1.1X135 0.0837 13 104 0.1090 0.7420 0  1194 n m u
1986 0.3988 (15913 01X116 0,1720 0.1KXH 0.0710 0-1X160 I1.IKI3H 0.0728 1-2026 0.1408 0.8(131 0.1324 0.(XX)3
ly 8 7 o.4 iy y 0  6778 01X117 0.1K02 OiXXM 0.076? 0,1X164 0.0041 0.0627 1.1771 0.1813 0.7986 0.1558 0.(XX12
19KK 0.6627 1 0714 (11X127 0.2555 0-1X106 0.1109 0.1X194 0,1X164 0.0998 1.H560 0.1471 13(747 0361(1 tu x x n
iyH9 0.8593 1.2354 0 IXI31 11.3581 O.IXXW 0.1558 (1.0130 0,1X190 11.1306 2.5295 0.2169 1.6686 0.6727 11IXX15
19911 0.9585 15043 04X134 0.4220 (1(8110 0.1818 0,0154 (1.(1 IOC, 0,1359 2-3386 0.2696 U W 29 U.yK45 (l.(XXI5
1991 0.8K53 1-4558 O.OU3K OJMXW 0,(X111 O.IK55 0.0166 0.0111 0.1458 2.2644 0.3186 0.7952 1,1)994 (UVOfi
1W ? 0.KWK 1 1140 O.IK136 0.3954 (UXK)K 0.1655 0.0143 11.1X190 0.1379 2,4070 o j o i y 0.8464 1.6684 IUXX16
Sourc*  1M F /IF S  v a r io u s  tv.ui*s
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Table AV.1-5
Jordan's Direction of Trade, 1971-1990 (percentage of total)
1. Direction of Exports
1971 1975 1980 1985 1990 A verage A djusted  average
u s 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.10 0.18
UK 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.05 0.10
Japan 1.50 4.00 2.20 1,80 1.88 2.28 4.22
G erm any 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.06 0.10
Italy 0.00 2.60 1.20 1.10 0.61 1.10 2.04
France 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.70 0.86 0.51 0.95
Greece 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.08 0.15
Spain 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.03 0.06
S. Arabia 13.40 9.80 11.50 11.57 6.63 10.58 19.60
K uw ait 11.70 5.70 3.00 0.00 1.60 4.40 8.15
Syria 13.00 7.40 8.00 0.00 1.19 5.92 10.97
Iraq 6.50 4.60 16.50 21.60 16.83 13.21 24.47
Egypt 4.30 2.00 0.00 1.00 1.50 1.76 3.26
Turkey 1.50 6.00 3.20 1.20 2.16 2.81 5.21
India 8.40 3.40 4.70 14.50 18.33 9.87 18.28
R om ania 0.00 0.00 2.70 2.90 0.47 1.21 2.25
Total 53.97 100.00
2. Direction of Imports
1971 1975 1980 1985 1990 A verage A djusted  average
US 20.00 7.80 8.60 12.00 17.35 13.15 17.73
UK 9.30 9.30 7.80 5.90 5.19 7.50 10.11
Japan 5.00 7.30 7.20 6.30 3.15 5.79 7.81
G erm any 6.00 10.50 10.00 6.20 5.85 7.71 10.39
Italy 2.30 4.80 6.30 6.80 3.92 4.82 6.50
France 2.90 3.10 7.30 3.20 5,65 4.43 5.97
G reece 0.00 1,00 2.00 1.00 0.42 0.88 1.19
Spain 5.00 1.10 2.10 1.00 1.08 2.06 2.77
S. Arabia 5.80 9.80 17.10 15.10 4.62 10.48 14.13
K uw ait 11.70 5.70 3.00 0.00 1.54 4.39 5.92
Syria 2.90 2.70 1.60 1.00 0.69 1.78 2.40
Iraq 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.00 15.81 4.56 6.15
E gypt 5.00 2.70 1.00 1.00 1.12 2.16 2.92
Turkey 0.00 2.00 1.20 2.70 2.69 1.72 2.32
India 1.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.27 1.15 1.56
Rom ania 0.00 3.80 1.90 1.30 0.92 1.58 2.14
Total 74.18 100.00
3. Direction of Trade (Exports & Imports)
1971 1975 1980 1985 1990 A verage  A dju sted  average
US 17.40 6.45 6.94 9.31 13.51 10.72 15.95
UK 8.09 7.69 6.29 4.58 4.05 6.14 9.13
Japan 4.55 6.73 6.24 5.04 2.60 5.03 7.48
G erm any 5,22 8.69 8.07 4.81 4.56 6.27 9.32
Italy 2.00 4.42 5.32 5.37 3.09 4.04 6.01
France 2.52 2.56 5.89 2.62 4.46 3.61 5.37
Greece 0.00 0.83 1.61 0.78 0.36 0.72 1.06
Spain 4.35 0.91 1.69 0.78 0.85 1.72 2.55
S. Arabia 6.79 9.80 16.02 12.67 4.12 9.88 14.69
K uw ait 11.70 5.70 3.00 0.00 1,32 4.34 6.46
Syria 4.21 3.51 2.84 0.78 0.64 2.39 3.56
Iraq 0.84 0.79 3.18 7.20 13.65 5.13 7.63
Egypt 4.91 2.58 0.81 0.86 0.99 2.03 3.02
T urkey 0.19 2.69 1.59 2.19 2.27 1.79 2.66
India 2.40 1.41 1.71 1.96 2.49 2.00 2.97
R om ania 0.00 3.14 2.05 1.25 0.75 1.44 2.14
Total 67.25 100.00
Source: IMF, D irection  o f Trade 1972-77; 1978; & 1990.
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Table AV.1-6
Real E ffective Exchange Rate for Jordan, 1970-1992 (JD per $US)
Import
w eighted
REER Index 
1972=100
Trade
w eighted
REER Index 
1972=100
1970 29.93 79% 22.10 70%
1971 31.94 85% 23.49 74%
1972 37.71 100% 31.58 100%
1973 38.27 101% 32.30 102%
1974 36.82 98% 30.79 98%
1975 34.04 90% 27.99 89%
1976 32.31 86% 26.29 83%
1977 32.99 87% 26.87 85%
1978 32.54 86% 26.32 83%
1979 33.50 89% 27.16 86%
1980 34.92 93% 28.54 90%
1981 33,25 88% 26.93 85%
1982 32.66 87% 26.40 84%
1983 32.38 86% 26.18 83%
1984 34.13 91% 28.22 89%
1985 34.39 91% 28.31 90%
1986 34.14 91% 28.03 89%
1987 35.40 94% 29.24 93%
1988 53.72 142% 47.61 151%
1989 65.41 173% 59.63 189%
1990 68.92 183% 62.78 199%
1991 61.52 163% 55.99 177%
1992 64.76 172% 59.34 188%
Appreciation
1972-1978 13.71% 16.66%
1979-82 2.25% 2.39%
1983-88 -85.84% -105.00%
1989-92 -1.74% -0.94%
Source: calculated from Tables AV.1-1 to AV.1-5, see text for methodology.
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APPENDIX AVI.l 
Statistical Tables for Agriculture
Table AVI.1-1
Average area utilised (000 dunums)^ 
1973/74-1975/76 1980/81-1982/83
Change in 
dunum (000)
cropped areas
per cent
Field crops 2,531.30 1,633.47 -897.83 -35.47
Wheat 1,616.97 975.63 -641.33 -39.66
Barley 499.87 405.63 -94.23 -18.85
Lentils 230.13 83.90 -146.23 -63.54
Legumes 87.43 46.40 -41.03 -46.93
Others 96.90 121.90 25.00 25.80
Vegetables 352.40 493.50 141.10 40.04
Tomatoes 120.93 156.90 35.97 29.74
Others 231.47 336.60 105.13 45.42
Fruit trees 313.59 464.14 150.54 48.01
Olives 163.07 244.10 81.03 49.69
Grapes 86.50 141.67 55.17 63.78
Citrus 20.07 36.37 16.30 81.23
Others 43.96 42.00 -1.96 -4.45
Total 3,197.29 2,591.10 606.19 -18.96
Source: Calculated from World Bank (1990), Totoards mi 
1/1 dunum = 0.1 hectare
Agriculture Sector Strategy.
Table AV I.1-2
Per Capita Food C onsum ption (kg/annum ), 1973 & 1981
1973 1981 % change
Cereal 115.20 233.20 102.43
Wheat & Flour 72.60 128.20 76.58
Rice 9.6 15.9 65.63
Vegetables 82.0 83.9 2.32
Fruit & Citrus 81.5 71.5 -12.27
Meat 19.2 38.9 102.60
red 5.3 12.6 137.74
white 13.9 26.3 89.21
Milk & dairy products 46.3 58.6 26.57
Eggs (mn) 65.4 123.9 89.45
Sugar 11.6 38.8 234.48
Coffee, Tea & Cocoa 3.6 3.0 -16.67
Source: D ep a rtm en t o f S ta tistics, Statistical Yearbook, v a r io u s  issu es .
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Table AVI.1-3
Production and Imports of Agricultural Com m odities
average 1973-1981 (000 tons)____________________________
Consumption Production Imports Production/
consumption
Imports/
consumption
Cereal 384.1 121.0 326.1 31.50 84.90
Vegetables 114.5 251.8 49.9 219.91 43.58
Fruit & Citrus 145.3 124.1 113.6 85.41 78.18
Sugar 71.4 0.0 71.4 0.00 100.00
Meat 48.4 37.3 11.1 77.07 22.93
Fish 3.9 0.1 3.8 2.56 97.44
Milk &l Dairy Products 103.2 40.4 64.7 39.15 16.74
Nuts 5.7 2.4 3.4 42.11 59.65
Tea, Coffee & Cocoa 6.2 0.0 6.2 0.00 100.00
Source: Department of Statistics (1973; 1981), External Trade Statistics.
Table AVI.1-4
C om position of Agricultural Imports, 1973 & 1981
(000 000 JD)
1973
Value % total
1981
Value % total
Cereal 10.50 34.07 35.03 20.71
Wheat & Flour 7.00 22.71 23.43 13.85
Vegetables 2.50 8.11 7.01 4.14
Potatoes 0.84 2.73 3.48 2.06
Fruit & Citrus 3.30 10.71 9.11 5.38
Apples 1.41 4.57 3.50 2.07
Citrus 1.45 4.70 3.20 1.89
Sugar 1.80 5.84 21.40 12.65
Meat & Fish 0.80 2.60 18.39 10.87
Milk & Dairy Products 3.30 10.71 8.60 5.08
Tea, Coffee & Cocoa 2.52 8.18 7.08 4.18
Other 6.10 19.79 62.56 36.98
Total 30.82 100.00 169.18 100.00
Source: Ibid.
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Table AVI.1-5
C om position  o f Agricultural Exports, 1973 & 1981
(000 000 JD)_______________________________________________
Value
1973
% total
1981
Value % total
Cereal (Lentils) 0.48 10.43 0.66 1.94
Vegetables 2.42 52.61 19.50 57.20
Tomatoes 0.92 20.00 6.67 19.57
Eggplant 0.40 8.70 1.61 4.72
Onions 0.07 1.52 0.39 1.14
Fruit & Citrus 1.57 34.13 9.98 29.28
Citrus 1.41 30.65 8.74 25.64
Grapes 0.10 2.17 0.31 0.91
Milk &: Dairy Products 0.06 1.30 0.26 0.76
Eggs 0.00 0.00 1.62 4.75
Other 0.07 1.52 2.07 6.07
Total 4.60 100.00 34.09 100.00
Ratio to total exports 32.9% 22.5%
Ratio to GDP 2.4% 3.3%
Source: Ibid.
Table AVI.1-6
Agricultural Trade Balance, 1973 & 1981
(000 000 JD)____________________________
1973 1981
Cereal -10.02 -34.37
Lentils 0.48 0.66
Wheat -7.00 -23.43
Vegetables -0.08 12.49
Tomatoes 0.92 6.67
Potatoes -0.84 -3.48
Fruit & Citrus -1.73 0.87
Apples -1.41 -3.50
Citrus -0.04 5.54
Sugar -1.80 -21.40
Meat & Fish -0.80 -18.39
Milk & Dairy Products -3.24 -8.34
Tea, coffee & Cocoa -2.52 -7.08
Other -6.03 -60.49
Total -26.22 -154.07
Source: C a lcu la ted  from  T ables A V I.1-4 & A V I.1-5.
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APPENDIX AVI.2 
Jordan Valley River Project Investment (000 JD)
Invest­ Area
Year ments Project Project Project Project Project Served
(ha)
1962 850 EGMC1
1963 850 EGMC
1964 850 EGMC
1965 850 EGMC
1966 2,041 EGMC 8km ext Kafrein D^
1967 2,041 EGMC 8km ext Kafrein D
1968 2,041 EGMC 8km ext Kafrein D
1969 1,075 EGMC 8km ext 10,108
1970 10,108
1971 10,108
1972 2,314 KTD/ZTI3 10,108
1973 2,314 KTD/ZTI 10,108
1974 2,314 KTD/ZTI 10,108
1975 3,714 18km ext KTD/ZTI 10,108
1976 5,357 18km ext KTD/ZTI HsKafrein WZDEJI4 10,108
1977 5,357 18km ext KTD/ZTI HsKafrein WZDEJI 10,108
1978 11,025 18km ext KTD/ZTI HsKafrein WZDEJI W.ArabDam 14,060
1979 10,542 LTD/ZTI WZDEJI W.ArabDam 16,188
1980 5,667 W.ArabDam 16,188
1981 18,380
1982 18,380
1983 4,950 KingTalal(raising) W.Arablrrg 18,380
1984 7,300 KingTalal 14.5 km ext W.Arablrrg 18,380
1985 7,300 KingTalal 14.5 km ext W.Arablrrg 18,380
1986 7,300 KingTalal
14,5 km ext
W.Arablrrg 18,380
1988 3,250 14.5 km ext W.Arablrrg 23,891
Source: Tech International, 198?, AIII.2-1.778
•j
East Ghor Main Canal
9
Southeast Ghor Complex- Kafrein Dam and Hisban kafrein Irrigation. 
King Talal Dam and Zarqa Triangle Irrigation.
^Wadi Ziglab Dam and Wadi Jurum Irrigation.
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APPENDIX AVI.3 
Index of Profitability of Agricultural Production (Real Producers' Price)
This appendix documents the steps involved in constructing an index of 
profitability for agricultural production, or what is called in Dutch disease 
literature 'real producers' price'. Real producers' prices are obtained by deflating 
the wholesale price index (WPI) by a composite cost index for three groups of 
commodities: cereals, vegetables, and fruit. The new approach in constructing 
this index, which differentiates it from Dutch disease indexes, is that technical 
coefficients of production are taken into consideration, thus accommodating the 
effect of technological change in the estimate of profitability (via productivity 
growth).
The structure of the cost index is based on the following identity:
Q  „ — S  {  P i „ • fl-j „ J
That is total cost, C, for individual commodities, r, in the respective year, n, 
equals the sum of input prices, pif weighted by technical coefficients, a,.
(1) Cost structure for a representative farm in the Jordan Valley is 
available for 1975 from ECWA (1978) (Table AVI.3-1). For 1982, a similar table 
was constructed from data available from Zehlan (1985) and Burrel (1986) 
(Table AVI.3-2). The 1982 figures were deflated by FAO (Yearbook, various 
issues) indices of prices paid by farmers for the different inputs covering the 
period 1975-81 (Table AVI.3-3), thus establishing the cost structure for 1982 at 
constant 1975 prices (Table AVI.3-4).
(2) Cost shares of inputs were taken as the technical coefficient of 
production, ait considering 1975 as the base year (Tables AVI.3-4 & AVI.3-5). 
Interpolating between the two end years 1975 and 1982, technical coefficients 
for all years between 1975 and 1982 were obtained.
(3) Input prices, p{, are taken from FAO statistical series (Table AVI.3-6).
(4) From technical coefficients, ait and input prices, pu total costs, C, were 
obtained according to equation (1) above for single crops (Table AVI.3-7).
(5) Indexes for groups of commodities (cereals, vegetables, and fruit) 
were then constructed using crop shares in total cultivated area as weights 
(from World Bank, 1990, statistical appendix), the result is shown in Table 
AVI.3-8.
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(6) Wholesale price indexes (WPI) for the main commodity groups are 
available from the Central Bank of Jordan, 1989 (Table AVI.3-9).
(7) Real producers' prices are obtained by deflating WPI by the composite 
cost index for the respective commodity group (Table AVI.3-10).
T ab le  A V I.3-1
Per H ectare P rod uction  C osts for Irrigated Farm E nterprises in  the Jordan V a lle y , 1975
(at current prices)
Land Machinery Material Water Labour Total
W heat 35.00 4.30 6.50 27.30 25.60 98.70
M aize 40.00 6.60 3.20 35.50 57.00 142.30
Tomato 75.00 8.00 118.20 25.20 149.80 376.20
Potato 89.00 12.30 202.00 25.80 96.40 425.50
Eggplant 79.00 7.50 104.00 51.00 207.80 449.30
Cucumber 60.00 11.70 86.70 24.80 188.30 371.50
Citrus 100.00 9.50 157.70 59.20 185.90 512.30
Banana 100.00 9.50 289.70 111.30 324.80 835.30
Onion 71.00 7.60 163.70 25.00 17.00 284.30
Source: FAO/ECW A, 1987.
T ab le A V I.3-2
Per H ectare P rod uction  C osts for Irrigated Farm E nterprises in  th e Jordan V a lle y , 1982
(current prices)
Land Machinery Material Water Labour Total
Wheat 200.00 28.00 33.80 40.00 5.30 307.10
Tomato 350.00 25.00 1129.00 36.00 195.00 1,735.00
Potato 350.00 15.00 1,500.00 60.00 150.00 2,075.00
Eggplant 350.00 25.00 415.00 60.00 183.00 1,033.00
Cucumber 350.00 170.00 1,0204.0 20.00 1,808.00 1,2552.0
Citrus 250.00 10.00 660.00 60.00 80.00 1,060.00
Banana 250.00 10.00 1,000.00 111.30 160.00 1,531.30
Sources: Mitchel (1986), Table 4.1: 42 for wheat (land rent is assumed); Abu Howayej (1985): 95 for vegetables; Qasem 
(1986): 96-98, for fruit and vegetables.
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Table AVI.3-3
Per H ectare P rod uction  C osts for Irrigated E nterprises in  the Jordan V a lley , 1982
(at constant 1975 prices)_____________________________________________________
Land Machinery Material Water Labour Total
Wheat 101.33 10.29 22.38 40.00 1.77 175.78
Tomato 177.32 9.19 747.68 36.00 65.31 1035.50
Potato 177.32 5.51 993.38 60.00 50.23 1286.45
Eggplant 177.32 9.19 274.83 60.00 61.29 582.63
Cucumber 177.32 62.50 6757.62 20.00 605.50 7622.93
Citrus 126.66 3.68 437.09 60.00 26.79 654.21
Banana 126.66 3.68 662.25 111.30 53.58 957.47
Source: Table AV1.3-2 for current price values, deflated by FAO price series (Table AVI.3-6)
T ab le A V I.3-4
In p u t Shares in  P rod uction  C osts for Irrigated Farm E nterprises, 1975
( JD per hectare, at current prices)____________________________________________
Land Machinery Material Water Labour Total
Wheat 0.35 0.04 0.07 0.28 0.26 1.00
Tomato 0.20 0.02 0.31 0.07 0.40 1.00
Potato 0.21 0.03 0.47 0.06 0.23 1.00
Eggplant 0.18 0.02 0.23 0.11 0.46 1.00
Cucumber 0.16 0.03 0.23 0.07 0.51 1.00
Citrus 0.20 0.02 0.31 0.12 0.36 1.01
Banana 0.12 0.01 0.35 0.13 0.39 1.00
Source: Calculated from Table AVI.3-1.
T ab le A V I.3-5
In p u t Shares in  P roduction  C osts for Irrigated Farm E nterprises. 1982
(JD per hectare, at constant 1975 prices)
Land Machinery Material Water Labour Total
W heat 0.58 0.059 0.127 0.23 0.01 1.00
Tomato 0.17 0.009 0.722 0.03 0.06 1.00
Potato 0.14 0.004 0.772 0.05 0.04 1.00
Eggplant 0.30 0.016 0.472 0.10 0.11 1.00
Cucumber 0.02 0.008 0.886 0.00 0.08 1.00
Citrus 0.19 0.006 0.668 0.09 0.04 1.00
Banana 0.13 0.004 0.692 0.12 0.06 1.00
Source: Calculated from Table AVL3-3.
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Table AVI.3-6
Index of Prices Paid by Farmers (1975=100)
Land Machinery Fertilisers Seeds Pesticides Material W ages
1975 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1976 112 107 73 110 104 99 120
1977 125 112 59 111 80 90 144
1978 140 118 50 140 67 99 173
1979 157 120 74 128 88 104 207
1980 176 272 109 166 107 137 249
1981 197 272 116 186 116 151 299
Average 12.0% 24.2% 6.7% 11.7% 4.3% 7.8% 20.0%
Source: FAO Production Yearbook, various issues.
Notes: Wages are assumed to increase at 20% p.a. (based on El-Akel’s (1985) findings). Land is assumed to increase at 
12% p.a., slightly ahead of COL rate. Material index is a composite of 50% fertilisers, 25% pesticides, 25% seeds.
T ab le  A V I.3-7
C ost In d ex  for M ajor Crops G row n  in  the Jordan V a lle y  (1975=100)
Wheat Tomato Potato Eggplant Cucumber Citrus Banana
1975 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1976 82.34 102.81 100.50 99.71 104.62 97.91 95.40
1977 92.31 108.34 101.82 107.88 111.29 102.68 99.36
1978 78.11 76.51 112.56 121.35 123.72 112.40 110.52
1979 92.50 130.59 120.67 133.53 132.99 123.04 119.15
1980 140.40 157.39 148.39 158.66 161.06 147.57 143.40
1981 154.50 170.84 161.34 173.68 173.32 159.58 155.20
Source: Calculated from Tables AVI.3-1 to AVI.3-6.
T ab le A V I.3-8
C om p osite  C ost In dex  for G roups of A gricu ltural C om m od ities (1975=100)
Cereals Vegetables Fruit
1975 100.00 100% 100%
1976 82.34 102% 101%
1977 92.31 108% 107%
1978 78.11 92% 118%
1979 92.50 131% 128%
1980 140.40 158% 154%
1981 154.50 172% 166%
Source: Calculated from AVI.3-7, with weights given the different enterprises equivalent to their share in 
cultivated area (from World Bank, 1990, Annex)
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Table AVI.3-9
W holesale Price Index for Major Agricultural Com m odity Groups (1975=100)
Cereals Vegetables Fruit
1975 100% 100% 100%
1976 126% 178% 148%
1977 133% 196% 170%
1978 133% 207% 214%
1979 141% 243% 216%
1980 153% 300% 229%
1981 149% 267% 231%
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, 1989, Yearly Statistical Series 1964-88,
Table AVI.3-10
Index of Real Producers' Prices (1975=100)
Cereals Vegetables Fruit
1975 100% 100% 100%
1976 153% 174% 146%
1977 144% 181% 159%
1978 170% 226% 181%
1979 153% 185% 168%
1980 109% 189% 148%
1981 97% 156% 139%
Source: Calculated from Tables AVI.3-1 to AVI.3-9.
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APPENDIX AVII.l
Total Factor Productivity Calculations: Methodology
I use the method adopted by Krueger and Tuncer (1980) in their calculation of 
TFP growth for two-digit manufacturing industries in Turkey over the period 
1963-1976. My calculations are done at both the firm-level using my own 
industrial survey data collected as an integral part of this study, and two-digit 
manufacturing industries using officially published data from the Department 
of Statistics (DOS). The firm-level data include: nominal value of output, 
physical capital stock, number of workers, wage payments, purchased inputs 
disaggregated into domestically produced and imported inputs, unit value of 
imports for each imported material input, and occasionally unit output price. 
The two-digit manufacturing industries data include: value added, fixed capital 
stock, number of workers, and wages, all values are given in current prices. The 
following data series were constructed for deflation purposes using officially 
published data from DOS (External Trade Statistics, various issues) and Central 
Bank of Jordan (1989, Yearly Statistical Series, & 1992, Monthly Bulletin, Dec.); 
wholesale price indexes for output; unit value of imports for imported material 
and capital; and a capital stock deflator (using data for unit value of imports of 
machinery and equipment and wholesale prices for construction material; with 
75% and 25% weights respectively).
At the firm-level, I included raw materials in TFI, and output was gross 
of material; at two-digit manufacturing, however, I only included labour and 
capital, and output was therefore net of raw material - value added.
Competitive markets are assumed where factors are paid the value of 
their marginal products, the elasticity of output with respect to factor input is 
equal to the factor's share in the value of output. The methodology of measuring 
total factor productivity growth is that of growth accounting, where the growth 
rate of output less the weighted average rate of growth of identified inputs 
equals total factor productivity growth. For estimating the growth of output and 
inputs an exponential time trend was assumed and growth rates estimated 
accordingly. This method was thought appropriate because the growth in 
capital and labour was not smooth. Labour input was taken as the number of 
workers, rather than hours worked, because data on the latter were not given. 
(While interviewing industrialists it became clear that the total days worked per 
year did not change in most firms. However, changing the number of shifts per
271
day, which depends on demand and therefore produced output, would have 
changed total hours worked per year.)
No adjustment for the quality of inputs was attempted, due to 
unavailability of data with which to make such adjustments. Normally where 
shares of inputs in total output vary over time, a Divisia index for estimating 
aggregate inputs is ideal (as Tsao, 1982, has done for Singapore, and Ahluwalia, 
1992, for India). I did not follow this procedure because input shares were quite 
stable over the periods considered, and period averages were therefore used for 
weighting. For firms, the data on wage payments was used to estimate the share 
of labour; purchased inputs to estimate the share of material; and the return to 
capital was estimated as a residual. For two-digit manufacturing, the share of 
capital was the residual of value added over the wage share, after netting out 
depreciation.
TFP growth was calculated over three distinct periods: 1970-73, 1974- 
1982, and 1983-1992 which cover the pre-boom, boom, and post-boom periods 
respectively. The results are given in Tables VTI.4.2~1 and VII.4.2-2 in the text.
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APPENDIX AVII.2 
Correlation Among Manufacturing Industries
Here I present the results of a simple analysis of correlation among growth rates 
of output, labour, capital, etc. and absolute values of other variables, such as 
wage levels, relative prices, etc. Seventeen variables, listed in Table AVIL2-1, 
were used. The correlation is performed on 18 manufacturing industries (the 20 
discussed in chapter VII, with the exclusion of plastic products, for which the 
data are unsatisfactory, and a combination of non-electric and electric machinery 
into one set); and for three periods: pre-boom (1967-73), boom (1974-82), and 
post-boom (1983-91). The analysis is in two parts: (1) correlation coefficients 
between two different variables in the same period, and (2) correlation 
coefficient between the same variables in successive periods. In this appendix I 
will only present the results and draw attention to some of the more significant 
figures. Some of the correlation coefficients are quoted in chapter VII to support 
or refute particular hypotheses.
Table AVII.2-1
Variables Used in Correlation Analysis
Variable Abbreviation
Annual percentage growth rates of:
Output Aq
Labour ai
Capital Ak
TFI Af
TFP AP
Labour productivity Aq.xj
Capital per worker Ak-Al
Capital per unit output Ak-Aq
Exports Ax
Output per man (first year of period) q/1
Capital per worker (first year of period) k/1
Capital-output ratio (first year of period) k/q
Proportion of output exported (first year of period) x/o
Proportion of total cost spent on imported intermediate input m/c
Relative export to domestic wholesale price (last year as a percent of first year of period) r
Wage rate (first year of period) w
Wage rate (last year as percent of first year of period) (1+Aw )t
The within-period correlation coefficients are shown in Table AVII.2-2. The most 
salient features being:
(1) Output growth is strongly correlated with growth in labour 
productivity, capital productivity, and, therefore, TFP (Verdoorn's law).
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(2) There is no significant correlation between output growth and 
changes in relative prices; nor was output growth dependent on initial factor 
intensities, or their growth (Dutch disease model).
(3) TFI seems to have been influenced by growth in capital only, and not 
in labour; and, during the boom, it is positively correlated with absolute levels 
of wages. (The explanation for the positive correlation between TFI and wages is 
via capital input, which itself is positively correlated to wages: since TFI seems to 
be strongly correlated with capital input, the higher the wage level, the higher is 
capital input and, therefore, TFI.)
(4) The growth of TFP is positively and significantly correlated with 
growth in labour productivity; and negatively and significantly correlated with 
growth in the capital-labour ratio.
(5) The growth in capital-intensity (relative to labour) seems to have been 
correlated with labour productivity levels during the boom. However, increases 
in capital intensity do not seem to have influenced wages.
(6) There is no correlation between capital intensity and the proportion of 
output exported. Generally, the proportion exported and the growth in exports 
seem to have been autonomous, i.e. they do not seem to have been related to 
any of the variables considered here.
(7) In all three periods, industries with a high labour productivity level 
also had high wages.
(8) For the boom period, but not the other two periods, growth in capital 
input and TFI are positively correlated with high wages.
Between-period correlations are shown in Table AVII.1-3. There was a 
tendency for the same industries to have high capital per unit of output in all 
periods. In the pre-boom (1967-73) and the boom (1974-82) periods, but not in 
the post-boom period (1983-92), there was a tendency for the same industries to 
experience rapid growth in labour input, to have high wages, and to export a 
greater proportion of their output. The between-period correlations of growth in 
output, TFI, TFP, and labour and capital productivity are remarkably low, and 
even more remarkable is the preponderance of negative signs, which may 
indicate that the conditions leading to growth in those variables in one period 
were reversed in the following period. Those industries that experienced rapid 
growth during the boom had a slow rate of growth in the post-boom period.
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Table AVII.2-2
Within-Feriod Correlation Coefficient for Nineteen Manufacturing Industries in Jordan, 1967-73; 1974-82; & 1983-91,
Variable A1 
Aq -0.30 
0.08 
0.04
Ak
-0.29
0.05
0.04
Af
-0,33
0.05
0.13
A p
0.97
0.88
0.93
Aq-Al
0.99
0.94
0.96
A k .A j
-0,15
0.01
0.02
Ak-Aq
-0.94
-0.78
-0.86
q/1
-0.24
-0.36
-0.12
k/1
-0.09
0.28
0.25
k/q
-0.13
0.15
0.37
Ax
-0.30
0.12
-0.29
x/o
-0.33
0.24
0.26
m/c
-0.29
0,21
0.35
r
-0.06
0.05
0.16
w
-0.17
-0.19
0.36
(1+Aw)t
-0.41
0.45
-0.38
A1 -0.32
-0.30
0.32
0.05
-0.01
0.53
-0.31
0.01
-0.16
-0.43
-0.27
-0.23
0.14
-0.25
0.13
-0.58
-0.62
-0.19
-0.09
-0.17
-0.51
-0.24
0.39
0.15
0.24
-0.02
-0.05
-0.12
-0.35
-0.06
0.43
-0.19
-0.27
0.45
0.53
-0.05
0.19
0.58
-0.09
-0.11
-0.14
-0.10
0.57
-0.13
-0.17
Ak 0.99
0.93
0.92
-0.39
-0.37
-0,31
-0.23
0.15
-0.05
0.60
0.59
0.48
0.96
0.93
0.87
0.12
0.67
-0.47
-0.16
-0.20
0.07
-0.03
-0.19
-0.04
0.50
-0.18
0.14
-0.29
-0.09
-0.50
-0.34
-0.20
-0.28
-0.33
0.04
0,45
0.08
0.62
-0.28
-0.13
0.11
0.03
Af -0.53
-0.39
-0.26
-0.32
0.05
-0.03
0.57
0.55
0.36
0-88
0.77
0.69
0.23
0.64
-0.67
-0,03
-0.05
0.11
0.02
-0.20
-0.03
0.07
-0.24
0.10
-0.19
-0.13
-0.29
-0.18
0.01
-0.37
-0.46
0.21
0.30
0.16
0.58
-0.34
0 0 5
-0.02
-0.13
Ap 0,97
0.85
0.95
-0.95
-0,94
-0.98
-0,24
-0.31
-0.24
-0.28
-0.62
0.13
-0.09
0.31
0.21
-0.12
0.31
0.4
-0.23
0.24
-0.32
-0.26
0.28
0.36
-0.24
0.14
0.48
0.06
-0.06
0.05
-0.20
-0.42
0.48
-0.40
0.39
-0.32
A q _ A j -0.06
0.22
0,07
-0.06
0.22
0.07
-0.21
-0.29
0.04
-0.05
0.13
0.22
-0.15
0.15
-0.10
-0.26
0,23
-0.23
-0.37
0.30
0.30
-0.34
0.02
0.35
-0.08
-0.15
0.21
-0.15
-0.14
0.39
-0.47
0.48
-0.32
Ak-Al 0.47
0.58
0 4 3
0.14
0.62
-0.22
-0.11
-0.31
0.00
-0.10
-0.15
-0.01
0.45
-0.02
0.18
-0.31
-0.01
-0.38
-0.45
-0.37
-0.26
-0.23
-0.18
0.51
0.11
0.56
-0.24
-0.27
0.14
0.12
Ak-Aq 0.24
0.72
-0.13
0.02
-0.35
-0.19
0.09
-0.24
-0.35
0.43
-0.21
0.33
0.17
-0.25
-0.48
0.12
-0.30
-0.45
-0.07
-0.01
0.08
0.17
0.54
-0.46
0.30
-0.30
0.35
q/1 -0.13
-0.03
0.00
-0,09
0.00
-0.11
-0.06
-0.19
-0.29
-0.17
-0.32
-0.14
-0.25
-0.13
0.40
0.41
-0.11
-0.09
0.95
0.91
0.61
-0.21
-0.50
-0.03
k/1 -0.13
0.74
-0.17
-0.34
-0.24
0.16
-0.34
-0.24
0.16
0.07
0.16
0.32
-0,33
0.08
0.43
-0.19
0.16
0.45
-0.11
-0.37
0.06
k/q 0.40
-0.19
-0.20
0.40
-0.19
-0.20
-0.04
-0.04
-0.05
-0.02
-0.11
-0.23
0.15
0.27
-0.14
-0.34
-0.56
-0.16
Ax -0.14
-0.17
-0.09
0.10
-0.15
0.15
0.07
-0.48
0.02
0.02
-0.33
-0.04
-0.24
0.13
0.56
x/o 0.19
0.21
-0.09
0.03
-0.14
-0.01
-0.21
-0.25
-0.14
0.57
0.11
-0.29
m/c -0.23
0.20
0.27
-0.34
-0.24
0.58
0.15
0.01
0.29
r 0.37
-0.06
-0.11
0.22
0.19
0.22
w -0.34 
-0.56 
-0 16
Source, D epartm ent of Statistics* 'Industrial Survey'; In d u s tria l C ensus1; & 'External T rade Statistics', various issues. C entral Bank of Jordan , 'M onthly Bulletin' v arious  issues. 
Mote: T he first figure in each cell refers to  1967-1973, the second to 1974-82, and  the th ird  to  1983-91.
A n asterisk  refers to  a correlation coefficient significantly different from  zero  a t the 5% level ( the critical value is + .576)
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Table AVII.2-3
Between-Period Correlation Coefficient for Nineteen Manufacturing 
Industries in Jordan: 1967-73,1974-82, and 1983-91
Variable
Between
1967-73
and
1974-S2
Between
1974-82
and
1983-91 Variable
Between
1967-73
and
1974-82
Between
1974-82
and
1983-91
Aq -0.09 -0.14 q A -0.05 -0.22
A] 0.70 0.29 k/1 0.41 0.45
Ak 0.05 -0.38 k/q 0.99* 1.00*
Af -0.11 -0.14 x/o 0.81 0.06
Ap -0.04 -0.34 m/c 0.37 0.21
Aq-aj -0.05 -0.22 r -0.19 -0.15
Ak-Al 0.30 -0.22 w 0.97* -0.00
Ak-Aq -0.01 -0.39 (1+Aw)t -0.38 -0.29
Ax -0.02 -0.17
Source: Department of Statistics, Industrial Survey, Industrial Census, External Trade Statistics, various 
issues; Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Bulletin, various issues.
Note: An asterisk refers to a correlation coefficient significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
(the critical value is ± 0.576)
Similarly, those industries where the stock of capital grew relatively rapidly 
during the boom had relatively slow growth in capital stock in the post-boom 
period; and since TFI is strongly correlated with capital growth, a negative - 
albeit insignificant - correlation exists for TFI between periods. Most surprising, 
perhaps, is the fact that industries experiencing high labour and capital 
productivity growth in one period experienced a slower growth in those 
productivities in the following period. These tendencies in partial factor 
productivities are responsible for negative between-periods TFP growth.
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APPENDIX AVII.3 
E stim ation o f C apacity U tiliza tion  in  M anufacturing Industries  
in  Jordan, 1967-93
Assume that the relation between capacity utilization 
and unemployment is linear as follows:
Table AVII.3-1
Relation Between Capacity Utilization and CU=a + b/IJE (1)
U nem ploym ent (%)_______________________
Capacity
____________U nem ploym ent Utilization
1967 9.9 57.1
1968 9.9 57.1
1969 11.8 55.9
1970 13.7 55.0
1971 13.8 55.0
1972 14.0 54.9
1973 11.1 56.3
1974 8.0 58.8
1975 4.9 64.6
1976 1.6 94.8
1977 2.2 82,1
1978 2.9 74.9
1979 3.5 70.4
1980 3,5 70.4
1981 3.9 68.3
1982 4.3 66.6
1983 4.8 64.9
1984 5.4 63.1
1985 6.0 61.8
1986 8.0 58.8
1987 8.3 58.4
1988 10.1 56.9
1989 11.8 55.9
1990 13.5 55.1
1991 15.3 54.5
1992 17.0 54.0
1993 14.0______________ 54.9
Source: Calculated from  Royal Scientific Society, 1989, 'The Data Base for the Jordanian Labour M arket', for em ploym ent; D epartm ent of Statistics, 
1971, Industria l Census', for capacity utilisation.
The Relation Between U nem ploym ent and  Capacity U tilization
18.0 100.0
90.016.0
80.014.0
70.012.0
60.0
10.0cIb
I5
■ -«
50.0
40.0
6.0 30.0
4.0 20.0
2.0 10.0
0.0 0.0
«-< cn m ts. o \ i-i
OO OO 0 0  CO 0 0  0 \
n  r t  in  N  tN K K
□  UnemptaYmsnt ® Capacity
where CU is capacity utilization, and UE is percentage of overall 
unemployment, a and b are constants.
- For 1970 CU is given from 'Industrial Survey' (Department of Statistics 
1971) at 55% (unweighted average for 32 industrial groups).
- For 1976 it is assumed to be maximum at 95%. Therefore, 
for 1970 formula (1) becomes 55 = a + b /13.8
& for 1976 formula (1) becomes 95 = a + b /  1.6 
Solving simultaneously gives: 
a = 49.8 
b = 72.4
From which CU is found for all other years, as shown in table and graph
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